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This thesis explores how policy evolves in weak commodity dependent African states, 
in a context of increasing organisational diversity due to fast-growing foreign 
investment from emerging markets. Through a case study of the Zambian mining 
sector, where state-firm relations have been highly contentious following privatisation 
in the late 1990s, I develop an interdisciplinary and empirically grounded account of 
how policy evolves. My findings are based on over 100 interviews conducted with 
employees of Chinese, Indian and ‘western’ case-study firms, as well as government 
officials, NGOs and other stakeholders. 
My aim is to give adequate attention to both state and firm perspectives on regulatory 
policy making. To this end, the thesis first reviews the literature on policy making in 
the African state as well as theories of institutional change. It then draws on 
evolutionary economics and organisational theory, to develop a framework for 
understanding firm behaviour that emphasises the role of organisational routines and 
objectives. I develop and define the concept of organisational learning as the process 
through which organisational routines and objectives change over time. 
I find that policy development in Zambia, in its formal expression, appears framed 
around a ‘partnership approach’ to regulation. This approach is based on a view of 
government as enabler of private investment, emphasising state-firm consultations 
and consensus in policy development. This approach contrasts but co-exists with an 
alternative expression of state power through the Presidency, which maintains strong 
informal links with the foreign mining companies. 
I find significant yet nuanced variation in organisational routines and aims across the 
companies under study. This includes the tendency among western companies to seek 
operational stability by engaging with local stakeholders directly, whilst Chinese 
investors prefer to operate through close relationships with the Presidency, relying on 
the Zambian state to ‘broker’ its wider social relations. 
Over time there is some evidence of organisational learning taking place among the 
mining companies, including through convergence in regulatory standards and 
practices. Yet differences persist because routines and aims – conditioned by a firm’s 
institutional background – change slowly over time, even in the presence of 
inefficiencies. 
Zambia’s mining sector was during the period under study subject to various 
pressures for policy reform, stemming from discontent with limited tax contributions 
and pervasive negative environmental and safety impacts. These reform proposals, 
however, failed to move ahead despite support from some of the mining companies. I 
show how Zambia’s accommodating and pro-investor regulatory framework sits 
uneasily with an interventionist political culture and a diverse mining sector. The 
consensus among the regulated companies – on which effective partnership regulation 
relies – proves elusive in a ‘presidential’ state that readily accommodates different 
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“Development is no longer seen primarily as a process of capital accumulation but 
rather as a process of organisational change” (Hoff & Stiglitz 2001) 
1 Situating the study 
1.1 Introduction 
The overarching objective of this thesis is to explore how regulatory policy evolves in 
a context of weak state capacity, high organisational diversity and the political 
ramifications of the commodities cycle. I pursue this objective through a study of the 
Zambian mining sector, chosen as location for this study partly due to the significant 
(and growing) presence of Chinese and Indian investors following privatisation of the 
country’s copper mines in the late 1990s. It focuses on four case study companies: a 
Chinese firm, an Indian firm, as well as two ‘western’ multinationals. 
To understand the evolution of policy I examine processes of organisational 
change as well as changes to government’s regulatory institutions.1 My aim is to 
understand how state-firm relations are articulated, in a way that is theoretically 
informed and empirically grounded. I analyse regulatory policy making through a 
framework that sees changes within organisations as well as between organisations 
and external actors, as simultaneously determined and mutually dependent.2 In this 
framework neither policy nor firm behaviour is completely endogenous to the local 
context: government policies are heavily influenced by donors, whilst company 
behaviour tends to reflect international capital markets, home country institutions, and 
managers’ prior experiences. 
This chapter begins by situating the study with reference to two global trends 
that were evident during the commodity price boom that lasted roughly from 2004 to 
2008. First, it discusses the growth of foreign direct investment (FDI), including its 
development promises as well as potential pitfalls. In doing so it highlights the need 
for effective business regulation. Such regulation is a necessary (but not sufficient) 
condition for government to be able to demonstrate local benefits (of national 
resource extraction), the absence of which can easily translate into political pressures 
in the form of resource nationalism. This section notes how such pressures, including 
the re-assertion of states versus foreign capital, was on the rise during the short but 
unprecedented commodities boom of 2004-2008. 
The chapter then examines the growing trend of multinational investors from 
developing and emerging economies investing in other developing countries, or 
‘south-south’ FDI. Greater investment by Chinese and other emerging-market firms 
was a prominent feature of the international expansion of mining investment during 
the period under study. I argue that influence arising from home-country standards, 
international capital markets, inter-state relations and commodity prices are all 
significant in shaping the behaviour of multinationals, but vary between ‘western’ and 
emerging market investors. 
1 The approach follows North’s conceptual distinction between institutions and organisations: 
institutions as the rules of the game whereas the organisations are the players of the game (North 
1990). The separation of rules and organisations can be traced back to the ‘old institutionalist’ 
economist John Commons who favoured a separation between the “mechanisms and rules of conduct” 
(Scott 1995). 
2 Organisations are seen as groups of individuals bound by a common purpose to achieve objectives, 
including political (political parties, regulatory agencies), economic (businesses, trade unions) and 
social (churches, clubs) bodies. 
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Having situated the study in this way, the chapter then presents the research 
questions and a note on how I conceptualise this study. Finally it elaborates on my 
choice of Zambia as a case study and specifies the ways in which my study 
contributes to the literature. 
1.2 Foreign direct investment and development 
This thesis is concerned with the role of foreign direct investment (FDI) in national 
development. 3 UNCTAD defines FDI as “investment involving a long-term 
relationship and reflecting a lasting interest and control by a resident entity in one 
economy (the ‘home country’) in an enterprise resident in an economy (the ‘host 
country’) other than that of the foreign director investor” (UNCTAD 2006: 1). 
Dunning (2001) defines FDI as investment made outside the home country of the 
investing company, but within the organisational structure of the investing company, 
where the investor retains control over any resources transferred. Both definitions 
emphasise the control by an external entity over productive activities in the host 
country. 
1.2.1 Development promises and potential 
Within the context of rapidly globalising markets, observers have emphasised the role 
of FDI as a potentially significant contribution to economic growth and development.4 
The contribution FDI could make to local development was emphasised at the United 
Nations (UN) Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey, Mexico in 
2002, which highlighted the ability of FDI to “transfer knowledge and technology, 
create jobs, boost overall productivity, enhance competitiveness and entrepreneurship, 
and ultimately eradicate poverty through economic growth and development” (UN 
2002:5). More directly, host governments could capture tax revenue from foreign 
investment into productive assets, and demand generated through forward and 
backward economic linkages can generate jobs and catalyse the local manufacturing 
sector. 
In theory the positive mechanisms by which FDI can contribute to 
development centre on taxation, local economic linkages, externalities (or 
‘spillovers’) and employment. First, host states that are able to effectively tax foreign 
mining companies may significantly increase the contribution of FDI to government 
resources (see Otto 2000 for a review of mining sector taxation frameworks). Second, 
forward and backward linkages to the local economy, via intermediate products, can 
be a key driver of local economic development (Hirschman 1958, 1971). The 
relevance of such linkages to local development may be significant in a context of 
large-scale investment into sectors that generate sufficient demand to push 
manufacturers of intermediate inputs to reach an efficient scale (Krugman 1994). 
Third, positive externalities may occur through the transfer of technological and 
human (management) knowledge, spread without a property-rights-allocating 
(contractual) relationship (Meyer 2004: 260). This view reflects the idea of FDI may 
3 Although the literature distinguishes between foreign portfolio investment (non-controlling minority 
stakes in overseas assets) and foreign direct investment (as defined above), for the remainder of this 
thesis I use the terms foreign direct investment and foreign investment interchangeably. 
4 The term ‘development’ is broad and unless otherwise noted I use it to refer to improvements in 
human well-being that involves increased economic opportunity; is socially inclusive and equitable; 
and that is environmentally sustainable. 
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be seen as a ‘package’ of assets and intermediate products, such as capital, 
technology, management skills, distribution channels to access markets and 
entrepreneurship (UNCTAD 2006: 155-157). Finally, in environments of widespread 
unemployment the contribution of FDI to raise incomes may be significant, but 
depends crucially on the level of technology-intensity of the sectors targeted by 
foreign investors. Yet despite these theoretical arguments, development benefits of 
FDI remain uncertain, as discussed below. 
1.2.2 Development problems and pitfalls 
Growing liberalisation of markets and capital flows in the 1980s illustrated the 
perverse effects of transnational corporations (TNCs), when corporate scandals – 
often ‘outed’ by civil society – demonstrated companies’ faltering accountability to 
their impacts (Utting 2005).5 More recently some academics have criticised the causal 
links between FDI and development as lacking empirical support. Promised 
employment generation and technology spillovers have often failed to materialise 
(Nunnenkamp 2004: 657) and appear to vary across sectors and to depend on 
institutional conditions of the host country (Görg & Greenaway 2004; Meyer 2004; 
see also UNCTAD 1999: chpt 11). 
Explanations for the failure of FDI to promote economic growth and 
development are based on the empirical phenomenon that resource abundance is often 
associated with lower and even negative economic growth, often referred to as the 
resource curse (Auty 1993, 2001; Sachs & Warner 1995). Some explanations 
emphasise economic mechanisms, such as the empirical observation of real exchange 
rate appreciation in response to commodity booms, the so-called Dutch disease 
(UNCTAD 2007: 35; Weeks 2008). Economic effects also include ‘crowding out’, 
where capital and skills are transferred from non-tradable sectors of the economy (in 
particular nascent manufacturing) to resource-sectors with fewer linkages to the local 
economy. 
Institutional explanations for the resource curse focus on the centralisation of 
political and institutional mechanisms to capture resource rents and the characteristics 
of the state bureaucracy (e.g. limited transparency, high corruption); and the risk of 
militarisation of the state in attempting to limit wider access to resource rents. This 
literature conceptualises the state as an actor that is largely independent of the 
resource sector itself, paying scant attention to how diversity of business interests and 
claims shape government policy formulation and implementation.6 
FDI also risks undermining development where negative external costs (be 
they environmental, social, or economic) are generated but not captured by the 
investor, such as pollution, migration and infrastructure dilapidation. These issues are 
of particular concern in the extractive industries and infrastructure sectors (World 
Bank 2003). Here, unchecked investment into pollution-intensive industries may lead 
to long-term damage to people’s health and livelihoods. Civil society organisations 
have also criticised TNCs for exploiting local workers by taking advantage of weak 
regulations in developing countries. 
5 These include the 1984 Union Carbide gas leak in Bhopal, India, the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989 
and the uncovering of sweatshop conditions within the supply chains of Nike (see Utting 2005: 14). 
BP’s 2010 Gulf of Mexico quagmire starkly illustrates the dangers of inadequate regulation, even 
among supposedly highly developed regulatory frameworks. 
6 Independent, that is, over and beyond transfer of financial resources through formal (taxation 
payments) as well as informal (corruption, kick-backs) means. 
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Lastly, where local regulatory oversight is limited, companies can often reduce 
their tax bill through various grey-area accounting provisions, including transfer 
pricing (Christensen & Murphy 2004).7 This leads to misappropriation of resource 
rents and limits the state’s ability to provide public services and fund regulatory 
agencies. 
The above discussion cautions against simplistic arguments that FDI is good 
for economic and social development. Widespread negative development impacts 
arising from mining sector activity led the World Bank to launch an Extractive 
Industries Review (EIR) in 2000, resulting in an independent report and subsequent 
World Bank Board-level response in August 2004.8 The lack of effective regulation 
has also been observed by leading firms in the mining industry itself, resulting in the 
two-year multi-stakeholder consultative process Minerals and Mining for Sustainable 
Development (MMSD) Project.9 
1.2.3 The importance of business regulation 
Effective business regulation is needed wherever external costs arising from the 
firm’s production function are not borne by the firm in question, and where 
governments fail to capture resource rents. Chang (2003: 157) defines regulation as 
the government directly prescribing or proscribing what the private sector can and 
cannot do, through the provision of incentives and disincentives, to prevent the private 
sector from contradicting or undermining the ‘public interest’. I similarly define 
regulation broadly, conceptualising it as the institutions and relationships that allocate 
costs and benefits of FDI. Business regulation includes formal as well as informal 
state-firm contracts, and covers both top-down (state-led) regulation as well as multi-
stakeholder initiatives that may be more or less driven by firms themselves. 
Yet the responsible of regulation rests in large part on governments. Effective 
regulatory oversight requires the development of costly regulatory frameworks that 
place demands on the organisational capacity, financial resources and the political 
legitimacy of the state. As international investment continues to increase, many 
developing countries have been unable to provide corresponding ramp-ups in 
domestic regulatory capacity, resulting in a ‘governance deficit’ (Newell 2001: 908). 
In response, the World Bank and other donors have promoted greater self-reporting 
and market-based incentives, rather than direct command-and-control regulation 
(World Bank 2000; Graham & Woods 2006).10 Companies have also adopted a range 
of voluntary standards on environmental management and health and safety (e.g. ISO 
14001 and OHSAS 8000). 11 Some of these emanate from international capital 
markets, for instance the Equator Principles. Banks who sign up to this voluntary set 
of standards require borrowing firms to have a stringent environmental impact 
assessment in place, against which borrowers must submit quarterly progress reports. 
7 Transfer pricing is understood as the practice whereby companies reduce taxes payable to host 
governments by engaging in intra-company sales and purchases at non-arms-length basis. 
8 Please see www.ifc.org/eir. 
9 The project was co-managed by UK-based International Institute for Environment and Development 
(IIED) and the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD). 
10 Kaplow & Shavell (1994) argue that self-reporting has benefits (compared to purely inspection-
driven regulations) for regulators because resources needed to identify non-compliant self-reporters are 
saved. 
11 Newell (2001: 910-912) provides some examples of how codes and standards, even when 
compliance is not required under the law, may contribute towards holding TNCs accountable. 
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The sharp rise in civil society and wider stakeholder engagement, ranging 
from partnerships to naming-and-shaming campaigns, have played some role in 
promoting accountability among foreign investors. 12 Civil society representing 
various groups with a ‘stake’ in corporate activity played a big role in uncovering 
large-scale corporate misconduct in the 1980s. This drove the corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) agenda, variously referring to CSR as discourse, policy, specific 
initiatives, tools and as institutions (Utting 2005). 13 The social or community 
investment advocated by this agenda can serve to mitigate risk, but also functions as 
an input into a policy process with aim of securing the political outcome of preventing 
future ‘hard’ regulation (Utting 2005a). I discuss the theoretical and practical 
implications of recent shifts in regulatory ‘ideology’ in more detail in chapter two. 
Box 1: Evolution of the Corporate Social Responsibility agenda 
Over time, conceptions of CSR have changed from largely voluntary activities of companies 
(community-development) to include initiatives and policies that are partly voluntary yet 
underpinned by formal law, and where government-sponsored agencies play key roles. Such 
so-called “articulated regulation” (Utting 2005b: 15) may include partnerships between state 
and business actors (e.g. the UN Global Compact), as well as initiatives like Ghana’s 
legislation that requires logging companies to enter into Social Responsibility Agreements 
with customary landowners (Blowfield & Frynas 2005: 203). 
However, there are also some problems with these novel forms of regulation. First, 
although large companies that are wary of protecting their reputations may be inclined to 
voluntarily improve their operating standards, many smaller companies fall ‘below the radar’. 
For instance, sector-based assurance schemes (including third-party audits) are gaining 
ground, but usually limited to the largest companies. 
Second, the CSR agenda is rooted in management literature on large, northern, and 
stock market-listed companies (Fox 2004) and arguments of how CSR is good for business 
may not be valid in developing-country contexts. The risk of being held to account by local 
stakeholders is likely to be limited in developing-country contexts with pervasive information 
asymmetries, a weak press and NGOs that are highly capacity-constrained. Moreover, to be 
successful such projects require follow-ups and long-term support from business as well as 
the support of government (Ite 2005; Frynas 2005). 
1.2.4 Externally imposed constraints on regulatory policy 
Developing countries are increasingly reliant on private capital in seeking national 
development: a function of dwindling oversees development aid, economic 
liberalisation 14 and neo-liberal ideas of markets at the centre of economic 
development. 
States may attract investment by providing a ‘business friendly’ investment 
climate, for instance by offering financial and other incentives. Many state-firm 
12 The term stakeholders will be used, in the following, to denote all those actors that have a stake in 
the firm’s behaviour, whose own success or failure in achieving their objectives hinges, in part, on 
what they firm does. Note however that the term stakeholders say nothing about the direction of 
influence. For example, it includes regulators (who are mainly seeking to influence the conduct of a 
firm) as well as local communities (who are mainly influenced by e.g. the firm’s environmental 
standards). 
13 Related concepts include corporate accountability, corporate social performance and corporate 
citizenship (see Garriga & Melé 2004 for a review of definitional constructs). 
14 The need to attract investment arising from the sudden removal of trade/investment barriers which 
almost overnight exposed weak local industries to cut-throat international competition. 
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contracts given to incoming investors also include clauses that ‘stabilise’ fiscal as well 
as other regulations (Otto 1998), committing the host government to not change 
environmental, fiscal and other regulatory parameters (Nayyar 2006, UNCTAD 
2003). 
Investment incentives may be negotiated at local or the international level 
(through bilateral or multilateral investment treaties; see Chowla 2005).15 They are 
particularly prominent when seeking to attract FDI into sectors where longer-term 
(and therefore, from the perspective of business, higher-risk) investments are required 
(IIED 2005). 
However, investor incentives can easily distort the economy. Blomstrom & 
Kokko (2003) find that spillovers (skills and technology) only occur where local firms 
have the capacity and motivation to absorb these skills and technology (see also 
Kosack & Tobin 2006: 212).16 These constraints on a host-country’s ‘policy space’ 
are thus partly self-imposed but also shaped by international investors’ bargaining 
with the state (Feeney 2002). 
The earlier concern that countries would out-compete each other in reducing 
the ‘costliness’ of business regulations, in a ‘race-to-the-bottom’, appears to have 
been overblown (Mani &Wheeler 1998; see Gray 2002 for a review). Rather evidence 
exists to support competing claims that FDI improves as well as undermines local 
regulatory standards (Newell 2001: 908). One reason may be the fact that firms 
actually prefer a stable and transparent environment, and would value this against any 
one-off fiscal incentives. However providing an investment environment with clear 
‘rules of the game’, with enforceable property rights and that allows businesses to 
plan their investments, is a non-trivial task for most governments of developing 
countries. Reforms to enhance the ease of doing business are notoriously difficult 
(discussed with reference to the case of Zambia in chapter four). 
The evolution of policy in weak commodity-dependent states will be 
particularly influenced by external influences. Countries that are institutionally weak, 
in the sense of having existing deficiencies in regulatory and bureaucratic institutions, 
are more likely to incentivise and accommodate foreign investors. 
1.2.5 Growing resource nationalism 
The ability of government to ensure capture benefits and minimise costs of FDI can 
determine its political popularity. Thus, the commodities boom that ended in 2008 
with the financial crisis coincided with a sharp rise in resource nationalism in many 
countries. Booming commodity markets and windfall profits of foreign companies led 
to calls for greater citizen participation in the economy. In response, many states tried 
to re-assert their control over economic activity within their borders (see box below). 
In Zambia there were, at the height of the boom in 2007, strong political pressures on 
the Zambian state to become more assertive with investors. 
During the recent boom, the world also witnessed an unprecedented rise of 
powerful multinational firms from developing countries, including China and India. A 
wider choice of development partners emboldened African governments, as did the 
15 Because I did not find international or bilateral investment treaties to be of relevance in the case of 
copper mining in Zambia, I chose to not pursue this topic further. 
16 They argue that FDI incentives are generally not an efficient way of raising national welfare and that 
“good governance in the area of FDI policy is to consider the investment incentive packages as part of 
the country’s overall industrial policy, and make any incentives available on equal terms to all 
investors, foreign as well as local” (2003: 21). 
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high demand for Africa’s resources. As the World Bank noted, “[t]he current boom in 
commodity prices presents a unique opportunity for governments across Sub-Saharan 
Africa to mobilise home-generated wealth from natural resources for sustainable 
development” (World Bank 2008b). 
Governments across the world thus moved to secure a greater share of 
resource rents. This is reflected in the noticeable (albeit conservative) trend towards 
placing increasing constraints on international capital since 2000 (see figure 1), 
indicating a growing assertiveness of countries in seeking to capture benefits from 
FDI. 
Figure 1. Global investment policy changes 




Box 2: Selected examples of renegotiations of state-firm contracts 
In Chile, the world’s largest producer of copper, the fiscal framework for mining and its zero-
royalty legislation came onto the public agenda in 2002 when ExxonMobil sold off a copper 
mine to AngloAmerican for $1.3bn, despite the mine having reported net losses (and paid no 
taxes) for 25 years (The Age 15.6.2005). In 2004 the Chilean government submitted a bill to 
increase royalties on base metals to 3% via repeal of the zero-royalty law, enacted during 
military rule in the 1970s. Another Bill was introduced and enacted in 2005, with a 5% 
royalty imposed from 1 January 2006, expected to lead to an additional $200m in tax revenue 
(Ibid.). 
In Ecuador the government announced in April 2008 it would revoke 80% of mining 
concessions, mainly exploration activity or inactive licenses, and impose a 180-day ban on 
mining activity whilst reviewing the mining laws. The government later stated that it would 
not force investors to form joint ventures with local companies, contrary to the fear of some 
foreign mining companies. In July 2008 Ecuador was exploring bilateral cooperation with 
India to develop the country’s mining sector, with Indian Minister of State for Mines quoted 
as saying “it is just the beginning … we are looking forward to opportunities for bilateral 
cooperation with Ecuador in the mining sector” (Economic Times 17.7.2008). 
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) launched a review process of 61 mining 
concessions granted during the DRC’s 1997-2003 civil war and its aftermath. The DRC 
government called for companies to make proposals for new terms to contracts, including the 
proportion of equity participation held by government (MiningReview.com 20.4.2009). 
Counter to initial anticipation that the review would not impact the larger and generally more 
transparent investors, the government prosecutor ordered the immediate closure of the 
Kolwezi project operated by First Quantum Minerals Ltd (whose operations in Zambia 
constitute one of the case studies in this thesis). The company’s legal advice was that this 
order was illegal, and First Quantum announced it was preparing for international arbitration 
whilst pursuing alternative solutions (MarketWatch 16.9.2009). 
Peru – the world’s third largest copper producer and sixth largest gold producer – 
implemented mining legislative reforms in December 2005. The new fiscal regime was to be 
applied from 2007 onwards for many companies. Only by 2018 – upon expiry of stability 
clauses – would all mining companies pay royalties. A bill to impose a variable, or sliding 
scales, royalty had been passed in early June 2004 with a 3% royalty for large-scale mines 
(Engineering and Mining Journal 2004).17 
In Mongolia, where copper and gold together contribute 56% of export earnings, 
respectively, the government increased royalties in 2006, from 2.5% to 5%, and introduced a 
windfall tax on the copper and gold sectors. The receipts of this windfall tax will go into a 
development fund, two-thirds of which is earmarked for “social programmes and capital 
spending” (World Bank 2006), and the remainder is to be saved for future uses. The 
government also introduced a mixture of tax reforms, some of which lower the tax burden for 
firms (introduction of loss carry-forwards, reduction in corporate income tax) and some which 
increase the tax burden (e.g. the abolition of tax holidays) (Ibid.). 
1.2.6 Section conclusion 
In theory there are various positive development impacts of FDI, including taxation, 
local economic linkages, externalities, and employment generation. However, as 
argued in this section, these benefits are not a foregone conclusion but depend on 
host-country capacity to regulate effectively and fairly. Positive impacts of FDI will 
17 However, after President Garcia came to power again in 2006, he claimed imposing royalty charges 
on holders of stability agreements would cause legal problems for Peru, and negotiated for companies 
to pay a ‘voluntary payment’ (amounting to $172.4m per annum) towards fighting poverty. Thus, 25 
large mining companies pay no royalties. 
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be more elusive when the state lacks capacity to formulate and enforce necessary 
regulation, both to capture economic rents from foreign investment activities but also 
to ensure negative externalities are kept under control. 
Failures to develop and enforce regulatory policy may be due to lack of 
resources in government agencies, and other capacity constraints. To mitigate some of 
the resource deficits at local government agencies, novel approaches to regulation 
have emerged based around voluntary standards and partnerships with civil society. 
Yet the state remains crucial in upholding property rights and as political 
representative of local communities. I define a ‘weak state’ as one that lacks the 
ability to effectively formulate and enforce a regulatory framework. The inability of 
the state to align the state-firm bargains with local political demands (for 
redistribution, economic opportunity, environmental stewardship) renders it subject to 
resource nationalism. 
I define a ‘resource dependent state’ as one where the state relies on one or 
more key commodities for the majority of its foreign exchange earnings.18 In such 
countries, the state relies on private capital to bring into the country the highly capital 
intensive and sophisticated equipment needed to develop the sector. These countries 
are therefore more likely to offer investment incentives and stability periods to 
investors. In doing so, however, they are also constraining their future scope for 
changing the rules of the regulatory game, regardless of changing circumstances. This 
suggests that the ability of host country governments to provide effective oversight is 
inversely related to the degree to which the country depends on this economic 
activity. 
1.3 Growing south-south FDI 
1.3.1 Emergence of south-south economic and political linkages 
The period of 2004-2008 saw many commodity prices reaching unprecedented highs, 
partly driven by the rapid industrialisation of China, India and other emerging 
economies (Kaplinsky 2005).19 High prices generated much interest and investment 
into resources sectors. For the first time these investment inflows featured a 
significant share of companies from emerging economies. Such ‘south-south’ FDI 
formed part of a broader trend of a growing proportion of trade and investment within 
the ‘global south’ of low-to-middle income countries (World Bank 2006: 99, Aykut & 
Ratha 2003).20 South-south FDI has grown rapidly since the beginning of the decade, 
and by 2006 UNCTAD estimated that a quarter of all TNCs originated in developing 
and transition countries (UNCTAD 2006: 122). The rise in activity of developing-
country TNCs also reflects falling transaction costs of FDI due to advances in 
information technology, cheaper international logistics, and the internationalisation of 
financial markets, standards and skills (Autio 2005). 
18 For a small poor country such as Zambia, with a largely undeveloped secondary manufacturing 
industry, any falls in receipts of foreign exchange will sharply impact on the ability of producers to 
acquire much-needed foreign-produced inputs (including oil and petrochemicals). 
19 Chinese consumption of various base metals accounted for between 76% and 100% of the global 
increase in demand between 2000 and 2003 (Kaplinsky 2005). 
20 Different definitions for south and north are used in the literature on international development. 
Generally the ‘global south’ refers to ‘developing’ countries (as per UNCTAD’s definition) and ‘low­
to-middle income’ countries (as per the World Bank’s definition). Unless otherwise noted, the terms 
South and North are used as per the World Bank’s classification. 
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Table 1. South-south FDI as % of total FDI flows

This trend of economic integration is mirrored in greater political integration of low-
and middle-income countries. Fast-growing middle-income countries are using their 
economic influence to demand greater political participation in multilateral fora such 
as the UN and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). In sub-Saharan Africa the 
economic clout of South Africa makes it a natural leader of the region as it seeks to 
take on a role as spokesperson for the continent.21 The India-Brazil-South Africa 
Forum (IBSA) seeks to garner a greater role for these countries at the UN, an 
important aim for India given China’s current role as permanent and veto-carrying 
member of the UN Security Council (Alden & Vieira 2005: 1089).22 
The 2006 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Beijing, which 
attracted high-level officials of 48 African nations (including over 40 heads of state 
and government), highlighted China’s pursuit of integration with African 
economies.23 Tull (2006: 467) argues that deepening economic ties are aimed at 
generating diplomatic support from African countries, to counter western efforts in 
the United Nations Commission on Human Rights to condemn China’s human rights 
record. In 2008 India held a similar but smaller-scale India-Africa Summit (Xinhua 
9.4.2008), with leaders and delegations from 14 African countries (including Zambia). 
At the summit the Indian Premier announced a doubling of lending to African 
countries and greater preferential trade access for many products and services. The 
summit concluded with the adoption of the Delhi Declaration, containing political 
commitments to support UN reform.24 
Among investors from large emerging economies, Chinese investment in 
Africa has received the most attention. Early writings focused on concern around the 
Chinese government’s ‘non-involvement policy’ (BBC News 25.11.2006) as paying 
paid scant attention to the social and environmental impacts associated with overseas 
projects. The policy expression of this “state-centred orthodoxy”, as Tull (2006) refers 
to it, dictates that (the issue of Taiwan aside) no political conditions are to be attached 
to international cooperation, be it trade, investment, development assistance or other 
forms of cooperation. 
21 In Southern Africa as a whole, South Africa accounts for less than one-third of the population but for 
over 75 percent of the GDP, a size in relation to Africa similar to that of the US economy in relation to 
the world. 
22 An inaugural summit was held in Brasilia in September 2006, promoting cooperation within the 
areas of energy, transport and climate change (Domain-B 14.9.2006). 
23 People’s Daily Online, 2 Nov 2006. Available at 
http://english.people.com.cn/200611/02/eng20061102_317428.html. Accessed 3 Dec 2006. 
24 The declaration stated that “Africa takes note of India's position and its aspirations to become a 
permanent member with full rights in an expanded UN Security Council” (Xinhua 9.4.2008). 
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1.3.2 How ‘institutional background’ shapes company behaviour 
Policy makers and academics interested in knowing whether south-south FDI presents 
any distinct risks or opportunities for developing host countries could begin by asking 
what drives the behaviour of a firm. A lot of what a company does and does not do in 
Zambia (or anywhere else) is clearly determined by what the host government does 
and does not ask for. However in weak commodity dependent states one can discern a 
range of influences from what I call the ‘institutional background’ of the company, 
also appear to play a prominent role. 
The idea that investment from China, India, and other emerging markets 
would somehow be ‘different’ from ‘western’ firms rests on theories that capitalism 
can somehow sustain different types of political-economic systems: each with their 
own institutional frameworks and behavioural logics (Thelen 1999: 72; Hall & 
Soskice 2001).25 It follows that when companies that have ‘grown up’ within one 
institutional environment go abroad, they bring with them practices and established 
ways of doing things that may conflict with, or re-enforce, host-country rules and 
expectations. Therefore, as Buckley et al. (2007: 515) have argued, research on 
international business must pay closer attention to the role of home-country 
institutions. As I discuss in chapter two, company practices change slowly in response 
to changes in the external environment. Home-country as well as other international 
influences therefore continue to shape company behaviour in the new host country. 
Company-wide policies and procedures set by the firm’s home office 
constitute one institutional influence that shape how managers will engage with state 
and non-state actors in the host country. These include accounting policies, reporting 
responsibilities, organisational structures and extent of decision-making 
decentralisation. 
International capital markets are a second influence on company behaviour. 
Institutional theory suggests that different financing arrangements are associated with 
different governance mechanisms (Hall & Soskice 2001, Thelen 1999), e.g. 
international accounting standards. Direct demands on environmental and social 
safeguards arise when companies get project financing from Equator Principles 
signatory banks (Amalric 2005), or through World Bank and IFC’s ‘performance 
standards’ (for environment and social screening of projects).26 
Third, large state-owned investors can be influenced by home government’s 
diplomatic considerations. Patey (2007) has shown how the trajectory of western 
companies in the Sudan has been shaped by the international relations between home 
governments and Khartoum (see also Alden & Davies 2006). Within the management 
literature, Filatotchev et al. (2007: 557) have argued that ownership structure 
(including the degree of state ownership) must be given greater analytical 
prominence, as it impacts on firm behaviour by shaping managers’ risk-preferences 
and decision-making horizons. Even where home-country governments are not 
involved directly as shareholders, they may provide investment incentives in the form 
of concessionary loans, tax incentives and investment guarantees (UNCTAD 2001). 
Fourth, international markets shape firm behaviour. For example, the 
international market for copper constitutes the main determinant of the financial 
25 The ‘varieties of capitalism’ literature, although useful to establish the founding fact that entire 
institutional arrangements differ among countries, has to date negated the developing world. Although 
this presents a potentially fruitful future avenue of research, I do not pursue it further in developing my 
theoretical framework in chapter two. 
26 Another example is the European Investment Bank’s Economic and Social Impact Assessment 
Framework, currently in development following the launch of a pilot initiative in 2005 (Wright 2007). 
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(mis)fortunes of copper mining firms. With regards to inputs into the production 
process, the degree of access to international product markets determines the extent to 
which firms will engage with and seek to develop local input markets. 
As noted above, international NGOs may also influence corporate behaviour: 
in the late 1980s and 1990s, the human rights violations attributed to the government 
of Sudan forced many northern investors to scale down their operations in the 
country. Chinese and Indian firms stepped in to replace northern investors (Taylor 
2006: 950). 
1.3.3 Features and potential development impacts of south-south FDI 
The discussion up to now has set out some prima facie reasons for why companies 
might vary in their behaviours vis-à-vis domestic regulators and stakeholders. Many 
of these ‘drivers’ of behaviour are jointly present among large Chinese, Indian and 
other emerging market firms. I now present some early indicative findings of broader 
development impacts from south-south FDI. 
South-south FDI almost by definition occurs between countries that share 
similar levels of economic as well as institutional development: the World Bank 
governance indicators are highly correlated with levels of income (Kaufmann et al. 
2007).27 Therefore, investment between countries of similar levels of institutional 
development may hold particular challenges and opportunities for developing 
countries. In exploring what these might be, most research to date has been limited to 
exploratory surveys (Henley et al. 2008) or quantitative ‘high-level’ analysis (Aykut 
& Ratha 2003; Jenkins & Edwards 2006; Broadman 2007).28 
These early efforts have highlighted both theoretical and empirical reasons for 
why so-called southern TNCs would, relative to established western firms, be 
associated with different development impacts. First, there is some evidence of 
emerging-market firms operating and applying different business strategies from their 
northern counterparts (Hoskisson et al. 2000; Henley et al. 2008), leading to 
differences in technology transfer and linkages to local markets. Investment by 
emerging market TNCs may embody lower technological gaps compared to skills and 
knowledge available in the host country, thereby facilitating technology transfer. On 
the other hand there are indications that positive linkages to the local economy may be 
27 The World Bank’s governance indicators (Kaufmann et al. 2007) – which seek to quantify countries’ 
institutional development, including government effectiveness, voice and accountability, and property 
rights – are highly correlated with countries’ level of economic development, as per World Bank 
classifications (available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/CLASS.XLS). 
28 Quantitative accounts of south-south FDI are complicated by the lack of available statistics. 
Government balance-of-payments and mergers-and-acquisitions statistics are often incomplete or 
distort the picture of south-south FDI. First, most developing countries do not report the source of FDI 
inflows and destination of FDI outflows by country (UNCTAD 2006: 137), and even relatively 
developed countries (notably Mexico and Malaysia) often do not report FDI outflows in their balance-
of-payment statistics at all (Aykut & Ratha 2003: 161). Second, statistics are distorted by the practice 
of shifting capital abroad – often to an offshore financial centre such as Cayman Islands, Bermuda, or 
the British Virgin Islands (UNCTAD 2006: 116) – only for it to be subsequently repatriated. This 
practice is motivated by concessions to foreign investors, such as tax holidays, land rights, exchange 
controls. Third, difficulties in distinguishing between ‘ultimate’ and ‘immediate’ investor lead to 
additional problems (UNCTAD 2006: 106). When investment is undertaken by a subsidiary, but where 
subsidiary (immediate investor) and the company headquarters (ultimate investor) are located in 
different countries, the usual convention of reporting immediate rather than ultimate investor may lead 
to distortions of south-south FDI statistics. 
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more limited for emerging market investors, that appear to prefer imports from cheap 
home-country product markets (Kaplinsky 2008). There appears to be differences 
between Chinese and Indian investors in this regard: Broadman (2006) found that 
Indian investors into Africa are more likely to integrate with the local economy, 
relative to their Chinese counterparts. 
Second, many southern TNCs herald from environments of weak property 
rights and limited state capacity for enforcement, which increases transactions costs 
associated with enforcement of contracts (Hoskisson et al. 2000: 254). When 
transaction costs associated with ‘formal’ institutions are high, alternatives of more 
personalised and informal means of contracting become more attractive (North 1990: 
34). Gelb (2005: 204) has suggested that southern TNCs will tend to organise 
themselves along such informal lines and that this makes them better suited to 
developing-country conditions. 
Greater informality in business practices may undermine formal governance 
but may also increase the stability of businesses, if it allows companies to better 
navigate an institutionally ‘emerging’ investment climate. There are early indications 
that emerging-market investors may also be better able to manage operational and 
political risk in developing countries due to experience of similar situations at home 
(World Bank 2005: 99). In Africa, Tull notes that “Chinese firms appear to be 
significantly less risk-averse than their Western counterparts, especially in war-torn 
states such as Angola, DR Congo and Sierra Leone” (2006: 468). 
Third, a higher degree of state ownership appears to be common among the 
largest ‘southern’ TNCs compared to their ‘northern’ counterparts, in particular for 
firms investing in primary resource sectors (UNCTAD 2006: 122). The largest 
Chinese investments in Zambia are managed through a Special Economic Zone, the 
first of China’s five ‘special economic zones’ announced at FOCAC in 2006. 
Questions around the state-ownership of large southern TNCs have been raised in 
particular with reference to large Chinese investment into Africa’s extractive 
industries.29 State-owned TNCs may engage in construction, infrastructure and other 
highly ‘visible’ projects as a way of generating political goodwill, which may 
subsequently be used to open commercial doors in separate sectors (Tull 2006: 468). 
They can be instructed to overpay for an asset if it is considered to be strategic to the 
home country’s national interest (Alden 2007), or bid for public works contracts at or 
below cost in order to generate diplomatic support at international fora. 
Fourth, concerns have been raised that developing-country TNCs with less 
stringent environmental standards at home might export lower standards, vis-à-vis 
northern investors (TI 2006).30 This is supported by evidence that TNCs harmonise 
environmental standards across different operating locations (to economise on 
transaction costs associated the use of varying standards; see UNCTAD 1999: 292). 
Fifth, the potential for CSR to contribute to strengthening standards may be 
more limited in the case of southern TNCs.31 The CSR ‘business case’ typically rests 
on notions of risk management, emphasising how firms can lower operational risk – 
29 For instance, the extent to which FDI from China is used as an effective foreign policy tool is an 
emerging area of research (Gill & Reilly 2007). 
30 In Transparency International’s ‘2006 Bribe Payers Index’ reviewing overseas companies from the 
30 largest exporting nations – representing 82% of the global exports in 2005 – ranks Chinese, Indian 
and Russian firms (all with significant corruption is their ‘home’ countries) as the most corrupt, in that 
order (TI 2006). 
31 Doh & Guay (2006: 49) have argued that different national institutional frameworks result in varying 
expression (and effectiveness) of CSR initiatives and civil regulation. 
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including the risk of NGO-driven ‘naming-and-shaming’ campaigns or consumer 
boycotts – through adoption of CSR practices (UNCTAD 2006: 237). Yet given that 
developing countries often feature less developed civil society movements (Smith 
2003: 58, cited in UNCTAD 2006: 233), the reduction in risk from improving 
community relations, labour standards and so on may not be worth the emerging 
market firm’s while.32 
1.3.4 Section conclusion 
In developing a research agenda to explore how policy evolves in a context of 
growing south-south FDI, a simple dichotomy of southern and northern TNCs may be 
of limited use.33 Rather it becomes necessary to look for particular characteristics that 
are shared by groups of foreign investors and explicate the origins and impacts of 
these characteristics. This section has defined an investor’s ‘institutional background’ 
as the mix of influences that arise externally to the host-country context (e.g. from 
home-country head office, home government, international markets, capital providers, 
and other international organisations). A firm’s institutional background is likely to 
retain some relevance for explaining its behaviour, even when it enters into a new 
institutional environment in the host country. 
At this stage the concept of institutional background is necessarily crude and 
does not, in and of itself, say much about how external influences translate into firm 
behaviour ‘on the ground’ and how this influences the evolution of regulatory policy. 
In order to address such issues, the next chapter reviews the literature on policy 
making, institutional theory and organisational learning. It thus develops a theory of 
how organisational behaviour among foreign investors varies systematically, 
depending on influences that are both internal as well as external to the host-country 
context. 
1.4 Objectives and research questions 
My primary objective in this thesis is to understand how policy evolves in weak 
commodity dependent states, in a context of high organisational diversity. In doing so 
I want to explicate the mix of external (international) and internal (domestic) 
influences on state-firm relations. An important part of my overarching purpose is 
thus to nuance the debate on south-to-south FDI, and to consider the analytical value 
of this concept more generally. Following from these research objectives, the main 
research question is thus: 
•	 How do state-firm relations and regulatory policy making evolve in weak 
resource-dependent countries? 
My secondary objective is to investigate the extent to which there is convergence or 
divergence in regulatory standards and practices due to organisational learning among 
32 This can help explain why ‘northern’ investors are largely absent from the Sudan while Chinese 
National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), India’s Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) and 
Petronas (Malaysia’s national oil company) are all heavily involved in the region (UNCTAD 2006: 
161). 
33 As UNCTAD note, developing-country TNCs are diverse and “range widely in terms of country 
origins, their level of maturity, position in the value chain and strategies” (2006: 155). There are large 
Southern TNCs such as Mexico’s CEMEX and Brazil’s Petrobras who are considered leaders in their 
industries with regards to social and environmental responsibility (Ibid. p.233). 
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investors from different backgrounds. To this end I pose a secondary research 
question: 
•	 What shapes processes of convergence or divergence around regulatory 
standards in the Zambian mining sector? 
1.4.1 Conceptualising the study 
This study is concerned with how economic, environmental and social business 
regulation evolves, through policy formulation and enforcement, in a context of a 
weak state subject to rapid internal and external change. In conceptualising the study I 
have purposely drawn on a broad range of literatures in order to understand the role of 
organisational change in policy making and development (Hoff & Stiglitz 2001). 
Thus, chapter two develops a theory of the state (policy making) as well as a theory of 
the organisational change (learning) and links these through a theory of institutional 
change and bargaining. In doing so, I apply a hierarchy of sub-questions to interrogate 
the literature and later the data collected during fieldwork in 2007 and through follow-
up interviews. 
At one level I ask how regulatory policy and processes of implementation 
evolve and whether behaviour among companies directly shapes policy outcomes 
(Grindle & Thomas 1991). This question is premised on the idea that firms have 
incentives to engage with policy makers with the objective of minimising regulatory 
costs (Hillman & Hitt 1999: 825). Such costs are not uniformly distributed across 
actors but depend on institutional complementarities (i.e. what the company in 
question is already doing), wherefore not all firms will exert the same influence on 
policy makers. My case study companies are all significant in the context of the local 
economy, suggesting that government will be attentive to the preferences of these 
investors. 
I subsequently discuss how regulatory policy can be understood through a lens 
of institutional theory, by drawing on North (1990) and other institutionalist scholars. 
Here I discuss the processes whereby states and firms allocate benefits and costs of 
resource extraction. If companies do play some active role in shaping these processes 
of allocation, then the question arises as to how they engage with local state and non-
state actors. Here I draw on evolutionary economics and the view of organisational 
behaviour as guided by routines and objectives held by the firm (Nelson & Winter 
1982). 
Finally I ask: how do organisational routines and objectives emerge and 
change? In particular, why would they continue to influence behaviour once the 
company moves abroad? I explore these questions by reviewing and developing the 
concept of organisational learning. I define this concept as changes to firms’ routines 
and objectives (Levitt & March 1988) that occur through continuous interaction 
between states, firms and markets. After establishing this theoretical ‘chain’ I am able 
to make claims about how drivers of organisational behaviour are linked to policy and 
institutional change, a topic thus far ignored in the literature. 
I apply this theoretical framework on three areas of state-firm relations of 
relevance to the mining sector: fiscal policy and practice; environmental, social and 
labour governance; and local economic linkages.34 This choice of areas was intended 
34 Potentially significant impacts of FDI not explicitly covered by these policy spheres include 
employment generation and skills and technology transfers. Although these factors will form part of the 
discussion, they do not constitute independent foci of this study. 
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to cover a variety of issues concerning regulatory policy and to reflect prominent 
development challenges associated with large-scale FDI into the extractive industries. 
Importantly, the study acknowledges that state-firm relations do not exist in a 
vacuum but in a broader political economy that includes convergent and divergent 
‘local’ influences arising from actors such as donors, civil society and the media. 
These stakeholders will at any given point in time exert a range of pressures on the 
firm. 35 Local pressures on firms may also arise from host-country commercial 
constraints (scarcity of inputs, labour relations) and intra-industry dynamics 
(cooperation vs. competition, industry associations, convergence). 
The view that firms’ behaviour is shaped by demands and needs of multiple 
stakeholders highlights the need for a qualitative research strategy, to provide the rich 
contextual account necessary to identify and incorporate diverse influences. A 
qualitative research strategy also reflects the inductive spirit of this study around the 
novel phenomenon of south-south FDI: rather than using pre-defined theories and 
testing them, my aim was to remain open to any empirically grounded explanations of 
policy evolution. 
The qualitative approach of this thesis should not diminish its salience for 
policy makers. As Walker observes, “[w]hat qualitative research can offer the policy 
maker is a theory of social action grounded on the experiences – the world view – of 
those likely to be affected by a policy decision or thought to be part of the problem.” 
(Walker 1985: 19). I elaborate on the methodological implications of this approach in 
chapter three. 
1.4.2 Choice of Zambia as case study 
Zambia’s mining sector was an apt choice for this study for several reasons. First, the 
privatised mining sector includes a diverse set of multinational mining companies 
from China, India, South Africa, as well as various ‘western’ countries, enabling me 
to select an appropriate sample of case-study companies. 
Second, the mining sector in Zambia is economically as well as politically 
important, an a priori indication that these companies might be expected to have some 
influence over the policy process. One of my case study companies, Konkola Copper 
Mines (owned by India’s Vedanta Resources), was at the time of writing the country’s 
largest private sector employer. 
Third, the agents that comprise the mining industry are a discrete community 
of relatively large foreign investors, distinguishing it from a monopoly (e.g. pre­
privatisation) as well as from perfect competition (price-taking). I would therefore 
expect that this is an environment where ‘norming’ is taking place because of 
diversity across mining companies. 
Fourth, the privatisation that took place between 1997 and 2002 set a useful 
benchmark against which more recent entrants into the mining sector can be judged. I 
was keen on incorporating this element of time in exploring how company behaviour 
and policy responses had evolved since their arrival in Zambia.36 
35 For instance NGOs may target firms through naming-and-shaming campaigns, labour unions may 
instruct members to down tools, or suppliers may corrupt procurement systems by offering bribes to 
procurement personnel. 
36 Meyer (2004) argues that negative spillovers are greater, and positive ones fewer, in the early years 




Finally, the Zambian experience may hold relevance for other commodity-
dependent developing countries. Among African countries, Zambia is close to the 
median in terms of its institutional development, according to the World Bank’s 
‘Governance matters’ indicators (see section 4.3). It is neither a failed state nor one of 
Africa’s economic success stories, but a place where somewhat functioning 
institutions complement and compete with deep informal and neopatrimonial social 
structures. A study of Zambia can thus cast light on how weak commodity dependent 
states negotiate with international capital more generally. I discuss the institutional 
structure and governance features of Zambia in chapter four. 
1.4.3 Contributions 
This study, pursued through an applied political economy framework, contributes to 
current debates among scholars and practitioners surrounding the potentials and 
pitfalls of resource-led development. It also contributes to the literature on the role of 
international capital in economic and political globalisation. Its findings should 
inform debates on regulatory policy making and institutional convergence, and the 
prospects for globalisation to promote harmonisation of environmental and social 
standards of governance. 
It offers a critique of the liberal regulatory ideology that has the promotion of 
an enabling environment for business at its core, the source of thinking underpinning 
the discourse of FDI as a driver of economic development. This study illustrates the 
pitfalls in taking such an approach to business regulation in the context of increasing 
diversity of business practices and a severely capacity-constrained state. 
A specific contribution of this thesis is to add to the literature on China’s fast-
growing engagement with Africa. To date such accounts have drawn heavily on the 
idea that there is something uniquely distinct about large-scale Chinese engagement 
with Africa (what Large 2008 calls ‘Chinese exceptionalism’) and focused on 
rhetorical rather than substantive elements. Chinese companies have now operated in 
Zambia’s copper mining sector for over a decade wherefore this study can address 
questions of convergence or divergence between Chinese and ‘traditional’ western 
investors. My study also elucidates how this particular case of state-sponsored 
Chinese economic engagement fits within the political economy of Zambia. 
One limitation in scope is that I do not investigate directly the role of local 
(district and municipal) government. Nor do I look at the role played by local and 
international consultants in mediating state-firm interaction, or the role of traditional 
rulers. I elaborate on these and other limitations in scope further in section 3.1.1. 
1.4.4 Outline of thesis 
This introductory chapter has set the scene for a study of policy evolution in weak, 
commodity-dependent states. I first highlighted the trend of greater reliance on FDI 
and private capital as agents of development, yet noted the need for regulation to 
ensure development benefits materialise. I observed that failure to capture rents from 
resource extraction and inability to internalise environmental and social externalities 
easily lead to political pressures in the form of resource nationalism. 
Subsequently, I examined the trend of growing south-south FDI, with 
companies from China, India and other emerging markets playing an increasing role 
in Africa’s development. I observed there were a host of reasons, many relating to the 
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‘institutional background’ of an investor, why business practices (and consequential 
impacts on host countries) might vary across foreign investors. 
Chapter two reviews the academic literature of relevance to answering my two 
research questions. It first reviews the literature on the African state and different 
conceptualisations of the regulatory policy process, followed by a review of how 
institutional theory can be used to analyse regulations. Based largely on evolutionary 
economics, it develops and defines the concept of organisational learning that I use to 
address the second research question in particular. 
The third chapter presents the methodology of the study. It reflects on the 
choice of research methods and my approach for executing the study, based on in-
depth interviews carried out in Zambia and secondary documentary data. This chapter 
also elaborates on the study’s limitations in scope. 
Chapters four to seven are mainly empirical. Chapter four presents the 
Zambian context by placing the country’s copper extraction in historical perspective 
and discussing the context of privatisation that began in the late 1990s. It elaborates 
on my view of the state as provider the institutional framework within which actions 
by government, firms as well as various non-state actors are interpreted and 
legitimated. The chapter seeks to paint a comprehensive picture of the Zambian 
political economy of copper mining by identifying key policy actors and features of 
the country’s political culture. 
Chapter five discusses fiscal policy and practice, including issues of regulatory 
capacity to collect taxes and royalties. It explores the role of state-firm contracts and 
stability clauses in preventing the state from reforming the fiscal framework, and how 
these contracts have emerged and changed through state-firm bargaining. 
Chapter six covers institutions and practices surrounding environmental, 
health and safety and labour practices. These are important issues given significant 
social and environmental externalities in the sector, in particular during the rapid 
expansion associated with the boom in copper prices. This chapter elaborates on the 
features of environmental and safety regulation, assessing the relative merits of 
command-and-control versus incentives-based regulation. 
In chapter seven I discuss the extent and impact of forward and backward 
linkages through mining companies’ supply chains. I look at issues such as whether 
inputs are procured locally or internationally, and how firms’ relationships with local 
economic actors develop over time. 
Chapter eight synthesises the findings of chapters five through seven by 
bringing out themes that cut across my three policy spheres of interest. It discusses 
implications for host-country sustainable development in the context of the two 
research questions. The final chapter concludes by summarising the core arguments 




2 Literature review and theoretical framework 
2.1 Introduction 
The objective of this study is to explore how policy evolves in weak commodity 
dependent states, in particular in a context of institutionally diverse foreign mining 
investors. The research questions developed in the preceding chapter are designed 
with this objective in mind. The first section of this chapter reviews the literature on 
the African state, followed by a review of the literature on policy making. I develop 
the argument that the process of regulation can usefully be understood as constituted 
through dynamic interaction between regulators and regulated. 
The second section reviews the literature on institutional emergence and 
change. In explores how institutional theories can help us understand the evolution of 
regulatory policy. Here I review theories of institutional emergence and change within 
both the social and management sciences, to identify points of common interest and 
contention. 
In the third section I present the case for analysing foreign investors’ interaction 
with policy makers and the policy environment through a framework of evolutionary 
economics. This approach, based on the notion of corporate behaviour as guided by 
relatively stable organisational routines and aims, forms the foundation of the theory 
of the firm I use to explain company behaviour. 
In the fourth section I develop the concept of organisational learning to explain 
how firm-stakeholder relations evolve over time. This section emphasises the path 
dependent nature of organisational routines and objectives, as well as the role of both 
external and internal influences in shaping organisational behaviour. The fifth section 
concludes. 
2.2 Policy making in the African state 
This section discusses the structures and features of the state and how they matter for 
the process of government regulation of private sector activity.37 It is based on the 
premise that an understanding of the state is crucial to any analysis of policy making. 
I first review the literature on the African state, highlighting various features brought 
out in the dominant perspectives, including the concept of the neo-patrimonial state. I 
argue that the African state can best be described as a hybrid state, where formal and 
informal, individual and collective forms of governance co-exist and simultaneously 
shape state-firm relations. 
I then turn to theories of policy making to explore, more specifically, the role 
played by interest groups in shaping state behaviour. I discuss both society centred 
approaches, where the state is seen as a neutral arbitrator, as well as perspectives on 
the ‘developmental state’ as an active agent for development. I then propose to 
understand the policy process in weak commodity dependent states as one of 
evolutionary policy making that takes place over time through repeated interactions. 
Before proceeding it is worthwhile to distinguish between the terms ‘law’, 
‘regulation’ and ‘policy’. I see laws as the formal rules and objectives through which 
states attempt to govern economic, political and social life. They prescribe rights and 
responsibilities, including sanctions for non-adherence. I see regulation as more of a 
37 Vogel (1998) shows how the same pressures and processes of government deregulation in the UK 
and in Japan in the 1970s led to very different regulatory and social outcomes. 
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process-orientated construct, including the activities that state actors and others 
undertake in implementing the law. It is a concept that highlights interaction between 
the regulator and the regulated and will be a key analytical concept in much of the 
analysis in subsequent chapters. Policy, meanwhile, is taken to mean ‘what the 
government does’: it includes the processes of developing laws, as well as 
bureaucratic practices and norms whereby they are applied in ongoing regulation. 
Government’s policy pronouncements, or statements, serve as a vehicle for the 
government to signal to other actors what its objectives are. 
2.2.1 Perspectives on the African state 
Despite vast endowments of fertile land, oil, minerals and waterways, the African 
continent remains plagued by development challenges.38 The dominant literature to 
explain the politics behind Africa’s persistent economic underdevelopment is based 
around notions of African states as neopatrimonial states: states that retain features of 
both of Weber’s (1968) two ideal-type states, the ‘rational-legal’ and the ‘patrimonial’ 
state. 
According to Weber, the former is a bureaucracy where institutions routinise 
the (largely impersonal) exercise of authority, where this authority is constrained and 
enabled by written laws, and where the public and private sphere are clearly 
separated. A patrimonial system of governance, on the other hand, tends to apply – in 
its pure form – to the smallest and most traditional polities. It largely removes the 
distinction between public and private, and citizens are treated as extensions of the 
household of a leader who exercises authority by decree.39 
Africanist scholars argue that African states exhibit enduring features of 
patrimonial governance despite a rational-legal formal appearance. Bratton & van de 
Walle (1997) define African ‘neopatrimonial’ states based on three key 
characteristics: systematic concentration of power in the presidency (presidentialism), 
the award of personal favours (clientelism), and the misuse of state resources for 
political legitimation (blurring the line between private and public). Van de Walle 
observes that with limited Parliamentary oversight and ministries often filled with 
loyalists, “the Presidency emerges as the dominant arena for decision-making, to the 
point that regular ministerial structures are relegated to an executant’s role” (2003: 
310). This ‘presidential’ system engenders an interventionist political culture where 
political leadership emerges as a dominant force for change (Grindle 2001). 
Indeed, centralised control over the affairs of the state remains a hallmark of 
African countries. Among 45 African countries with multi-party systems in 2003, 40 
had presidential rather than parliamentary constitutions (van de Walle 2003). 40 
Bratton & van de Walle further note that “whereas personal relations occur on the 
margins of all bureaucratic systems … it is the core feature of politics in Africa” 
(1997: 62, italics in original). 
38 About half of Africa’s population is living in countries with significant oil, gas, or hard mineral 
resources (World Bank 2008c). 
39 In drawing this distinction Weber argued that the modern state must be classified according to is 
means, not to its ends, defining the state as a “human community that claims a monopoly over the 
legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (1948: 78). 
40 This in part reflecting the highly centralised administrative structures inherited at independence 
(Wunsch & Olowu 1990: 4-5). 
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The neopatrimonial view of the state remains contested and contains divergent 
interpretations and explanations.41 At one end of the spectrum, some see development 
challenges as rooted in social and political life that is distinctly ‘African’ and 
homogenous across countries (see Chabal & Daloz 1999). Scholars writing from this 
perspective emphasise informal and cultural traits: Chabal (2002) has argued that in 
Sub-Saharan Africa informal rules and norms appear to explain social behaviour 
better than countries’ formal (but poorly enforced) legal frameworks. This perspective 
presents the state largely as a façade, a stage, where actions have little real bearing on 
the political and economic realities of the local population. Formal policy is seen as 
ineffectual and conditioned by donor demands. This results in a largely a dichotomous 
view of institutions and personal rule: it implies that institutions do not matter, or that 
institutions and strong leaders are mutually exclusive (see Jackson & Rosberg 1982). 
Other Africanist scholars challenge this perspective, arguing that it fails to 
account for diversity in culture, institutions, as well as actual divergent economic 
fortunes across countries. Some authors (e.g. Englebert 1997, 2002) see this diversity 
across African states as significantly influenced by exogenous impacts, arguing that 
development outcomes are a function of the tension between pre- and post-colonial 
institutions. In doing so Englebert develops the argument that the neopatrimonial 
African state lacks legitimacy because “its structures have [not] evolved 
endogenously to its own society and [without] some level of historical continuity to 
its institutions” (2002: 4). In doing so he takes a stance against culturally deterministic 
approaches to understanding the African state, arguing that “[p]atterns of predation, 
neo-patrimonialism, rent seeking, urban bias, and administrative decay can be thought 
of as deriving from the administrative deficit of the African state.” (Englebert 1997: 
768). 
Chabal’s idea of the state as nothing more than a façade is eschewed by 
Bratton & van de Walle (1997) who insist that formal features of the state (though 
weakened by the clientelist networks and limited accountability of rulers) do have a 
role to play. They favour a view of the African state as a hybrid of pre- and post 
colonial institutions where “those hybrid political systems in which the customs and 
patterns of patrimonisalism co-exist with, and suffuse, rational-legal institutions” 
(Bratton & van de Walle 1997: 62). Similarly, but through a rational-choice 
framework, World Bank economist Dia (1996) has argued that African government 
can be understood as formally framed around Western democratic institutions that 
have been superimposed on informal traditional institutions and norms.42 
Over time, Bayart argues, the institutional frameworks imposed by 
colonialism (and subsequently by donor conditionalities) become endogenised 
through interaction with local informal systems of governance. 43 The imported 
institutions are “hybridised with local strategies of power, re-appropriated by local 
groups” (Bayart 1996: 14; 1991). He views political and social institutions – which he 
41 A general critique of neopatrimonial accounts is that they tend to compare the African state to either 
a Weberian ideal bureaucracy, to contemporary western capitalist states, or to pre-modern western 
states (Willott 2009). 
42 Bangura argues that formal institutions have been ineffective in poor African countries in part 
because of contradictions “between the interests of bureaucratic actors and the goals they are supposed 
to uphold” (1994: 785). 
43 This is similar to Hodgson’s concept of ‘downward causation’, whereby values percolate downwards 
from formal institutions into individuals’ habits (see Hodgson 2000b). 
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sees as “structures or social forces”44 – as arenas for “intense struggles” between 
actors representing different interests (Ibid., p.41). These struggles reduce state 
autonomy, suggesting that one way for the state to stay autonomous is to isolate itself 
from these struggles by centralising power in the President. 
Some hybridity of the state exists everywhere, reflected in its different roles as 
author of the rules, enforcer of these rules, as well as “provider of institutional 
infrastructure” (Scott 1995: 95), i.e. hosting the arenas in which conflict mediation 
takes place.45 In the African state this is taken one step further, due to the overlap of 
formal and informal institutions. In a hybrid African state the government may be able 
to simultaneously accommodate formal as well as informal relations with foreign 
investors. This can lead to a policy environment that is less predictable from the 
perspective of these actors. 
2.2.2 Perspectives on policy making 
This section presents three theoretical and practical perspectives on the policy 
process. I first discuss society-centric (pluralist) accounts of policy making, followed 
by state-centric accounts (associated with the idea of the developmental state). Lastly 
I explore perspectives of policy making as an evolutionary and dynamic process. 
2.2.2.1 Pluralism: policy making as society-centric 
Pluralist theories, in essence, present a view of the state “as a neutral arbitrator among 
competing organised interests in society where its principal role is to respond to 
societal pressures and changes in the balance of these pressures” (Healey & Robinson 
1994: 51). These perspectives emphasise (sometimes exclusively) the role of interest 
groups in shaping policy. Where the influence of interest groups is strong, this easily 
leads to regulatory capture by non-state interests. Within political science, the theory 
of public choice constitutes one such ‘pluralist’ perspective, in which the state is seen 
as an aggregator of group interests. It is based on a rationalist interpretation of 
competition for state resources – thus corruption and rent-seeking 46 Simply put, 
bureaucrats will create artificial scarcities e.g. through licensing procedures. to 
facilitate such regulatory capture – are seen as rational responses to the incentive 
structure of prevailing institutions (Olson 1971).47 I present three critiques of this 
perspective, highlighting the danger that pluralist theories result in functionalist 
accounts of social life; that they strip agents of power to articulate their interests; and 
that they fail to account for fast-changing external circumstances. 
44 These institutions include “structures or other social forces, such as bureaucracies, local authorities, 
chiefdoms, trade unions, employers’ organizations and even Christian Churches, Islamic brotherhoods, 
so called ‘independent’ religious movements or sects.” (Bayart 1991: 41). 
45As Fligstein & Freeland observe, the state has a broad role to play in “defin[ing] and regulat[ing] the 
conditions that make transactions possible, including the limits of contract and property rights” (1995: 
22). 
46 
47 Following Nye I define corruption broadly, as the “behaviour which deviates from the formal duties 
of a public role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status 
gains, or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence.” (1967). 
Corruption thus defined includes behaviour classified as bribery or “use of a reward to pervert the 
judgment of a person in a position of trust”; nepotism, i.e. “bestowal of patronage by reason of 
ascriptive relationship rather than merit”; and misappropriation, or “illegal appropriation of public 
resources for private-regarding uses” (Nye 1967). 
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First, theories based on pluralism in the political sciences can be critiqued for 
their propensity for so-called functionalism, whereby ex-post institutional outcomes 
are explained with reference to the interests promoted by these very same 
institutions.48 Functionalism sits uneasily with Bates & Krueger’s observation that 
“[o]ne of the most surprising findings in our case studies is the degree to which the 
intervention of interest groups fails to account for the initiation or lack of initiations of 
policy reforms” (1993: 14). Mkandawire similarly argues that African business 
classes have often failed to capture state policies, and that “[m]uch of the evidence of 
‘capture’ is deduced from the fact that gains accrue to identifiable groups or sectors” 
(2001: 300). A further problem of functionalism is its failure to accept the possibility 
of reverse causation: that rather than policy change being due to successful lobbying, 
the congruence of interests and institutions may be due to the fact that these policies 
preceded – and actually created – the very interest groups that subsequently extracted 
rents from the policies in question. 
A second problem with rational-choice pluralism is the lack of autonomy 
accorded to the bureaucracy, regulators, and other political actors within the state 
(Almond 1988). The state appears to be largely reactive. This perspective thereby 
ignores the politics of redistribution: Knight (1992) is critical of functionalist 
pluralism and argues that conflict and unequal power distributions mean that 
institutional outcomes in general, in fact, do not reflect efficient outcomes.49 
Yet I have argued above that in many African states the central government 
and ultimately the Presidency is intimately (and actively) involved in many facets of 
policy, and is anything but reactive. Rational-choice pluralism also assumes that 
actors shape institutional change by the sum of their interests/preferences. However, 
when information asymmetries are high and organisational capacity constrained 
(common features of many developing countries) the researcher must make explicit 
the relative capabilities and constraints of actors. 
Not all groups will have access to the negotiating table; some may lack 
organisational capacity to formulate their positions and overcome collective action 
dilemmas. 
A third critique of pluralism and public choice theory comes from the 
Africanist literature, which repeatedly suggests that local political leaders have 
significant power to bargain amongst themselves, as well as between competing 
national and international interests. Bayart (2000) has argued forcefully that African 
states tend to be highly influenced by external powers with whom local political elites 
must negotiate (and often do so very successfully), thus developing the concept of the 
extraverted state (see also Clapham 1996: 139). Political elites in control of 
extraverted states secure financial or other support through the provision of protection 
for external capital interests. This perspective lends itself to a view of the state as 
‘broker’ between international capital and local communities, underwriting a ‘social 
license to operate’ in return for taxes and political gains (for instance through job-
creation for locals). 
48 Theoretically, such a view can only be valid if we assume that all efforts at institutional change are 
purposeful as well as successful. 
49 Knight’s arguments pose the question: are institutions that promote stability but that are unequalising 
better than not having these institutions at all? 
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2.2.2.2 Policy making as state-centric and autonomous 
An alternative take on government policy making ascribes the state with powers to 
actively promote development through participation in social and economic life. Such 
state-centric views see policy development as endogenous to the state, determined by 
interaction between central government, street-level bureaucrats and economic 
interests. Within this literature, some see ‘public policy’ as largely determined by the 
(internal) institutional structure of the state (Weir & Skocpol 1985: 126). Others 
emphasise the role of individuals, ideology, and learning process (Heclo 1974: 308). 
Mkandawire (2001) defines a state that is based on such an ideology of 
economic and social development as a ‘developmental state’. It reflects a view that 
was a popular across developing countries in the aftermath of independence, when 
many African leaders legitimised themselves around a primary objective of economic 
development. They set out to replace anti-developmental colonial policies that had 
paid scant attention to education and capacity building. Across Africa, authoritarian 
regimes were thus legitimated with reference to the need to control economic activity 
in order to foster development. Rakner (2003) argues that Zambia under the 
leadership of Kaunda and United National Independence Party could be classified as a 
development state, in particular following the nationalisation of private enterprises 
through the Mulungushi reforms of 1968-1971. 
Rapidly industrialising east-Asian economies, led by South Korea, provided 
support for the idea that developmental states could be associated with policy 
effectiveness. Authors such as Amsden (1989) and Wade (1990) pointed to the 
successes of these countries in fostering economic development. They argued that for 
developmental states to exist, state autonomy was needed to engage widely without 
being ‘captured’ by narrow interest groups. Evans (1995) interjected that state 
autonomy was not sufficient for successful government-led development. Rather, the 
state must also exhibit a degree of embeddedness of the state, through direct or 
indirect participation in the business-networks and economic and social interest 
50 groups. 
Indeed many African countries appear state-centric due to the high degree of 
centralisation around the Executive, reflected in wide-ranging interventions in the 
economy (Bates & Collier 1995). However the extent to which this consists of 
autonomous action is questionable. Developing countries often suffer from significant 
interference by donors and other external actors, complicated ethnic politics, high 
levels of inequalities, dependence on international commodity prices and 
macroeconomic instability – all of which constrain policy autonomy. Weak 
institutions with limited enforcement capacity often constrain government’s ability to 
effectuate policy, even where independently formulated.51 
2.2.2.3 An evolutionary perspective on policy making 
A third view of policy making sees it as an evolutionary process. This approach 
emphasises the continuous but non-linear interaction between government and non­
government actors. Regulatory policy is thereby constituted by mutual actions of state 
50 Evans (1995) thus proposed that successful industrial policy-making requires embedded autonomy: 
if the state is totally embedded (aligned with interest groups) it will not be able to enforce policies, and 
if it is totally autonomous it will not have sufficient information about economic sectors to devise 
appropriate policies. 
51 Rodrik (1996) has argued that one reason behind the East Asian economies’ success was the high 
level of education and low levels of inequalities. 
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and private actors. 52 Within this literature one can locate different value-based 
positions – or regulatory ideologies – on what constitutes the optimal allocation of 
roles and responsibilities across government and non-government actors. 
Dominant regulatory ideologies have shifted over time, toward approaches 
that rely to a greater extent on market institutions to regulate economic activity. As 
Majone (1997) has argued, regulatory frameworks in developed countries have, over 
time, moved away from top-down, ‘dirigiste’ or interventionist state-regulation to 
various forms of self-regulation.53 
As Nayyar argues: “[t]he original solution the [the problem of externalities] 
was appropriate taxes and subsidies [but] this went out of fashion with the Coase 
Theorem, which returned the market to its pedestal” (2006: 10). 54 The greater 
involvement of business in activities of regulation reflects what Harris-White has 
called an “inherent tension in modern capitalism” (2003) where the state is 
increasingly charged with providing an enabling environment for business, in addition 
to its role as enforcer of standards chosen by society. 
The fall in the role of formal (government) regulation has been matched by a 
rise in the role played by non-state actors in shaping regulatory agendas and 
monitoring their implementation, including through cooperative approaches (Newell 
2001: 908; UNCTAD 2003). In developing countries this discourse is supported by 
the idea that – given the empirical reality of many institutionally weak states – it is in 
a company’s enlightened self-interest to take proactive responsibility for wider 
impacts on stakeholders. 
A key feature of this perspective is that policy making and institutional 
development are best understood as two-way processes. In contrast to pluralist 
accounts, it ascribes significant agency to actors and recognises internal competition 
within and between groups of actors. The importance of individual and group agency 
is of particular significance in a small country like Zambia. As Harberger has 
observed, “[t]he smaller the economy, the more unique the pressures and forces 
working to influence the policy structure are likely to be … The smaller the leadership 
elite, the more characteristics peculiar to it – including its own cliques, factions and 
rivalries – are likely to play a dominant role in defining pressures and points of 
resistance” (1988: 255). 
A small political leadership with centralised decision-making power suggests 
that ideas and ideology become more influential in shaping policy. Hall (1993) 
critiques pluralist approaches for failing to explain the role of ideas in the policy 
process. He proposes a “concept of policy making as social learning” (1993: 275) that 
recognises that policy develops in response to ideas evolving within the state as well 
as in response to local context.55 Hall calls for a more explicit treatment of how ideas 
52 Under an evolutionary policy approach government agents provide information regarding regulatory 
objectives and mechanisms, and takes firms’ responses and feedback into account in the development 
of regulations. Motivations behind a consultative process include the notion that industry has private 
information (e.g. about the costs of environmental pollution abatement). 
53 Giandomenico Majone describes how “rule-making is replacing taxing and spending” in European 
regulatory policy (1997: 139). He cautions that failure to change the underlying structures and 
regulatory norms (which, as Williamson 2000 reminds us, change slowly) undermines the 
effectiveness, credibility and legitimacy of the ‘official’ version of state-firm relations. 
54 According to Coase (1937), the father of neoclassical institutional economics, if you change relative 
prices, firms will respond by internalising or externalising costs. 
55 Thus, rather than choosing state autonomy over pluralism, social learning in the policy-making 
process “may well be a process that is intimately affected by societal developments rather than one that 
takes place largely inside the state itself” (1993: 276). 
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change, and the mechanisms whereby ideas get translated into policy action (see also 
Campbell 1998: 377). 
An evolutionary perspective on policy making is also multi-faceted in the 
sense that the state as well as the private sector are disaggregated. The policy process 
can – for instance – be conceived of as consisting of three stages: agenda-setting, 
design and implementation (Healey & Robinson 1994: 48-49). However Grindle & 
Thomas (1991) argue that these are often not empirically discrete (sets of) actions, but 
can rather be seen as processes that are all inter-connected through feedback loops.56 
Firms may ‘target’ different government counter-parties depending on their 
objectives, their relative bargaining strength in different fora, and the stage of policy 
development and implementation. 
An evolutionary concept of regulation sees it as mutually constituted by the 
regulator and the regulated. One of Grindle & Thomas’ (1991) significant 
contributions is the insight that regulated entities are themselves agents for 
implementation of policy. 57 The intellectual roots of this view can be traced to 
Hirschman’s work on institutional development, which sees actors as shaping the 
trajectory of development simply by participating in it (Hirschman 1971, see Santiso 
2000 for a review). 
In practice, many developing countries are highly capacity-constrained, with 
limited resources for enforcement, and with poorly paid public servants that are easily 
corrupted (for those that wish to do so). This means that levels of compliance 
observed among firms will, so some extent, depend on firms’ willingness to comply. 
The latter, in turn, will depend on whether compliance is costly, i.e. if attaining some 
given standard represents different ways of doing things from what the company is 
already doing. 
2.2.3 Section conclusion 
In this section I first looked at the African state and its characteristics, in particular in 
relation to political culture and policy making. I argued for viewing the state as a 
hybrid that simultaneously exhibits formal and informal features. I highlighted the 
centralisation of power in leaders who have been skilful both at selectively deploying 
economic policy (towards certain actors) and playing off competing external 
influences against each other. 
I then reviewed different approaches to understanding policy making. I 
critiqued rational choice pluralism for neglecting that collective action dilemmas often 
arise, preventing individuals and groups from pooling their interests and competing 
around them. I also argued that pluralism assumes all actors have the same access to 
the policy process, yet in the African state such access critically depends on the ability 
of the firm to cultivate informal channels of exchange with the government in power. 
An evolutionary view of policy making allows multinational companies to play 
a more nuanced role in the evolution of policy. This includes through consultations, 
56 Jackson & Rosberg (1982: 18) argued that such a feedback loop (between policy-maker and policy-
subject) could serve to discipline policy makers and ‘steer’ the government in the ‘right’ direction. 
However this argument is undermined in contexts where democratic institutions that underpin 
accountability are lacking and where there is limited transparency and freedom of information. 
57 The de facto state-firm contract (defined as the allocation of costs and benefits of resource 
extraction) may thus evolve in the absence of changes to formal (legal, government-sanctioned) policy, 
for instance where compliance increases e.g. due to technological or process innovation, due to greater 
reputational sensitivity or risk aversion. 
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direct lobbying of ministries, or through interaction with enforcing agencies and 
compliance (or non-compliance) with existing rules and norms. Over time policy 
evolves. Given my research questions, I am particularly interested in how firms from 
different institutional backgrounds might influence policy, but also – as highlighted in 
my second research questions – how this process results in convergence or divergence 
in practices across a diverse foreign mining companies. 
The evolutionary view of regulation can explain the shift in ideology towards a 
view of the state as enabler of private sector driven economic growth. In this context 
the relationship between states and regulated actors becomes more interactive, 
predictable and could be termed a partnership. Regulators become more prone to 
engaging – through formal or informal means – with private business. 
Note however that this type of partnership is no panacea for solving regulatory 
issues, for two reasons. First, as my critique of rational choice pluralism above 
suggests, collective action dilemmas will persist as long as diversity persists, leading 
to difficulties in reaching agreements. The Zambian mining sector is, in this sense, 
diverse, including large western as well as Chinese and Indian companies. These 
companies have different institutional backgrounds that lead to different business 
practices. Second, in an interventionist African (or other) state, political discretion 
between how to treat different investors may allow for organisational differences to 
persist over time. Crucially, then, the hybrid nature of African state appears able to 
both encourage diversity (through discretionary and centralised exercise of power) as 
well as accommodate it (in the interest of seeking private sector-led growth). 
2.3 Regulations, institutions and state-firm bargaining 
The preceding discussion has suggested that both theories of the African state and 
theoretical perspectives on policy making can be grounded in institutional accounts of 
social life. This section now looks in more detail at how regulations affecting the 
mining sector can be understood through the lens of institutional theory. 
It begins with some observations on the increasing attention paid to local 
political and social institutions within the development policy literature. It then 
elaborates on why regulations and regulatory policy can be seen as institutional 
structures in their own right, and what lessons institutional theory may hold for the 
analysis of regulatory policy evolution. The third sub-section explores in more detail 
the theoretical link between institutional theory and organisational behaviour, by 
reviewing the new institutionalist literature within political science and organisational 
theory. The fourth sub-sections shifts the disciplinary focus to review how institutions 
and institutional change are conceptualised within the management literature. The 
fifth section then elaborates on how the evolution of state-firm relations has been 
conceptualised within the management literature on state-firm bargaining. The final 
section concludes. 
2.3.1 Increasing attention to local context: the ‘institutional turn’ 
The confidence in the capacity of the state to direct development around the time of 
independence was not supported by experiences in the 1960s and 1970s. To move 
away from inefficiencies attributed to government’s involvement in the economy, 
market liberalisation became the norm. It included removal of capital controls and 




Many reforms were designed and implemented by the World Bank and the 
IMF through structural adjustment programmes (Meier & Stiglitz 2001). These 
reforms reflected an ideology of economic development as more sensitive to state-
failure than to market-failure (Chang 2003), resulting in increased marketisation of 
economic and social life and an effective ‘retreat of the state’ (Strange 1996).58 
However the highly liberal policies associated with so-called structural 
adjustment typically failed to generate positive development outcomes. The dominant 
perspective thus shifted in the 1990s, away from getting policy objectives right to 
‘getting institutions right’ (Dollar & Easterly 1999).59 Success in policy making came 
to be seen as dependent on host-country institutions and politics. As part of this 
‘institutional turn’ development practitioners increasingly emphasised the role of 
public and private institutions in shaping development trajectories (Landell-Mills 
2003: 360). Notions of governance – defined as “the capacity of the government to 
effectively formulate and implement sound policies … [through] the traditions and 
institutions by which authority in a country is exercised” (Kaufman et al. 1999: 1) – 
moved to the top of the (western) donor agenda.60 
The growing focus on actors’ interests and influences – and the sources of 
their (potentially overlapping) incentives – opened up space for political and social 
context in policy analysis (Rodrik 2006; see also Hausmann et al. 2008). As Grindle 
has argued, since “political behaviour is always deeply rooted in [both] context and 
specificity ... to be useful, theory must [therefore] be able to evoke, explore, and 
explain this complexity and specificity” (2001: 348). 
2.3.2 Why look at regulations as institutions? 
I highlight, below, five reasons why state-firm relations (manifested through 
government regulation and firm responses) can be understood using institutional 
theory. First, the idea of overlapping formal rules and informal norms as shaping 
governance in African states (introduced above) resonates strongly with institutional 
theory. To illustrate, Greif has argued that “a society’s institutions are a complex in 
which informal, implicit institutional features interrelate with formal, explicit features 
in creating a coherent whole” (1998: 82). Both government policy and market 
institutions operate through formal as well as informal (normative) dimensions: laws 
dictate procedures and expectations, but there is usually some element of discretion or 
tacit understanding between regulators and regulated, or common practices that are 
not codified (what North 1990 refers to as “mental models”, see also McBarnet & 
Whelan 1991). In addition, over time the informal and social institutions become 
reflected in formal and state-sanctioned institutions (laws), as well as vice versa 
(Helmke & Levitsky 2004). 
Second, the idea of policy evolving through continuous state-firm interaction 
resonates with North’s (1990, 2005) explanation of how institutions evolve through 
58 The confidence in the capacity of the state to direct development that prevailed following and second 
world war and around the time of decolonialisation was not supported by experiences in the 1960s and 
1970s. Instead liberalisation became the norm, designed and implemented by the World Bank and the 
IMF through structural adjustment programmes (Meier & Stiglitz 2001). 
59 It appears the role of institutions was first introduced into the development discourse with the 1983 
World Development Report, which highlighted the institutional constraints on the policy-making 
process (World Bank 1983: 41). 
60 This included the related but fuzzier concept of ‘good governance’ – understood as “a process 
characterised by communication and consultation, through which disputes are resolved, consensus is 
built and performance is reviewed on a continual basis” (Nayyar 2006: 17; see also DFID 2006). 
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feedback loops (one of his main contributions to institutional theory). North argues 
that institutions first decide which organisations can come into existence and under 
what terms. Organisations, when faced with changes to their incentive structure, will 
attempt to change these institutions to suit their interests.61 Because institutions – 
including regulations – are costly to change, this process is slow, incremental and 
path-dependent.62 Yet institutions do evolve, albeit slowly, in response to “continuous 
interaction between institutions and organisations in the economic setting of scarcity 
… hence competition is the key to institutional change” (North 2005: 59; see also 
Scharpf 2000).63 North argues that as firms learn from these exchanges, and alter their 
internal resource allocations, they become more successful at (intentionally) changing 
the institutions in question. This suggests that learning by individuals and 
organisations can constitute a major influence on the evolution of institutions. 
Third, North’s distinction between the content of institutions and their 
enforcement characteristics resonates with the issue of lacking enforcement that 
undermines sustainable private sector development in many countries (see table 2). 
Whilst formal government regulations dictate one form of behaviour (e.g. public 
officials should inspect and report environmental non-compliance), normative rules 
enshrined in kinship ties may dictate another (e.g. the individual should support the 
extended family, even if this means supplementing income by taking bribes).64 The 
co-existence of institutions with conflicting incentive structures is at the root of the 
principal-agent problem that often undermines enforcement by street-level 
bureaucrats (see Besanko et al. 2008). 
Table 2. Examples of formal and informal regulatory institutions 
Institutional form Examples of enforcement Examples of sanctions in event of 
non-compliance 
Formal: legal and • Rule of law, courts • Legal action 
regulatory policy • Reg. agencies • Revoked licenses 
• Inspectors • Fines or other costs in event of 
• Reporting non-compliance 
Informal: regulatory • Competition • Political opposition 
norms and established • Social capital • Market access 
values, including social • Repeat transactions • Inefficiency 
networks • Reputation 
Fourth, regulatory policy and wider market institutions allocate development costs 
and benefits of FDI and are therefore contested. Bates (1997) argues that institutional 
change is always contentious, because by definition social rules are relational and 
about allocations: never does institutional change affect one party alone. As Grindle 
(2004) similarly observes, policy changes always entail winners and losers, thus 
explaining resistance to change within and across organisations. This contestation is 
61 As North puts it, “institutions … determine the opportunities in society. Organisations are created to 
take advantage of those opportunities, and, as the organisations evolve, they alter the institutions.” 
(1990: 7). Institutional change is driven by “the feedback process by which human beings perceive and 
react to changes in the opportunity set” (Ibid.). 
62 As North argues: “[t]he economies of scope, complementarities and network externalities of an 
institutional matrix make institutional change incremental and path dependent” (2005: 59). 
63 Despite this, Dahan et al. note that evidence of the active shaping of institutions by organisations is 
“often overlooked by mainstream institutionalist literature” (2006: 1575). 
64 Olivier de Sardan (1999) explains high degrees of corruption in Africa with reference to social 
institutions, although he fails to incorporate the notion of information asymmetries. 
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evident in the conflicting objectives of policy makers charged with constraining as 
well as enabling the private sector. They must ensure licensing procedures are not 
overly onerous (thereby disincentivising investment) whilst at the same time ensuring 
that these licensing procedures are rigorous enough to vet companies unlikely to 
uphold environmental and operating standards. Appreciating the tensions and 
dilemmas that confound policy makers leads to a view of capitalism as conflictual and 
contrary, in which institutions are necessary to regulate capitalist development 
(Harris-White 2003). 
Fifth, institutions guide behaviour, also the explicit aim of government 
regulation. The idea of institutions as (behavioural) incentives is prominent among 
writers in the intellectual traditions of the New Institutional Economics spear-headed 
by Douglas North and Oliver Williamson. As North observes, “[t]he institutional 
framework provides the incentives that dictate the kinds of skills and knowledge 
perceived to have the maximum pay-off” (2005: 59). Williamson (1998: 76) notes 
that the need for institutions to govern transactions arises in situations characterised 
by bilateral dependency (resulting from sunk costs and asset specificity); where 
contracts are incomplete (because of cognitive limitations, see Shleifer & Vishny 
1997); and where the other party cannot make credible commitments (due to 
opportunism). This suggests that institutions should play a large role in the 
governance of the mining sector, which features sunk costs as well as incomplete 
contracts (due to forward-looking nature of mining activity). 
2.3.3 How institutions shape behaviour 
This sub-section contains two parts. Having looked at the general characteristics of 
institutions above, I now review the political science literature on institutions, 
distinguishing and drawing parallels between rational-choice, sociological and 
historical institutionalisms. I argue that these perspectives all rely, directly or 
indirectly, on an ontology of the external environment as something that can be easily 
understood and interpreted by the firm. I then review the literature that portrays an 
organisation’s external environment as socially constructed. I discuss what this means 
for our understanding of the relationship between an organisation and its external 
environment. 
2.3.3.1 The new institutionalisms within political science 
Rational choice theorists responded to the ‘institutional turn’ in the social sciences 
(see 2.3.1) by expanding their agency-orientated framework to account for rule-
following that is normative and less reliant on perfect information. March & Olsen 
(1998), for example, attempt to explain how institutions shape behaviour through an 
expanded rational-choice framework. They distinguish between action as guided by a 
logic of consequence (rational actors calculate and chose actions consistent with their 
preferences) and action guided by a logic of appropriateness (emphasising social 
expectations and norming), the latter kind being more stable over time. 
In the framework of March & Olsen, the role of institutions and norms 
includes structuring the exchange between a firm and society through the allocation of 
rents (more tangible incentives; a logic of consequence) and expressing normative 
expectations of how organisations should behave (less tangible incentives; a logic of 
appropriateness). This points to the importance of looking at forms of structural 
exchange (e.g. for government services) as well as expectations of stakeholders when 
seeking to understand the evolution of state-firm relationships. One critique of March 
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& Olsen’s view is that they – whilst acknowledging that the agents are norm-seeking 
as well as profit-seeking – assume that cues from the external environment are always 
correctly interpreted by largely rational agents. In doing so they imply that responses 
to changes in the external environment are unambiguous, thereby neglecting the role 
of information asymmetries as well as constraints on individual cognitive capabilities. 
March & Olsen’s work represents a rational-choice institutionalism that sees 
actors as calculating and choosing among the choice sets provided by incentives 
embedded in the institutional environment. Hay & Wincott (1998) critique this 
literature by arguing that rational-choice institutionalism is in fact also structuralist: 
although it espouses to capture individual choice it tends to “replac[e] political 
subjects with calculating automatons,” thus resulting in “a deep structuralism, 
deriving action from context” (Hay & Wincott 1998: 952). 
A second strand of institutionalist literature is sociological institutionalism 
(see Hall & Taylor 1996 for a review). This literature retains the focus on institutions 
as the key unit of analysis, but emphasises the role of institutional structures in 
shaping individual behaviour. In other words, institutions precede individual action. 
However, whilst attempting to introduce social structure to account for unintended 
consequences, Hay & Wincott (1998: 952) argue this analysis often becomes overly 
structuralist, thereby failing to account for the role of individual and collective 
action.65 
A third strand of this institutionalist literature is historical institutionalism (see 
Hall & Taylor 1996 for a review). It is concerned with unintended consequences of 
social action and emphasises the path dependent nature of institutional change. Hay & 
Wincott (1998) argue that although adherents of historical institutionalism promote it 
as middle way between rational-choice and sociological institutionalisms, in terms of 
the link between institutions and behaviour it offers nothing new: it simply 
acknowledges that agents may be both rational optimisers and cultural norm-seekers 
(seeking to fit into social ‘structures’). 
Scharpf (1997, 2000) locates the dominant approaches to institutional analysis 
into categories that are predominantly either ‘genetic’ (institution-centred) or 
‘consequential’ (actor-centred, see table 3). He offers a similar argument to that of 
Hay & Wincott, arguing that both sociological institutionalism and historical 
institutionalism are too deterministic, or ‘genetic’. Instead he opts for a view where 
individual self-interest and agency explains some of firm behaviour and wider rules 
and norms account for the remainder. This represents a view of individuals’ 
objectives and the institutional environment as mutually constituted through social 
interaction, which resonates with the notion of “cumulative causation” first developed 
by Thorstein Veblen (see Hodgson 2002: 217). 
However Hay & Wincott note that some sociological institutionalists, such as Fligstein (1997), 




Table 3. Genetic and consequential views of institutions

‘Genetic’ view of institutions 
(institution-centred) 
‘Consequential’ view of 
institutions 
(actor-centred) 
• Institutions precede and 
generate individual action 
• Actors create institutions 
through their actions 
Outcome-orientated analysis • Policy outcome is understood 
as a distribution of interests 
across actors, aim of research 
is to explain which institutions 
have generated this outcome 
(functionalist) 
• Public choice – the state as a 
neutral arena which balances 
out competing interests 
• Policy outcome is understood 
as an institutional matrix, aim 
of research is to explain the 
characteristics and influence 
of actors that have generated 
this outcome 
Process-orientated • Political economy analysis • Reflexive policy analysis 
analysis	 with multiple and overlapping where incentives are 
institutions that influence the embodied in actors, where 
policy process through history is path-dependent 
feedback loops 
Source: Scharpf (2000). 
In practice empirical research is often not easily placed into theoretical categories 
such as those identified by Scharpf (2000). First, whilst institutions often do precede 
and incentivise particular behaviour (genetic view), they are also frequently subject to 
incremental change by individuals and organisations (consequential view).66 A similar 
tension exists between outcome-orientated and process-orientated institutional 
analysis. Institutional outcomes have important consequences worthy of study 
(redistribution, wealth accumulation, collective action), yet a process-orientated 
approach is necessary if one wants to avoid a functionalist or structuralist analysis that 
overlooks the social nature of bargaining. This suggests that empirical work on 
institutions (including regulatory frameworks) should not be overly constrained by 
theoretical distinctions such as those proposed by Scharpf.67 
My approach in this thesis is more process-orientated than outcome-orientated. 
Like Grindle & Thomas (1991) I take the view that different stages of policy 
development and implementation are not always readily identifiable, but rather 
intertwined through feedback loops. Thus, in operationalising the concept of 
institutional and policy change, I focus on regulatory agendas as well as regulations 
themselves, and include as units of analysis policy proposals at varying stages of 
formalisation and implementation. 
2.3.3.2 Organisational environments as socially constructed 
An alternative perspective holds that the external institutional environment of an 
organisation (and the incentives it contains) is socially constructed. This view 
developed as a challenge to early sociological accounts of organisational behaviour 
that often saw firms’ responses to strategic contingencies (or ‘environmental shifts’) 
as guided by a form of rational adaptation (Thompson 1967, Lawrence & Lorsch 
66 As North points out, where the institutional incentive structure does not match actors’ own 
behavioural tendencies, they will seek to change the institutional environment. 
67 Aoki (2005) offers a theoretical take on the debate of the origin of institutions, arguing that 
institutions which appear as exogenous constraints are in fact endogenously determined. 
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1967, both cited in Fligstein & Freeland 1995: 28). Within management theory a 
similar shift took place, which I elaborate on below (see 2.3.4). 
Scholars writing from this perspective have argued that a firm’s adaptation to 
the external environment is anything but unproblematic, putting forward two claims. 
The first is that rational adaptation is not a straight-forward process: the environment 
may exhibit significant information asymmetries wherefore the information that 
reaches the firm has to be interpreted by the agents within that firm (Hay & Wincott 
1998: 956). This points to the need to account for actor preferences and how these are 
formed, for instance through shared understandings of the world that can be used as 
guides for collective action (Hannan & Freeman 1977, 1984; Salanacik & Pfeffer 
1978).68 
Organisational theorists contend that in addition to identifying and interpreting 
the surrounding environment, the firm must also have the power to act. Pfeffer (1981) 
defines power as access to resources required to materialise an action in response to a 
changing environment). Pfeffer & Salancik (1978) see organisational resources as 
dependent on this socially constructed external environment. They argue that when 
environmental conditions change the distribution of power, it ultimately produces 
organisational change and stability. Fligstein & Freeland share this view and argue 
that political theories of the firm must acknowledge “resource dependence as socially 
constructed” (1995: 31).69 
This view holds that the processes whereby these environments are 
constructed are themselves an object of study (Fligstein 1990; DiMaggio 1985, 1989; 
Pfeffer 1981). 
Resource interdependencies imply both constraints and opportunities, dealt 
with by the firm in one of two ways: by changing own activities in order to adapt to 
new constraints, or by seeking to change the institutional environment itself (Stern 
1979). The external environment thus becomes a product of the ongoing interaction 
between organisations and the institutions that embed them, in effect endogenising an 
environment that is itself socially and politically constructed. Fligstein (1990) 
therefore argues that formal and informal relationships across and between firms and 
their stakeholders (in particular capital providers) become central to understanding 
corporate behaviour (see also Fligstein & Brantley 1992). This resonates strongly with 
North’s view of institutions discussed in section 2.3.2. 
2.3.4 The resource-based view of the firm and dynamic capabilities 
Partly to reflect my firm-centred approach to understanding regulatory policy making, 
I now review the insights of management theory concerning state-firm relations. I 
begin by reviewing theories around the resource-based view of the firm, followed in 
the next sub-section by a review of the state-firm bargaining literature. 
As Stopford & Strange (1991) argued, you cannot understand international 
politics without understanding international business and management, nor can you 
understand business without paying attention to international and domestic politics. In 
doing so they brought to the fore the exercise of authority outside of the state and the 
view of the firm as politically embedded (see also Desbordes & Vicard 2007 and 
68 Within management theory Hoskisson et al. (2000) take the view that management systems of rich 
world TNCs are indeed different from those of developing-country TNCs, such that “enterprises [that 
are] likely to interpret the same objective environment differently, process information differently, and 
therefore make different strategic responses” (2000: 255). 
69 Doing so would supplement a focus on technical environments with a focus on institutional 
environments such that “states [become] implicated in all features of organisational life” (Ibid.). 
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Yeung & Liu 2008: 58). 70 As Meyer (2004) puts it, TNCs’ strategies and the 
institutional environment in host developing economies are thus mutually 
interdependent. 
Within the management literature there has been a shift away from simple 
assumptions about how the firm responds to environmental factors (see the previous 
sub-section). This shift is partly a reaction to Michael Porter’s influential analyses of 
sustained competitive advantage (Barney 1991). Porter’s approach held that the 
primary determinants of competitive advantage were environmental factors, rather 
than a company’s internal resources. It assumed that any heterogeneity among firms’ 
resources would be temporary because of the assumption that value-enhancing 
resources can be bought and sold on factor markets. 
In contrast, the resource-based view of the firm places emphasis on the 
internal characteristics of the firm. It conceptualises firms as bundles of imperfectly 
mobile resources, including tangible and intangible assets as well as organisational 
routines (both explicit and tacit).71 The firm is seen as “an evolving collection” of 
resources (Rugman & Verbeke 2002: 769). These resources are imperfectly mobile, 
wherefore differences in endowments of resources between companies may persist 
over time and across space. 
This resource-based view of the firm was pioneered by Edith Penrose (1959) 
who emphasised how managers’ intimate knowledge of their operating environments 
aid in “the discovery of productive opportunities through a dynamic learning process 
but guided by path dependencies” (see review by Rugman & Verbeke 2002: 771). 
Through this process of organisational learning companies can develop new ways of 
leveraging assets and existing routines, and thereby achieve sustained competitive 
advantage. The ability to develop new ways of combining existing resources is now – 
within the management literature – referred to as the ‘dynamic capabilities’ of a firm. 
Eisenhardt & Martin define dynamic capabilities as “the organisational and strategic 
routines by which firms achieve new resource configurations” as markets emerge and 
evolve (2000: 1107). 
Dynamic capabilities – and sustained competitive advantage – are awarded to 
firms that are able to apply their routines in ‘new’ ways on ‘old’ resources (this view 
resonates with the evolutionary economics approach, which provides further 
theoretical grounding for a routines-based theory of the firm and which I review in 
section 2.4). However the merits of dynamic capabilities in casting light on corporate 
behaviour in institutionally weak and commodity-dependent developing countries 
may be limited. As Eisenhardt & Martin (2000) point out, dynamic capabilities are 
only likely to have “predictable outcomes” in relatively stable markets.72 When the 
environment is poorly predictable a firm’s capabilities may not explain organisational 
performance very well. In such situations, the need for paying attention to the 
environmental context is greater. 
70 Reflecting on the state’s role in the emergence of powerful international capital, Strange argues that 
states were instrumental in granting this power to TNCs, that “[i]t was not that TNC’s stole or 
purloined power from the government of states. It was handed to them on a plate – and, moreover, for 
‘reasons of state’” (1996: 44-45). 
71 The resources in question can be grouped into physical assets (e.g. location, technology, access to 
raw materials), human capital (e.g. past experience, skills/training and technical know-how, 
relationships), and organisational capital (e.g. reporting systems, formal/informal operating practices, 
informal relationships between groups within the firm as well as with external stakeholders) (Barney 
1991: 101). 
72 In contrast, “in high-velocity markets, they are simple, highly experiential and fragile processes with 
unpredictable outcomes” (Eisenhardt & Martin 2000: 1105). 
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The resource-based view of the firm assumes that access to scarce (tangible or 
intangible, material or discursive) resources confers power on those with such access 
(Child & Tsai 2005: 98). The literature, however, fails to explain to what extent the 
firm’s exercise of power to control resources is contingent on existing processes of 
policy and political agenda-setting (Boddewyn & Brewer 1994: 120). To get around 
this, I argue that in developing countries with informal and centralised political 
governance, firms’ ability to establish links with policy makers constitutes a resource 
in its own right, enabling greater visibility for the firm (see 2.2.1). 
Importantly, the resource-based view of the firm also shows us that differences 
across firm behaviour can persist over time, as companies respond to the external 
environment by combining their resources and routines in new ways. This suggests 
that foreign investors from China, India and other emerging markets may exhibit 
variation vis-à-vis ‘western’ capital that persist over time. Moreover, governments 
may differentiate between TNCs within a sector depending on the resources (e.g. 
future investment) on offer by the TNC. 
2.3.5 The obsolescing bargaining model 
Given my primary research question on how policy evolves, and my argument thus 
far that this takes place through a two-way process of interaction, I now review the 
management literature on state-firm bargaining. This area of inquiry arose from the 
‘obsolescing bargaining’ literature pioneered by Vernon (1971, 1979), which 
originated from observations of state-firm relations in the 1970s as often adversarial 
and with frequent nationalisations. This led to research on how companies bargain 
with host-states over a range of issues, including foreign exchange controls, 
investment controls, repatriation controls, the right to refer disputes to international 
arbitration, stability clauses, and performance requirements relating to labour and 
local procurement (UNCTAD 1999: 96). This body of literature holds relevance for 
this study because it emphasises an active role for individual TNCs in shaping the 
institutional environment. 
The obsolescing bargaining model (OBM) first developed by Vernon (1971) 
hypothesises that, in initial stages where a multinational firm is contemplating an 
investment, bargaining advantages will rest with the firm.73 Given that the regulatory 
framework is an important determinant of investment location (in particular for 
resource-seeking FDI), it posits that governments may tailor regulations (legislation, 
incentives) with a view to attracting investors. Vernon’s original bargaining theory 
held that, over time, bargaining power would shift away from the foreign investor and 
obsolesce towards the state: as the firm sinks its costs and develops location-specific 
routines, including in relation to local value-chains, it becomes economically and 
politically embedded and thus loses the threat of an easy exit (Haslam 2007 offers a 
more contemporary treatment; see also Poynter 1985).74 
In theory this is (just like the processes of institutional evolution discussed 
earlier) an ongoing process. Firms continuously seek to improve the terms of explicit 
or implicit state-firm ‘contracts’, including through direct negotiations or lobbying 
73 Dolowitz & Marsh (1996: 348) similarly emphasise the mobility of firms as conferring bargaining 
advantages on TNCs vis-à-vis states. 
74 Mining is associated with significant capital expenditure, which may be considered a sunk cost once 
invested (this depends on how easy/difficult it is for another operator to take over, i.e. the degree of 
asset specificity). Sunk costs also include investment in time and non-monetary resources, e.g. internal 
resources used to develop management systems. 
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(Meyer 2004: 271; Eden et al. 2004). The regulatory environment facing a firm can 
thus be seen as a reflection of how state-firm bargaining has evolved over time.75 
In addition to access to resources, Eden et al. (2005) suggest that an account of 
firms’ objectives and interests is central to understanding state-firm bargaining. They 
argue that the extent of active bargaining will depend on the complementarity of 
private and public actors’ goals. In a context of high central government intervention 
in the private sector in many African states (discussed in section 2.2), the roles (and 
goals) of political elites will be significant and must be explicitly problematised. 
Complementary objectives may lead to constructive state-firm relations with little 
political interference. Conversely, the profit motive of a firm may lead to social 
tensions, thereby undermining government’s political objective of stability. In this 
case host states could move to sanction firms by enacting stricter regulation and/or 
increasing enforcement efforts, or penalise the firm in other ways. 
Empirical case study research on state-firm bargaining within the management 
literature has been criticised for focusing too much on overly simplistic relationships 
between one firm and one state (Schepers 2006). One critique of this approach is that 
a context of rapid globalisation renders the two-sector bargaining model incapable of 
explaining the development of industrial policies. Ramamurti (2001: 24) argues that 
bargaining has been transplanted towards bilateral or multilateral settings: many of 
the issues over which bargaining would traditionally occur are now addressed through 
the international investment regime (UN WIR 1999). He observes that TNCs are 
“particularly adept at working through home governments and international 
institutions to rewrite global rules to suit their own interests”, for instance through 
Bilateral Investment Treaties (2004: 279, see also Chowla 2005). 
A second critique holds that collective action, epistemic communities and the 
growing complexity of state-firm relations must be more closely accounted for (Eden 
et al. 2005). For instance, the proliferation and growing influence of civil society and 
other non-state actors – at national and international levels – all point to an 
increasingly complex ‘bargaining’ environment. Haslam (2007) shows evidence of 
multinational firms becoming more powerful due to globalisation, but argues that 
bargaining still relies on alliances between the firm and political and interest group 
leaders (at multiple levels of government). 
Like Haslam, I argue that the international dimension becomes embedded in 
the local bargaining process. The sources of host states’ bargaining power are those 
characteristics of a policy environment that are attractive to a would-be investor, and 
as such differ across investors depending on the investor’s own circumstances. These 
in turn depend on companies’ relationships with external stakeholders, in particular 
capital providers. 76 With greater diversity in company’s goals and resources, 
bargaining becomes more complex (because there are many different resource 
dependencies that need to be considered by the host government). Effective collective 
action becomes a more daunting task, in particular for a capacity constrained and 
institutionally weak developing country. 
75 Ramamurti (2001: 26) argues that TNCs’ sources of bargaining power include: technology, product 
differentiation, access to capital, exports (and ability to generate foreign exchange), size (as a proxy for 
non-financial resources, e.g. access to top legal advice) and ability to “play countries against one 
another”. Host states’ sources of bargaining power include: control over access to markets, natural 
resources, and local labour; ability to provide incentives, and ability to “play TNCs against one 
another”. 
76 Hall & Soskice (2001) argue that stability in the external environment matters less if a firm has more 
financial leeway from lenders. 
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2.3.6 Section conclusion 
This section first discussed the institutional turn in the social sciences and the growing 
attention to local context within development theory. It highlighted the emergence of 
notions of governance on donor and development policy agendas. It then made the 
case that the regulatory policy at the centre of my inquiry can be understood using 
institutional theory. Here I first argued that formal and informal institutions often co­
exist and exert overlapping influences on social actors. I then explored how 
institutional change could be seen as taking place through feedback loops of 
interaction – a slow process due to path dependencies. I also made the point (argued 
by North and others) that in understanding what impact institutions will have on 
individual’s behaviour, both the rules themselves as well as their enforcement matter. 
This is of key importance in understanding institutions in weak, capacity constrained 
states. When institutional change takes place it is always contested, in part because of 
transaction costs, but also because of the aforementioned overlaps of multiple 
institutions. Finally, I introduced the idea of institutions as guiding human and 
organisational behaviour. 
The third sub-section reviewed variations across the ‘new institutionalisms’ in 
the political sciences, and how they account for the relationships between institutions 
and individual behaviour. I noted how much of this writing could be critiqued for 
assuming that an organisation’s external competitive as well as policy environment 
are unproblematically interpreted by the firm. This is a particularly stark assumption 
in African states with high levels of political intervention and low levels of 
transparency. I subsequently presented an alternative approach where external 
environments are seen as socially constructed, depending on the particular norms and 
practices preferred by the state and non-state actors. I argued that this approach is 
more valid when seeking to understand a diverse set of investors from different 
institutional backgrounds (see 1.3.2). 
Turning my focus to the management literature, I noted how the resource-
based view of the firm stresses the role of internal routines, objectives, systems, and 
processes that enable the firm to create new resources configurations out of existing 
resources and routines (dynamic capabilities). Yet these will differ among firms 
depending on their institutional backgrounds. I emphasised how operating in an 
environment of extensive resource-dependencies results in uncertainty for firms 
(Pfeffer & Salancik 1978). In institutionally weak commodity-dependent states these 
resource dependencies are difficult to identify, thereby discounting the idea of 
predicting firm successes or failures as a straightforward function of dynamic 
capabilities. 
I then reviewed the literature on state-firm bargaining within the management 
literature, noting how the more recent bargaining literature highlights the need to look 
at external influences, some of which are direct (e.g. Chinese state influence) and 
some of which are indirect and structural (e.g. international commodity prices). I also 
argued that networks of actors, to the extent they share financial, political or other 
resources, must be made explicit in order to understand state-firm bargaining. The 
following section develops a theory of firm behaviour that emphasises how 




2.4 Evolutionary economics and the theory of the firm 
This section examines the theory of the firm from the perspective of evolutionary 
economics. This body of literature views organisational behaviour as shaped by 
processes, routines, and templates for behaviour, that are relatively stable over time 
(jointly referred to as organisational ‘routines’). I begin by looking at three 
foundational principles for understanding organisational behaviour: that company 
behaviour is driven by routines, that firms are goal-orientated, and that these routines 
and aims change slowly over time (I henceforth use the terms ‘objective’ and ‘aim’ 
interchangeably). This is followed by a critique of how neo-classical economics treats 
organisational behaviour and change. Finally, the section concludes. 
2.4.1 An evolutionary theory of the firm 
This sub-section looks at the theory of the firm from the perspective of three 
observations drawn from behavioural studies of organisations. First I discuss the idea 
that organisational behaviour is based on routines (Nelson & Winter 1982; Cyert & 
March 1963). Second, organisations are guided by explicit (and implicit) aims and 
objectives (Levitt & March 1988: 320). Third, organisational routines are history 
(path) dependent, such that “routines are based on interpretations of the past more 
than anticipation of the future” (Ibid.). 
2.4.1.1 Organisational routines as drivers of firm behaviour 
It is a common view among organisational theorists that a firm – in order to overcome 
cognitive limitations on information-processing and facilitate the pursuit of 
organisational objectives – creates standard operating procedures, or ‘routines’ 
(Simon 1964). Evolutionary economics places such routines at the centre of 
explaining social and economic behaviour (see Nelson & Winter 1982, 2002; also 
Hodgson 2000b). According to this view individuals do not so much deliberate 
between different courses of action as they select (mostly automatically) a course of 
action depending on what has worked for the organisation in the past. The implication 
is that organisational behaviour is guided by hierarchies of routines, or rules, a 
perspective shared with the early management theorists such as Cyert & March 
(1963). 
Organisational routines include a broad range of practices, of varying degrees 
of formalisation and codification. Formal routines include reporting systems, 
company codes of conduct, accounting systems, certifications, the division of labour 
between groups of people within the organisation, as well as technologies (Fligstein & 
Freeland 1995). Informal routines are what Polanyi (1964) calls tacit knowledge and 
what North (1990) calls shared mental models.77 Routines can further be distinguished 
between those that are directed towards engagement with external actors (customers, 
suppliers, auditors, environmental inspectors) and those that deal primarily with the 
internal workings of the firm. The latter include internal accounting methods and 
investment approval processes, as well as procurement practices.78 Burgelman (1991) 
thus suggests that organisations can be understood as ecologies of routines, echoing 
77 Squire (1987) develops a similar concept that he calls “skill memory”. 
78 As the ‘old institutional economist’ John Commons noted, “[s]ometimes an institution seems 
analogous to a building, a sort of framework of laws and regulations, within which individuals act like 
inmates. Sometimes it seems to mean the ‘behavior’ of the inmates themselves.” (1934: 69). 
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the view of overlapping institutions within organisations as well as within the African 
state. 
Organisations vary in the extent to which they can be described as routines-
based. Generally, larger firms with more specialised inputs, products and more 
complex organisational forms will tend to place a greater emphasis on routines (Levitt 
& March 1988: 327; Nelson & Winter 1982: 96-97). These are key characteristics of 
the companies studied in this thesis. 
Nelson & Winter see organisational routines as the ‘genes’ that constitute an 
organisation: routines are heritable, selectable, and overall determinant of behavioural 
processes (1982: 14). Cohen et al. (1996) see routines as creating pre-dispositions for 
behaviour that evolve over time. They define a routine as “an executable capability 
for repeated performance in some context that [has] been learned by an organisation 
in response to a selective process” (Ibid., p.683). Hodgson & Knudsen (2006: 357) 
similarly view routines as preferences when they argue that habits, routines, and 
management systems together constitute organisational genotypes that increase the 
propensity for particular behaviour. 
Organisational routines are functional in enabling the firm to respond 
effectively to complex business issues, enabling behavioural continuity in spite of 
highly limited cognitive capabilities of individual managers (Nelson & Winter 
2002).79 They are the organisational analogue of individual skills: just as new skills 
are not instantly learned overnight when needed, organisational routines take time to 
develop. Learning of new routines/skills is necessary to materialise a rational or 
optimal response to changes in the external environment, yet constitutes a process 
over time. 
One reason for this is that organisational routines routinise particular patterns 
of interaction. Different patterns of interaction will pick up different information 
about the external environment (routines thereby acting as a set of ‘filters’, see Hay & 
Wincott 1998).80 Thus the historical experiences of the firm (its ‘inferences from 
history’) – which function as guide towards further routines-development – are 
interpreted through the lens of existing routines, thereby endogenising learning. The 
process of filtering leads to a modified set of behavioural options, among which 
agents more or less automatically choose a course of action (North 2006: 59; see also 
Aoki 2005: 26; Dosi & Marengo 2000). This implies that a change in the external 
environment will never exactly correspond to a completely ‘rational’ response from 
the firm. 
2.4.1.2 Organisational objectives as drivers of firm behaviour 
An evolutionary theory of the firm must also account for organisational objectives, or 
aims (Levitt & March 1988). For example, the firm may pursue a high-quality or low-
price strategy; it may prioritise (in negotiations with government) a regulatory 
environment that is flexible or one that is stable. 
These aims depend on the institutional framework affecting the firm, including 
relationships with capital providers and home country regulations, which vary across 
firms from different institutional backgrounds. For example, hierarchies of 
organisational aims can shape behaviour by altering the time preferences of a firm. If 
79 This resonates with the oft-cited finding by Tversky & Kahneman (1974) that agents follow 
relatively simple rules of decision. 
80 Recall, too, that because of transaction costs involved in changing organisational routines, even 
where a company interprets it experience ‘accurately’ it will not instantly adapt its routines in response. 
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a firm crucially relies on funding from the international debt markets a key 
organisational goal will be to ensure the firm does not prejudice future funding by 
non-payment of interest or in other ways breaching debt covenants (including 
environmental and social safeguards dictated by the Equator Principles, see section 
6.3.1). 
Organisational aims may be held independently of routines, for instance when 
an external CEO candidate is recruited, or may be embedded in routines (I take the 
view that most routine procedures were designed, initially, with some specific 
objective in mind). The notion of ‘corporate strategy’ can best be understood as a 
combination of organisational objectives and routines, i.e. what to achieve and how. 
2.4.1.3 The path dependent nature of organisational routines and objectives 
Following the work of Nelson & Winter (2002: 30) the ontological position adopted 
here is that a routine is defined as a decision-making rule that is relatively stable over 
time. Nelson & Winter (1982: 99) argue that firms ‘remember by doing’, and that 
organisational routines function as repositories of organisational memory. If the 
experience of an individual does not somehow affect the way things are done, the 
lessons of this experience will be forgotten. Like routines, organisational aims are 
path-dependent and unlikely to change rapidly in the absence of external (e.g. changes 
to the regulatory regime) or internal (new senior management) shifts. 
It is worth highlighting that evolutionary economists’ view of routines 
underlying social behaviour (Nelson & Winter 1982) is analogous to the perspective 
of Africanist scholars of how patrimonial logics and codes are reproduced over time 
in African states. Bratton & van de Walle thus argue that “when patrimonial logic is 
internalised in the formal institutions of neopatrimonial regimes, it provides essential 
operating codes for politics that are valued, recurring, and reproduced over time.” 
(1997: 63, see also Bayart).81 
From the perspective of the firm, routines can ‘reside’ with management and 
shareholders, local and expatriate employees, as well as in historical choices of 
production technologies. Thus, when a new investor takes over a going concern, for 
instance through a privatisation process, the new company is likely to adopt some 
existing legacies of processes, systems and ‘culture’. When FDI targets a ‘going­
concern’ firm (as opposed to a ‘greenfield’ operation) the routines espoused by the 
new shareholder will therefore compete – through a constructive tension (cf. 2.3.2) – 
with routines that were already in place before the arrival of new management.82 
Nelson & Winter’s framework allows for such internal tensions, which they argue are 
always present within an organisation: a routines-based firm in no way should be 
taken to represent one that consistently upholds its nominal standards. Employees’ 
shirking, pilfering and general principal-agent problems are all consistent with a 
routines-based organisation, to the extent they occur routinely (Nelson & Winter 
1982: 108).83 
Nelson & Winter (1982: 134) offer a perspective of organisational routines as 
the genes of a firm, stressing the role of routines in increasing behavioural continuity. 
81 Bayart’s notion of how patrimonial logics and codes are reproduced over time is analogous to the 
routines underlying social behaviour according to theories of evolutionary economists (Nelson & 
Winter 1982), discussed below. 
82 I discuss this tension, and the mix between home-country and host-country institutional legacies in 
shaping firm’s routines, in more detail in chapter four. 
83 Nelson & Winter stress that “[i]n short, routine operation is consistent with routinely occurring 
laxity, slippage, rule-breaking, defiance, and even sabotage” (1982: 108). 
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Even where the surrounding environment changes, managers will exhibit path-
dependent behaviour (Fligstein & Freeland 1995) by continuing with procedures that 
have worked for them in the past (Nelson & Winter 1982). This resonates with 
North’s argument that “path dependence is not ‘inertia’ … rather it is the constraints 
on the choice-set in the present that are derived from historical experiences” (2005: 
52). 
Routines change slowly because they are costly to change: mechanisms and 
processes for internal reporting are costly to set up, and address specific operational 
and strategic concerns. Routines are also difficult to change by decree because over 
time they become internalised (taken for granted) by management. Over time 
previously explicit and questionable guidelines become taken-for-granted cognitive 
frames of reference (Helmke & Levitsky 2004). Therefore, routines and aims will not, 
and cannot, be thoroughly re-evaluated every time the economic and political 
environment changes. 
2.4.2 The evolutionary critique of orthodox (neoclassical) economics 
In critiquing orthodox (neoclassical) economics and the methodological individualism 
it represents, Herbert Simon argued that “the rational individual is, and must be, an 
organised and institutionalised individual” (Simon [1945]1997: 111). According to 
Simon, individual self-interest-seeking could never be the full explanation of 
behavioural differences among organisations. Rather, any kind of rational behaviour 
could only be possible within a framework of value assumptions, cognitive frames, 
routines and rules. 
Unlike orthodox economic theory, Nelson & Winter’s framework incorporates 
organisational routines and objectives into the conceptualisation of decision rules and 
production technology. In neoclassical economics the choice of production 
technology is a simple cost-benefit decision without regard for a firm’s proficiency in 
deploying this technology. In evolutionary theory, by contrast, both are 
conceptualised as routines, based on the observation that operating technology always 
involves human interactions (1982: 15). Nelson & Winter (1982: 94) also critique 
orthodox economics for allowing for ‘skill’ by identifying it with maximising 
behaviour. They argue this is unrealistic and that people do things because they 
(already) know how to do it (e.g. drive a car), and that individuals’ choices of which 
skills to acquire generally proceed their usage of these skills. 
In comparison to other institutional ‘schools’, evolutionary economics appears 
closer to the ‘old’ institutional economics (see e.g. Commons 1934 and the work of 
Thorstein Veblen) than to the ‘new’ institutional economics.84 First, authors within 
the latter tradition appear closer to neoclassical economics in their methodological 
individualism (taking the self-interested, maximising individual as given). This 
ontology of the individual was rejected by the old institutional economists (see 
Rutherford 1996; Hodgson 2000b) as well as evolutionary economists. Second, the 
‘old’ institutional economics sees markets as instantiations of institutions, 
emphasising processes of interaction over individual choice. This latter view 
84 Ghoshal & Moran (1996) critique Williamson’s transaction cost theory for its methodological 
individualism in conceiving of intra-organisational and market institutions as identical, both being 
‘instruments’ appropriated by individuals driven by self-interest and opportunism. They argue that for 
transaction cost theory to be grounded in a real and balanced account of human nature, it must take into 
account the role of confidence and trust. 
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resonates strongly with the view of evolutionary policy making developed in section 
2.2.2.3. 
Finally, evolutionary theory has – unlike neoclassical economic theory – a 
distinctly empirical relevance, where “the ultimate discipline on the representation of 
firm behaviour is considered to be empirical” (Nelson & Winter 1982: 410). This 
implies that assumptions that firms pursue profits, minimise costs, that they expand 
when profitable, and that they satisfice, are only dealt with to the extent they carry 
empirical relevance.85 A real-world context of rapid change is unaccounted for by 
orthodox theory that does not recognise management decision-making as skilful. By 
recognising management behaviour as skilful, evolutionary economics recognises that 
questions of change in the external environment matter. 
2.4.3 Section conclusion 
This section has reviewed the evolutionary economics literature to develop the 
concept of organisational routines and objectives as a basis for understanding 
organisational behaviour. I first argued that organisational routines could be seen as a 
basis for understanding firm behaviour. Such routines enable behavioural continuity 
in cognitively complex environments, by routinising action. Similarly, organisational 
objectives serve as a basis of behavioural ‘rules of thumb’ by acting as a normative 
benchmark against which historical action is judged. Jointly they determine an 
organisation’s patterns of interaction with the external environment. Both reflect the 
rules and expectations that arise from various stakeholders, including the parent 
company, shareholders and other capital providers, as well as the international 
experience of managers. Routines and aims also act as filters, determining what 
information will be picked up on by the firm. 
I argued that routines and aims are path dependent and change slowly (much 
like regulatory institutions, see 2.3.2). This means that there will always be some mis­
match between what is going on in the policy environment and the internal routines, 
aims and practices of firms. In the context of this study it implies that the routines that 
managers bring with them from abroad continue to shape the behaviour of foreign 
investors once in Zambia. 
The evolutionary approach in economics is able to explain seemingly rational 
behaviour (efficient firm responses) with reference to routines rather than often 
unrealistic assumptions of rational optimisation by the individual. Neoclassical 
economics, by contrast, is based on comparison of conditions of two or more 
equilibria. Furthermore it is silent on the economic and political processes whereby a 
firm’s behaviour changes from one equilibrium to another (Nelson & Winter 1982: 
163; Mahoney & Rueschemeyer 2003: 213). 86 By emphasising both the role of 
routines in guiding firm behaviour and the view that path-dependent routines will 
always be in a ‘mis-match’ with the external environment, the evolutionary approach 
eschews a focus on equilibrium. 
85 In this sense, my approach to explain economic activity through an evolutionary framework that 
emphasises learning constitutes an effort to maintain empirical grounding. 
86 Mahoney & Rueschemeyer (2003: 213) reflect on how theories of path dependence and institutional 
evolution present a departure from (punctuated) equilibrium theory. Both Williamson’s and North’s 
strands of institutionalism emphasise “the multiplicity of equilibria” (Bardhan 2001: 270). However 
they do not adequately explain how the economy moves from one equilibria to another. 
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2.5 Organisational learning 
This section puts forward three perspectives on organisational learning. I first define 
organisational learning as a social activity that results in changes to organisational 
routines and aims. Second, I discuss how learning can take place at the individual as 
well as collective level, but always being a path dependent process. Third, I point to 
different levels of learning, with different outcomes for the organisations involved. 
Fourth, I look at how learning can be seen as a collective activity, and how routines 
and aims are disseminated across wider groups of organisations. Fifth, I discuss the 
role of organisational learning in evolutionary policy making. This is where I bring 
the state back into my framework for analysing firm behaviour. 
2.5.1 Perspectives on organisational learning 
Different definitions of organisational learning exist within the social science 
literature. Organisational theorist Herbert Simon defined learning as growing insights 
and restructurings of organisational systems by individuals, that over time come to be 
reflected in structural elements of the organisation itself (Simon 1969). This means 
that – to the extent these structural elements are path-dependent and costly to change 
(as argued in the previous section) – the corollary of learning from past experience is 
path dependence. In other words, learning today results in path-dependence 
tomorrow. 
Hodgson & Knudsen view learning as the replication of habits, arguing that 
“this replication process cannot be completed without the existence of a common 
language. The ability to refer to common mental models through language enables 
communication and thereby replication of mental models” (2006: 359). Nelson & 
Winter see organisational competences as based on organisational learning, which 
they define (loosely) as the cumulative development of “skills and routines” through 
practice (2002: 29). 
Levitt & March similarly define organisational learning as the “encoding [of] 
inferences from history into [organisational] routines that guide behaviour” (1988: 
320).87 They argue that this focus on routines and “ecologies of learning” places their 
approach closer to “the traditions of behavioural theories of organisational decision-
making” (Ibid.) of evolutionary economics (see, for instance, Winter 1986 and Carroll 
1984). 88 Other scholars have adopted a less “ecological” approach to learning, 
defining learning as instances of new insights or knowledge within single 
organisations (Argyris & Schön 1978, Hedberg 1981), and as the emergence of new 
structures (Chandler 1962) or systems (Jelinek 1979, Miles 1982). 
2.5.2 Individual vs. organisational learning 
At one level, the idea of organisational learning is a metaphor, given that 
organisations are made up by individuals and do not exist in the absence of these 
individuals. Argyris & Schön (1978: 190) therefore insist on the importance of the 
individual in their organisational learning framework. They suggest that the process of 
87 Like Nelson & Winter (1982) they define routines broadly as encompassing “the forms, rules, 
procedures, conventions, strategies, and technologies” through which the firm operates, including “the 
structure of beliefs, frameworks, paradigm, codes, cultures” that support, elaborate or contradict the 
formal routines (Levitt & March 1988: 320). 
88 However, unlike my approach in this thesis, Levitt & March conceptualise organisational learning as 
a largely one-way process and neglect the role of feedback loops in explaining organisational change. 
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learning is driven by conflict between (groups of) individuals within an organisation, 
arising out of a mismatch between expectations and outcomes. These conflicts may 
generate processes of inquiry, which in turn lead to revisions of routines and 
behavioural standards (learning). 
The ontological position adopted here is that organisational learning is more 
than a collection of individuals’ learning. This is partly because the organisation 
functions as a depository of individuals’ experiences that can be drawn on and shared 
amongst individuals constituting the organisation. I adapt the view (central to 
evolutionary economics) that the firm is not merely a nexus of formal contracts, 
determining the rights and responsibilities of actors (as suggested by Fama 1980). 
Rather, much of the intra-organisational agreements are informal, normative, and 
implicit (i.e. behaviour does not always represent ‘conscious’ routine-following). 
The view that part of what constitutes the firm is ‘invisible’ is at the core of 
the argument (see section 2.3.4) that what management theorists call ‘dynamic 
capabilities’ can provide sustained competitive advantage to the firm: because much 
of the agreements among individuals within a firm is normative or implicit, it cannot 
be possible (as observed by Teece et al. 1997) for an entrepreneur to arrive one day 
and overnight piece together a set of organisational capabilities to replicate a leading 
firm. 
2.5.3 Learning as search and learning-by-doing 
This sub-section highlights two theoretical perspectives on how organisational 
learning takes place. The first is based on Nelson & Winter’s perspective on 
organisational learning which emphasises “the joint action of search and selection” 
through which “firms evolve over time, with the condition of the industry in each 
period bearing the seeds of its condition in the following period.” (1982: 19). 
The actions of search and selection are defined as the purposeful acquisition of 
information or technologies by the firm, with the aim of changing the organisation’s 
current way of doing business (i.e. to alter existing routines and aims). It is based on 
the idea that organisations are continuously asking themselves ‘what are we doing that 
is appropriate or inappropriate?’. This self-reflection feature of organisations is based 
on internal routines that support the search for better ways of capturing, controlling 
and reflecting on business issues (corporate governance and reporting, meetings of the 
board and its committees). Routines that facilitate self-reflection combined with 
routines that facilitate information capture can be jointly seen as the firm’s capability 
for ‘learning-to-learn’ (Levitt & March 1988). 
Nelson & Winter’s search and selection resonates with the argument of 
sociological institutionalists that firms ‘search’ for ways to copy routines of other 
organisations because convergence of organisational features grants legitimacy (and 
power) to organisations (see section 2.5.5 below). Over time, this search function may 
drive convergence within the sector, as firms actively seek legitimacy by imitating the 
organisational routines and aims of market leaders (Meyer & Rowan 1977; Zucker 
1977). Doing so enables rule-followers to more easily mobilise resources from 
society. 
An alternative view of learning is that it is more of an evolutionary, passive 
activity, which takes place largely from the firm constantly assessing its performance 
and making incremental changes to its practices (i.e. passive ‘search’ rather than 
active ‘search’). Over time, repeated transactions reveal the preferences of 
stakeholders and counterparties, and a firm may modify its practices accordingly in 
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order to economise on transaction costs (judging outcomes – albeit imperfectly – 
against organisational aims). Change results from reflection of what has worked in the 
past, the assessment of which is made possible through repeated interactions (Greif 
1998: 81). 89 This process is more likely to yield greater alignment – and more 
efficient routines – in transparent and non-monopolistic markets where repeat 
transactions will promote specialisation and therefore learning. 
2.5.4 Different depths of learning 
In distinguishing between different ‘depths’ of organisational learning, Argyris & 
Schön (1978) develop the concepts of ‘single-loop’ and ‘double-loop’ learning.90 
‘Single-loop’ learning is understood as unreflexive adaptation, resulting in a form of 
learning that “restricts itself to detecting and correcting errors within [a] given system 
of rules” (Argyris & Schön 1978: 20-28). Single-loop learning includes changes to 
company policies but without any change to strategies or funding for implementation. 
‘Double-loop’ learning, on the other hand, is associated with changes to 
managers’ existing preferences and underlying norms held by managers that reflect 
formal and informal organisational routines and aims (what Argyris & Schön refer to 
as managers’ ‘theories-in-use’). 91 Double-loop learning includes changes in the 
routines and policy instruments used, including a re-allocation of enforcement 
mandates – including changes to the means whereby a particular organisational 
objective is implemented. 
To illustrate, if a firm when faced with media pressure over its safety record 
decides to institute a new role as head of safety, this change constitutes in-and-of­
itself an instance of single-loop learning. However if the new head of safety is given a 
clear mandate, reporting responsibilities and resources needed to pursue this mandate 
– thus resulting in a materially different approach to addressing health and safety 
concerns – this constitutes double-loop organisational learning. 
The concept of double-loop learning is associated with greater reflection over 
what one is seeking to achieve and how: “it is through double-loop learning alone that 
individuals or organisations can address the desirability of the values and norms that 
govern their theories-in-use” (Argyris & Schön 1996: 22). A “double feedback loop 
… connects the detection of error not only to strategies and assumptions of effective 
performance but to the values and norms that define effective performance” (1996: 
23).92 The distinction between different levels of learning is analytically useful and 
applied in my analysis of empirical findings in chapter eight. 
89 This argument resonates with concepts of forward and backward economic linkages: firms may 
integrate backward in order to obtain better information about prices and quality of inputs (see Arrow 
1975). 
90 An analogy between organisational learning and policy-making is made by Hall (1993: 278) through 
a similar distinction between first-, second-, and third-order learning. He illustrates with the example of 
government policy, which can be seen as comprising three components: the parameters of these 
instruments (e.g. pollution standards, minimum wage levels); the policy instruments and techniques 
used to achieve these objectives (institutions); and the overarching idea that constitutes the social 
objective of policy (Hall 1993: 278). 
91 Theories-in-use are defined as the formal and informal routines and worldviews through which 
individuals’ construct their responses to outside interest groups. Double-loop learning may take place 
at two levels: that which changes theories-in-use, and that which changes processes of inquiry (the way 
in which these theories-in-use are developed, i.e. learning about learning). 
92 This illustrates the evolutionary character of learning: the benchmark against which performance is 
measured is itself evolving over time. 
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2.5.5 Learning as a collective activity: diffusion of rules and norms 
As argued above, evolutionary economics seeks to explain economic change through 
an understanding of how routines are spread to actors in wider society (Nelson & 
Winter 2002: 25). It shares this aim with organisational sociologists that attempt to 
explain how norms and practices become diffused across a wider “organisational 
field”. 93 The literature on organisational sociology is, however, generally more 
concerned with organisational learning as a collective activity. 
DiMaggio and Powell argue that rules and norms are diffused across the 
organisational field through a process of institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio & 
Powell 1983: 148, 1991; March & Levitt 1988). They point to three forms of 
information diffusion. First, coercive diffusion is where information is broadcasted, 
e.g. through regulatory requirements. Second, mimetic diffusion refers to where 
information is spread from one adoptee to another, sometimes through intermediary 
organisations, e.g. staff turnover, consultants, and trade associations (see Biggart 
1977). Third, normative diffusion is where rules spread by certification boards, higher 
education institutions, political sentiment, as well as through self-reflection over what 
constitutes appropriate norms and behaviour. 
Granovetter (1985) provides an more longitudinal take on how routines and 
institutions get transplanted between actors. He argues that economic relationships 
over time become embedded in social structures through processes akin to Grindle & 
Thomas’ feedback loops (see 2.2.2.3). Granovetter’s form of institutional embedding 
is a two-way process of mutual adaptation: one might expect host-country 
stakeholders (including regulatory agencies) voluntarily adopt some of the foreign 
investors’ preferred approaches to interaction.94 
Diffusion of organisational routines and aims may take place through 
organisations coming together around particular interests (i.e. interest groups). To the 
extent that companies within an industry have common interests they can cooperate 
and exert greater influence over other (groups of) stakeholders. For instance, 
companies may wish to present a common political position vis-à-vis government or 
through associations such as chambers of commerce. Over time, these cooperative 
practices can lead to convergence by disseminating routines across the organisational 
field. However cooperation cannot be taken for granted, and Ostrom (2000: 475) 
argues that ‘social dilemmas’ often present themselves for actors seeking collective 
action. Such dilemmas arise from a range of structural variables including actors’ 
general heterogeneity, different discount rates, and information asymmetries. 
2.5.6 Organisational learning and evolutionary policy making 
Policy changes often come about as part of the political process, e.g. in response to 
electorate demands, to placate donors, or to transfer resources to different constituents 
(see discussion in chapter four). Within the evolutionary framework developed in this 
chapter, state-firm negotiations around proposed policies become complex processes. 
The routines that are best suited to one set of policies may not be suited to another, so 
93 DiMaggio & Powell define an organisational field as a group of organisations that share a set of 
institutions. In addition to the firm and its direct competitors, an institutional field includes “key 
suppliers, resources and product consumers, regulatory agencies and other organisations that produce 
similar services or products” (1983: 148). 
94 This may be the case particularly where TNCs have significant influence on local stakeholders (e.g. 
making significant contributions to government revenues, providing scarce employment opportunities, 
procuring a large amount of production inputs etc.). 
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that firms from different institutional backgrounds (with different sets of routines, 
aims and resources) will see different benefits and cost associated with a particular 
government policy. Added to this complexity is the impact of an endogenously 
changing external environment (which means the result of a given set of routines and 
interactions are not constant over time). As Levitt & March put it, “[b]ecause of the 
simultaneous adapting behaviour of other organisations, a routine may produce 
different outcomes at different times, or different routines may produce the same 
outcome at different times.” (1988: 331). 
Firms sometimes obtain information about proposed policies because 
governments wish to brief them ahead of making binding changes to the regulatory 
framework. This reduces transaction costs of future enforcement and giving firms 
time to adjust to the new rules of the game (coercive diffusion). The firm also gleans 
new information about the external environment through contact with enforcement 
agencies, for instance through inspections and efforts to collect compliance-related 
data (coercive diffusion). Finally, information about what is expected of firms may 
also reach managers through the media (in particular in countries with state-controlled 
media) and advocacy groups (normative diffusion). 
Firms may also actively seek information about government’s policy agenda 
by engaging with external actors (mimetic diffusion): firms will expend resources to 
engage with government to obtain new information about the direction of planned 
policy, enabling them to make more predictable business plans. Information may be 
sought through formal or informal channels (e.g. personal visits to senior government 
officials), and directly or through mediating organisations. Lastly, this may take place 
through participating in stakeholder consultations over new policy. This is a mix of 
coercive and mimetic diffusion of rules, more commonly found in developing 
countries that are heavily reliant on foreign capital and therefore need to 
accommodate investors. 
An evolutionary view of policy making acknowledges that firms have 
different options in responding to such emerging policy proposals (see 2.2.2). First, 
firms may take on board whatever policy changes the government is proposing, go 
hat-in-hand to shareholders to explain the costs implications (e.g. for cleaner 
technology or higher tax rates), and get on with business. Alternatively, firms may try 
to fight their corner by, for instance, threatening cut-backs in investment or 
employment. This latter approach requires three things. First, information on which to 
base action (e.g. firms could argue their case with reference to their superior 
knowledge of the technicalities of their industries). Second, firms would need 
resources with which to effectuate action (Pfeffer 1981), and mechanisms through 
which to make their position known (e.g. access to senior policy makers). The 
mechanisms whereby the private sector expresses these interests will sometimes be 
formal, as when government approaches companies to consult over new regulation, or 
informally expressed through personal networks (see 2.2.1). A third option is 
available to firms, in particular in less transparent environments. Firms may simply 
‘do nothing’ and stall, in the hope that limited regulatory capacity (and easily 
corrupted inspectors) will allow it to proceed without internalising higher costs 
associated with proposed policy changes.95 In fact, in a fast-changing regulatory, 
political, and social context, expending resources on trying to adapt to local (weakly 
Mining companies with low levels of transparency and accountability (e.g. limited reporting) will 
have fewer reasons to comply. For example, some organisational impacts (e.g. environmental) are 
inherently non-transparent, i.e. people may know that they are affected until (for example) they or their 




enforced) regulatory demands may not be in the firm’s interest. I therefore 
hypothesise that in a context of the co-existing, overlapping, unclear and sometimes 
competing institutions of African countries, firms’ existing routines-in-place will play 
a significant role in determining the course of action chosen by the firm. 
2.5.7 Section conclusion 
In this section I introduced the concept of organisational learning and defined it as 
changes to organisational routines and aims (defined, in turn, in the preceding 
section). I examined how routines change as a result of ongoing social interaction 
through which firms acquire new information about the external environment. The 
literature review focused on processes of learning that result from social interaction 
between the organisation and its external environment. 96 I also noted how 
organisational learning must always be a metaphor, as any organisational learning in 
essence constitutes patterns of learning among individuals. 
The third sub-section then explored how learning can take place through 
proactive search within the external environment and learning-by-doing through the 
accumulation of experience. I then introduced the two concepts of single-loop and 
double-loop learning to distinguish between more superficial learning and that which 
is associated with changes in underlying norms, values and resources. Having looked 
at perspectives largely concerned with what goes on inside the firm, the fifth sub­
section reviewed perspectives on how routines and rules spread through collective 
action. 
Finally I argued that organisational learning must be understood as a function 
of the politics as well as political culture shaping a country’s policy process. When 
new regulations emerge firms are able to respond in different ways, e.g. by 
accommodating it, lobbying against it, or in some cases simply by ignoring it. This 
will result in different learning outcomes for the firm (i.e. different degrees of change 
and adaptation in organisational routines) depending on the nature of its engagement 
as well as its institutional background. 
2.6 Chapter conclusion 
In this cross-disciplinary review of the literature I have argued that a holistic view of 
state-firm relations and policy evolution must take into account how internal firm-
based routines as well as wider institutions shape organisational behaviour. On the 
one hand, the incentive structures embodied in the institutional environment are 
constantly changing, through new industrial policies and regulations or political 
pressures (in particular in economically strategic sectors). On the other hand, firm-
specific organisational routines themselves change over time, through processes of 
organisational learning. In these processes the foreign investor aligns its practices 
with demands and expectations of local as well as external stakeholders.97 These 
96 Hall argues that “competition for power can itself be a vehicle for social learning” (1993: 289). 
Hirschman’s notion of social learning within an organisation is similarly based on interaction, and 
understood as externalities from knowledge that arises from forward and backward linkages 
(Hirschman 1958). 
97 In support of this argument is the fact that organisations, most evidently in the private sector with its 
profit motive, have an incentive to learn from own experiences even in the absence of new information 
about their institutional environment. By reducing transactions costs, such organisational learning can 
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demands and expectations are themselves in a constant state of flux, and are likely to 
shift significantly when a company enters a new and unfamiliar market. Both 
institutions and organisational routines are thus path-dependent and develop through 
social interaction. I thus see the path of state-firm interaction and policy evolution as a 
combination of what the firm can do (its dynamic capabilities) and what the external 
environment rewards (as determined by policies and institutions). 
This chapter comprised four sections, beginning with an examination of policy 
making in the African state. I first reviewed the literature on the African state, 
followed by a review of perspectives on the relative roles of the state and interest 
groups in policy making. I noted the overlapping formal and informal features, as well 
as often highly centralised governance, of the neopatrimonial state. Moreover, I 
observed how the current dependence of many developing countries on private 
investment to generate economic growth predisposes the state to take on a role of 
enabler, as well as regulator, of foreign investment. 
An evolutionary perspective of policy making best captures these features, 
enabling us to understand regulatory policy as mutually constituted through a process 
of continuous interaction and feedback loops. Thus, although policy may be mandated 
by ministries, de facto policy is often set by street-level (implementing) bureaucrats in 
conjunction with regulated entities themselves. 
In the second section of this chapter I argued that regulatory policy could be 
understood using institutional theory. Indeed, all state-firm interaction is mediated by 
the state’s institutional infrastructure, through which actions (including those of the 
state itself) are legitimated. I explored various perspectives from the new institutional 
economics, as well as the ‘new institutionalisms’ in political science. Here I sought to 
show that key categories from institutional theory could be applied to policy process 
described in the previous section. I subsequently noted how the idea of socially 
constructed environments had risen to prominence as a critique of more rationalist 
explanations for how organisations respond to changes in their external environments. 
Given my focus in this study on large multinational companies, I then 
examined perspectives on organisational behaviour in the management literature, in 
particular the popular resource-based view of the firm. This body of theory holds that 
firms can generate competitive advantage by combining existing resources, including 
intangible managerial skills (routines), in new ways. It argues that a firm’s abilities to 
do so – its ‘dynamic capabilities’ – are key to explaining firm behaviour (see 2.3.4). 
In critiquing this perspective I argued that the notion of a firm’s dynamic 
capabilities must be expanded to include, for instance, the ability to reach and engage 
(informally of formally) with stakeholders (the power to be heard). Indeed, access to 
the political leadership is likely to be a key resource in its own right for anyone 
seeking to influence the direction of policy, given Africanist scholars’ accounts of the 
role of centralised and personalised power. I also noted that theories of dynamic 
capabilities assume a relatively stable external environment. In practice in many 
developing countries – where the external operating environment is subject to rapid 
change due to volatile commodity markets, privatisation, and various unsettled 
aspects of governance – a firm’s (dynamic) capabilities are unlikely to provide 
companies with and sustainable competitive advantage (see section 2.3.4). 
To conclude the second section of this chapter I reviewed the management 
literature on state-firm bargaining, including more recent accounts that see state-firm 
increase a firm’s profitability (Williamson 1985). Note however that while learning can reduce 
transaction costs, learning itself is associated with costly change. 
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bargaining as having been transplanted to the multilateral fora. I critiqued this 
literature for not accounting for variations in bargaining dynamics across companies 
with different preferences, in turn depending on their institutional background, 
including operational routines and norms of business. 
The third section of this chapter developed an evolutionary theory of the firm 
that conceptualises firm behaviour as guided by path-dependent routines (the 
embodiment of managerial skill) and the unintended consequences of action. It was 
based on the evolutionary economics literature, which seeks to explain the paths by 
which organisations (and the wider economy) develop over time. Unlike neoclassical 
economics, it eschews a focus on particular equilibrium characteristics. 
Evolutionary economics resonates strongly with features of the neopatrimonial 
African state. For instance, Bayart’s (1991) notion of how patrimonial logics and 
codes are reproduced over time is analogous to the routines underlying social 
behaviour according to theories of evolutionary economists (Nelson & Winter 1982). 
I also found the focus on routines within evolutionary economics to resonate with the 
resource-based view of the firm as driven by dynamic capabilities. 
Within the work of Nelson & Winter and other evolutionary economists I 
found support for the notion, developed in section two, that an organisation’s 
environment is socially constructed. Because of the path dependence of routines as 
well as institutions, there will always be tension in state-firm relationships, and to 
some degree a mis-match between exiting routines and the external environment. This 
mis-match is likely to be greater in a context of rapid change, e.g. volatile commodity 
markets, varying demands form capital markets for different firms, different norms 
and variations across institutional backgrounds more generally. 
In the fourth and final section of this chapter I developed the concept of 
organisational learning. Over time, through ongoing interaction, organisational 
routines and aims evolve in tandem with government policy. This section highlighted 
how organisational learning can – over time – result in convergence in practices 
through various mechanisms (e.g. learning as search, learning-by-doing, and 
institutional isomorphism). 
However the process of convergence is by no means automatic. As Levitt & 
March put it: “[o]ne organisation’s action is another organisation’s outcome” (1988: 
332). This leads to a view of organisational behaviour that is – like the institutions 
discussed in section 2.3.2 – always contested. The idea of a socially constructed 
external environment seems particularly applicable in developing countries such as 
Zambia with limited state accountability and transparency. Such operating 
environments will reduce the ability of firms to validate and confirm their 
interpretations of what other stakeholders are doing. 
I highlighted how firms can respond in different ways, and that a socially 
constructed external environment (see 2.3.3.2) makes convergence less likely (as 
different actors, de facto, interpret things differently). In this process of organisational 
learning, organisational routines and aims play a dual role of governing patterns of 
interaction (influencing what information will reach the firm) and acting as filters 
(influencing how this information will be interpreted). Thus, since learning depends 
on information capture through interaction, and interaction is conditioned by routines, 
the firm’s ability to learn is endogenous to its already-in-place routines. 
In conclusion, this chapter has argued that an evolutionary approach to policy 
making is well-suited to explaining institutional developments in Zambia’s mining 
sector. Within this framework, external shocks are not required for institutions to 
change, rather institutions evolve continuously through social interaction. In this 
~ 62 ~

approach the concept of organisational learning is an organising principle: it is 
defined in relation to the organisation (my key unit of analysis) yet is a central 
concept in theories of institutional evolution as occurring through feedback loops 
between actors and institutions. 
Effective policy making implies that the state is able to devise and implement 
policies that apply equally across regulated firms. If growing south-south FDI is now 
leading to greater diversity among investors into institutionally weak developing 
states, how is it affecting the host-country regulatory policy framework? Is there 
evidence of convergence across investors (as well as between investors and the state)? 
These questions are of importance to academics and policy makers interested in 
implications of the growing investment from China, India and other emerging 
markets, and will be explored empirically in chapter four through seven. Before doing 





The aim of this thesis is to understand how policy evolves in weak commodity 
dependent states, in a context of high organisational diversity. To pursue this aim, 
chapter one developed the following two research questions: 
•	 How do state-firm relations and regulatory policy making evolve in weak 
resource-dependent countries? 
•	 What shapes processes of convergence or divergence around regulatory 
standards in the Zambian mining sector? 
To answer the research questions I conducted case study research on four foreign 
mining companies (representing roughly half of the total Zambian production of 
copper in 2006), through five months fieldwork between July and December 2007. 
Zambia’s copper mining sector was chosen as an appropriate location for conducting 
this research given the significant (and increasing) presence of emerging-country 
investors (Chinese and Indian firms). I examine four case study companies including 
an Indian company, a Chinese company, as well as two more ‘western’ 
multinationals. 
The case study method was chosen in part because I wanted to situate these 
companies in their Zambian context: the strength of the case study method rests in its 
ability to provide a holistic and ‘deep’ account of the research subject in its natural 
setting (Gerring 2004). As Gerring observes, “[o]ne may think of depth as referring to 
the detail, richness, completeness, wholeness, or degree of variance that is accounted 
for by an explanation” (2004: 348). The process of triangulation between different 
sources of data offers the potential for reliable and valid research results. 
This chapter presents the methodology adopted for this thesis, including 
reflections over data collection and analysis. The methods themselves as well as 
attending reflections are usually presented jointly, rather than having a self-contained 
section on research relfexivity. 98 First I discuss the research design (instruments, 
sample selection) and my motivations for adopting this design. I then give an 
overview of how the study was operationalised, including reflections on how the 
approach evolved whilst in the field. A section that discusses data analysis and 
presentation then follows. Finally I address questions of validity and potential bias, 
before the chapter concludes. 
3.1.1 Limitations in scope 
A methodological limitation is that I was unable to conduct primary research in the 
home countries of each case study firm, to learn more about autonomy of the firm in 
relation to head-office or shareholder influences. This would have been useful in light 
of the discussion in chapter one about how the institutional background matters for 
the firm (see 1.3.2). Instead, I tried to illuminate the ‘mix’ between companies’ 
locally and externally driven decision-making routines through my interviews with 
98 Given that my approach evolved (in part through my own reflections) whilst in the field, my 




company representatives and others. Further theme-specific limitations in scope arose 
from a combination of general time and resource constraints. 
3.2 Research design: case study as method 
The term ‘case study’ has been used to refer to many different approaches to 
designing and implementing research in the social sciences. A case study may 
connote, inter alia, a study that is focused on in-depth fieldwork, that focuses on one 
or a few instances of a phenomenon (small-N analysis) or that uses qualitative 
methods (Gerring 2004: 342). It is also associated with identifying and explicating 
causal mechanisms (Ibid. p.348). Braithwaite & Drahos argue that explanations to 
social phenomena should focus on mechanisms (i.e. means, rather than ends) because 
“[r]arely will social scientists be able to state necessary and sufficient conditions 
under which the various mechanisms are ‘switched on’” (2000: 15; see also Elster 
1989: 9).99 This relates to the general difficulty in the social science research of 
establishing a counter-factual, a problem that is compounded when researching 
complex and evolutionary phenomena. 
The case study method is also considered appropriate for generating and 
testing theory about previously understudied topics (Yin 1994; George & Bennett 
2004). Case studies can be conducted and analysed within a positivist as well as a 
constructivist/interpretivist epistemology, as the case study method does not, per se, 
carry implications for research philosophy (Gerring 2004: 345). The focus on policy 
evolution within a context of high organisational diversity resulting from south-south 
FDI is a novel topic, lacking established theory. I therefore adopted the case study 
method as a research approach that would allow me to move between inductive and 
deductive reasoning. 
In this section I first discuss the research instrument, followed by the sample 
selection process and the appropriateness of this sample for answering my research 
questions. 
3.2.1 The research instrument: qualitative interviews 
3.2.1.1 Semi-structured interviews 
I collected data mainly through interviews with representatives of four case-study 
firms, as well as government agencies and non-state stakeholders. These interviews 
were generally semi-structured: I asked questions of varying open-endedness and used 
prompts to ensure that the desired topics were covered. 
I followed Gillham’s advise that elite interviews be “loosely structured at 
best” (2005: 54). I expected government decision makers and organisational 
representatives to be sensitive regarding what information they provided, and did not 
want to jeopardise their trust by appearing to inquisitive (at least upon first contact). 
Although less structured interviews with fewer ‘prompts’ are more likely to contain 
‘gaps’ (where one theme is not fully explored before the interview moves on to the 
next theme), they will also contain a greater element of discovery (Gillham 2005: 
132). Given my focus on the nascent phenomenon of large-scale south-south FDI, I 
saw this process of discovery as key to my research. 
99 Whilst social science can identify causal mechanisms that lead to an event (and thus shed light on 
why something happened), the reasons why that particular mechanisms rather than another was 
triggered is likely to remain veiled. 
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The interview approach varied slightly between different organisational 
groups: interviews with mining companies and government representatives were more 
focused, seeking to illuminate certain issues and relationships suggested by theory or 
prior data collection, with an aim to facilitate intra-group comparison of responses. 
Interviews with other stakeholders were less structured and more interviewee-led. 
This was the case in particular during early stages of fieldwork, when my objective 
was to map out the issues, the mechanisms of influence, as well as identification of 
further key informants to contact (resonating with the approach of grounded theory, 
see Charmaz 2000).100 
Interview data was complemented by documentary reviews, including 
financial reports and regulatory instruments (laws, statutory instruments), as well as 
informal conversations.101 
I had overall descent success in obtaining legal documents, although firm-
specific reports on regulatory compliance were accessible mainly in the area of 
environmental regulation. As I was also interested in understanding the financial 
conditions of companies, I tried to and was able to source the annual reports of some 
of the privatised mines.102 
3.2.1.2 Questions asked 
I operationalised the key theoretical concepts identified in chapter two and asked a 
range of questions about managers’ (and other interviewees) relationships with other 
firms, state or non-state actors. I found that many respondents did not distinguish in 
their accounts between organisational routines and aims. Consequently, I began 
asking about companies’ ‘practices’, a concept I defined as the manifestation of 
routines and aims. 
Before leaving for Zambia I developed a ‘master’ interview schedule that 
included questions grouped by the firm-stakeholder relationships that I wanted to 
explore. Although I envisaged that this list of questions would change once in the 
field, I wanted to have base-line set of questions before leaving for the field (given 
constraints on time once there, see Arksey & Knight 1999: 7). The interview schedule 
was purposely developed to go from more open to more closed questions, to allow for 
further discovery during initial stages of interview (particularly important during early 
stages of the project, when I was still seeking to uncover relationships and issues of 
interest). 
I was keen to ensure that interview questions were salient to my respondents. 
Daniels & Cannice (2004) note that business executives appear more at ease with 
interviews if questions are seen as salient and if they can expect to learn something 
about other companies in their industry. Upon arrival in Zambia my interview 
schedule was reviewed in a focus group consisting of 16 MBA students at the 
Copperbelt University on 3 August 2007. Throughout fieldwork I also endeavoured to 
100 Note that this will not ‘pure’ grounded theory in the form advocated by Glaser and Strauss (1967) in 
the sense of constant interaction between data and theory (see also Bryman & Burgess 1994: 5-6). 
Rather I am suggesting that I systematically revisited theory in light of additional data gathering. 
101 Informal conversations in the field often help to “uncover complexities” (Arksey & Knight 1999: 
26). 
102 My hypothesis was that financial accounts could illuminate some resource interdependencies and 
the role of institutional constraints in shaping firm behaviour. For example, data on financial strength, 
cash flow, and indebtedness, as well as breakdowns of revenue and cost types can demonstrate who a 




review relevant secondary data before meeting interviewees and adjusting my choice 
of questions accordingly, to prevent interview-time being spent on superfluous 
description. 
In interviewing mining companies my initial plan was, in broad terms, to first 
ask respondents to themselves identify who their most important counterparties 
(policy and economic stakeholders) were, how they viewed these actors, the 
modalities of their interaction (cooperation vs. conflict; formal vs. informal) and how 
this relationship had evolved over time. However, this linear model was rarely 
applicable. 
3.2.1.3 Snow-balling within the research instrument 
While in the field I introduced a certain element of dynamism to the research 
instrument, allowing each subsequent interview schedule to be influenced by prior 
and relevant interviews. As Steier argues, reflexive research should recognise that 
“research structures are themselves researchable and not immutable, and by 
examining how we are part of our own data, our research becomes a reciprocal 
process” (1991: 7). This approach (for non-mining and to a lesser extent mining 
organisations) enabled me to gather more information, to build a better overall picture 
of the policy and business dynamics I was studying. Given my inductive approach I 
saw this as a research priority, acknowledging the implied trade-off with the ability to 
establish internal validity (via direct comparison across respondents’ answers). 
This approach, what I call ‘internal snowballing’ within the research 
instrument, implied building on previous respondents’ accounts as I moved from one 
interviewee to the next. As I was progressing through the interviews, I also let the 
inquiry proceed by triangulating interview data with information from documentary 
sources, and rigorously followed the local press. Throughout this process, I 
maintained the research objectives and research questions as overarching guides to 
my inquiry. 
This approach resonates with ethnographic methods, which hold that the 
‘appropriate’ questions are always contextually situated (Bloomberg et al. 1993). This 
requires the researcher to ask questions that can ‘locate’ the issue of interest in its 
natural context. To the extent that different interviewees are situated in, and thus 
constitute, different ‘parts’ of the local context (in different roles, representing 
different interests, taking different views), it becomes meaningful to ask them 
different questions. 
The validity implications of this approach were that I was able to obtain richer 
detail about certain themes, but at the expense of closing myself off to other ‘new’ 
avenues of inquiry. In trying to avoid introduction of bias I was careful not to identify 
how my questions had been shaped by prior respondents’ answers, or who had said 
what. Moreover, referring to people that I had previously met often gave me 
credibility (as a serious/productive researcher), put the respondent at ease and 
improved my access to information. To avoid introducing bias my general approach 
was to avoid making organisation- or people-specific references when formulating my 
questions. 
3.2.1.4 Interviews vs. surveys? 
Survey techniques are an alternative way of collecting data that I considered 
inappropriate for this study for practical and methodological reasons. Practical 
reasons included, first, the need to establish trust (Daniels & Cannice 2004: 189). By 
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meeting face-to-face and giving assurances I could increase this trust by giving a 
professional appearance and stressing my research ethics. The choice of data 
collection method was thus partly a reflection of the need to gain further access via 
social referrals. Studying something with somewhat unclear benefits for participating 
companies raised the importance of being able to explain the purposes of my study in 
person. 103 Third, people may find it easy to reject or delay a survey. My experience in 
Zambia indicated that a survey would not have been feasible, because people operate 
rather informally and generally make limited use of email.104 On the other hand, a 
face-to-face meeting was considered a socially acceptable, or even necessary, 
obligation (in cases where I approached somebody through a personal referral). 
Methodological reasons included, first, the fact that the study was limited to 
such a small possible sample (seven privatised mining companies). In such cases, 
semi-structured interviews can be an appropriate data collection technique (Daniels & 
Cannice 2004: 186). Second, a central aim of data collection was to capture issues of 
significant complexity but low transparency that I could not sufficiently foresee 
before setting off for the field. I thus ruled out using a pre-developed questionnaire or 
highly structured interview, since I could not know beforehand exactly who I would 
be interviewing or what they would be able to contribute. Interviews are more useful 
than surveys in uncovering complexity because they enable the researcher to develop 
a deeper rapport with research subjects (see e.g. Daniels & Cannice 2004).105 
3.2.2 Sample selection 
3.2.2.1 Choice of organisations 
At the time of fieldwork there were seven large-scale foreign investors in Zambia’s 
copper sector. These investors operated nine large-scale copper production 
companies, each with one or more mines or refining facilities. The four firms that 
constitute my ‘case-study firms’ are highlighted in the table below. My case study 
units are not conceived of as mere reflections of their parent (foreign) companies but 
rather the Zambian operations of a certain international mining companies.106 The 
case study units comprise individuals and their collective mining-related activities 
within a geographically delineated space on Zambia’s Copperbelt Province. 
103 Being able to do so appeared particularly important given the negative attention the mines had been 
getting (in the press and from NGOs) around the period of fieldwork. 
104 In my experience many respondents had what I would call a ‘short-term’ outlook and people tended 
to leave things to the last minute. I often called on people to arrange a meeting 1-2 weeks in advance, 
only to have them reply that I call closer to the date. This meant that, oftentimes, what could be delayed 
would be delayed. 
105 Daniels & Cannice (2004) suggest this is necessary when theory indicates that there are overlapping 
formal and informal structures, and where perceptions and attitudes matter. 
106 The main exception to this is the case of FQML, where some of my respondents were based at the 
group headquarters (for all Zambian and DRC operations) located outside Ndola, and thus spoke with 
the experience of wider issues beyond the Copperbelt. 
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Table 4. Overview of Zambia’s copper mining sector

Source: Bank of Zambia. Notes: Shading indicates case study units. Table excludes small and 
medium-size companies, as well as companies at various stages of prospecting and 
development. 
Because of distance and costs, I first excluded Kansanshi (First Quantum) mainly 
because of its location in NorthWestern Province, some five hours drive away from 
where I was based on the Copperbelt.107 Of the seven mining operations on the 
Copperbelt as at mid-2007, two (Chambishi Metals and Luanshya Copper Mines) 
were owned by the same company (Enya Holdings), implying a possible 
organisational sample size of six. Of these companies I initially targeted four: KCM 
(Vedanta), MCM (Glencore), NFCA (CNMC) and Chibuluma South (Metorex). 
During my third week in Zambia I sent letters to the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) 
of my initial selection of case study firms. The letters were printed on Copperbelt 
University letter-headed paper, outlining aims, logistical requirements, and how the 
research could benefit the companies 
KCM responded promptly and positively through the Company Secretary, 
offering to set up an introductory meeting. At the end of the fieldwork, I had met 
formally with six people within KCM management. The CEO of MCM responded via 
email saying that they were busy with a due diligence process, and that I could contact 
him again in late September. In early October 2007 I wrote to the firm again but got 
no response. 108 After following up with a fax and another email, the MCM CEO 
politely declined noting that “we are too busy with a due diligence and some 
acquisitions at present to be able to look at your requests”. 
At the time of sending out these letters I had already established contact with 
NFCA.109 After an initially welcoming reception and two official interviews, access 
107 Fuel is expensive in Zambia, due to a combination of infrastructure (high transportation costs) and 
policy (all crude is refined by a state-owned monopoly, Indeni, which has long suffered from 
underinvestment). At the time I left the cost of fuel was approximately $1.50/ltr, and whilst on the 
Copperbelt I refueled my car for about $65-70 every three days or so. In addition, with Lumwana being 
a new greenfield site with production commencing in 2007 I expected this company to constitute a less 
comparable case. 
108 To lower my demands on management time I suggested that I could meet with perhaps an 
environmental manager, a human-resources manager and a procurement manager. 
109 This contact took place via repeatedly cold calling the Association of Chinese Corporations in 
Zambia (a small business promotion organisation), who put me in touch with the Chinese Economic 
and Commercial Consulate (ECC), who in turn put me in touch with a deputy CEO at NFCA. The ECC 
is an arm of the Chinese government, affiliated but not directly under the Chinese Embassy, which 
promotes trade and investment ties and whose objective it is to supervise Chinese companies operating 
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was cut off, politely citing the “framing” of NFCA by journalists. This reflected the 
criticisms levied against the company in western and local media, focusing on labour 
and safety standards. The company had responded to these criticisms by deciding to 
not entertain inquiries, even by people calling themselves researchers.110 Subsequent 
interviews came from informal sources, i.e. through meetings with company 
informants outside of the plant area. In total I held seven interviews with four people 
at NFCA. The CEO of Chibuluma South called me a week after receiving my letter, 
to say that although he would have liked to be able to help, he did not think that my 
study would “make sense” given the volatility and “state of flux” in the regulatory 
environment at the time of my field work. Later, in mid-November, I tried again to 
establish access through another formal email but got no response. 
Given that two of my four intended case-study companies had declined to 
participate, I began looking at other mining companies on the Copperbelt, namely 
Chambishi Metals and First Quantum Mineral Resources (‘Bwana Mkubwa’). To 
contact Chambishi Metals I cold-called the Company Secretary who pointed out that 
people would be reluctant to see me without knowing what questions I would ask, 
prompting me to prepare and send her outlines of interview questions for distribution 
to her colleagues. I subsequently met with six people within the management of 
Chambishi Metals. I contacted First Quantum through a personal contact who had 
accommodated me in Ndola, and who knew some staff at the company personally. He 
put me in touch with the Technical Manager and the Commercial Manager (who is 
also Company Secretary). At the end of the fieldwork I had met with five people in 
managerial roles at First Quantum. I present overviews of each case-study firm in 
more detail in chapter four. 
3.2.2.2 Choice of non-mining organisations: snowball sampling 
In terms of non-mining organisations, I began my inquiry by speaking to donors. The 
cultural affinity to Swedish and Norwegian embassy personnel, as well as their 
attentive usage of email, meant that I could prepare some meetings before my arrival 
in Zambia. In approaching government I tried to explore the evolution of mining 
sector policy using the Ministry of Finance as an entry point (at the suggestion of 
Lundstol, 16.7.07, given the ministry’s role in leading government efforts on planned 
re-negotiation of state-firm contracts, through ‘Renegotiation Technical Committee’). 
However this proved difficult and the official I contacted was reluctant to speak to me 
about these renegotiations, and with regards to other regulation pointed me towards 
the Ministry of Mines. I was more successful there, as well as with regulatory 
(implementing) agencies in the area of environmental, health and safety. 
The choice of which government and non-government organisations to speak 
to was determined in part by review of secondary literature (including news articles) 
and partly by snowballing techniques whereby interviewees would refer me to other 
organisations and individuals. For civil society I initially cold-called some NGOs I 
had come across in reading up on mining in Zambia. Getting further contacts through 
snowballing proved easy with civil society organisations, which often draw 
abroad. See Gill & Reilly 2007 for an overview of how the ECC relates to Chinese ministries and the 
local embassy. 
When NGOs, activists as well as journalists falsely present themselves as serious (academic) 
researchers this poses a problem for the legitimate academic researcher in obtaining access. I tried to 
strengthen my legitimacy by presenting formal invitation letters with the University of Bath letter-head, 
stressing my independence from any organisation other than the university, but this seems to have had 




legitimacy and resources from maintaining links with similar-minded bodies. 
Snowballing also constituted my main way of expanding my sample size among 
suppliers. 
Snowball sampling proved important for several practical reasons. First, it was 
often difficult locating individuals from organisational websites, and a lack of ‘email 
culture’ meant that it was difficult to establish contact before arriving in Zambia. 
Second, snowballing can facilitate access by allowing a researcher who is ‘vetted’ by 
a gate keeper to gain greater access to future interviewees. In doing so this approach 
leverages the trust and credibility that the researcher has developed with prior 
research subjects, something that other data collection techniques cannot.111 Over 
time, I could see how my credibility as a serious researcher increased. The table 
below shows the distribution of interviews across different respondent groups over the 
period of fieldwork. 
Table 5. Distribution of interviews over time 
3.2.2.3 Is this an appropriate sample? 
I set out two criteria in asking whether my four case-study companies (KCM, NFCA, 
CM, FQML) constituted an appropriate sample. The first was that the sample exhibit 
a potential for mapping institutional and cultural diversity. The sample appears to 
satisfy this condition due to the inclusion of case study firms of Chinese (NFCA) and 
Indian (KCM) origin, as well as ‘western’ investors (in the case of FQML, publicly 
listed) with international experience. I expected there to be significant diversity across 
these companies given the arguments about path-dependent organisational routines 
and aims that derive from an investor’s institutional background (see chapter one). 
The second criteria in sample selection was that the sample be large and 
‘deep’ enough to allow the identification of patterns regarding how firms vary in their 
approaches to dealing with political and economic stakeholders. The objective of 
identifying patterns relates less to the number of case study units in my sample, and 
more to my degree of insight into each case: my choice of sample is only defensible to 
the extent I have enough insight into each case to identify patterns of stakeholder 
relationships. This necessitates ‘deep’ accounts from respondents familiar with each 
case. 
My overall objective was thus to ensure that I had a sufficient number and 
sufficient depth of interviewees within each case study firm to construct a broad 
enough picture to illuminate the research questions. I therefore sought to speak to a 
Trust is particularly important in a research setting such as Zambia, with a small policy elite, often 
with personal connections. Small elite networks create accountability pressures on individuals within 




range of individuals within each case study firm, in order to get a broader 
understanding of which issues matter, to get a deeper understanding of particular 
issues, and thirdly to increase validity through the corroboration of responses between 
respondents. I believe my total sample of mining-company respondent satisfies the 
abovementioned criteria for sample appropriateness (see section 3.4.1). 
Given the nature of the research (constraints on managers’ time, varying 
access, variation across firms’ organisational practices etc.) it was, however, not 
possible to ensure that individuals with consistent roles were chosen in each of the 
four case study companies.112 
3.2.3 Further notes on motivating the research design 
3.2.3.1 The importance of context 
The richness in context provided by the case study method appears appropriate for 
analysing the evolution of mining sector policy in Zambia. As Nayyar observes, 
“[i]nstitutions are local and cannot be transplanted out of context” (2006: 14). This is 
so because of, first, the difficulty in observing informal rules and, second, because 
enforcement characteristics are likely to be shaped by a multiplicity of local factors 
and power relations. This points to the need for a holistic and contextual approach. 
The need for mapping context was one reason behind the choice of qualitative 
interview methods. Westwood (2004) argues that a high degree of context-sensitivity 
is essential for research on international business in order to move away from a 
‘colonialist’ approach.113 Given my aim of making claims to knowledge of relevance 
beyond the units under study, it becomes essential when defining case studies to be 
specific about the context surrounding each unit. For qualitative analysis to be seen as 
credible and trustworthy by the reader, the researcher has to set out in significant 
detail the background conditions under which the phenomena is being studied. To 
make scientific (falsifiable) claims about a theoretical relationship, one must in the 
first instance be able to state when and how a particular relationship holds (Bacharach 
1989). 
3.2.3.2 The importance of interdisciplinarity 
Susan Strange takes the view that social science research needs to be interdisciplinary, 
arguing that “our times no longer allow us the comfort of separatist specialisation in 
the social sciences, and that however difficult, the attempt has to be made at synthesis 
and blending” (1996: xvi). Thus, whilst the theoretical core of this thesis rests with the 
literatures on policy analysis, institutional change and evolutionary economics, I 
incorporate theories about the firm and its bargaining with the state (from the 
international business literature). This reflects my firm-centred approach to political 
economy and policy analysis. I deemed an appreciation of management discourse to 
be of particular importance given my qualitative research design, which emphasises 
detailed accounts given by firm representatives, in their own words. 
112 This cross-case variation in terms of the roles of interviewees prevents direct comparisons of 
findings across firms, although this was largely foreseen. 
113 Henley et al. observe that in survey research on international investment, establishing a firm’s 
nationality is hard, but “ascribing causality is even more difficult, not least because of the learning over 
time involved in undertaking FDI in a specific country” (2008: 11). 
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3.3 Operationalising the study 
3.3.1 Reflecting on the process: accessing companies 
During my time in Zambia I was affiliated with the School of Management at the 
Copperbelt University, organised through Professor John Lungu, a long-term expert 
on the Zambian mining sector. Upon arrival I had several fact-finding meetings with 
Dr Lungu, who also helped me distribute letters inviting the mining companies to 
participate in the study. 
Regarding access it proved easier than expected to get access to non-state 
stakeholders, more or less as expected with state stakeholders, and more difficult than 
expected with firms. As noted in the introductory chapter, copper mining in Zambia 
enjoys a strong historical political, social and economic legacy, with more recent 
attention given to the perceived misallocation of mining-benefits between private 
investors and the state. Professor Lungu described the mines as having grown “more 
cautious these days,” following the increased attention and scrutiny given to the 
mining sector in the media, through civil society reports, and due to some high profile 
regulatory ‘failures’ (see section 6.4).114 This increased the need for me to present the 
research as neutral and non-threatening, whilst not diverging from a truthful 
representation of my research. 
My introductory letter stated that: “The objective of the study is to explore the 
Zambian environment for investment in mining, including relationships between firms 
and other interested groups … Emphasis will be on systematically gathering 
perspectives from different individuals and stakeholders in a balanced and neutral 
way. In doing so the research seeks to contextualise the roles that foreign mining 
companies play in Zambia, with the aim of promoting fruitful dialogue and 
cooperation between all parties”. 
In interviews I stressed that I was an independent researcher, affiliated with 
Bath and Copperbelt universities, and provided interviewees with information and 
consent forms offering anonymity.115 I also tried to highlight how my research could 
help them with stakeholder management by casting light on industry dynamics.116 
However, many potential respondents appeared unclear as to what the direct benefits 
for them might be: indeed, whereas my findings could cast light on wider 
organisational dynamics, benefits to individuals were understandably less clear. 
During interviews people often wanted to speak a bit about the overall context, 
privatisation, and the perceived unfairness of current state-firm contracts etc. Often 
some part of the interview would be spent discussing things that were already known 
to me. I tended to accept this as it functioned as a useful icebreaker. Fortunately, for 
the most part it did not seem to result in less ‘data’: people were usually generous 
with their time and I would typically still be able to cover what I wanted to during 
interviews. 
3.3.2 What data can be generated from semi-structured interviews? 
There were limitations to gaining knowledge from interviews once access had been 
granted. A general culture of secrecy (Fraser & Lungu 2007), coupled with the 
114 Fraser & Lungu (2007), Christian Aid (2007). 
115 I also offered to provide a summary of the thesis in electronic form. 
116 I stressed how my unbiased account of the priorities and experiences of stakeholders as well as 
companies themselves might help them avoid mismatches of expectations. 
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Zambian policy-elite constituting a very ‘small world’, meant that people often 
seemed reluctant to divulge information. Although the theoretical framework 
developed in chapter two distinguishes between different levels of government, in 
practice my respondents often saw the government as an entity. The quality of 
interview data also depended on organisational capacity issues (e.g. respondent not 
being able to locate hard-copy data), low proximity to decision making among some 
respondents, and confidentiality agreements with third parties. 
Some respondents may have felt concerned about the anonymity I would 
provide. Regulators, in particular, were often unwilling to distinguish between 
companies. It is possible that asking outright about variations across companies – that 
in theory are meant to be subject to a uniform regulatory pressure – left respondents 
feeling that to acknowledge such variation would be tantamount to admitting that they 
were not doing their job. I had limited success with soliciting quantitative data (e.g. 
regarding investment, employment, breakdowns of costs etc.).117 
The timeliness of my research topic had significant implications for data 
collection, with ‘pros’ (salience) as well as ‘cons’ (sensitivity). On the one hand, the 
high interest in mining sector issues at the time meant it was often easy to get people 
interested, and I had little difficulty getting access to non-mining organisation. 
However, having such a salient topic was also a hindrance: people were more 
concerned with providing information lest they be seen as taking sides in what was a 
politically sensitive debate. Respondents might have felt more free to talk to me if my 
research questions had concerned historical policy evolution (e.g. privatisation or 
major policy reform) that had already been discussed and agreed upon. However, as I 
was interested in studying ongoing processes through which policy evolves and is 
articulated, I accepted this as a limitation inherent to my research design. 
3.3.3 How the study evolved (to focus more on change than outcomes) 
My initial approach when arriving in Zambia did not emphasise organisational 
learning but rather I focused on understanding variation across mines. I initially 
explained my research objective as “to understand how different mining companies 
approach and deal with stakeholders over environmental and social issues”. In my 
early interviews I tended to ask explicit as well as implicit questions about state-firm 
relations and policy evolution. 
However as I found respondents to be quite cautious when asked explicitly 
about the firm’s relationships with external actors, I increasingly shifted to focusing 
on rules and objectives internal to the organisation in question, and how these had 
evolved over time. As argued in chapter two, such internal ‘drivers’ of firm behaviour 
constitute a link between the firm and its external environment, allowing the 
researcher to infer external relationships. 118 However, given the difficulty of 
identifying routines and processes, I often sought to identify different organisational 
practices. My research also evolved in the sense that I initially focused a lot on the 
117 In general people would be generous with their time and their views, but were not so keen on 
sharing ‘hard’ information, e.g. documents, correspondence. 
118 Internal organisational routines will reflect the wider international environment, for instance, to the 
extent they are shaped by demands of external stakeholders such as project finance providers, stock 
market regulators, the home government and export markets (Vogel 1997: 563). 
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role of civil society, until discovering that this was more of a ‘background issue’ for 
the policy processes under study.119 
Reflecting on my sample selection process I should perhaps have targeted 
Company Secretaries first, rather than CEOs of companies. I had hoped to target 
people as close as possible to decision-making, but it quickly became apparent that 
they would not entertain me. A further reflection is that I could have provided one or 
more interview schedules already during the initial contact, something I did later on 
when establishing contact with my fourth company, at the suggestion of the Company 
Secretary at Chambishi Metals. 
I found that being able to make audio recordings (in around three quarters of 
my interviews) facilitated relationship management. This enabled me to establish a 
familiarity with interviewees (e.g. how open or closed they were on particular 
subjects, or what issues they considered to be most salient) which came in handy 
when I went for follow-up interviews (just under 30% of my interviews were follow-
up interviews). 
Issues of access and openness of interviews may have been reduced if I had 
been able to provide a more convincing confidentiality proposition, i.e a formal (but 
short) confidentiality agreement. Given the small world of the Copperbelt and the 
political pressures on the mining sector at the time, respondents may have viewed the 
questions as contentious. 
3.4 Data and analysis 
3.4.1 Overview of data collected 
During field work I conducted 120 interviews with 95 individuals. Of these, 25 
respondents were individuals in varying (mainly managerial) roles at four foreign 
mining companies as well as the state investment company through which the 
Zambian government holds shares in the privatised firms. I also interviewed 14 
individuals in varying capacities at government agencies, as well as a broad range of 
donor respondents, private sector suppliers and representatives of civil society 
organizations. Table 6 shows the distribution of responses across my case-study firms 
as well as ZCCM-IH (the government’s holding company for minority stakes in the 
privatised mines). 
Table 6. Mining company respondents by company and occupation 
Whilst in the field I discovered that civil society in Zambia appears to be important politically (e.g. 




3.4.2 Transcription and coding 
Transcription and coding of interviews (some 75% of which were audio recorded) 
was a mammoth task, amounting to around 400,000 words of material. The process of 
coding consisted of applying a construct (understood as theoretically informed 
categories and concepts developed in chapter two) to sections of text whose meaning I 
identified with a particular construct.120 By drawing on constructs used in existing 
literature I sought to leverage meaningful insights from previous research, thereby 
increasing the generalisability of my knowledge claims.121 
I began transcribing whilst in the field. This formed part of my method of 
‘snowballing’ within the research instrument (see 3.2.1.3) and enabled me to develop 
further and more locally appropriate constructs. At this stage the coding was 
preliminary, and time constraints meant that transcriptions were often incomplete (i.e. 
I might have transcribed only the first half of an interview) when moving on to the 
next interview. The purpose here was to develop the inquiry whilst still in the field, to 
make sure I asked the right questions in upcoming interviews. Upon return from the 
field, I went through each interview again to capture detail and further develop the 
coding framework.122 I wanted this process to be grounded in the data by letting 
constructs – to some extent – emerge from the data. Over time, some constructs were 
collapsed, expanded, or dropped.123 
As with most social science research this study involved the combination of 
inductive and deductive analysis (Stinchcombe 1968). It included initial coding where 
data was allocated into constructs based on existing theory, and axial coding where 
data and relationships is put back together in new ways.124 Incorporating elements of 
deductive logic was particularly important given my theoretical position (developed in 
chapter two) that organisational and policy change are largely endogenous processes. 
Being able to move between induction and deduction in this way also facilitates 
theory development.125 
Once all interviews were transcribed and coded, I used Nvivo to ‘auto-code’ 
my interviews according to my coded transcripts, enabling me to search and bring out 
coded data in easily accessible form.126 These printouts then provided the basis for 
which I drafted my three main empirical chapters (chapters five through seven). 
120 This distinguishes my research from pure grounded theory, where emphasis is based on links 
between constructs that are themselves entirely derived from the data (Turner 1994, cited in Gough & 
Scott 2000: 342). 
121 The use of such constructs is, however, by no means a prerequisite for generating generalisable 
knowledge, to the extent that the analysis of the research problem “links with more abstract theoretical 
knowledge and principles, known to be applicable across a wider range of similar situations” 
(Robinson 1993: 133). 
122 I kept a database of constructs in an Excel document, to record new constructs and to keep track of 
constructs used. I also reviewed some of my interview transcripts to ensure coding consistency. 
123 For instance, [head office] was initially a main code for overseas organisational influence, later 
changed to [shareholders] in light of an interview with Chambishi Metals managers who reflected on 
their company as not having an overseas head office in the traditional sense. 
124 In other words, concepts brought out in one interview would be applied to data gathered in a 
different interview. 
125 Rudner defines theory as “a systematically related set of statements, including some law-like 
generalisations, that is empirically testable” (1966: 10). He distinguishes between a model (the “related 
set of statements”) and the theoretical propositions (the “law-like generalisations”). 
126 
‘Auto-coding’ means letting Nvivo search through all transcripts and index all paragraphs that 
contain a particular text (say, “[Transparency]”) and index paragraphs (by applying some Nvivo 
‘code’). Thereafter the user can easily produce a printout summary of, for instance, all the cases where 
civil society groups mentioned government “[Transparency]”. 
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3.4.3 Data analysis and display 
The process of analysing qualitative data is about grouping mainly textual data into 
meaningful categories and establishing conceptual links between these categories. In 
analysing my data I aimed to identify patterns regarding how companies engage with 
policy makers, regulatory agencies, and other external stakeholders, and how they 
interpret their surroundings. By doing so I sought to explicate the role of diversity, 
learning and convergence in the evolution of regulatory policies and standards. 
Miles & Huberman (1994: 10) identify three stages of qualitative data 
analysis: data reduction, data display, and conclusion drawing/verification. Data 
reduction consists of “extracting the essence” (Gillham 2005: 127) of what has been 
communicated by “selecting, focusing, simplifying, abstracting and transforming the 
data that appears in written-up field notes or transcriptions” (Miles & Huberman 
1994: 10). In qualitative research this process of ‘data reduction’ begins during data 
collection wherefore, as Miles & Huberman (1994) point out, data collection forms an 
integral part of data analysis. Data reduction thus inevitably requires interpretation of 
the data, thereby opening up – to some extent – qualitative research to challenges of 
bias and validity (Gillham 2005: 127). 
My principal empirical data display (chapters four through seven) was 
developed through a two-stage process. The first stage was to group the data on the 
basis of the three spheres of describing state-mining sector relations (fiscal, 
regulatory, economic linkages) identified in chapter one. Here, rather than having a 
count of how many people supported a particular point, data is presented as an 
account of the themes and their constructs that result from data reduction. 
The idea of capturing an comprehensive account of these phenomena was 
enabled by my choice of research instrument: by allowing questions to evolve to 
capture additional nuances uncovered as the field work proceeded I ensured there was 
a ‘red thread’ running from one interview to the next. This approach is reflected in 
heterogeneous structures of chapters five through seven. The second stage consisted 
of analysis across different groups of interviewees, ‘attaching’ evidence to 
organisations (i.e. firm, state, non-state actors) and to theoretical concepts (e.g. 
routines, aims, interaction, institutional change, learning) within my chosen ‘spheres’ 
of interest. 
Through this process of data display I attempted to construct analytic 
narratives, based on a case study tradition within political economy that incorporate 
elements of deductive as well as inductive reasoning (Bates et al. 2000). Such 
narratives are constructed through a rich account that provides the reader with “the 
sense of time and place that brings a narrative to life” (Bates et al. 2000: 689).127 I see 
this study as fitting into the methodological tradition of analytic narratives.128 
127 Mahoney (2000) further argues that the analytic narrative approach is useful for moving between the 
aggregate (cross-unit) and disaggregated (within-unit) levels of analysis. 
128 Bates et al. (2000) emphasises the identification of a parsimonious set of exogenous variables and 
the grounding of these in the analytic narrative. By contrast, I base my narrative on largely endogenous 
concepts (see chapter two) of organisational and institutional change, hypothesised to illuminate the 




When inquiring about politically sensitive issues one cannot assume that interviewees 
always provide unbalanced accounts. In particular where interviews are less 
structured, with respondents thus having greater control, it becomes important to 
triangulate between sources of data in order to strengthen its validity (Gillham 2005: 
58). Triangulation constitutes the process cross-verification, and rests on systematic 
collection of data about the same phenomenon from different sources and/or using 
different data collection methods (Miles & Huberman 1984: 234).129 
Throughout the process of data analysis, I attempted to triangulate between the 
views expressed by different actors in order to establish the validity of claims. I 
looked for instances of several interviewees within the firm corroborating an account 
of actions or perceptions, or for cases where external stakeholders (e.g. government or 
suppliers) would support or dismiss such accounts.130 Triangulation is crucial in this 
type of research design that relies on otherwise non-verifiable personal accounts. In 
the four mostly empirical chapters that follow I frequently use footnotes to validate or 
disprove specific points in my findings. 
To strengthen and increase the falsifiability of the research, Arksey & Knight 
(1999: 22) advise the researcher to specify whether the purpose of triangulation is to 
confirm (validate) or to seek completeness.131 In my case I emphasise triangulation as 
a way of gathering complementary and contrasting perspectives, rather than 
triangulation of data for confirmation (validation). This reflects the Zambian context 
of limited transparency, where institutional arrangements and processes can easily be 
understood differently by different stakeholders. 
It should be stressed that the confirmation of evidence/accounts gathered from 
one source with that of another source does not necessarily indicate that this account 
is an accurate and balanced view of reality. Rather, a common view presented by two 
(or more) sources may constitute a discourse, reflecting an established way for a 
group of individuals to represent and frame the social world. Recognising the role of 
discourses I tried to err on the side of caution when drawing conclusions from data 
analysis, seeking to probe further even when triangulation pointed to mutually 
supporting evidence from multiple sources. 
3.4.5 Research ethics 
Ethics are paramount in interview-based field research. The researcher mediates 
between the supply side (respondents) and demand side (readers) of research and has 
an obligation to address ethical concerns towards each group (Tellis 1997). 
Protection of respondents was the overarching ethical principle with which I 
conducted this study. This meant ensuring that any information that may harm the 
interviewee (by positioning them in an unfavourable light vis-à-vis employers, co­
workers, or others) not be associated with that person in displaying the data. Where 
respondents opted to remain anonymous, or when they clearly stated they did not 
129 In the words of Miles & Huberman, “the meanings emerging from the data have to be tested for 
their plausibility, their sturdiness … their validity. Otherwise we are left with interesting stories about 
what happened, of unknown truth and utility” (1984: 11). 
130 The technique of corroboration of data is a form of triangulation, understood here as the validation 
of evidence from one source through a second source, using the same method (Sayer 1992: 246). 
131 The reason is that the unearthing of certain data will lead to confirmation claims, but that different 
(and often more) data will lead to completeness claims. For a critical assessment of triangulation 
techniques, see Mason (1994). 
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mind being mentioned by name, this proved easy. In some cases, however, I had to 
use my judgement and in these cases I tended to err on the side of caution: 
pseudonyms have been used for respondents who presented critical views of their own 
organisations or other entities on which they rely for support. 
I judged it unlikely that I would through my involvement with respondents 
significantly alter their practices, or put them in any danger, as long I protected their 
anonymity. This reflects a research strategy where I was interviewing individuals, but 
mostly asking about organisations. A second ethical responsibility towards 
respondents is to give a truthful and unbiased overview of the project, something I 
addressed by always providing interviewees with a standard introduction letter and 
offering to explain the research. 
Qualitative researchers also have a high degree of responsibility toward their 
readers, in confronting questions of validity: the researcher has to be honest towards 
the reader in judging the data obtained. In other words, if a particular respondent 
consistently makes exaggerated claims around a particular point known to the 
researcher, the ‘truth value’ of other statements in that interview must also be taken 
with a greater ‘pinch of salt’. 
3.4.6 A note on style 
To convey the sentiment of this specific period in Zambia’s history, and to be 
consistent with the voices in my interviews, the narrative in the following chapters 
makes use of the present tense. I use the past tense when statements are specifically 
related to events in the past, or when providing historical context for the analysis. 
Moreover, I wanted to group voices around thematic accounts: this makes the 
narrative ‘jumpy’ at times, as I move between voices from disparate groups (mining 
companies, government, donors, civil society, and private sector suppliers to the 
mines). 
In order to anonymise respondents I use the term ‘manager’ to refer to 
individuals in positions ranging from operational management within a particular 
business area (e.g. commercial, environment, procurement) to vice presidents within 
companies who are closer to strategic decision making and implementation. 
I use three full stops within interview quotes to represent some part of the 
respondents’ speech that I cut out, usually for the sake of brevity. To preserve the 
integrity of my data I refrained from re-ordering any parts of a transcript. All italics 
are in original unless otherwise stated. 
3.5 Research validity 
There are many pitfalls and considerations that must be taken into account when 
conducting case study research. As Robert Yin notes, “the ‘softer’ a research 
technique, the harder it is to do” (2002: 26). Miles & Huberman note that that 
challenges of qualitative research include the time consuming nature of both data 
collection and coding, the risk of data overload, as well as “a distinct possibility of 
interviewer bias” (1994: 4; see also Arksey & Knight 1999: 30). This section 
discusses sources of bias and challenges of validity faced in this thesis. 
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3.5.1 Research bias 
3.5.1.1 Researcher-induced bias 
Whenever the respondent looks to the researcher for prompts to guide the interview, 
or whenever the researcher interferes with the account of the respondent, there is a 
risk of introduction of bias. Hammersley & Gomm (1997) define bias as systematic 
and culpable error on the part of the researcher. Case study research may suffer from 
three forms of researcher-induced bias (Darke et. al. 1998: 285). 
One form of bias is that which results from interaction with the research 
subject (affecting which information is provided). Examples include where questions 
are not formulated and delivered in a clear and consistent way, or where the research 
instrument suffers from omitted variable bias (the interviewer does not ask the ‘right’ 
questions), often due to poor operationalisation of constructs.132 Second, researcher-
induced bias may result from the beliefs, values and prior assumptions of the 
researcher (affecting how information provided is interpreted). Lastly, qualitative 
research can be criticised for relying heavily on interpretation by the researcher. 
However judgements/statements (what we collect during an interview) are a function 
of human intelligence, and could not be anything but subjective. As Gillham observes, 
“[t]he ‘objectivity’ lies in making explicit the criteria for the judgement” (2005: 134). 
To increase the validity of the research, the researcher should strive to be 
neutral, for instance by being reflexive over her/his position, the underlying 
assumptions, and the influence the researcher expects to have on data collection. This 
point recognises that in qualitative research, the researcher is herself the instrument 
(Gillham, 2005: 7, Patton 1990). The direct contact between researcher and research 
subjects (without intermediating ‘tools’, such as surveys) implies that claims to 
objectivity are more difficult to make. In my own study reflexivity was particularly 
important given my focus on a heterogeneous set of actors, including representatives 
of local stakeholders, civil society and international business (Douglas 1985: 42). 
3.5.1.2 Other sources of bias 
Issues of validity may also arise in ways that are not researcher-induced. This includes 
where respondents misinterpret questions due to their different cultural background, 
or where they exaggerate or understate things out of a desire to make their responses 
seem ‘socially appropriate’ (what Arksey & Knight 1999 call social desirability bias, 
a particular risk when researching advocacy-orientated organisations). The only way 
of countering these sources of bias is for the researcher to be sensitive towards the 
broader context of the interviewee.133 
Bias may also result from uneven access to the organisations being researched. 
In the case of this study I had, in some respects, better access to FQML that the other 
firms. This means that I can present more detailed accounts for this firm, meaning in 
turn that it more easily ‘stands out’ (in positive or negative ways). However, given 
that my questions often focused on the mining sector and mining sector policy more 
generally, this additional access at some companies also gave me more information 
with which to illuminate wider state-firm relationships. 
132 Failure to include all significant relevant explanatory variables may lead to bias: the observation of 
co-variation among two variables may be due to the influence of a third variable which is not 
accounted for. This concern applies to research strategies based on nominal as well as ordinal levels of 
measurement (Mahoney 2003: 395). 
133 Westwood argues that “reflexivity has become an imperative in vanguard social science research 
and increasingly in organisation studies” (2004: 75). 
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Finally, bias can result from responses being shaped by social norms. For 
instance, bias might result from respondents reporting unsubstantiated variation across 
mines (e.g. criticising the Chinese because it is the popular thing to do). Throughout 
data collection I therefore had to be conscious of the fact that Indian and (more 
recently) Chinese nationalities are associated with particular stereotypes in Zambia.134 
3.5.2 Research validity 
Yin (2003) presents four types of validity for case study research. First, challenges to 
construct validity arise where researchers use instruments that do not accurately 
capture the concepts they are trying to measure.135 During the data collection phase 
the researcher can strengthen this form of validity in several ways, e.g. by using 
multiple sources of evidence, establishing a chain of evidence and allowing key 
informants to review draft reports of research findings. In this study I tried to validate 
my constructs using secondary data, and also asked about the sequencing of events in 
order to create a ‘chain’ of evidence. My focus group of MBA students at the 
Copperbelt University was also useful in this regard. I contemplated going back to 
Zambia to do follow-up interviews and disseminate preliminary findings with key 
informants, but in the end time and financial constraints prevented me from going. 
Second, the notion of internal validity relates to the consistency of findings on 
which we base our claims to knowledge. Challenges to internal validity arise mainly 
during analysis in seeking to compare findings across cases. One issue relates to the 
sampling of interviewees at the Chinese mining company: as later interviews were 
conducted ‘off-the-record’, there was naturally more scope for these respondents to 
appear open and critical of their employer. This gave more detail on issues associated 
with their company’s internal management than I was able to get from other mining 
companies, but also complicated direct cross-case comparisons. I also experienced 
difficulties in establishing counterfactuals. For example, the industry-leading 
environmental, health & safety policies at Chambishi Metals have been in place since 
the time of the former shareholders (according to respondents), but it was difficult to 
ascertain whether the new shareholders would otherwise have implemented their own 
equivalent procedures.136 
Third, considerations of reliability must be addressed, ensuring that the 
research can (in theory) be replicated with the same results.137 I had to be particularly 
sensitive to reliability concerns in this type of study, given that “[k]nowledge in 
qualitative interviewing is situational and conditional” (Rubin & Rubin 1995: 38). My 
approach of snowballing within the research instrument (see section 3.2.1.3) implies 
that the sequencing of interviews matters more. The implications for replicability are 
that if the study had begun with different respondents, it might have supported 
different findings towards the end. To some extent this was an unavoidable feature of 
my methodology. I tried to minimise this risk by choosing to interview more 
‘generalist’ organisations during the first months of fieldwork (e.g. donors and civil 
134 For example, one respondent from a long-standing supplier firm talks about the “Indians at KCM” 
and claims that KCM “is just like the Chinese, that’s how they are. They look after each other.” 
135 For instance, in Zambia the concept of information as being public or not is not associated with the 
type of ‘binary’ idea e.g. in the UK (i.e. either a document is public or it is not), but rather appears to be 
a relative concept. 
136 In other words, are the path-dependent routines from previous operations or those of incoming 
managers dominant in shaping organisational behaviour? 
137 Note that complete reliability is – in practice – unattainable (Arksey & Knight 1999: 32, see also 
Brenner et al. 1985). 
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society). I also sought to increase the reliability of the study by emphasising, 
systematically, the themes of inquiry and keeping detailed records during the course 
of the fieldwork. Moreover, the high detail of context I provide gives information 
about a wide range of ‘variables’. 
Finally, the external validity of the study’s findings (whether the study has 
utility and relevance) rests on these findings being generalisable outside of the 
particular Zambian context. A commonly voiced concern is that inferences from 
small-sample analysis are unlikely to be useful for broader generalisations. However 
Collier & Mahoney (1996) caution against interpreting generalisability too rigidly in 
‘small-N’ analyses with few cases. In such studies there are no hard and fast criteria 
for judging representativeness. Here, the responsibility of generalising findings rests – 
to a greater extent – on the reader rather than the researcher. In qualitative research 
the researcher therefore has a responsibility to provide a rich account of findings as 
well as assumptions and practical approaches, such that the reader can make an 
informed decision (Arksey & Knight 1999: 56). 
3.5.3 Epistemological and ontological tensions 
One epistemological challenge – inherent in the use of interviews – is to infer action 
from individuals’ accounts of action. There will always be some disconnect here, 
because “the interviewee works with a memory that remembers some aspects and not 
others” (Arksey & Knight 1999: 16). Thus, in researching policy change and state-
firm relations, I was really observing people’s knowledge, attitudes and subjective 
values about these things. This points to the need for an interpretivistic ontology: 
research subjects will report their own understanding of a phenomenon, influenced by 
their position within organisational hierarchies, their own agendas, and their 
subjective values of how things should be done. 
A second challenge was how to infer organisational behaviour through a 
research design that focuses on interviews with individuals. Throughout the data 
collection process I tried to reflect on how close the individual was to organisational 
decision-making and issues of interest (e.g. environmental, procurement, planning and 
finance). I did this through the actual interview as well as by looking at the formal 
position of an individual within the organisation. I also tried to establish the 
generalisability ‘within’ the organisation by triangulating between data provided by 
different respondents in the same organisation. 
3.6 Chapter conclusion 
To avoid common criticisms of qualitative research as lacking systematic rigour (see 
Miles & Huberman 1994: 4) I have endeavoured, principally through this chapter, to 
state clearly and comprehensibly how data was collected and analysed. To reduce bias 
I have strived to be reflexive about my role as a researcher, the environment, and what 
was (by choice or by necessity) left out of the analysis. 
The following four chapters (chapters four to seven) present the empirical 
findings of this study. Chapter four introduces the Zambian context, including 
information about mining companies under study. Chapter five to seven present the 
thematic findings of the three spheres of study introduced in chapter one. 
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4 Governance of Zambia’s mining sector 
4.1 Introduction 
As noted in chapter one, my intention for this study is to explore state-firm relations 
with reference to three areas (or institutional ‘spheres’) of fiscal policy, environmental 
and labour regulation, and supplier practices. The initial idea was that these would 
then constitute three relatively self-contained empirical findings chapters. However, 
during fieldwork I quickly realised that there were many features that cut across these 
three lines of inquiry. As I began to organise my data after leaving Zambia it became 
clear that an additional chapter would be necessary. With this in mind, the present 
chapter outlines important background context and the relevant policy environment 
more generally. 
This chapter is structured into three sections that draw on interview data (i.e. 
reflecting views of the respondents) as well as relevant secondary literature. The first 
section presents the historical context of Zambia, including the move to multi-party 
democracy in 1991 and the wide-scale liberalisation of the economy that followed. It 
discusses the privatisation of the mining sector, including the historical roles of 
donors and local civil society in Zambia. 
The second section begins to elucidate the political economy and governance 
of copper mining in Zambia, by highlighting various mechanisms of state-firm 
interaction. The governance mechanisms discussed here are broad and not issue-
specific – the regulatory agencies that focus on specific issues (environment, labour 
etc.) are introduced in more detail in subsequent chapters. This section focuses on 
four areas: the investment climate and its recent nationalistic expressions; political 
culture and interventionism in the mining sector; the public discourse which frames 
state-firm relations;138 and the formal role of the state in the corporate governance of 
foreign mining companies. 
The aim of the third section is to introduce the case study firms and begin to 
identify their strategies, structures and norms. It first introduces the mining companies 
one-by-one, followed by a cross-sectional account of these firms’ mechanisms of 
copper marketing, as well as the nature of competition and cooperation in the sector. 
Finally I then discuss the mix of external and internal influences on these firms, 
highlighting the tensions between routines and aims held by local employees and 
those introduced by expatriate management (see 2.4.1). 
4.1.1 Limitations in scope 
At this stage I specify in some detail the limitations in scope of the thesis, both to 
guide and manage the expectations of the reader. First, I am not specifically analysing 
the role of traditional rulers in mining. Although the approval of local chiefs is 
paramount to recently-arrived mineral exploration companies, the issue is of lesser 
138 Discourse is defined here as a set of statements about the social world, reflecting the information 
available to social actors as well as how these actors interpret this information (through mental models 
and other routines in place). 
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relevance on the Copperbelt compared to more recent developments in North-Western 
Province.139 
Second, I do not go into detail about the role of local government. This 
limitation in scope is guided by my choice of institutional areas on which to focus, 
that exclude municipal and district services. It also reflects my chief concern with 
state-firm relations and the highly centralised nature of the Zambian government 
(discussed below). 
Third, I will not be discussing international investment treaties, as I did not find 
any evidence of such agreements shaping investment into the mining operations under 
study.140 Nor do I analyse the state-firm bargaining and policy positions relating to 
energy security, although this was an issue of growing significance at the time of 
fieldwork (mining companies consume around two-thirds of Zambia’s energy).141 
Finally, I do not analyse the role and influence of consultants. Technical 
assistance consultants can play a big role in regulatory development through their 
coordination of consultations, thereby indirectly influencing the reform agenda. 
However, I wanted to focus on stakeholders with a permanent presence in Zambia, 
whereas many consultants are international firms that appeared difficult to access for 
this study. I also wanted to focus as closely as possible on actors that originated 
(rather than mediated) pressures on the policy process. 
4.2 Historical background and privatisation 
4.2.1 Independence and single-party rule 
Zambia gained its independence from British colonial rule on 24 October 1964. The 
country was, in the period following independence, considered a development success 
story and by 1969 classified as a middle-income country. The country’s GDP/capita 
was then one of the highest in Africa, and higher than that of Brazil, Malaysia, Turkey 
or South Korea (Ferguson 1999: 6). At this time Zambia was also the largest producer 
of copper in the developing world and the third largest producer overall (after the 
United States and the Soviet Union), producing 12.2% of total world production 
(Bostock & Harvey 1972). 
The copper industry was nationalised through the 1968 Mulungushi reforms, 
whereby all mining assets were grouped together under the state-owned Zambia 
Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM). However the nationalisation was ill-timed, as 
the gulf wars of the 1970s led to a sharp increase in the price of oil. The negative 
impact of falling copper prices were magnified by the increase in oil prices, which led 
to inflationary pressures on imported goods – including many capital intensive goods 
used as inputs to the mines – raising costs for the sector and reducing reinvestment. 
139 There was even a provision in the draft new mining act (in development in 2007) to make license 
granting conditional on chiefs’ ‘letters of approval’, but this provision was dropped in the law that was 
enacted in April 2008. 
140 According to UNCTAD, by 2009 Zambia had bilateral investment treaties with 13 states, of which 
five are developing countries (China, Egypt, Ghana, Croatia, Cuba). The most recent was with Finland, 
signed in 2005, with the most recent BIT with a developing country being that with Ghana, signed in 
2001. See www.unctad.org/iia (accessed 2 March 2009). 
141 Mines are very energy intensive. To illustrate KCM’s Konkola Deep Mining Project in 
Chililabombwe can flood within 15 minutes if the pumps stop working (Chaila, 29.8.07). New 
investment into power-generating capacity has been limited due to the caps on energy tariffs as well as 
rises in costs of inputs (such as fuels and metals, including copper). 
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This led to a sharp fall in the terms of trade between copper and imported 
goods (Jamal & Weeks 1993: 84). During the 1970s some 90% of Zambia’s foreign 
exchange came from copper exports. When the value of these exports plummeted, it 
led to shortages of foreign currency needed to import capital products and inputs not 
produced locally. 
Faced with these challenges, the government of the republic of Zambia (GRZ) 
under Kenneth Kaunda (president from independence to 1991) set its hopes on 
increases in copper prices and borrowed heavily to spend on social services, food and 
industrial subsidies. Copper prices, however, remained stagnant and the government 
continued borrowing. By 1984 Zambia had the world’s highest external debt 
(measured as debt/GDP; Fraser and Lungu 2007: 60). 
Zambia’s economic struggles continued into the 1980s and 1990s, due to low 
copper prices, economic mismanagement and severe droughts. In 1983 Zambia 
entered its first World Bank structural adjustment programme (SAP) (Fraser & Lungu 
2007: 9), heralding cuts in subsidies and increased competitive pressures. Structural 
adjustment policies included the liberalisation of exchange rates and reductions in 
public spending, and resulted in widespread protests. To contain political pressures, 
the Kaunda government declared a New Economic Recovery Programme in July 
1987, whereby interest repayments to the IFIs were limited to 10% of export earnings 
(Ferguson 1999). Donors responded by freezing aid disbursements. Development 
assistance only resumed assistance once Zambia eventually conceded to a second 
SAP in 1989, including policies to cut food subsidies, de-control prices and devalue 
the currency (Fraser & Lungu 2007: 9). 
4.2.2 Return of multi-party democracy and economic liberalisation 
By the late 1980s support for Kaunda’s United National Independence Party (UNIP) 
was waning, and the influential trade unions – led by the Zambian Congress of Trade 
Unions under Frederick Chiluba – were increasingly backing a new political party 
called the Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD). This party campaigned on a 
political reform agenda and won (by a landslide) the 1991 elections. Once in 
government the MMD undertook extensive liberal macroeconomic and market 
reforms. Donors responded positively by increasing aid, to the extent that Zambian 
budget became over 40% donor-dependent (Bauer & Taylor 2005: 70). 
However the process of liberalisation contained few attempts at mitigating the 
negative social consequences of reform. Rakner (2003) provides evidence that these 
reforms were associated with reduced living standards and a failure to promote 
economic growth.142 For instance, exchange rate liberalisation proved detrimental to 
the competitiveness of local manufacturers. Thus, whilst Zambia’s annual 
“merchandise” imports doubled between 1995 and 2003, the country’s exports fell by 
12.5% (World Bank 2005: 9). 
As part of this liberal reform package, the MMD embarked on an ambitious 
privatisation programme, seen as a way for Chiluba to dismantle UNIP’s previous 
power base (Fraser & Lungu 2007: 9). By 1997, 224 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
had been privatised, out of a portfolio of 275 companies (Bigsten 2000; Larmer 
2005). The government, however, faced difficulties in privatising the mining 
parastatal ZCCM due to international copper prices being at historic lows and 
142 Collier & Gunning (1999) have argued that Zambia undertook financial liberalisation when it in fact 
should have focused on fiscal stabilisation. 
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competition from other countries that were privatising their copper mining sectors at 
the same time (including Peru, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan; see Feeney 2002). A 
German firm was contracted to assess privatisation options for the copper mines, and 
reported in 1994 with a proposal that ZCCM be broken into five units. In 1995 both 
the World Bank and IMF extended loans conditional on the adoption by the Zambian 
government of this proposal (World Bank 1996). 
The government lifted the responsibility of privatising the mines out of the 
general privatisation programme within the Zambia Privatisation Agency (ZPA) and 
charged a former ZCCM executive, Francis Kaunda, with leading the process. The 
agreement gave Mr Kaunda significant discretion with regard to negotiating the terms 
of state-firm contracts used to allocate the long-term benefits of mining (see chapter 
five). 143 Although the Minister of Finance was involved in signing off on these 
agreements, negotiation of their terms and concessions was largely the purview of 
people close to Francis Kaunda, mainly within the Ministry of Mines (J.Lungu, 
21.8.07).144 
The process surrounding the privatisation of the mining sector was widely 
seen by external parties as lacking in transparency and accountability (van Donge 
2009). 145 Fingers were pointed at donors, in particular the international financial 
institutions (World Bank/IMF), for making development assistance directly 
contingent on privatisation of state-owned enterprises (RAID 2000). 
4.2.3 2001 and 2006 elections, growing resource nationalism 
In the 2001 elections Levy Mwanawasa from the MMD was elected president on an 
anti-corruption platform. In the post-election period, the opposition party Patriotic 
Front (PF) was formed, led by Michael Sata. The PF broke away from the MMD after 
it emerged that Chiluba had chosen Mwanawasa as his successor over Sata (who had 
thought himself the designate heir).146 
The elections of 2006 – for president, parliament and local government – 
yielded a voter turnout of 71% and were hailed by international monitors as generally 
free and fair (Gould 2006), with fewer allegations of corruption compared to the 2001 
elections (G.Lungu, 22.10.7).147 Voters on the Copperbelt roundly rejected MMD 
policies by electing the opposition (mainly PF) Members of Parliament to every urban 
seat in the region (Fraser & Lungu 2007: 1). Gould observes that following the 
election “[t]he Patriotic Front ha[d] hegemonic control of local government 
institutions in Lusaka, in the influential Copperbelt towns and in Kasama in the 
populous Northern province” (2006). 148 The MMD only retained control of the 
143 Jones & Sakong describe the use of such discretion by policy makers as a high-risk/high-return 
strategy, “feasible only in the Myrdalian hard state [of effective enforcement]” (1980: 139). 
144 As one respondent recalls, “the ZPA was involved, the Ministry of Mines was involved, but I’m not 
sure there was much involvement from the Ministry of Finance at all.” (MSDP techn. ass’t, 1.10.07). 
145 One high-profile example of possible corruption was in relation to the bid by First Quantum 
Minerals Ltd for Luanshya Copper Mines. Hours before the stated deadline the government received a 
bid from the Binani Group, which was chosen over FQML. Lawyers representing FQML challenged 
the bid with three pieces of evidence but were not heard (Chanda 2003). 
146 Michael Sata was Minister without portfolio in Chiluba’s administration and has been in politics 
since Kaunda’s times. 
147 This was partly due to a strengthened electoral code (through a new Electoral Act 2006), although 
my respondent adds that “one remarkable challenge that remained was in terms of enforcement of those 
pieces of legislation.” (Ibid.). 
148 Of the presidential vote, Levy Mwanawasa (MMD) got 43%, Michael Sata (PF) got 29%, and 
Hakainde Hichilema (UPND) got 25% (Gould 2006). The big surprise was the turnout for Hakainde 
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legislature by virtue of the eight ‘deputies’ appointed by the President under the 
constitution, bringing 51% of votes under MMD control.149 
The mining sector played a significant role in the 2006 elections, with the PF 
campaigning successfully on an anti-Chinese (and anti-foreign investment more 
generally) platform, and Sata vowing to re-establish ties with Taiwan. Recognising 
the challenges to its mandate the government subsequently edged toward the centre, 
by addressing some issues raised and championed by the PF during the election 
campaign (including mining sector policy, labour standards, and reductions in 
personal taxes, see Larmer & Fraser 2007). 150 In the mining sector the MMD 
government tried to defuse criticisms by portraying the new mine owners as good 
‘corporate citizens’ (Ministry of Mines 2007). 
Charles Husband, mining specialist at the World Bank, observes that “part of” 
the reason “why the MMD lost the election on the Copperbelt, was that the population 
around the mines [were] not seeing any benefits. So there has been a backlash, 
tremendous pressures.” (11.12.07).151 There was wide-spread conviction that mining 
companies were reaping huge rewards, which resulted in sustained debate (in the local 
and international media) and pressures for reform.152 These voices drew legitimacy 
from the fact that several other resource-dependent countries had already undertaken 
similar reforms.153 The ‘outing’ of Development Agreements in 2007 – through a 
Christian Aid-funded report (Fraser & Lungu 2007) – amplified these pressures for 
change by mobilising local and international civil society groups. 
To be certain, a paternalistic ZCCM set a high ‘benchmark’ for terms and 
conditions for workers as well as social investment by the mines (Larmer 2007). 
Michael Soko, governance specialist at UNDP, notes that salaries and working 
conditions in the copper mines were seen as a standard toward which other sectors 
aspired.154 There were also high expectations of economic development for Zambians 
more broadly following privatisation in the late 1990s. Many remembered and longed 
for a return to the former splendour and opportunities offered on the Copperbelt and 
the privatisation gave grounds for renewed expectations of modernity (Ferguson 
Hichilema, leader of the United Party for National Development (UPND) and a business-minded 
technocrat, who got 25% of the vote after only a couple of months of campaigning (following the death 
of predecessor Anderson Mazoka). 
149 MMD won 73 of 150 parliamentary seats that were filled (via simple majority) by the 2006 ballot. 
After allowing for the eight Presidentially appointed deputies, MMD control came to 81/158=51%. 
150 These challenges to MMD popular legitimacy also constrain government in implementing 
unpopular policy reforms long requested by donors, such as expanding the tax base to tax individuals 
more heavily (World Bank/IMF 2007: 10). 
151 An MUZ official explains how ZCCM “used to own houses, municipal facilities, football clubs, all 
of these new mining companies have divested from some of those responsibilities that ZCCM used to 
do. So, for example supply of water is now the responsibility of local councils, and workers have to 
bear the costs of such services.” (Muchimba, 3.8.07). 
152 The debate over DAs and their renegotiations had however lost some momentum by late 2007, in 
part due to issues regarding a new constitution taking centre stage. 
153 In these processes, there appears to be a trend for royalty-related policies to ‘trickle down’ from 
richer to poorer countries. For instance, when Chile in 2005 was debating the introduction of a 3% 
royalty, some politicians made references to more developed countries, saying “this Bill is similar to 
legislation found in Australia, Canada, South Africa and Peru”, see 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0BEK/is_6_13/ai_n14791758. In Zambia in 2007 and 2008 
politicians would refer to Chile and say ‘if they can do it, so can we’. 
154 Soko notes that “in the past, that is what happened. ZCCM paid its workers well, they had good 
conditions for their workers, and so everybody was gravitating towards similar conditions to the mines. 
Now the mines are the largest employers, but now the conditions are pretty bad, and nobody gravitates 
towards them.” (Soko, 14.9.07). 
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1999). One respondent who grew up in Chingola in the 1980s explains how 
“everything was on the Copperbelt, and everybody wanted to be on the Copperbelt” 
(Mususa, 5.8.07). As copper prices began rising rapidly in 2004 and people failed to 
notice improvements in standards of living, these expectations turned into 
disappointment, and later indignation, thus fuelling the political opposition. 
4.2.4 The economy of Zambia 
Zambia’s economy is highly dependent on the vagaries of international markets. At 
the time of writing the mining sector provided c.70% of Zambia’s foreign exchange, 
on which the country relies to upgrade other industries to more capital-intensive 
production. The mining industry has significant impacts on for exchange rate stability 
to the extent that high inflows of foreign exchange from mining is expended 
domestically, thus putting upward pressure on the exchange rate and making exports 
less competitive (Weeks 2008).155 Inflation has come under control and was 8.2% at 
the end of 2006, the lowest annual inflation of over 30 years (Bank of Zambia 2007). 
However this inflation rate masks the fact that food inflation has been close to zero, 
but inflation in other commodities has been high. In the first half of 2008 inflation 
increased to 12.1%, up from 11.1% a year earlier, driven by higher production costs 
due to power cuts and higher transportation costs (due to rising petroleum costs). 
In recent years the Zambian economy has benefited hugely from debt relief. In 
2005 Zambia received debt relief of $3.9bn under the Highly-Indebted Poor Countries 
(HIPC) initiative, as well as a further $2.7bn under the Multilateral Debt Relief 
Initiative (MDRI) (IMF 2007: 86). This helped bring external debt down from $7bn to 
$700m in 2005. It was, however, associated with a strengthening of the Kwacha in 
mid-2005 (from K4,800/$ to around K3,400/$) that impacted negatively on public 
revenues, mainly through lower local-currency equivalent donor funds and a 
reduction in trade taxes (Weeks 2008: 1).156 
Zambia today operates a very open trade regime, with imports subject to 
tariffs of 0% to 25% depending on the degree of processing the product has 
undergone (raw materials attract no tariffs and finished goods have a 25% tariff) 
(CSTNZ 2007: 24). However the country has struggled to diversify away from the 
‘traditional’ copper sector and develop its manufacturing base (see table 7). Copper 
remains dominant in Zambia’s national development, in particular in the local 
economy of mining regions. 157 In 2006, copper exports contributed to 40% of 
(nominal) GDP (Lundstol, 10.9.07). 
In addition to copper Zambia is a large producer of cobalt, used primarily for 
batteries (accounting for 35% of all cobalt production) and superalloys for the 
aerospace industry. In 2006 Zambia was the world’s second largest producer of 
cobalt, with output of 9,000 tonnes/year, after the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) with output of 11,000 tonnes/year. However much of Zambia’s mineral wealth 
155 Despite appreciation of the Kwacha during the mid-2000s, prices of many imported goods did not 
fall, what a respondent at the Dutch Embassy suggests was due to price-fixing (Gerner, 19.7.07). 
156 In 2007 the exchange rate was stable but strengthened gradually from around K4,500/$ to around 
K3,800/$. In this study I will use a Kwacha-USD exchange rate of $1=K4,000. 
157 A respondent at the Norwegian Embassy argues that this “is a general concern, that it is too copper 
dominated, the growth accelerations are often very much driven by the copper price, and the slumps 
you have as well, in the other direction.” (Lundstol, 16.7.07). 
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remains untapped, with 44% of the country not fully geologically mapped (MSDP 
techn. ass’t, 22.8.07).158 
Table 7. Zambian exports and imports by sector 
Sector Exports 2000-2003 Imports 2000-2003 
Manufacturing 13.5% 81.0% 
Ores and metals 62.3% 0.9% 
Agricultural material 9.3% 0.9% 
Agric. (foods and feeds) 11.8% 9.1% 
Fuels 0.1% 7.1% 
Other 3.0% 1.0% 
Source: World Bank (2005: 10). 
4.2.5 The role of donors in Zambia 
At the time of writing Zambia was on its second World Bank Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper (PRSP), known locally as the Fifth National Development Plan 
(FNDP), covering the period 2006-10.159 Under the FNDP donor funds contribute 
approximately 28% of Zambia’s budget (World Bank/IMF 2007: 4). The FNDP sets 
the framework for budgeting by “guid[ing] to a large extent the allocation and use of 
resources using the ‘Medium-Term Expenditure Framework’-process and the annual 
budget” (World Bank/IMF 2007: 5). With regards to risk factors “[t]he FNDP 
identifies the failure of scaling up of aid as a particular risk to the Zambian economy, 
but is less specific on other important potential risks, such as a sharp fall in copper 
prices and drought.” (World Bank/IMF 2007: 4). Regarding governance of regulatory 
frameworks, the IFIs acknowledge that institutional strengthening is required. They 
emphasise reform within the bureaucracy and in coordination across government 
institutions, but without any consideration of regulatory enforcement (World 
Bank/IMF 2007: 10). 
In Zambia the harmonisation of donor activities, as envisaged in the Paris 
Declaration of 2005, has gone quite far. Donor activity in Zambia is guided by the 
Joint Assistance Strategy for Zambia (JASZ), completed in April 2006 and signed by 
12 bilateral donors, the European Commission (EC), the IFIs, and the United Nations 
(UN). It aims to support donor objectives of making aid more effective, more locally 
‘owned’, and to increase the share of aid given as direct budget support (JASZ 2007: 
3). 
Under the JASZ framework there are three types of donors: ‘lead’, ‘active’ 
and ‘silent/background’. 160 The largest donors are the World Bank, the UK’s 
Department for International Development (DFID), and the UN, with six, five and 
four sectoral lead responsibilities, respectively (JASZ 2007). The private sector is led 
by the World Bank and the Netherlands with a sub-sector created for mining, initially 
led by the EC and later with significant involvement of Norway (see chapter five). 
There is some variation across these ‘traditional’ donors, with the US and the 
Japanese bilateral agencies generally opting for more visible project-based support.161 
158 Oil was discovered in North-Western Province in 2007 and diamonds have been found in Western 
Province. 
159 The first PRSP covered 2002-4 and was later extended to include 2005 (World Bank/IMF 2007: 2). 
160 The latter refers to, for instance, where the EC has some money to spend on governance, but does 
not have the local staffing capacity to follow and analyse government policies and processes, and will 
give the money to one of the lead donors on governance. 
161 As some respondents put it, desiring to “put a flag” on their projects. 
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There is limited dialogue between ‘traditional’ donors and emerging powers 
like China, India, and South-Africa. Among the latter, China’s presence is the fastest-
growing, yet the Head of the European Commission in Zambia notes that “[w]e have 
no contact [with them]. It is kind of a black box, even diplomatically it is a black box. 
They attend cocktails, but as far as discussing in donor groups … they never show. 
Sometimes they show, sit there, never say a word. That is it, it’s one way traffic.” 
(Fee, 20.11.07). 
One characteristic of Chinese aid projects is – as one Ministry of Finance 
official puts it – that “there is a lot of publicity when the Chinese do something. It is 
part of the political economy of China-Zambia relations. For instance that [China-
sponsored Ndola] stadium, it is something like $60m, constructed over 3-4 years, and 
it’s a big issue! But it is only $60m – there are donors who give us $60m in a single 
year … With other donors it would not be the subject of continuous talk. But with the 
Chinese, they are our friends, in our hour of need, and so on.” (Mubanga, 21.11.07). 
The perspectives of ‘traditional’ donors on the mining sector were summarised 
in a joint “issues paper” from June 2007. In it donors welcome changes to the fiscal 
framework, encouraging the GRZ to seek – while avoiding unilateral action – “a 
revision of the current mining Development Agreements such that the principle of 
predictability rather than fiscal stabilisation will guide the sector” (Cooperating 
Partners 2007, emphasis added). In doing so they imply that policy predictability in 
the regulatory framework can substitute for fiscal stability. The report emphasises the 
need to couple any changes to the legal framework with efforts to strengthen fiscal 
institutions, including through support of the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI) as a complement to legal reforms (see chapter five). 
4.3 The political economy of copper mining in Zambia 
This section discusses overarching characteristics of Zambia’s institutional framework 
that cut across various facets of state-firm relationships, and covers four areas. I first 
discuss the investment climate, and how recent policy developments simultaneously 
reflect the ruling party’s private sector-led national development strategy as well as 
growing popular disillusionment with foreign investors. I then discuss the role of 
political culture in policy making, and its expression through centralised and 
personalised modes of governance, and the discourse surrounding foreign investment. 
This sub-section also looks at the potential for civil society, including the media, to 
hold government or mining companies to account. Third I examine the corporate 
governance of the mines, including formal mechanisms for direct state-firm 
interaction such as the Board-level insight granted by government’s retained stake in 
the privatised mines. Finally I conclude by elaborating on how Zambia’s institutional 
framework facilitates a ‘brokering’ role of the state. 
4.3.1 Legal framework and investment climate 
Zambia, on the face of it, appears to have a relatively strong legal framework, largely 
based on that of the United Kingdom (Chulu, 7.11.07).162 However donors are quick 
to highlight that long-standing problems of governance remain (JASZ 2007: 5). 
Zambia was ranked 19 out of 48 African countries in the 2007 Mo Ibrahim 
162 My respondent argues that legislators will “change a few things here and there, but generally we just 
transplant regulations and bring it to Zambia.” (Ibid). 
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Governance Index and ranks 123 out of 179 countries on Transparency International’s 
‘Corruption perceptions index’ in the same year. Based on 2006 data, the World 
Bank’s Governance Matters index ranks Zambia as per the figure below (where 
Zambia’s ranking is represented by the line). 
Figure 2. Zambia and the World Bank Governance Indicators (2006) 
Source: World Bank (2006c). 
Note: The lightly-shaded areas represent the range between median-ranking country and 
highest-ranking country in the sample (all African countries). Darker-shaded areas represent 
the range between median- and bottom-ranking countries. Zambia’s ranking is represented by 
the line. 
The World Bank’s Doing Business survey consistently highlights Zambia’s labour 
laws and reports a largely unchanged overall ranking of Zambia’s ‘ease of doing 
business’ since this survey began in 2005 (in 2008 ranked at 100 out of 181 countries; 
see World Bank 2009). Issues highlighted by respondents in my sample include 
labour laws, cumbersome licensing and registration processes, and a “tricky” 
framework for cross-border trade (Riby, 15.8.07). 163 Corruption also remains a 
problem, and my interviewees suggest that corruption at the lower levels of 
bureaucracy is commonplace. The MMD has placed the fight against corruption high 
on the party agenda, however its anti-corruption credentials are largely based on 
fighting corruption on a few high-profile cases and in government (G.Lungu, 
22.10.07), in particular the pursuit of former president Chiluba in the national and 
international courts.164 
Businesses often complain that the government introduces broad-brush 
regulation with heavy licensing requirements that raise the costs of business. Grant 
Gatchell, a young veteran of business on the Copperbelt, argues that such policies are 
forcing small firms into informality “because it just gets too hard” (26.11.07). The 
country has also experienced increasing energy shortages, as supply has failed to keep 
pace with growing demand from the mining sector (which accounts for about two-
thirds of Zambia’s total energy consumption). I now discuss two pieces of legislation, 
both of which were enacted ahead of elections in 2006. 
163 Two of the FQML managers I interviewed considered Zambia’s tariffs to be significant, citing 
Botswana’s investment climate as much more “business friendly” (FQML mgr 1, 11.10.07). 
164 Transparency International has shown cases of misappropriation and loss of public revenue to the 
sum of K6tr ($1.25bn) (Djokotoe & Chama 2007). 
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4.3.1.1 The Zambian Development Agency Act 
The Zambian Development Agency Act (ZDAA) is a cornerstone of the government’s 
strategy to promote economic growth through private sector investment. The ZDAA 
merged five former investment-related government agencies (including the Zambia 
Investment Centre, ZIC) and established the Zambia Development Agency (ZDA). It 
was passed in 2006 and described by one donor representative as “rushed through” in 
advance of that year’s election (Hasle, 24.7.07). 
This investor-centred framework provides for the establishment of ‘multi­
facility economic zones’ (MFEZ). These constitute geographically delimited areas 
where investors enjoy various benefits (e.g. tax breaks and expedited licensing) and 
are increasingly referred to in national development strategies (GRZ 2009b). In 2007 
the first MFEZ was established as the Chambishi Special Economic Zone (CSEZ), 
managed by the Chinese minerals company CNMC and its subsidiary in Zambia, 
NFCA. An initial investment of $800m was targeted for the zone, the lion’s share of 
which was to fund the construction of the Chambishi Copper Smelter (Reuters 
3.2.2007). 
In the first nine months of 2007 Zambia attracted around $1bn of investment, 
attributed by government to ‘early successes’ of the ZDA. Donors however were 
quick to note that this influx of investment reflected, in part, high commodity prices 
and expected growth rather than a sudden emergence of investor-friendly policies. 
Indeed, the act soon came under review.165 Juan-Jose Villa-Chacon, private sector 
specialist at the European Commission (EC) in Lusaka, explains that the ZDA came 
under revision because “they realised it was restrictive … with regards to nationality, 
the number of work permits you could have, these conditionalities if you will, they 
were putting conditions for investing in Zambia, instead of making the environment 
more attractive to investors.” (20.11.07). 
Villa-Chacon sees the prescriptive nature of the ZDA Act as representative of 
a growing emphasis on command-and-control regulation within the GRZ (Ibid.). Dr 
Derek Fee, Head of the EC delegation in Zambia, echoes this view. He observes that 
“the ethos for the moment seems to be command-and-control … the post-election 
period shouldn’t be like this, the post-election period should be one of calm, setting 
the strategy for the next four years [however] you see a lot these things coming up, 
like the NGO Bill, and the Hospitality Act” (Fee, 20.11.07).166 This is a view he 
shares with some private sector suppliers: “with Mwanawasa I would say there has 
been more prescriptive laws”, opines Grant Gatchell on the Copperbelt, although he 
questions “whether there is any greater ability to implement” (26.11.07). 
165 Henny Gerner at the Dutch Embassy explains that issues addressed by the review (carried out by 
consultants in 2007) included a lack of clarity; overly onerous conditions on self-employment permits 
(previously an investor could put up $50k to get one self-employment permit, under the ZDAA it 
became $250k for five such permits, a change to the disadvantage of smaller investors); insufficient 
attention to SMEs; insufficient incorporation of CEEA in the ZDAA; and the constitution of the ZDAA 
board, which stakeholders argued gave too much discretionary power to the President and Minister of 
Commerce (19.7.07). 
166 Dr Fee describes the Hospitality Act (governing investment and regulation of the tourism sector) as 
“a disaster … If this passes, it is terrible, with all the approvals you need, all these requirements to be 
given by all sorts of ministries. Nothing will happen!” My respondent explains how the EIB has an 
interest this due to a new EUR50m credit line, mainly for tourism and agriculture. The credit line has 
been committed to, “[b]ut of course the take-up will depend on such laws … [and] there is no point 
having the credit line if people don’t want the money.” (Ibid.). 
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4.3.1.2 The Citizens Economic Empowerment Act 
Even as government promoted greater participation of private foreign capital in the 
economy, concerns over limited participation in this growth by Zambians were on the 
rise (see 4.2.3). In response to these pressures, the Citizens Economic Empowerment 
Act (CEEA) was passed in 2006. This Act provides for the establishment of a CEE 
Commission that will provide incentives – including preferential access to 
government supply contracts – to companies with demonstrable Zambian share-
holdings. Michael Soko, governance specialist at the UNDP, sees it as representing an 
ideological move towards ‘economic empowerment’ for Zambian citizens by 
“borrow[ing] a leaf from South Africa” (Soko, 14.9.07). This policy, originally 
proposed by former Minister of Commerce Deepak Patel, has ideological roots in 
Kaunda’s ‘Zambianisation’ policies 1970s. 
Larmer (2005) argues that the idea of locally empowered development in 
Zambia is intimately tied to claims of sovereignty, commonly discussed with 
reference to neo-liberalism and structural adjustment programmes (see also The Post 
14.8.2007). The current move towards economic empowerment and investment rather 
than aid can thus be seen as a backlash against prior World Bank/IMF policies. 
Engagement with China on the other hand, with its hands-off approach and limited 
impositions relating to good governance, fits more readily within the discourse of 
local economic empowerment. 
The CEEA represents demands for economic empowerment that are grounded 
in the experiences of Zambians following a decade of privatisation, where enterprises 
representing 85% of the country’s economy were sold off to foreign investors.167 
However Zambian business associations such as the Zambia Business Forum were 
sceptical towards the CEEA, asking whether this legislation really addresses the key 
issues around limited private sector development (Masumbu, 25.7.07). 
The CEEA did not ‘take off’ during the period under study, and few 
respondents saw it as having much practical significance at the time. It nevertheless 
represents a degree of policy uncertainty for private sector investors. One respondent 
notes how the CEEA provides for the Minister of Commerce to designate any land as 
‘for Zambians only’ and that “this is what people should be worrying about when they 
talk about investor climate” (MSDP techn. ass’t, 22.8.07). 
4.3.2 Political culture, discourse, and civil society 
In this sub-section I focus on three features of the institutional environment that are 
less easily observed but nevertheless of great importance to understanding how state-
firm relations evolve over time. I first discuss the political culture that shapes policy 
decision making, and how this enables government intervention in the mining sector. I 
then discuss the very investor-friendly public discourse I encountered whilst in 
Zambia, and finally I explore how civil society can help to hold government and 
mining companies to account. 
4.3.2.1 Political culture 
In line with the literature review in chapter two (see section 2.2), I found the Zambian 
political culture to be characterised by highly centralised policy making and informal 
167 Thus, although the CEEA was enacted shortly before the 2006 election, Soko says he “[does] not 
think MMD were rushing it for the purposes of just winning the vote”. Rather, he argues, “there was a 
genuine cause, because this was an emerging source of conflict.” (14.9.07). 
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links between government and mining companies. These two characteristics engender 
an interventionist approach to private sector regulatory policy, as will be shown in 
subsequent chapters. 
A senior technical assistant at the donor-funded Mining Sector Development 
Programme (MSDP, housed within the Ministry of Mines) observes that the President 
makes appointments to most constitutional offices, as well as senior-level ministerial 
appointments. The Permanent Secretaries of ministries, who in the UK are meant to 
be the ‘institutional memory’ that carries on from one administration to the next, are 
in Zambia political appointments and periodically reshuffled by the President (MSDP 
techn. ass’t, 1.10.07). 168 The Executive Director of Transparency International 
Zambia (TIZ), argues that in some cases, such as the Anti-Corruption Commission, 
“the President actually does the appointments” without Parliamentary ratification 
(G.Lungu, 22.10.07).169 
A World Bank staff member reflects that “[t]he office of the President has 
significant powers under the constitution, but even the constitution aside, I think in 
effect it has even more far-ranging powers that what the constitution says. All 
decisions are highly centralised, you will not find Permanent Secretaries (PS) or 
ministers making any decisions when they are not sure what the President thinks.” 
(WB staff member, 22.10.07). The ruling MMD has access to significant funding 
resources, including through remaining state-owned (and other) enterprises, as well as 
state-owned media. Guy Scott, Vice-President of the opposition Patriotic Front, 
argues that “[i]n practice, this is still a one-party state” (24.10.07). 
The direct involvement of the Presidency in much of political life reduces 
policy predictability for firms and other economic actors. The aforementioned 
respondent at the World Bank argues that policy ‘visibility’ was lower under 
Mwanawasa than under Kaunda, despite the former’s highly centralised rule: “[e]ven 
someone as powerful and feared as Kaunda was at that time, he would make a 
statement, go to a rally and say this is what is going to happen, then the technocrats 
[at the National Commission for Development Planning] would have to go through 
and see how can they make Kaunda’s statement into a policy that fit into the 
development plan, and more often than not they could not, so they would revert to the 
President.” She explains “Kaunda could say I’ll cut the price of bread in half, but the 
private sector knew that until a policy paper came out and it was signed by the 
President, [government] would not implement it. That is different now [under 
Mwanawasa].” (22.10.07). 
Centralised, top-down political mandates engender an interventionist approach 
to the private sector. Yusuf Dodia (Director of the Private Sector Development 
Association, a lobby and research group) claims that there is a lot of “government 
intervention” that undermines the predictability for business in Zambia. He argues 
that the practice whereby ministers or politicians (with little experience of business) 
take tours of companies and make pronouncements – in the media often referred to as 
168 This contrasts with the UK, for example, where Permanent Secretaries are career civil servants who 
represent the ‘institutional memory’ of a ministry, that carries over from one administration to another. 
In Zambia, the PS plays a big role as “the connection between the technocrats and the political animals 
… he is supposed to understand the political imperatives of the Zambian context, as well as the 
technical imperatives, so he is supposed to build the bridge between the two” (MSDP techn. ass’t, 
1.10.07). 
169 Some civil society representatives have expressed concerns that such offices (e.g. the Public 
Services Commission, Teaching Commission, and Judicial Commission) should send the names 
directly to Parliament for ratification rather than first sending them to President for approval (Ibid.). 
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“courtesy calls” – results in “de facto” policy, and is in fact “the biggest hindrance to 
private sector development” (13.9.07).170 
Such informal meetings are a common occurrence according to several of my 
respondents, and tend to focus on larger and more ‘visible’ firms (Fox, 20.9.07).171 
Personal and informal interactions also provide a channel for mining companies to 
seek private information or lobby the government. Mining companies from time to 
time send representatives to visit the Ministry of Mines to seek clarification or 
otherwise follow up on issues in person. Such visits can play a dual role of increasing 
companies understanding of policy, as well provide government with feedback on 
proposed policy changes.172 
Box 3: Intervention and organisational efficiency 
The political culture of intervention is evident inside government bureaucracies. Reflecting on 
the workings of the Ministry of Mines, a donor representative with an office inside the 
ministry argues that such intervention is always efficiency-reducing, but not necessarily 
corrupt. “From my point of view, I simply say that it is inefficient … other urgent critical 
matters are simply sidelined, because it is the President’s wish … It is not corrupt I don’t 
think, it is just inefficient.” (14.11.07). There is clearly a demand for such intervention to 
exist, because if you manage to “get the ear of the President”, your issue is addressed “at the 
speed of light”. Such behaviour sets a precedent and leads to MPs and ministers behaving the 
same way: they expect to be listened to and may see themselves as organisational 
‘facilitators’. Finally, this behaviour becomes path-dependent: people would frequently go to 
my respondent rather than his staff, because they believe that going top-down is much faster 
than going bottom-up, “and regarding most government bodies they are right” (Ibid.). These 
observations resonate very strongly with my own experience, where people would first point 
me to somebody quite senior who, upon making contact, would proceed to direct me 
‘downwards’. 
4.3.2.2 A public discourse based on morals and faith (in FDI) 
The public discourse is an integral part of the external environment that foreign 
mining companies need to negotiate, thereby shaping the articulation of state-firm 
relations (Pfeffer 1981; Fligstein & Freeland 1995: 29). I use the word discourse 
loosely to denote patterns in how social action is motivated and legitimated in the 
public sphere (e.g. in the media, in press-statements etc.). 
During the time of fieldwork, the discourse in the media and in representations 
by government and other local stakeholders featured frequent references to moral 
concepts. The view from the political opposition and civil society that the Zambian 
government must capture a greater share of resource rents, and benefits from foreign 
investment more generally, was often framed in language of fairness. News reports 
and other media, in particular from the political opposition, often emphasised that the 
170 From the perspective of smaller businesses, it may be more of a nuisance than a real threat: “[y]es, 
you do see that, but whereas it is a big impediment to business as a whole I would say there are just not 
enough senior ministers to hit every business.” (Gatchell, 26.11.07). 
171 For instance, when the Minister of Labour and Social Security, Ronald Mukuma visited NFCA on 
10 April 2008 (Daily Mail 11.4.2007). 
172 The approaches chosen by the mines vary. “When the Chinese come to the Ministry of Mines they 
have various contact points, but they are all pretty senior, Director, Minister, PS. And some of them are 
acting pretty shrewdly these days, they have good English speakers, often a young lady with good 
English skills. Not a Zambian person, always Chinese. That’s the way the linkages are done. The other 
foreign investors have a different approach where they will usually have a prominent Zambian as the 
bridge. These Zambians will come with their expat colleagues.” (MSDP techn. ass’t, 1.10.07). 
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current setup was “unfair” to Zambians (rather than the dubious conditions under 
which Development Agreements were awarded, see RAID 2000). 
This idea of fairness can be traced to what Larmer describes as “Kaunda’s 
essentially moral world view [which] cast a long shadow across the Zambian polity” 
(2005: 43). He observes that “Chiluba’s corruption is commonly explained by 
judgements about his personality, rather than in the context of the vast unaccountable 
power of the Zambian Presidency” (Ibid., see also van Donge 2009). Larmer (2005: 
41) argues that Mwanawasa’s style of governance appears as a continuation of 
approaches taken under Kaunda’s leadership, exemplified by Mwanawasa’s moral 
exhortation in calling for Zambians to grow more food, and his criticisms of political 
plurality as a hindrance to achieving development (largely presented as “an 
unproblematic technical issue” in much the way it was under UNIP).173 According to 
Larmer, “[o]ne of the most notable features of Mwanawasa’s administration has been 
an increasing tendency to reflect Kaunda’s nationalist mode of governance, 
stylistically and in more substantive ways” (2005: 41).174 . 
If the tone of the discourse was heavily reliant on moral claims, the content of 
the discourse was characterised by government support for foreign capital, seen as 
holding straight-forward benefits for national development. Professor Chigunta at 
UNZA argues that Mwanawasa “ha[d] a very narrow definition of progress and 
development. So for him, as long as you have posted positive GDP growth figures, 
and having investment pledges, then Zambia is making progress.” (15.8.07).175 
This ‘faith in FDI’ discourse was illustrated when Minister of Commerce Felix 
Mutati led a Zambian delegation to China in September 2007, where he said 
“regarding the investment laws … it would be stupid to reverse the developments 
[policies] which have reduced poverty in Zambia, from 80-90%” (The Post 10.9.07), 
implying a direct link between higher FDI and poverty reduction.176 Larmer alludes to 
such ‘faith in FDI’ as being linked to a moral worldview when he observes how 
“corruption is understood as a problem that can be solved by the election of 
politicians who have the nation’s interest at heart, and by the identification and 
attraction of ‘good investors’” (Larmer 2005: 43). 
As discussed in chapter one, the relationship between FDI and sustainable 
development is contested and likely to vary across sectors and institutional conditions 
of the host country, in particular where governments provide investor-specific 
incentives (as discussed in chapter one, see for instance Nunnenkamp 2004 and 
Blomström & Kokko 2003). The role of FDI in reducing poverty levels in Zambia is 
far from ascertained, calling for caution in drawing a link between FDI and broad-
based development. 
At one level, support for the MMD’s pro-foreign investment discourse draws 
on Zambia’s long history of donor involvement. Stephen Muyakwa, Chairman of 
173 In a recent example, Minister of Mines Mr Mwansa described the objective of building revenue 
collection capacity as “to create mutual understanding between us and tax payers so that we create a 
level were tax payers feel guilty when they fail to comply”. He did not emphasise that mines should 
simply pay what is due to the government (LusakaTimes 20.4.09). 
174 Partly this is to distance himself from Chiluba: whereas Chiluba harassed Kaunda, Mwanawasa 
hailed him as an elder statesman. 
175 Competing explanations for President Mwanawasa’s uncritical stance to FDI include that he, 
without a background in economics, has struggled to understand the mining sector’s economic 
dynamics. 
176 An editorial by The Post notes, in contrast, that although “foreign investment is not bad … [w]hat is 
bad is the blind belief that foreign investment equals development. That is what we see in most of our 
leaders. They are sloganeering and parroting this song as an immutable dogma.” (The Post 10.6.2007). 
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NGO Civil Society Trade Network of Zambia, suggests that the ease with which the 
president’s support for FDI is accepted among the wider population reflects “an 
African psyche, or mindset. We don’t imagine that somebody would come from 
America, set up a business here, that would not benefit us. We think that when 
investors come here, they genuinely want to come and help us develop. That is a very 
basic understanding.” (Muyakwa, 17.7.07).177 However these attitudes appear to be 
changing, as reflected in the rise of resource nationalism and anti-mining company 
sentiments. Rueben Lifuka at Transparency International notes that people, at 
privatisation, thought that “jobs were jobs”, but are now “realising that we need to 
look not just at employment but at the quality of employment” (Lifuka, 20.7.07; see 
also Bufuku, 25.8.07). 
The shift towards emphasising international investment as a driver of 
development is also consistent with the liberal market reforms of the 1990s, which put 
in place the institutions through which private sector investment can be attracted. Guy 
Scott, Vice-President of the Patriotic Front, observes that the emphasis on FDI is also 
a way to challenge post-colonial power structures manifested through development 
assistance and structural adjustment. He suggest regarding the pro-investment (as well 
as pro-China) stances of government, that “part of it is snotting the old colonial 
powers … You know how the discussions go ‘these whites, these Europeans, telling 
us what to do … we don’t want aid, we want investment’” (24.10.07). 
Goodwell Lungu at Transparency International offers an alternative take on 
the Mwanawasa administration’s focus on facilitating investment. He thinks it may 
reflect a preference for quick wins, arising from Mwanawasa’s desire to leave a 
legacy in place: “[y]ou see, he has been in power for five-six years … He wants to 
leave a record where people will be able to appreciate. So he can emphasise of course 
… long-term goals and so on, but his preoccupation is to ensure that there are a 
number of quick wins that he leaves in place when he leaves.” (G.Lungu, 
22.10.07).178 
4.3.2.3 Media and civil society 
Media and civil society perform an important role in their attempt to disseminate 
information and hold private and state actors accountable. Newspapers and television 
stations broadcast information regarding what behaviour is expected from the private 
sector, and as Hall (1993) observes is highly influential in shaping mental models 
through which actors interpret the social world (see chapter two). 
Zambia has three daily news papers, two of which are government-owned (the 
Times of Zambia, the Daily Mail) and one which is independent (The Post). The latter 
is generally outspoken and influential as an advocate and opinion-builder. Reporting, 
however, is heavily constrained by the availability of information with the result that 
177 Muyakwa reflects how “when you read the speeches, such-and-such investors has brought in $5m to 
invest, so we are moving forward. But they don’t ask how many jobs are being created, what is the 
quality of jobs created … So the thinking is that when investors come, they are not coming for their 
own sake, they are coming to help us because they have seen that we are in a deplorable state of 
poverty and they want to help us come out of that poverty.” (17.7.07). 
178 Dr Francis Chigunta at the University of Zambia makes a similar point regarding the interest that 
Mwanawasa takes in the Copperbelt: “[when] Mwanawasa became President, there was a very serious 
economic depression on the Copperbelt … and he wants to be seen as someone who is leaving a 




there is little facts-based or principled debate. 179 Frederick Bantubonse, General 
Manager at the Chamber of Mines, stresses that one “ha[s] to appreciate that not all 
you read in the paper is correct, they are based on perceptions. People perceive 
something and they go hard.” (7.8.07). 
It remains easy to classify information as ‘confidential’ and efforts to 
introduce a Freedom of Information Act have met with little progress (Soko, 14.9.07). 
Being unable to rely on fact-based reporting, news and debates end up being heavy on 
moral exhortations and light on balanced analysis. This means that many ministerial 
claims – such as over the “tremendous” benefits of the Chambishi Special Economic 
Zone (ToZ 10.7.2007) – can only be taken at face value. 
The media can be used to legitimate state action and to mobilise public 
sentiment in favour of the government. The failures of neoliberalism legitimated the 
blaming of donors in general, and the World Bank/IMF in particular, for domestic 
development failures. A World Bank official in Zambia argues that her organisation 
has got used to “taking the heat” (Palale, 22.10.07) as the government tries to avoid 
political costs by associating tax hikes with donor conditionalities.180 The practice of 
‘blaming’ the World Bank/IMF in the media is widespread, and is in the view of 
Larmer (2005: 41) an expression of a growing populism among the MMD: 
“Mwanawasa’s populist attempt to shift the blame for their consequences from his 
administration to external agencies reflects a rising level of popular discontent with 
the enduring dominance of Zambia’s economy by foreign capital” (Larmer 2005: 
41).181 
Pervasive information asymmetries present challenges for third-party actors 
such as NGOs or donors in holding the mining sector (and government) 
accountable.182 They are reinforced by a ‘culture of secrecy’ (Fraser & Lungu 2007: 
17): until the DAs were made public, not even regulators and bureaucrats charged 
with policing the mines knew the details of what they were supposed to be enforcing. 
This reflects the opacity of the process whereby the mines were privatised, and 
contributes to the muddling of public debates concerning the mining sector. Professor 
Lungu reflects that “[t]his is a problem with all the authorities here, they leave people 
to speculate” (J.Lungu 31.10.07). 
Civil society is further constrained by government mistrust of civil society and 
intolerance of criticism; a long-standing feature of MMD presidencies (Rakner et al. 
1999: 35). A governance specialist at the Norwegian Embassy reflects that “NGOs 
[still] operate to some extent in a fragile environment, the government [does not] like 
criticism, they have difficulty distinguishing between positive, constructive and 
179 In addition to the media dialogue between state and non-state actors, this applies to the political 
dialogue between the government and opposition parties. Derek Fee reflects on the latter point with 
reference to political institutions: “You have a peculiar situation here, that if a guy runs for President, 
he cannot run at the same time for Parliament. So if he loses the presidency, as the PF did this time, 
then he does not have a platform any more. So he has to create a platform, which is what you find in 
the newspapers, this phony war that goes on in the newspapers. Because the guy is denied the platform 
that he should have, which is the Parliament.” (Fee, 20.11.07). 
180 In the case of constructing the Chingola-Solwezi road (to link the Copperbelt with the ‘new’ copper 
mining regions), public media included criticisms of the World Bank and JICA, “insinuating that 
WB/Japan would like GRZ to tax private sector even more” (WB staff member, 22.10.07). 
181 Larmer (2005) argues that IFI’s were widely blamed by trade unions for the disruptive social 
impacts of privatisation and liberalisation, and that ruling party has actively leveraged this. 
182 Even ‘serious’ non-state actors such as the EAZ can be associated with inaccurate media statements. 
For instance the national secretary of EAZ, a well-respected non-government research and lobby 
organisation, argued that mining companies had brought the January 2008 unilateral tax increases upon 
themselves by declining to voluntarily renegotiate Development Agreements (The Post 22.1.2008). 
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legitimate criticism from what they feel is political opposition.” (Hasle, 24.7.07). A 
recent example of repeated attempts by government at controlling the NGO sector 
was the Non-Governmental Organisation Bill, introduced in 2007. The Bill aimed to 
provide for the coordination and registration of NGOs by establishing a regulatory 
board comprised of eight government representatives and two civil society 
representatives (The Post 19.7.2007).183 
Although Stephen Muyakwa at the CSTNZ argues that “we are having a more 
vigilant civil society coming up in Zambia” (17.7.07), the ability of Zambian civil 
society to engage with the mining sector remains limited (with the notable exception 
of HIV/AIDS where there are many NGO-company partnerships in place). Local 
NGOs tend to focus on research (e.g. Muneku & Koyi 2007) or advocacy, and few 
civil society organisations have the technical skills needed to take on a monitoring 
role, e.g. in support of government regulatory reporting requirements. 
Moreover, mining companies may not trust NGOs to be impartial arbiters: a 
manager with FQML refers to an NGO newsletter (covering a case of forced 
resettlement by MCM) to illustrate how NGOs often misrepresent the mining 
industry. He notes that “FQML is mentioned here, as the first company, yet we have 
only 17% [ownership of MCM], we have no control over their environmental and 
social policies, yet we get criticised like this. It is very frustrating … So we become 
very sceptical of these NGOs, so most of the time we’ll have nothing to do with 
them.” (FQML mgr 2, 7.11.07). Limited facts-based analysis in outputs of media and 
civil society enables the ruling party to perpetuate a discourse that uncritically links 
FDI to development. 
4.3.3 Formal corporate governance of the mines 
The Presidency and the government retain a formal influence over companies through 
corporate governance agreements (including shareholder agreements, clauses on 
board membership, voting rights etc.). This influence is rooted in government’s 
retained minority stakes in the privatised mines through ZCCM-IH, an investment 
holding company formed at privatisation.184 
These minority shareholdings confer ZCCM-IH with two Board seats at firms 
where government retains a 20% shareholding, and one seat where shareholding is 
less than 20%. 185 The government also holds a ‘special share’ in the mining 
companies, giving ‘rights’ to an additional seat on privatised mining companies’ 
boards. This share provides the government with a veto over resolutions such as 
change in majority share ownership, sale of major assets, and appointment of 
183 As the President of Transparency International Zambia notes, “it doesn’t make sense to have two 
out of ten representatives on the Board coming from NGOs. So the Board will coordinate and provide 
guidance on the work of NGOs … the Board can easily create an environment which makes NGOs less 
independent.” (Lifuka, 20.7.07). 
184 These shareholdings are held by ZCCM-IH at carrying cost, meaning that ZCCM-IH (and the 
Zambian government) does not have to contribute additional capital in the event of equity raisings 
(Musama, 19.11.07). However, the upturn in copper prices from 2004 onwards has meant that 
companies have been able to self-finance operations to a greater extent, reducing the importance of this 
provision. 
185 ZCCM-IH holds 20% in KCM and Kansanshi, and 10-15% in the remaining privatised mines. The 
Board seat(s) for ZCCM-IH is provided under Development Agreements as well as the Shareholders 
Agreement (Bwalya, 22.8.07). ZCCM-IH memberships on companies’ boards are shared between its 
five managers (Katoto, 29.8.07). 
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Managing Director (Chaila 30.8.07; Bwalya, 22.8.07).186 The special share facilitates 
monitoring because although it carries limited voting rights, it is required for a 
quorum – i.e. the government representative(s) need(s) to be present for the Board to 
be able to pass resolutions. 
These formal corporate governance mechanisms constitute a two-way linkage 
between state and foreign capital. Government representatives that attend Board 
meetings can express official concerns to mining company directors, as well as report 
back to GRZ officials on the positions and views held by the mining companies. 
ZCCM-IH reports to the Ministry of Finance, which is the majority shareholder in 
ZCCM-IH, with the Secretary of the Treasury sitting on the ZCCM-IH Board (Katoto, 
29.8.07). 
With regard to the special share it is often Ministry of Mines officials, either 
Permanent Secretary (Leonard Nkhata) or the Director of Mines (Gerhard 
Kangamba), who attend Board meetings in this capacity (MSDP techn. ass’t, 1.10.07). 
That the Ministry of Mines rather than the Ministry of Finance is represented on these 
Boards is explained by “[t]he assumption with mining [which is] that a lot of what is 
talked about in Board meetings is technical stuff, so therefore you need a miner, a 
mining engineer to attend, to understand what is going on.” (Ibid.). 
ZCCM-IH’s Company Secretary, William Musama, stresses his organisation’s 
role in monitoring the mining sector: “[f]or some things we would ask the companies 
in passing, where they said they would invest so much, GRZ is not there, we are there. 
If they don’t invest what they said, we would know how much they are spending. 
That is part of the [monthly] management accounts [distributed to directors], we 
would be able to see that and comment on it.” (19.11.07). 
The Board presence also enables ZCCM-IH to bring various other issues at the 
privatised mines to the attention of government, including “safety, and other regulated 
issues … that is very important in view of the high incidence of accidents.” (Musama, 
19.11.07). Musama points out that it “is not just the Board we are represented on, we 
are also represented on the committees of the Board.” Any issues raised at the mines 
can be shared and discussed at the ZCCM-IH’s own Board of Directors (where the 
Ministry of Finance is represented), thereby facilitating government insight into the 
strategies of the mining sector. My respondent is keen to stress the strategic, 
discontinuous nature of this form of state-firm relations, noting that ZCCM-IH 
“interventions” are not “there all the time, it is [at] certain times those interventions 
may be required. Or it could be from the new companies to government, or from 
government to the new companies.”187 
ZCCM-IH can also play a role in promoting greater transparency in the mining 
sector. The consultant who was commissioned by the World Bank to undertake the 
scoping report for the EITI said she could see that ZCCM-IH CEO Mr Chikolwa “was 
really fired up for [the EITI]” (Chulu, 7.11.07). She explains this with reference to Mr 
Chikolwa being the former General Manager of the Lusaka Stock Exchange, “where 
he spearheaded the corporate governance movement” and oversaw the introduction of 
a corporate governance code. She observes that “[h]is leadership really seems to 
186 At the time of field work, the veto right of the special share had been used twice, regarding the 
change in ownership in CM and CEC, whereby “the Ministry of Mines Permanent Secretary gives his 
view” (Katoto, 29.8.07). 
187 Musama elaborates on how ZCCM-IH functions as a channel of communication between the 
government and the Chamber of Mines: “[we are] basically there to listen to what CoM’s concerns are 
and bring those, if they have merit, to GRZ. In fact if we know something, or we find that they are 
trying to misinterpret existing regulations, we move in to make those corrections.” (Ibid.). 
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thrive a lot on transparency, good governance, and all that.” (Ibid.) (see also section 
5.4.4).188 
Most companies appear to see the presence of ZCCM-IH as having some 
influence. Deputy CEO Gao Xiang at NFCA suggests that the presence of GRZ on the 
company Boards offers some control over mining companies. He describes 
government representatives on the NFCA Board as “ha[ving] priority, they have final 
decision, any decision if they do not agree. They have the veto. The veto is a really 
important thing.” (21.8.07).189 The company secretary at Chambishi Metals (CM) 
similarly sees the ZCCM-IH Director as being active on the Board, taking the 
company “to account” (Mwenya, 4.10.07).190 Vinod Bhandawat, Vice-President of 
Finance at KCM, sees ZCCM-IH as an arm of government which “helps manage 
relationships with GRZ”, and that this corporate governance mechanism provides a 
good sense of “direction” for KCM (Bhandawat, 6.12.07). 
In contrast, a commercial manager at FQML is more sceptical: “to be quite 
honest, I don’t think they bring anything to the party… Whether there are that many 
negatives about, I don’t know … I think as a general principle the government should 
not be holding shares in private companies.” (5.9.07).191 Donors, on their part, feel 
that ZCCM-IH is adding little value and take the view that ZCCM-IH should be 
listed. This was the original intention at privatisation, and Lundstol puts it, “[m]any 
donors don’t think there is a need for a new assessment, the GRZ just need to deliver 
on their plan to float all the shares.” (Lundstol, 10.9.07). 
4.3.4 The state as broker to the mining companies 
The direct influence of the Presidency enables government to offer support to the 
mining sector in dealing with other stakeholders. This idea of the state as ‘broker’ to 
mining companies is legitimated through a moralising and heavily pro-investor 
discourse (see 4.3.2), and resonates strongly with the idea of the extraverted African 
state (see 2.2.2). 
Professor Lungu recalls how “Mwanawasa arrived in Kansanshi, to find that 
workers were on strike, and almost immediately started blaming the workers, saying 
that ‘these are matters on which you can negotiate’.” (31.10.07). News reports 
commented how “Mr. Mwanawasa noted that … the same workers on strike had no 
employment and wondered what will happen to them and their families if Kansanshi 
mine closes down. He said resorting to strike action would not solve anything but 
distortion of the mining company.” (See Lusaka Times 14.7.07).192 
188 Charles Husband of the World Bank similarly talks of Chikolwa in favourable terms. “He is very 
good … [he] comes from the Lusaka Stock Exchange. So he has a market approach.” (Husband, 
11.12.07). These views also resonate with Anne-Marie Mwenya’s reflection over the CM Board 
representation by ZCCM-IH, whose appointed director Wilfred Katoto “is very active and puts the 
company under a lot of pressure … The man gives us no rest, he takes everybody to account, and is not 
afraid of anybody.” (4.10.07). 
189 When asked if the GRZ has used it, he says “I don’t think so, they are very good in [their] 
cooperation with us.” (Ibid.). 
190 Bantubonse at the CoM observes: “the people like you and I, you could say that we don’t have 
access to information. But the people that sit on the Boards, no information will be withheld from a 
Board member.” (10.10.07). 
191 Misgivings about the Zambian government’s industrial policy at FQML may reflect the fact that the 
company has been operating in Zambia since 1996. Being the first private company to enter the market, 
it has had first-hand experience of the tumultuous privatisation process in the late 1990s. 
192 Another respondent recalls how “the President came out strongly in support of the investors, telling 
the workers that ‘you are scaring away the investors, you don’t appreciate’” (Chigunta 15.8.07). 
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When workers at NFCA rioted following an industrial accident that killed over 
50 people, Mwanawasa was quoted as saying “[y]ou people of Chambishi should 
know better. This mine here was run by a South African company which failed. The 
Chinese came and you have seen what is happening. Don’t be cheated to lose your 
employment because your children will suffer.” (ToZ 10.7.2007). Many of these 
threats exploit the dependence of workers’ livelihoods on the mining companies, and 
can generate resentment against the mines. 
In another example the Deputy Minister of Mines (in reference to possible 
layoffs at MCM’s Mufulira division) said “there was no need for employees to be 
jittery over a matter that government was not aware of [because] government enjoyed 
a good communication channel with the mine” (Mining Mirror, 1-15 Oct 2007).193 
What does this mean to investors? Professor Lungu argues that the close links 
between the political leadership and mining companies may promote stability for the 
mines: “[T]he government is offering that protection, which is necessary for the 
mining companies … if government disappears, then all these issues can be blown out 
of proportion … if 8,000 get laid off it would be chaos” (31.10.07). Indeed, the wider 
information asymmetries discussed above complicate an analysis of the political 
environment, and increases the value to firms of being supported by the President. 
NFCA, in particular, appears to expect the GRZ to ‘broker’ its social relations, 
rather than engaging directly with affected parties. For example, Chinese Deputy 
Minister of Commerce Gao Hucheng, on a visit to Zambia in February 2008, called 
on Zambia’s government to ensure that meetings were held with stakeholders to brief 
them on projects and their impacts (ToZ 28.2.2008). Mwanawasa visited NFCA on 7 
July 2007 and was quoted as saying that “[t]he purpose of coming here is to show 
support of what the Chinese are doing for Zambia. I wanted to see their responsibility 
and how they are paying back to the community and I am excited.” (ToZ, 10.7.2007). 
When NFCA’s ‘west ore body’-project was launched in October later that year, Vice-
President Rupiah Banda visited the firm to inaugurate the project (China Daily, 
28.10.2007). 
4.4 Case-study firms and mining sector dynamics 
The boom in the copper sector has motivated rapidly expanding mining investments 
into new as well as existing assets. The Zambia Development Agency, in statistics 
that do not capture investment by Zambian-registered companies, reports that from 
2000 to the end of 2006 over $2bn has been invested in the mining (mostly but not 
exclusively copper) industry (The Post 29.10.2007). By the end of 2007 – and 
accounting for ongoing construction of several large-scale refinery plants – I 
estimated that foreign mining companies had invested close to $4bn. Production of 
finished copper during 2007 was 561 kilotonnes, twice the amount produced in 2000 
(see table in section 3.2.2). The Ministry of Finance reported that the “sectoral GDP 
growth” of the copper industry was 11.8% in 2006 (Ministry of Finance 2007). 
This section first introduces the four case-study firms and highlights their key 
characteristics. It then discusses the extent of competition and cooperation in the 
sector, including the role of the Chamber of Mines. Finally it elaborates on the role of 
institutional legacies in shaping firm behaviour. Here I highlight the role of routines 
and objectives ‘imported’ into Zambia (cf. the concept of ‘institutional background’ 
193 Larmer presents evidence that Binani (RAMCOZ) made regular payments to MMD, “in de facto 
exchange for evading its responsibilities” (2005: 36). 
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developed in section 1.3) and how they mesh with pre-existing norms and ways of 
doing business. 
Figure 3. Map of Zambia’s Copperbelt Province 
Source: Potts (2005).

Table 8. Zambia’s copper and cobalt sector production, 1999-2006





Box 4: Mining and international project financing 
Mining companies typically raise debt finance for mining projects at the parent-company 
level, usually their ‘home’ country, and then channel the funds to the project level. 
Companies are thereby able to lower their borrowing costs through the diversification of risk 
to the lender across several mining projects (Gannon, 25.1.08). By ‘locating’ this financing at 
the parent-company level, for instance in the UK, US, Netherlands etc., companies are subject 
to the reporting requirements and regulations of these countries, and therefore to some extent 
influenced by international capital. 
The four main stock exchanges where international mining companies raise equity 
capital are, in order of significance: TSX (Toronto, accounting for around 40%), AIM/LSE 
(United Kingdom), ASX (Australia) and JSX (Johannesburg). International mining companies 
are distinguished between larger companies and so-called ‘juniors’ (by international mining 
industry standards). Many of the larger mining companies in base metals are members of the 
International Council of Mining and Minerals (ICMM), which promotes codes of conduct and 
best practices among its 17 members. In 2006 ICMM launched an assurance procedure to 
validate members’ compliance with the ICMM Principles. They also publish guidelines to 
inform members on sustainable best practices, e.g. materials stewardship and biodiversity 
conservation (ICMM Annual Review 2006: 4). 
In 2006 seven of the ten largest non-fuel mining companies were members of 
ICMM.194 However the mining operations in Zambia were all owned by relatively ‘junior’ 
companies (with the exception of the Chinese company NFC Africa, owned by a large 
Chinese state-owned enterprise), and none were members of ICMM. 
4.4.1 Konkola Copper Mines plc 
The mining operations that AngloAmerican acquired in 2000 in the form of Konkola 
Copper Mines (KCM) were considered among the ‘jewels in ZCCM’s crown’. Yet 
faced with a continued weak outlook for copper prices, and more profitable 
investment opportunities elsewhere, AngloAmerican decided in 2002 to divest its 
holding in KCM. In 2004 the Indian company Vedanta Resources, majority-controlled 
by the Agarwal family but listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE), acquired 
KCM. The acquisition has been highly profitable: Vedanta acquired KCM for $50m, a 
price reflecting low international copper prices at the time. The subsequent boom in 
copper prices enabled the company to report operating profits of $52m in 2005 and 
$206m in 2006, thereby allowing it to self-finance further expansion (Chitambala, 
17.9.07). 
KCM comprises some of Zambia’s oldest mines (dating back to the 1930s) 
and has long been a high-cost producer of copper. Although the company has 
expanded by adding mining and refinery capacity – including a cutting-edge 
‘ISASMELT’ smelter at the Nchanga mine site (near Chingola) – much of the 
infrastructure is old. This increases costs, as does the fact that most of the more easily 
accessible reserves have been exhausted. As a result, a Financial Controller describes 
the firm as “very sensitive” to changes in prices set by the London Metals Exchange 
(LME).195 
194 See ICMM website (http://www.icmm.com/members/member-companies) and Reuters (1.2.2008), 
‘The world's biggest mining companies’, 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKL0132041220080201?sp=true. 
195 He illustrates it thus: “If we don’t do these projects, the smelter, and Konkola Deep Mining Project, 
then there is no life here”. (Chitambala, 17.9.07). 
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The company appears to operate within quite a formalised governance and 
management structure, including various Board sub-committees dealing with specific 
issues such as ‘safety, health and environment’ (Musama, 19.11.07). Reflecting on the 
role of head office in KCM’s management, Financial Controller Joel Chitambala 
considers that “it is a fairly independent operation. Vedanta’s philosophy is really 
decentralisation, so each operation is run as a separate unit, with a CEO and several 
general managers. All decisions are made here, we don’t really consult them as such. 
They do provide general guidelines, policy of this and that.” (17.9.07). 
The Company Secretary, on the other hand, reckons that head office of 
Vedanta does influence the adoption and implementation of broader policies in 
Zambia, including issues of financial management. “I think policies are set by 
Vedanta in a lot of respects … But there is, both in culture, and some of the financial 
policies, and I’m sure that a lot of the auditing and risk management, the policies are 
really set by Vedanta, and there is always this feeling ‘that is how Vedanta would like 
us to do it’, and that is how it’s done.” (Bwalya, 22.8.07). I asked Vice-President of 
Finance whether KCM was influenced by corporate governance standards emanating 
from Vedanta’s listing on the LSE; he answered that good corporate governance was 
not about being listed or not, but about a company’s “business, priorities and 
philosophy” (Bhandawat, 6.12.07).196 
Reflecting on company culture and its evolution since the acquisition by 
Vedanta, one respondent notes that Vedanta “rewards hard work, and the difference 
that I’ve seen between AngloAmerican days, at the time when it was fairly local 
management, to the time Vedanta came in … You find from the top guys, every 
influential position is held by relatively young people … You can be anything you 
want, as long as you are goal driven … Whereas the previous AngloAmerican setup 
had more older people, rewarding experience.” (Chitambala, 17.9.07). 
However the new owners were initially unpopular. A senior KCM manager 
recounts how, during the days of AngloAmerican, drivers would stay at the same 
hotels as managers when “going to Lusaka on business … When Vedanta came, they 
were like ‘how can you be in the same hotel?’, ‘No, no, no, we’ll find a cheaper 
hotel’. So issues like that didn’t go down well, it was like ‘you see, white people 
treated us with respect, not discrimination, they appreciated who we were, now look 
at these guys’” (12.10.07). 
4.4.2 First Quantum Minerals ltd. 
First Quantum Minerals ltd. (FQML) has operations in Zambia, Mali and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), with over 80% of its 2007 copper output 
produced within Zambia. The primary listing of FQML’s shares is on the Toronto 
Stock Exchange, with a secondary listing in London, and official headquarters in 
Vancouver. Whilst often referred to as “Canadian” in the media, the company was 
founded by two white South Rhodesians, and management includes expatriates from 
Canada, Australia, South Africa and the UK. As such, the company defies a national 
label. At the time of fieldwork in 2007, First Quantum operated two mine sites in 
Zambia: Bwana Mkubwa and Kansanshi Mine.197 
196 
“Listed or not, we have to follow good corporate governance … Corporate governance is about 
being fair and honest to stakeholders. It is about striking a balance.” (Bhandawat, 6.12.07). 
197 Kansanshi was one of ZCCM’s mines, sold to Cyprus Amax at privatisation in 1997 and 
subsequently acquired by Kansanshi in 2001. 
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My study of FQML in Zambia focused on Bwana Mkubwa, a set of facilities 
commissioned in 1996 to re-process old ZCCM slag dumps and thereafter to process 
ore from FQML’s Lonshi mine in the DRC. At the time of study Bwana Mkubwa 
employed about 400 full-time equivalent workers. My choice of Bwana Mkubwa was 
driven in part by convenience. Kansanshi Mine (FQML’s only other Zambian mining 
operation at the time of writing) is located near Solwezi in North-Western Province, 
some 260km away from Ndola where I was based. An additional factor influencing 
this choice was the fact FQML’s group headquarters (for all the firm’s operations in 
the Zambian and DRC ‘copper belts’) are also located near Ndola. 
The company appeared very transparent in its corporate governance, with 
policies and reporting structures clearly described in annual reports and other 
publications available on its website. Among my case study firms, FQML had the 
most transparent public commitments to being a good corporate citizen. In its 2007 
annual report the company set as its top objective for 2008 to “continue to promote 
the health, safety and development of our employees and to enrich the environment 
and communities in which we operate.” (FQML 2007). In Zambia FQML generally 
enjoys a good reputation for treating workers fairly, providing training programmes, 
and paying above-average wages. The company struck me as professional and 
appeared – like CM but unlike KCM and NFCA – quite readily willing to criticise 
government policies. My access to this company was good and the company was very 
forthcoming in supporting my study. 
4.4.3 Non-ferrous Metals Corporation Africa 
Non-ferrous Metals Corporation Africa (NFCA) is the largest of eight Chinese mining 
companies that operated in Zambia in 2007. It is a subsidiary of the state-owned 
China Non-ferrous Metal and Mining Group (CNMC), China’s 29th largest outward 
investor in 2006 (Morck et al 2008: 341). NFCA was established when CNMC 
acquired the former ZCCM-operations known as Chambishi Mines in 1997, in one of 
the earliest cases of privatisation. Here CNMC did not take over ‘going concerns’, i.e. 
up-and-running operations, but rather a flooded and disused mine that had been closed 
under GRZ ownership. NFCA rehabilitated the mine and began production of copper 
in 2003. 
As noted in chapter one, early research findings have shown that that Chinese 
businesses tend to follow strategies of vertical integration across the value chain, 
resulting in organisational structures that are geographically concentrated (Broadman 
2006; Alden 2007: 39). In this study I too found the Chinese mining companies to 
operate within a network structure with a high degree of vertical integration. 
Further inspection, however, leads to a more nuanced picture, and it is clear 
that the organisational structure has evolved since the firm entered Zambia. A Deputy 
CEO at NFCA explains that – in the beginning – the firm’s view was that 
“[e]verything can be done by ourselves. But right now when we operate the mine, it is 
not necessary to manage all of this, it is not our strong point.” (21.8.07).198 Following 
the completion of mine rehabilitation and commencement of production, there have 
been tentative moves toward greater inclusion of Zambian suppliers. As Steven Banda 
notes, “as of late they have come to recognise our local suppliers … In the past 
198 Gao elaborates: “Actually at the beginning the management was thinking that we can produce or 
provide everything ourselves: foundry, explosives … mechanical, manufactures, just like in China you 




everything came from China, even this pen would come all the way from China in a 
container.” (S.Banda, 8.9.07). 
Even excavation activities are conducted through a semi-autonomous long-
term contractor referred to as the ‘Mining Department’, or ‘Mining One’. It represents 
a commercial relationship which is neither based on vertical integration nor on arms-
length relationships. One respondent at NFCA stresses the independence of this 
contractor: “That one is on continuous basis, and it is dealing with direct mining 
development. That one is on contract. We pay them and they operate completely 
independently, they have their own management, they have got everything on their 
own, we just pay them.” (Chirwa, 30.11.07). 
Compared to the other mining companies in my sample, non-core activities at 
NFCA did not fall neatly into categories of ‘arms-length’ contracts nor vertical 
integration. Separate entities have been set up around Chambishi to form a self-
contained chain, supervised and supported by NFCA, but still operating formally as 
independent entities. As one employee explains, “NFCA department is the mother 
body, then has these subsidiaries, we have Exploration Department, we have Mining 
Department, we have Sino-Metals, Sino-Acid leach plant … They have their own 
managers but they report to the management of NFCA … the overall boss of Sino-
Metals will report to NFCA management. What is surprising is that the NFCA 
management will put pressure on all of these here.” (S.Banda, 8.9.07).199 The Deputy 
CEO explains that this networked structure (with many ‘sister companies’) reflects 
the strategy adopted when NFCA entered Zambia. 
NFCA plays an active role in China’s foreign policy towards Africa through 
the function it plays in establishing the Zambia-China Cooperation Zone (ZCCZ, the 
first of China’s five African ‘economic zones’, announced at FOCAC in 2006, see 
Haglund 2009).200 The area of the ZCCZ corresponds to NFCA’s 42km2 mining 
surface right, and hosts NFCA as well as additional companies providing mining-
ancillary services (to NFCA and third parties) (Mineweb 4.4.2008). 
The commercial ties between NFCA and other investments in the ZCCZ are 
mirrored in organisational governance structures. The ZCCZ was to be managed by a 
‘Zone Development Company’, headed by former NFCA CEO Tao Xinghu, which 
will select what companies are to invest (Sun, 1.11.07). The network structure allows 
financial flexibility for the group’s operations, and short-term loans to the Chambishi 
Copper Smelter (the flagship investment into the ZCCZ) have in the past been 
arranged through NFCA (Chirwa, 21.8.07).201 
NFCA employed about 3,000 employees and Chinese ‘sister companies’ 
employed some 500. Estimates provided by my respondents indicate that about 200, 
199 My respondent is unsure as to the motivations behind this structure: “We don’t know why they are 
saying that these are different companies, we don’t know what they are trying to avoid, if they are 
trying to avoid taxes…” (S.Banda, 8.9.07). He adds that NFCA “is a very big mine in Zambia, but they 
don’t want it to be called NFCA, this one to be called this, this one to be called this … When it comes 
to reporting … I understand that all these companies we have in Chambishi they report to one CEO 
which is the former head of NFCA. All these, foundry what, what, what, they all report to this one guy 
at CNMC, former head of NFCA.” Maboshe, separately, corroborates this point. 
200 The Memorandum of Understanding for this project (earlier referred to as the Chambishi Special 
Economic Zone) was signed by President Mwanawasa at the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in 
Beijing in 2006 (see Xinhua 8.11.06). 
201 Asked whether this enables sister companies to “help each other out”, my respondent, an accounting 
professional, responds that “[y]es in fact they do, very much. Even funding for smaller projects, they 
can do it.” He adds that “in fact the CEO which was here, he is now the overall [boss] of all the 
companies that are establishing here, so that means that the working relationship with the people, I 
think it is ok.” (Chirwa, 21.8.07). 
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or 7% of the workforce, are Chinese expatriates (S.Banda, 8.9.07). Senior 
management at NFCA were all Chinese and this appeared to be the case at the sister 
companies as well (Mwamulima, 30.10.07). 
There is a lot of employee turnover with Chinese managers typically staying 
for three years in Zambia. Anonymous Zambian respondents at NFCA perceive the 
rapid turnover of Chinese managers to be a problem: “it is the trade with NFCA, they 
always bring new people, phasing out those that are becoming conversant with the 
system. So they bring in somebody straight from China and he has to start from 
scratch again. And it is us who are teaching them, even the managers they are very 
blank, you think you are the manager, I believe you are supposed to know.” (S.Banda, 
2.12.07). 
With respect to links with head office, a Zambian accountant at NFCA 
explains that he reports to the (Chinese) Finance Manager who, in turn, will speak to 
head office. He thinks that this top-down structure reflects language problems, that 
“those people cannot directly communicate with us so they will go through the 
finance manager, if not, the CEO, or deputy CEO, and … they will transmit what is 
required.” (Chirwa, 21.8.07). Language, in this case, appears to entrench Chinese 
expatriate managers by concentrating administrative power in a few individuals at the 
top of operating entities in Zambia, perhaps one motivation behind what I found to be 
frequent replacements of Chinese managers.202 
Immediately following the establishment of NFCA in 1997, when the 
company focused on rehabilitating the Chambishi mines, the project was funded by 
China’s Export-Import Bank, with terms negotiated by CNMC. 203 The finance 
specialist I interviewed acknowledged that parent CNMC does get involved, but less 
and less over time: “[l]et me say they have been given more responsibility to do what 
is needed on the ground, since the time when they were just arriving. Initially that 
autonomy was a bit restricted.” (Chirwa, 30.11.07). One explanation for what appears 
to be local management’s increasing autonomy over business decisions is the fact that 
high copper prices allowed NFCA – like KCM – to be sufficiently profitable to self-
finance investment activities (Gao, 21.8.07). 
The Chinese investments on the Copperbelt have been plagued by accusations 
of poor working conditions, and weaknesses in health and safety. NFCA’s explosives-
manufacturing plant BGRIMM was levelled to the ground in a huge explosion in 
2005 that killed all 54 people working in the plant (BBC News 21.4.2005). The 
incident highlighted breaches in health and safety practices. Three months later, in 
February 2007, the spectre of protests prevented President Hu Jintao from travelling 
to Chambishi on the Zambian Copperbelt to inaugurate the SEZ. In March 2008, 
Zambian workers protested against stalling wage negotiations, leading to stone-
throwing, damaged property, and violence that injured two Zambians and one Chinese 
worker (LusakaTimes 4.3.2008). 
202 Asked about whether home country managers would understand the predicament of Zambian 
operations, Gao at NFCA claims that “they understand. We exchange employees, after 3-5 years here I 
go back to China, and I know what has happened here.” (21.8.07). Regarding whether this turnover is 
likely to undermine policy continuity at Chinese firms, China-Africa scholar C. K. Lee has argued that 
this need not be the case, pointing to frequent day-to-day communication between managers at home 
and overseas (Lee, personal communication, 19.9.08). 
203 Note however that Chinese-government funding was not a foregone conclusion. NFCA first 
researched its options in the local Zambian financial markets, but soon found the c.20% interest rate to 
be highly disadvantageous, opting instead to seek a loan form China ExIm Bank (Chirwa, 30.11.07). 
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Box 5: Dynamics of learning and among Chinese investors on the Copperbelt 
As discussed in section 4.4.3 NFCA plays a key role in supporting Chinese firms coming into 
the ZCCZ, often facilitated by its networked organisational structure. Steven Banda claims 
that “[w]hichever company that comes from China, it falls under NFCA, until it matures, then 
it becomes independent.” He reflects on the Chambishi Copper Smelter, that “when they 
came, we were doing the imports, the purchasing on their behalf, but we only did it for three-
four months, then everything was shifted, and now they are doing everything from their own 
end. Unlike these other companies who’ve taken long to mature.” (8.9.07). 
Support for new entrants takes place through NFCA’s coordination of procurement as 
well as policies. A respondent working in administration notes that “everything arrives at PO 
Box 22592 [Kitwe], I’m the one who sorts it” (Maboshe, 2.12.07). She claims that for the 
Chinese companies operating in the area (Chambishi Foundry, Sino-Acid, Sino-Metals) “[i]t 
is the same thing. The same conditions, they come and get them from NFCA … They just 
copy the same things. And change the names.” 
This suggests that the practices and performance of Chinese investment into this area 
is ‘geared’ toward the experiences of NFCA (as a form of gatekeeper for these smaller 
Chinese businesses). Anything the firm learns, in dealing with Zambian stakeholders, it is 
likely to project onto the strategies and systems of more recent Chinese investors into the 
area. 
4.4.4 Chambishi Metals plc 
The operations of Chambishi Metals (CM) consist of copper and cobalt processing 
facilities that were part of the privatisation package, sold in 1998 to Avmin (a South 
African mining company). CM’s assets at privatisation included the Wusakile Black 
Mountain, a large waste dump from earlier generations of mining at Nkana in Kitwe. 
This waste, or ‘slag’, contains significant amounts of copper and cobalt, owing to the 
less efficient production technologies used in the past. It was intended for use as 
inputs into cobalt production, using a new refinery plant commissioned by Avmin. 
After privatisation, Avmin invested $250-300m in setting up these facilities but 
experienced technical difficulties and failed to make it profitable: “they were losing 
money heavily and decided to sell” (Bangur, 29.11.07). 
In 2003 CM was taken over by new shareholders, a Dutch-registered holding 
company called Enya, through a 50-50 a joint venture between Swiss-based 
International Mineral Resources and Bein Stein Group of Israel. 204 Company 
Secretary Anne-Marie Mwenya (who was with the company during the days of 
Avmin) cites three reasons for Avmin’s sale: low cobalt prices (cobalt at the time 
constituting the majority of the firm’s output); difficulties with the refinery 
technology; and finally that Avmin had some issues concerning elements of the 
“Development Agreements [that] were not honoured by the government” (Mwenya, 
4.10.07). Shortly thereafter Enya acquired Luanshya Copper Mines (LCM) in order to 
use ore concentrates extracted from LCM mining properties as input into their 
processing facilities at Chambishi. 205 LCM included recently developed mines at 
Baluba near Luanshya, which have provided a greater stream of copper, resulting in 
CM’s sales at the time of study being split equally between copper and cobalt. 
204 IMR is part of the Eurasian National Resources Corporation, one of the world’s largest private 
mining and metals group controlled by three Kazakh businessmen (Wikipedia, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alferon_Management) 
205 At the time of Enya’s acquisition LCM had been put in receivership by Binani, the firm that bought 
LCM’s assets at privatisation and proceeded almost immediately to sell them off (see Larmer 2005). 
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CM employed about 1,000 employees, and its sister company LCM employed 
around 1,700. In terms of the corporate governance of the two operating entities, the 
same directors sat on the Board of CM and LCM, and company secretary services 
were all done from CM (Mwenya, 4.10.07). The company gave me, overall, a 
professional impression, based on how staff responded to my queries, and how they 
emphasised the formal systems of their operations: the Company Secretary noted that 
“the human resources policies are there, the right to be heard, the committee hearings, 
all those are there and are followed very well.”206 This professional appearance was 
corroborated in interviews with Environmental Council of Zambia (ECZ) officials 
who cited CM as a “good example” of environmental reporting. CM also appeared to 
be proactively engaging with regulators: environmental, health & safety 
Superintendent Daniel Chihili says “[s]ometimes we invite ECZ and the Mines Safety 
Department (MSD) to come and look at our plant, if we have done something new or 
are suggesting something new. So we have no problems.” (1.11.07). 
Among people I spoke to, including employees, regulators and business 
partners, CM enjoyed a fairly good reputation. Mwenya confirms this: “I don’t think 
we get a lot of negative press, when there are labour issues, of course the press will 
pick that up, but generally I think we have a good image.” (4.10.07). Several people I 
spoke to referred to CM as “Indian”, however as noted above the company’s origins 
are not linked to India. The CFO, Anil Bangur, argues that CM does not have a 
nationality, but that they “take professional people based on their merits.” (29.11.07). 
CM management did appear to include several people of Indian origin, in contrast to 
e.g. FQML, but also many Zambians and expatriates of other nationalities. Company 
secretary Mwenya notes that there used to be a lot of expatriates within management, 
but that “there’s been a lot of Zambianisation, especially during the time of Avmin, up 
to 2004.” (4.10.07).207 
4.4.5 Industry coordination and competition 
This sub-section discusses competition amongst foreign mining companies operating 
in Zambia. It also examines the Chamber of Mines industry association, which 
functions as a key mechanism for the coordination of the sector on government policy 
issues. 
4.4.5.1 Mining sector competition 
International copper mining firms generally sell their produce on terms dictated by the 
London Metals Exchange (LME), wherefore head-to-head competition is largely 
restricted to supply-side inputs into the production process.208 This takes three forms: 
206 This does not mean that access was trivial: the Superintendent of Environment would not share soft-
copies of company policies with me (recommending that I request them from the COO), although he 
did show me – during our meeting – a comprehensive set of policies and guidelines. He said these 
policies have been there since Avmin, but that they are periodically updated by current management. 
207 This resonates with the view of Steven Banda, an NFCA employee and resident in nearby 
Chambishi Township, who emphasises CM as trying “infuse” some higher-educated Zambians 
(S.Banda, 8.9.07). 
208 As one of my respondents at FQML notes, “we are not locking heads with MCM, KCM or 
whatever, and we have a pretty friendly relationship in general, if somebody has a breakdown and has 
run out of spare parts, they’ll call another mines and say ‘can you lend this to me, or sell this to me?’ 
So we are not rivals, we are not at each others throat, because we are not really competing in the sales 




first, mining companies compete for the skills offered by engineering consultants (e.g. 
in designing and developing new mines). However, the market for such consultancy 
services is global and mining companies are generally price-takers, so head-to-head 
competition amongst the firms over the services of consultants is likely to be limited. 
In the booming market environment of 2007, shortages of design engineers meant that 
in many companies resorting to proprietary designs when planning an expansion 
(FQML mgr 2, 7.11.07). 
Second, mining companies compete to some extent over skilled labour 
(FQML mgr 2, 7.11.07; G.Gatchell, 26.11.07; Walgaard, 5.10.07). Michael Soko at 
the UNDP notes “the thing with mines is that the more qualified in particular can 
move between the mines. For example the guys who set explosives, they are ‘trade 
tested’ as a guy that sets explosives.” (14.9.07). 209 The ability of skilled operators to 
get certified further increases mobility within the mining sector. 
Third, mining firms compete over certain goods and services. One of my key 
informants notes, “the one area where mines are competing and really fighting tooth 
and nail, that is big capital equipment, in particular tires … there is still a shortage. 
They would have a lot machines, brand new machines, standing on some blocks.” 
However, he adds that “capacity is [now] increasing, a lot of the Chinese 
manufacturers are coming online, so you see Chinese representatives of these 
companies around.” (G.Gatchell, 26.11.07). 
4.4.5.2 Mining sector coordination 
The Chamber of Mines (CoM) is the mining sector’s main policy coordination forum, 
established in its present form in 2001. The limited direct competition among mining 
companies (discussed above) facilitates this kind of coordination across the mines. 
One mining manager notes that “when we are talking about issues with the GRZ we 
are usually all on the same side. Because we don’t have any conflict between [mine] 
sites, all sites have their own operations. We don’t really have issues with each other, 
unless there is a massive pollution event or something.” (FQML mgr 2, 7.11.07). 
General Manager Frederick Bantubonse, who has been with the CoM since 
mid-2001, argues that the CoM exists to help mining companies identify common 
policy positions vis-à-vis government as well as other opinion-forming entities. He 
explains: “we do talk to the IMF, we do talk to the World Bank. You’ll appreciate that 
the World Bank and IMF have a fairly good influence on government, in themselves. 
So if the WB/IMF go to the government with the wrong idea, it affects our members.” 
(10.10.07). The CoM can be seen as a tactical response from the mining sector to 
increased bargaining power of the state following the fragmentation of the industry 
that resulted from privatisation. 
My interview data suggests that the CoM plays an important role in intra-
industry as well as state-mining sector interaction. The Chamber’s meetings typically 
include senior mining company executives.210 Its Chairman in 2007 was Passmore 
Hamukoma, the Chief Operating Officer of MCM. A respondent at FQML argues 
209 Soko further argues that “[b]ecause they can move between the mines, the differences [in terms and 
conditions] are not that great.” 
210 A manager at FQML explains that “it is normally the General Managers or CEO who goes… It is 
normally somebody quite senior. [The current GM] is quite keen on going, our previous GM wasn’t so 
keen on going so I would go in his stead. The council meets every two months. But the CoM also has 
special meetings, where there are issues that perhaps would not involve the CEO/GMs, but maybe the 




that, over time, “more and more the industry is taking a coordinated approach through 
the CoM. You have to remember that the CoM was re-formed just after privatisation, 
and it has taken a while to get going. So the CoM is in its infancy. But it is becoming 
bigger [and] getting more funding from the mining companies. And it is being 
recognised I think by the government as the main voice [of the sector].” (FQML mgr 
1, 5.9.07).211 
Personal relationships play a role in how the CoM coordinates mining sector 
policy positions. A manager at FQML explains that “the Chairman … usually goes to 
the Ministry of Mines, or liaises with and contacts them, he says this is the view of the 
mines on this issue, we want to raise objections, we put it in a letter. So this comes 
from the CoM so it is from all the mines.” (FQML mgr 1, 11.10.07). 
The importance of the CoM appeared to be on the rise – by 2007 all large 
mining companies were members – and in future may extend to more inclusive 
bargaining over labour standards: Bantubonse explains that “when there is a tripartite 
[labour] negotiation, you have the government, labour, and employers. And for the 
mines, being one of the largest private employers, to miss out on that is a shame at the 
moment.” Currently, only the largest mines play a role, i.e. “the likes of KCM and 
MCM are involved.” (10.10.07). 
Julia Chaila, Legal Counsel at the Copperbelt Energy Corporation (CEC) and herself ex-ZCCM, 
confirms that the CoM has become increasingly relevant. She argues that the CoM was “very strong” 
during the ZCCM days, but “seemed to fizzle out” immediately following privatisation. She argues that 
“what we’ve seen in the last three-four years is I think they realised they needed to get together and 




Box 6: Copper marketing 
Most mining companies in Zambia market their finished product to copper traders. Producers 
sell their copper “at mine-gate” to copper traders like Republic House, Trafigura, Glencore, 
Gerald Metals and others, with whom they agree sale and purchase contracts (often on an 
annual basis). These contracts are priced based on the London Metals Exchange, which serves 
as a benchmark throughout the copper production value chain. Many of these traders are 
based in Switzerland, explaining why UNCTAD statistics show 56% of the Zambia’s 2007 
copper exports going as to Switzerland (COMTRADE statistics). Copper traders will then re­
sell the product en route to consumers across the world. 
I found two exceptions to these practices, in relation to KCM and NFCA. KCM has a 
policy of marketing most of its finished copper directly to end-consumers. The policy has 
origins in KCM’s caretaker period (between AngloAmerican’s exit and the arrival of 
Vedanta) and the objective of increasing cost efficiencies (by cutting out the ‘middle-man’). It 
has remained in place under the ownership of Vedanta. 
NFCA has historically – since production of copper concentrates began in 2003 – 
exported most of its output directly to South Africa through off-take agreements. When asked 
about direct supplies of copper to China, NFCA Deputy CEO Gao said transaction costs in 
getting the copper to China were high and that “I would much rather sell the copper and 
deliver the profit” (21.8.07). This points to the need for nuancing the view (often presented in 
the media) that Chinese investment in resource extraction is closely linked to considerations 
of resource security. Indeed, NFCA makes use of international copper traders like most other 
mines: the Managing Director of NFCA’s main clearing agent explains that NFCA “looked at 
selling it direct,” the way KCM does, “but they didn’t like the risk … For selling it directly, 
you need insurance. Which we have, and NFCA doesn’t have.” (Walgaard, 1.12.07). 
However, off-the-record interviews with NFCA staff working in finance and 
exports/imports suggest that direct sales to China have been increasing, and that by the end of 
2007 a third of the final product was going to China (Chirwa, 30.11.07). The Chief 
Accountant reported that all produce had initially gone to South Africa because NFCA 
“wanted to test the market”.212 During the time of fieldwork, the Chambishi Copper Smelter 
had not yet come online and it was not clear from interviews whether future marketing of that 
smelter’s finished copper would be to copper traders or directly to end-users, in China or 
elsewhere. 
4.4.6 Institutional background and administrative heritage of firms 
When describing my case study firms it became clear that although external 
influences were important, as hypothesised in chapter one and two, already-in-place 
routines, aim and practices also played a big role. Much like the institutional legacies 
of home countries and capital markets (see 1.3.2), local norms and previously 
established ways of doing business are path-dependent as well. This section highlights 
examples of areas where external influences are significant in shaping divergent 
practices in the sector, and others where the legacy of already-in-place practices and 
norms remain influential despite a change in ownership. 
Developments of new organisational routines are associated with significant 
transaction costs, in particular in the case of normative values held by local staff. 
Thus, two setups of routines and aims and norms connect, and both are path-
dependent: the existing operations will have its own ‘administrative heritage’ (Dixon 
et al. 2009), and new expatriate management will have their own ideas – shaped by 
their previous experience and directives from head office – on how to do things. 
212 He believes that in addition to financial objectives (profit, cash flows, dividends), NFCA “wanted 
this to be a source of copper”, what he sees as “their ultimate intention” (30.11.07). 
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My initial findings were indeed that foreign investors, as suggested by Nelson 
& Winter, could be “expected to behave in the future according to the routines they 
have employed in the past.” (1982: 134). Thus a new set of owners would in the first 
instance ‘import’ into Zambia what they knew from before, including their own 
mining standards and technologies. Several respondents made this point in relation to 
NFCA, given China’s infamously poor safety track record in mining (BBC, 
8.10.2009). Prior international experience will also shape the initial expectations of 
expatriate managers regarding what constitutes ‘appropriate’ behaviour vis-à-vis 
stakeholders.213 When entering a new market, the expectations that underpinned a 
‘logic of appropriateness’ (March & Olsen 1998: 951) in the home or other 
established markets may be mismatched to local conditions in the new host-country. 
Variations exist, for example, in attitudes to the CoM and the value of 
collective action in the mining industry. The Chamber’s General Manager notes that 
“the interests of the members are obviously different, some members have a greater 
interest in the CoM” (7.8.07). My respondent argues that the main reason for 
divergent interest in the CoM relates to “the background [and] the history of the CEO 
of a particular country. If the CEO was recruited from a country where a chamber of 
mines plays a very prominent role, they will continue to be active here. If the CEO 
was recruited from a country where the CoM is either lukewarm or does not exist, 
they tend to keep their distance from the CoM.” (Ibid.). 
Within the realm of labour relations, Charles Muchimba at the Mineworkers 
Union of Zambia (MUZ) thinks that different backgrounds of investors do 
significantly shape their approaches and management styles: “obviously they have 
different management styles, different shareholders, they hail from different 
backgrounds, so their approaches, while standardised, they do have their unique 
approaches.” (Muchimba, 3.8.07). 
At the same time, the administrative heritage of business operations is 
significant in shaping behaviour. Such firm-level institutionalised ‘legacies’ include 
practices of the former owners that have become institutionalised and adopted as 
taken-for-granted by local staff (which are rarely completely replaced). They thereby 
moderate the routines and aims that newcomer expatriate managers may wish to 
introduce. 
Several respondents at KCM stressed the continuity of formal internal 
structures and processes in place when KCM was acquired from AngloAmerican (in 
2004, by Vedanta Resources). 214 In this instance of ownership transfer the new 
owners appropriated the KCM Development Agreement, as well as the Environmental 
Management Plan (EMP) and Social Management Plan (SMP) developed by 
AngloAmerican (J.Lungu, 21.8.07).215 The Vice-President of HR, who has been at 
KCM since before privatisation, notes that “AngloAmerican is coming from a well­
213 In reflecting on how “so many examples where Chinese companies have been found a little bit 
wanting”, Ernest Mwape at the Economics Association of Zambia, a think-tank, believes that “[h]ere in 
Zambia … expectations about how to pay and treat workers are slightly different. And how you look at 
environmental issues. So those are things that maybe Chinese investors have had to scale up … even if 
this is a poor country, the expectations on certain things are stronger than they anticipated.” (16.8.07). 
214 This was also the case for Chambishi Metals, the Copperbelt Energy Corporation (CEC) and 
Kansanshi mine. The latter was acquired by FQML from Cyprus Amax in 2001. CEC was initially 
privatised to a consortium comprising National Grid (UK) and Synergy (US). 
215 Ndalama at the Ministry of Mines confirms that in DAs “you will find clauses to that the next 
person who takes of a mining permit shall inherit the DA. For example Kansanshi was done with 
Cyprus Amax, and when First Quantum got the property at a later stage they more or less inherited the 
benefits, in fact the whole DA.” (Ndalama, 27.7.07). 
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entrenched and established system. They have been in mining for many many years 
… they did bring a lot of improvements when they came in 2000. Especially in the 
area of procurement.” (Masupha, 12.10.07).216 
The strong legacy of AngloAmerican can explain comments by Environmental 
Manager Yotham Phiri that “[i]n terms of standards, we are much better than the 
parent companies. We tend to have people coming from that side to see how we are 
doing things here.” He attributes this to the legacy of AngloAmerican and the 
“systems here that Vedanta found when they came.”217 (Phiri, 12.10.07). At CEC 
there has been a similar effect, and current internal systems and processes are heavily 
influenced by those implemented by former shareholders. Julia Chaila, Legal 
Counsel, argues that “this was the biggest credit we saw from National Grid [UK] and 
Synergy [US]. Procedures, standards, documenting things. They left a very solid base 
of this.”218 (Chaila, 30.8.07). 
A firm’s administrative heritage also includes historical choices of technology. 
As Joseph Makumba (Environmental Manager at ZCCM-IH) points out, “most of our 
infrastructure, like in mining, was developed way before environmental issues became 
… an issue.” (23.7.07). He stresses that the Environmental Council of Zambia was 
only set up in 1990, with the passing of the EPPCA, “[s]o it’s quite new, but when 
you look at the industry itself, it is going back to [the] 1920s.” This makes 
environmental management more costly for firms. 
Over time, the ‘unique’ characteristics of investors are diffused: the 
incremental engagement that often characterises FDI (Johanson & Vahlne 1977) 
results in firms becoming increasingly embedded in local political, economic, and 
social environments. Most visibly, this may take place e.g. through the recruitment of 
locals as managers, or entering into longer-term contracts with local suppliers. A 
manager at CEC (himself ex-ZCCM) notes that although these mining companies 
come from all over the world, they “appoint a couple of Zambians in senior position, 
and that brings the thinking. Those senior Zambians would have worked for ZCCM. 
In each mine you will find that there is a group of key Zambians who will probably be 
advisors to the investors of how business is done.” (Lwiindi, 31.8.07). 
However, the clash of new approaches and old habits can be disruptive. When 
Vedanta acquired KCM in 2004 Masupha notes that there was a lot of mistrust, 
“people have only seen Indians as traders and shop keepers … can they really do 
mining operations?” (12.10.07). The failure of Binani clearly set a bad example, and 
Masupha notes that “the strike we had in 2004, when you look at it, it was because 
there was so much mistrust, so much mistrust … And also maybe their 
communication at AngloAmerican was very good … it helped a lot of issues.” 
(Ibid.).219 
216 Masupha adds that “also the conditions in some respects it got better”, though acknowledging that 
the paternalistic approach of ZCCM was abandoned: “you could hear people complaining, this and 
that, but then they understand that it is better if you look at those areas yourselves.” (12.10.07). 
217 Phiri elaborates: “They found the safety management system around; at the time they were coming 
KCM was getting accredited to OHSAS (Occupation Health and Safety Assessment Systems) 18001.” 
(12.10.07). 
218 She reflects; “I don’t know whether they were told to transfer skills from there, but they got some. 
In the environment that was very strong as well. They were very particular because of all these claims 
you have in Europe in terms of damages to the environment, damage to the soils, oil spillages. We had 
it all over the garages, the workshops, but now you find they’re spotless.” 
219 She elaborates that “[t]he CEO would, every month without fail, put out a news letter, to the 
employees, and also in terms of having meetings, we would have executive meetings, which we still 
have, but with a more fixed agenda. Then he had an operations meeting separately, just to discuss 
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CM Company Secretary Mwenya reflects that “[i]n the Avmin days we had a 
lot of paper work, a lot of policies, a lot of adherences to those things. I think in the 
Enya days there is not so much emphasis on written policies.” (Mwenya, 4.10.07).220 
The change in approach to formal routines can be explained by the moving of people 
with an ‘old’ set of mental models. My respondent notes that “most if not nearly all 
the people that came with Avmin are no longer here. Enya brought its own people, in 
particular in the finance and smelter sections” (Ibid.). She observes that “[t]he place 
where we are struggling with image is LCM, where it is an uphill battle to divorce 
ourselves from the Indians that were previously there [Binani]. We have to make the 
distinction that we are a different kind of Indian. And no matter what you do, people 
align you with those who came before you.” (4.10.07). 
4.5 Chapter conclusion 
This chapter has introduced the historical background of the Zambian economy and 
its mining sector, and discussed the governance and political culture of how the state 
engages with the mining sector. In doing so it has highlighted how a weak state makes 
use of informal mechanisms to achieve dual objectives of enabling as well as 
controlling foreign capital. It does this directly, e.g. through brokering foreign firms’ 
relationships with labour unions and stakeholders, as well as through mediating 
organisations such as the CoM or the ZCCM-IH. 
The rising resource nationalism during the boom years, pressures from donors, 
and an uncritical pro-FDI development discourse all legitimated continued 
discretionary involvement by central government in the mining sector.221 These direct 
informal links enable government to accommodate, but also seek political favours 
from large private sector firms, for instance around renegotiation of the Development 
Agreements (see chapter five). At the same time, the lack of transparency and quality 
of reporting in the media means that there is little distinction made between firms of 
varying compliance records. 
Having the Presidency involved in what would otherwise be bureaucratic 
regulatory relationships reduces the policy predictability from the perspective of the 
mines and was raised as a key issue among many of my respondents.222 Yet at the 
same time, the growing political pressures during the boom years increased the 
‘usefulness’ to firms of having the President and other government officials to act as 
brokers of their economic interests. When informal direct relationships co-exist with 
the formal regulatory bureaucracy (that I describe and discuss in subsequent chapters) 
they open up space for different articulations of state-firm relations. 
This chapter then presented my four-case study companies and general mining 
sector dynamics, including competition as well as collective action. In describing my 
operations, they met every week. And then issued a follow-up. Those are some of the things people 
miss.” 
220 She adds that “[t]he policies are still there, because they are inherited from Avmin. But I think they 
are not followed with the same passion as we did in the Avmin days.” (Ibid.). 
221 Some stakeholders question what the GRZ gets in return for its support to the mining sector. Peter 
Sinkamba, Director of NGO Citizens for a Better Environment, asks “what motivates the President to 
protect or speak on behalf of the mining companies, to make it sound like such meaningful investment, 
we are wondering, those of us with an understanding of the contribution that mining makes.” 
(Sinkamba, 1.8.07). 
222 Thus, while this may enhance one form of operational stability for firms, it may come at the expense 
of reduced regulatory ‘clarity’ (e.g. around which regulatory infringements will be strictly enforced and 
which are open to negotiation). 
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case study firms it is evident that external influences do play a role in shaping 
company behaviour, but that they compete with pre-existing ‘administrative heritage’ 
of norms and practice in the workplace. Such legacies from ‘administrative heritage’ 
are not, however, present at NFCA and FQML/Bwana Mkubwa since neither took 
over ongoing ‘going concern’ operations – as such their practices and management 
structures are more clearly linked to the practices, ideas and ideals of current 
shareholders. In my following three thematic chapters on state-firm relations I thus I 
expect a messy mixture of internal (domestic) and external (international) influences 
on the firms under study. 
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5 Taxation and fiscal governance 
5.1 Introduction 
The commodities boom that followed the privatisation of Zambia’s mining sector 
coincided with growing criticisms against government, which was perceived as 
having failed to capture sufficient benefits from the mining sector. This chapter 
discusses the resulting pressures for fiscal policy reform, mining companies’ 
responses, and the evolution of government fiscal policy that culminated in unilateral 
action against the mines. 
The chapter begins by introducing the context and relevance of taxation and 
fiscal policy in the Zambian mining sector. In doing so it highlights the twin issues of 
fiscal concessions (including low tax and royalty rates) and lack of capacity to 
calculate and collect whatever taxes are due. The second section turns to the 
organisational routines and objectives that shape the stance of foreign mining 
companies on issues of fiscal policy. It sets the scene for a third section, which 
discusses at length the interaction between mining companies and state and non-state 
actors over fiscal reform. This includes an examination of how policy agendas have 
evolved and the role of foreign investors within this process. The fourth section 
summarises and concludes. 
5.2 Context and relevance 
As discussed in chapter four, the failure of the mining sector to make meaningful 
contributions to Zambia’s economic development resulted in growing political 
pressures on government to address the perceived imbalances. By late 2007 copper 
prices were close to historical highs,223 however the mining companies had been 
contributing little to fiscal revenues: in 2007 the government of Zambia (GRZ) 
collected $142m in royalties and corporate tax based on $4.7bn in copper and cobalt 
exports.224 According to Transparency International Zambia, individuals at this time 
contributed some 26% of Zambia’s tax base, while mining companies contributed 
1%.225 I now introduce two main reasons why the tax take has been so low, namely 
the fiscal concessions contained in state-firm contracts (Development Agreements) 
and other legislation, as well as limited capacity for tax collection.226 
223 Prices at the time of study were around $3.00/pound [$6,600/tonne], a five-fold increase over prices 
of $0.61/pound [$1,342/tonne] at the time of privatisation. 
224 President Mwanawasa, opening of 10th National Assembly speech, Jan 2008, 
http://www.mibs.gov.zm/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=285&Itemid=142 
225 These taxes arise from the 10% of the work force that are employed in the formal sector (Lundstol, 
16.7.07). 
226 These two areas are clearly interlinked: when announcing (in June 2007) the GRZ intention to 
conduct tax audits of the firms, Finance Minister Magande suggested that increasing collection 
efficiency would be easier than renegotiating Development Agreements (Mineweb 11.7.2007). 
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5.2.1 Development Agreements and the fiscal framework 
State-investor contracts, or Development Agreements (henceforth DAs), are provided 
for in Section 9 of the Mines and Minerals Act of 1995.227 They represent a way for 
government to satisfy the interlinked but disparate investor objectives of a stable 
operating environment and high financial returns. 
To assure incoming investors of a stable regulatory environment the DAs 
incorporated stability clauses on existing legislation (fiscal, environmental, labour), 
varying from 15-20 years, thus constraining GRZ’s ability to change such legislation. 
To make investment appear more profitable DAs also included various financial 
incentives, including 100% capital allowances and duty exemptions for the two 
largest mines (KCM and MCM).228 
DAs granted to incoming mining investors were not identical but rather 
depended on the bargaining powers of firms. Significant discretionary power was 
given to the Minister of Mines (through the Mines and Minerals Act), allowing him to 
vary fiscal terms of DAs with little if any involvement from the Ministry of Finance 
(MSDP techn. ass’t, 22.8.07) and without Parliamentary approval. Over time, as 
evidence emerged of corruption in this process of discretionary bargaining (World 
Bank 2006a), it undermined democratic support for the DAs.229 
Mining companies, on their part, argued through the Chamber of Mines that 
the DAs were created not only to protect investors, but also to protect the people of 
Zambia from failing to bring in “much needed FDI for revitalising the mining 
industry” (CoM 2007b). By many measures, however, the DAs were unequal treaties. 
First, although they committed the GRZ to reimburse the company if government 
failed to provide stability (e.g. under Cl.16 for MCM’s DA), there was no 
corresponding commitment for the firm to reimburse the GRZ if the firm failed to 
provide on its own obligations contained in a DA (e.g. planned investments, support 
for local business etc.). Moreover, although the CoM argues that DAs were “given in 
return for future commitments by the companies to invest”, such commitments appear 
tenuous given evidence of several companies (e.g. Anglo American, Cyprus Amax, 
Avmin and Binani Group) exiting Zambia in the years immediately following 
privatisation. 
Faced with growing political pressures to reform, the government enacted the 
Mines and Minerals (Amendment) Act, henceforth MM(A)A, in early 2007. It 
included changes to corporate tax rates (from 25% to 30%), limits on capital 
allowances, imposition of a windfall tax and increased royalty rates. The MM(A)A 
also transferred the authority to grant tax incentives from the Ministry of Mines to the 
227 Development of the mining and mineral sector was one objective of Zambia’s Mines and Minerals 
Act (No. 31) passed in 1995 (see USGS 2003: 1). Most of the Development Agreements for privatised 
mines are available at http://www.minewatchzambia.com/. 
228 Capital allowances are accounting provisions. They allow companies to write off the cost of capital 
equipment against profits the year it is acquired, rather than depreciating the cost over the life of the 
equipment. Capital allowances effectively enable companies to postpone tax payments, what Otto 
(2000: 17) has called a “time-sensitive tax incentive”. This was perhaps the most significant financial 
incentive for privatised mines, in particular during the heavy expansionary investment of the copper 
boom. 
229 The report’s number one reform agenda item was that “if government wants to design a progressive 
and more certain fiscal regime for future mining projects the scope of ministerial discretion needs to be 
sharply curtailed” (World Bank 2006a: 52). 
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Ministry of Finance, ostensibly to reduce ministerial discretion in awarding DA fiscal 
concessions.230 
However, the act only applied to future investors in the mining industry. Civil 
society protested that this was too little too late. Donors were similarly concerned that 
incumbent mining companies, after all, represented the vast majority of Zambia’s 
proven copper reserves. I elaborate in section 5.4 below on the evolving position of 
donors in supporting across-the-board fiscal reform, and government’s eventual 
approach to companies seeking renegotiation of existing DA contracts. 
5.2.2 State capacity for tax collection 
A lack of mining sector specialist capacity at the Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA) 
and various reporting ‘grey areas’ (Chungu, 21.11.07) enable mining companies to 
externalise resource rents through practices such as management fees, transfer pricing 
and inaccurate reporting to customs officials.231 
The World Bank highlighted these issues in a 2006 report, arguing that 
“[g]iven the nature of the mining and processing industry in Zambia, without further 
attention, it can be expected that transfer pricing is occurring and will increase as the 
number of processing plants increases over the next few years” (World Bank 2006: 
41). During fieldwork I found many indications that firms were externalising 
resources beyond the obvious channels of declaring dividends or repaying loans. This 
included evidence that large firms were selling their copper for below-market value 
prices, thereby reducing royalty payments to government.232 
Second, management contracts between head office and subsidiaries enable 
firms to externalise resources and minimise their domestic tax bill. The Company 
Secretary of ZCCM-IH explains that “the majority shareholders in these companies, 
in some cases they have actually got management contracts, which means they are 
getting money out of the operations … it is their companies providing those quality 
services to the industry. So, if they do not declare a dividend, they don’t care, they are 
making money indirectly.” (19.11.07). 
Finally, tax evasion may take place through over-reporting the value of 
imported goods. Anonymous respondents at NFCA claim there are always two 
invoices for all orders from China: one with a lower value that is attached to the 
container (and used to calculate duties at the border) and another that is used for 
paying the seller (S.Banda, 2.12.07). 
Of late the government has recognised weaknesses in the regulatory 
framework, although challenges remain. Chisanga Chungu, Partner at Deloitte in 
230 This reflected the trend of the Ministry of Finance wanting to be the only ministry involved in fiscal 
matters of the mining sector, and is consistent with IMF recommendations that granting of fiscal 
provisions be removed from Ministry of Mines (IMF 2006: 9). 
231 NFCA for example, appeared to evade taxes by failing to report mineral content of the concentrates 
they export. As one respondent puts it, “when I was working with the export department I was able to 
see the report that came from the independent [mineral analysis] … there was certain percent of silver, 
certain percentage of copper, certain percent of gold.” (S.Banda, 8.9.07). 
232 Bank of Zambia data suggests that mining companies – in particular MCM with who sells to 
Glencore, a trader within the same group of companies – sold its copper for significantly less than the 
LME price (Bank of Zambia). Michael Soko at the UNDP notes that Zambia’s “anti-trust laws are not 
as tight as they are in US or Europe, and the investigations are not as thorough. So it is really easy in 
this part of the world to demonstrate that you are not related. Again, we don’t have as much 




Lusaka, explains that ZRA used to accept management fees without further 
questioning. Increasingly, however, the agency is asking for motivations behind such 
transfers, e.g. “why one percentage rate over another”, who the on-the-ground 
managers are, and how long the managers spent in Zambia (Chungu, 21.11.07). 
5.3 Organisational routines and objectives 
I argued in chapter two that a firm’s routines and objectives constitute key drivers of 
organisational behaviour. This section highlights how some of these organisational 
routines and objectives vary across my case study firms, and their origins in a mixture 
of internal (domestic) and external influences. 
These routines and objectives are relevant to understanding the evolution of 
policy making because they shape how firms respond to policy proposals (see 2.5.6. 
By extension they have a bearing on the ability of states to formulate, coordinate and 
effectuate industrial (in this case, fiscal) policy. 
I first discuss the organisational aim of minimising costs, and how it varies 
across firms with different cost structures. I then discuss routines relating to 
organisational structure, and the implications for transparency around fiscal reporting. 
Lastly I briefly examine the organisational aim of stability, embodied in the stability 
clauses contained in the DAs signed by foreign investors at privatisation. 
5.3.1 The objective of minimising costs 
Many mining companies in Zambia have a high cost base, reflecting the old 
infrastructure of many mining operations and the fact that much of the “easy” copper 
has been taken out (Makumba, 23.7.07). This results in strong incentives to manage 
and reduce non-production-related costs where possible. As one respondent explains, 
“with a mine it is all about development and extraction. And the extraction is 
probably the easy part. So anyone who is watching their pennies is going to find it 
hard to justify putting a new drive [shaft] in, when they can spend money taking out 
existing ore.” (G.Gatchell, 8.10.07). 
The dependence on old (and costly) infrastructure is greater among the older 
mining operations (notably KCM and MCM), but differences in cost structures across 
mines also depend on strategic and structural characteristics. For instance, 
underground mines are more costly to operate than open pit mines, and low-grade 
deposits are more expensive to exploit than high-grade deposits. 
Varying cost structures across mines can explain some of the variation in 
companies’ willingness to accommodate proposed changes to the fiscal regime. As 
one manager at FQML notes, “everybody has different view points and different 
amounts available … at e.g. KCM and MCM, they are still throwing huge amounts of 
money at their projects, as they are gearing up … Now if you increase the royalties it 
hurts them in a way that is unavoidable, because it is not like a tax where you write it 
off against capital expenditure. Whereas FQML is a bit different. Kansanshi and 
Bwana Mkubwa are already paying tax, full stop.” (FQML mgr 3, 28.8.07). 
5.3.2 The aim of stability 
The recent experience of Nigeria illustrates that fiscal incentives alone are no panacea 
for attracting investors in situations where fundamental stability is lacking (see 
Mthembu-Salter 2009). Once capital needed for initial investment has been arranged 
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and committed to, i.e. once the operations in a country are up and running, a firm’s 
strategic priorities may shift away from fiscal concessions and towards stability. A 
Deputy CEO at NFCA notes that between stability and financial incentives, 
“[n]ormally, I think the stability is more key, so that we can plan into the future”.233 
Organisational theorists have long argued that the pursuit of stability in the 
external environment is central organisational objective of firms (see chapter two, e.g. 
Pfeffer & Salancik 1978). Mining is by its very nature a long-term endeavour, and is 
therefore particularly exposed to the risks of political and policy volatility. My own 
interviews with company managers suggest that a stable and predictable environment 
is important to the mines under study. As one manager at FQML puts it, “the whole 
point [of DAs] was to guarantee stability, because obviously Zambia had not been an 
attractive investment destination for many many years, and was considered very high 
risk” (FQML mgr 1, 11.10.07). 
Yet despite promises made at privatisation, some firms felt that the GRZ had 
failed in stabilising regulatory ‘costs’ for the mines. At CM I encountered a strong 
sense that the Zambian government had been dishonest about the DAs, failing to 
‘stabilise’, inter alia, fees, land taxes etc. Mwenya argues that government breached 
the spirit of the DAs: “we’ve have been arguing this and it has fallen on deaf ears … 
you said 15 years of no changes in taxes, Kalulushi City Council [local government] 
wants to change the land rates every year.” (4.10.07).234 My respondent recalls that 
“during the Avmin days, there were a lot of fights, there was even talk of going to 
court” and her colleagues corroborate this view. A manager at FQML argues that 
FQML had a similar experience to that of CM, that the list of issues on which he felt 
government had breached agreement was “long” and included land taxes, VAT on 
imported goods, changes of duties, and work permits (FQML mgr 1, 13.5.09). 
5.3.3 Organisational structures and financial reporting 
The internal routines through which the company organises its activities determine the 
scope for minimising tax payments through more or less legal methods. This sub­
section focuses on the case of NFCA to illustrate the link between organisational 
structure, international capital markets, and tax avoidance. As noted in the previous 
chapter, NFCA appears quite distinct in its organisational structure compared to other 
mines on the Copperbelt, with several ‘sister companies’ under its control.235 
NFCA’s networked organisational structure seems to result in coordination 
challenges for its management, as reflected in a lack of well-implemented formal 
reporting routines. As one respondent points out, “for financial management, it has 
basically created problems, and the recommendation [from auditors] has been that we 
do away with it.” (Chirwa, 30.11.07). My respondent adds that “[w]here you have 
233 The mines – representing over 60% of Zambia’s energy consumption – were during 2007 under 
pressure to pay higher energy tariffs, being criticised for paying lower energy tariffs (agreed and 
‘locked in’ with the private provider CEC at privatisation) compared to the national electricity provider 
ZESCO. However the Legal Counsel at the CEC notes that “the [energy] tariff they agreed at 
privatisation was twice the level that ZESCO was using [at the time]”, suggesting that the mines 
preferred stability as opposed to more ‘direct’ financial incentives. 
234 My respondent adds that “government says that this is a different kind of tax. But it is a cost to the 
company, and they all go together” (Mwenya, 4.10.07). This view is supported by another CM 
respondent who is concerned that “after a period of time the government turns things around … If you 
have a DA, it has to be credible, it has to stick” (Nordoff, 10.10.07; FQML mgr 1, 13.5.09). 
235 I was unable to determine whether the proliferation of smaller ‘sister companies’ to NFCA was part 
of a strategy to minimise taxes, e.g. by benefiting from tax thresholds. 
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insufficient documents, but [have] to make that payment, that is where it becomes 
extremely, I would say a risk … Contracts, the authorisation papers, those are not 
there, but there is pressure to make that payment” (Chirwa, 30.11.07). 
In addition, he claims the limited use of English among top management and 
close commercial links to other Chinese companies lead to difficulties in ensuring the 
adherence to international accounting standards: “where you have documents which 
are in Chinese, then when requests are made you have to ask the Chinese manager to 
retranslate into English to be understood. There are sometimes problems with 
auditors, because they will find some transactions, when the papers are all in Chinese, 
so it becomes difficult for them to understand that payment.” (Chirwa, 30.11.07). 
However, NFCA appeared less concerned with the opinions of international 
auditors (compared to my other case study firms), perhaps due to its limited exposure 
to international capital markets. These auditors (e.g Deloitte, PwC, Ernst&Young etc.) 
are required to audit and sign off on the annual financial statements of privatised 
mining companies – which the ZRA uses to calculate taxes due – as giving a “true and 
fair view of the company’s affairs”.236 Failure to get this sign-off results in so called 
‘auditor qualifications’, which may compromise relationships with lenders and reduce 
future access to capital markets. 
Among the five international mining companies operating in Zambia for 
which annual financial statements were available for the last three years, only 
NFCA’s accounts had received any auditor qualifications (and did so in every year). 
NFCA’s auditors Deloitte cite unavailability of information that makes them “unable 
to determine whether proper accounting records have been maintained” (NFC Africa 
Annual Accounts 2005). 
The networked organisational structure of NFCA, with many inter-company 
transactions, clearly facilitates transfer pricing. But why would NFCA be indifferent 
to whether or not it gets a clean slate from auditors? As noted in section 4.4.3, NFCA 
is a subsidiary of state-owned company CNMC and gets its funding principally from 
China’s Export-Import Bank. To the extent that NFCA therefore relies less on 
impersonal international (mainly ‘western’) capital markets, where scrutiny of 
company accounts is key to accessing finance, the firm will be less sensitive to a 
negative report from their auditors. 
5.4 Interaction and policy evolution 
This section aims to elaborate on the interaction between firms and the Zambian state 
and to explicate the evolution of fiscal mining sector policy. I first examine the 
origins of fiscal concessionary policies as outcomes of bargaining between the state 
and large, influential investors. I then look at the role of donors in the emergence of 
the fiscal reform agenda around 2005 and how the attitudes and involvement of 
donors evolved over time. 
The third sub-section discusses the consultative approach initially adopted by 
government, and how incumbent mining companies responded. I highlight the 
expectations among mining companies of a ‘quid pro quo’ whereby government 
would give something ‘in return’ for DA renegotiation, and how these claims centred 
on increasing stability in the external environment. 
236 According to the DAs, firms are also committed to produce quarterly reports on operations (copper 




The fourth sub-section highlights some other areas in which the strategy of 
consultations was evident. It discusses various – in some sense overlapping – 
consultations that were taking place at this time (on mining sector policy more 
broadly as well as the EITI). 
The fifth sub-section discusses how the GRZ, despite commitments to 
approach DA renegotiations in an inclusive and cooperative fashion, in early 2008 
imposed a sweeping unilateral tax reform package. I argue that this change in tactics 
of the government, and responses of companies, can be explained with reference to, 
inter alia, the difficulties of bargaining with a diverse sector and external influences 
(including high international copper prises). 
5.4.1 Evolution of DAs and the legislative framework 
Although the public debate made frequent references to tax holidays and concessional 
tax and royalty rates, the true extent of financial incentives in DAs is more limited 
than might appear. In fact, there are no explicit tax holiday provisions in these 
documents, except for deferrals of tax payments through the use of capital allowances 
and loss-carry forwards. 
The main concessions granting reduced tax and royalty rates were in fact 
outcomes of bargaining by individual companies, rather than by the sector as a whole. 
At the onset of privatisation, the corporate tax and royalty rates for the mining sector 
were set by the MMA, at 35% and 3%, respectively. Peter Sinkamba of NGO Citizens 
for a Better Environment (CBE) explains how these rates were gradually eroded, 
beginning with the acquisition by Cyprus Amax of Kansanshi mine in 1997.237 The 
company negotiated with government to reduce royalties to 2% through a legal 
Statutory Instrument (SI), the first time a company-specific legal instrument of this 
kind was issued in Zambia (Sinkamba, 1.8.07). 
A couple of years later in 2000, KCM and MCM were being privatised to 
AngloAmerican and Glencore, respectively. Both companies signed DAs on 31 
March 2000. Sinkamba claims that MCM actually completed its negotiations over the 
acquisition’s broad terms before KCM, but MCM stalled over signing until KCM had 
done so – knowing that KCM was a higher-cost mine and that KCM therefore was 
more likely to negotiate advantageous terms. 
Government thus offered these two companies a royalty rate of 0.6%, 
enshrined in law through the issuance of another company-specific SI. In 2002 
Metorex (who acquired Chibuluma Mines in late 1997) began putting pressure on the 
Zambian government by arguing that they, after all, were in the same business as 
KCM and MCM and should enjoy the conditions of other privatised mines. In 
response the GRZ issued an amendment to the MMA, under which ‘all ex-ZCCM’ 
companies were to pay a royalty rate of 0.6%.238 
My respondent goes on to explain how in 2003 new mining companies were 
investing in greenfield projects, such as Lumwana, and were asking government “why 
have you exempted these others?” They successfully lobbied government to change 
the law so that exemptions applied to all copper and cobalt investments, rather than 
237 Cyprus Amax was acquired by Phelps Dodge, which in turn was acquired by Freeport-McMoran. 
238 To put this figure in context, the world average was around 3%, and mineral royalty rates ranged 




being restricted to ex-ZCCM assets.239 My respondent continues: “in 2006 others 
were coming in, the Albidon guys [mining nickel in Mazabuka], they said hey us guys 
are also into mining, us we are in nickel, so why should you just exempt copper and 
cobalt … So also nickel is included, and aluminium and others … So what I’m 
saying is that the rules have been changing to suit circumstances.” (Sinkamba, 
1.8.07). 
The low corporate tax and royalty rates in the sector thus stem from the 
individual bargaining efforts of large mining companies (KCM and MCM). These 
larger investors, taking over established but dilapidated mines with a high cost base, 
were able to negotiate advantageous terms. Once this had taken place, companies that 
had entered earlier (e.g. Metorex acquiring Chibuluma Mines in 1997) were able to 
successfully make their cases for a level playing field. 240 Metorex in particular 
lobbied to amend legislation such that KCM’s and MCM’s tax and royalty rates also 
applied to other investors. Therefore, although my case study companies NFCA and 
CM – among the first to acquire privatised mines – did not get these fiscal benefits 
with their DAs, they benefitted from the state-firm bargaining of other mining 
companies.241 
5.4.2 Role of donors in negotiating fiscal reform 
The renegotiation of Zambia’s mining sector fiscal framework came onto the donor 
agenda with a report on Zambia’s effective tax burden in 2004 by the Foreign 
Investment Advisory Service (FIAS). 242 The report aimed to “understand better 
whether policy [was] growth-promoting or growth-inhibiting” and locate Zambia 
relative to its “competitor countries” in the region (FIAS 2004: 3). It was followed by 
another IMF report in 2005 (not made public). A third report came out in 2006 
following a two-week mission to Zambia in “response to a request from Mr. Ng’andu 
Magande, Minister of Finance and National Planning, for further technical assistance 
on the fiscal regime for mining” (IMF 2006: 5). 
However the World Bank and IMF remained cautious on the prospects for 
Development Agreements reform. A World Bank ‘Minerals Sector Fiscal Review 
Mission’ – in Zambia for ten days in early December 2006 – recommended that the 
GRZ “potentially pursue improvements in existing development agreements” (World 
Bank 2006). In the mean time other parts of the donor community began pushing for 
fiscal issues to take a more prominent role in the country’s policy dialogue. 
From mid-2006 onwards, as the public profile of the mining sector grew, the 
Norwegian Embassy became more involved in donors’ engagement with the GRZ 
over DA renegotiation (Riby, 15.8.07). As Lundstol at the Norwegian Embassy notes, 
“we tried to lobby the [other] donors quite hard, because many donors were not that 
keen initially to be honest, they said ‘why are you bothering about this now, Zambia 
were lucky that they managed to not close the mines, production is increasing and 
new investment is coming in.’ More and more, over time, people have realised the 
importance of this and that it is reasonable.” (Lundstol, 16.7.07). 
239 The MM(A) Bill (No.5 of 2003, section 6) amends the MMA such that the 0.6% royalty rate shall 
apply “in the case of the former ZCCM Ltd or any other company involved in copper and cobalt 
production”. 
240 Interviews (Chirwa, 30.11.07) and analysis of annual financial reports confirm that all mining 
companies in this study was, at the time of study, paying 25% corporate tax and 0.6% royalties. 
241 The bargaining power of larger firms thus became a positive externality for smaller ones. 
242 FIAS is a joint venture between the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the World Bank. 
~ 125 ~

By the end of 2007 the World Bank’s position had evolved. A mining sector 
specialist at the World Bank explains that “I think generally we would respect 
contracts, but having said that … certainly mining contracts which are entered into for 
the long term, should be built and constructed to adapt for change … if the benefits of 
breaking a contract exceeds the costs, then you should do it” (Husband, 11.12.07). My 
respondent referred to a growing realisation among “both sides of mining contracts … 
that for contracts to be sustainable in the long run, they have to be fair” (Ibid.). 
Stephen Muyakwa, Chairperson of the Civil Society Trade Network of Zambia, feels 
that “[t]his is a powerful statement from the World Bank, in the past they would have 
said ‘this is a valid contract, these are private companies, let them go ahead on what 
they agreed’.” (17.7.07). 
Several donors, under the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for donors’ 
assistance to the mining sector, thus committed themselves to supporting the 
government in mining sector reform. Their commonly articulated position was that a 
holistic approach was needed, and that DA renegotiations had to be coupled with 
broader institutional strengthening. Donor support in this area was organised around 
three pillars (Lundstol, 16.7.07). First, donors would support DA renegotiations 
through technical assistance as well as funding for consultants to advice on the 
renegotiation process. Second, they would support the Zambia Revenue Authority 
through technical assistance and capacity building, including assistance with 
implementation of the EITI (a multi-stakeholder initiative to improve revenue 
transparency of payments, taxes, and royalties from mining firms to the 
government).243 Third, they would promote the establishment of a copper fund – as 
Lundstol explains – “so that you have some restraints, such that you don’t have all of 
the surplus spent in one go, or [it] just goes into boosting salaries or consumption in 
the public sector.” (Lundstol, 16.6.07).244 
Donors who committed to funding the DA renegotiation consultants were 
initially Norway, DFID and EC.245 However the EC appeared to be “dragging its 
feet”, what one donor respondent suggests could be due to the fact that the EIB had 
financed several of the mines.246 In the end only Norway and DFID committed funds. 
The appointed consultants were in Zambia in mid-October and left the country to 
return a month later, to hold meetings with Ministry of Finance representatives in 
Livingstone 13-17 November 2007 (Mubanga, 21.11.07). My respondent at the 
Norwegian Embassy explained how it was decided during the first meeting that audits 
243 As part of its mining sector support, donors funded a trip by a delegation of Zambian government 
officials to visit Norway on 23-27 April 2007 to meet with Norwegian officials and legal experts to 
discuss resource revenue management. The 13-strong delegation was split into two, comprising a 
mining-focused group, as well as a group focused on oil and gas resource management, reflecting the 
recent discovery of likely oil reserves in Luapula Province in [2006] (Lundstol, 16.7.07). Among seven 
officials in the mining-focused group, five were ministerial representatives, of which four were from 
the Ministry of Finance. No representatives from the Ministry of Mines formed part of this group. 
244 Lundstol notes that such a fund should include rules on how these receipts are spent in the local 
economy to mitigate against Dutch disease impacts, which given the small foreign exchange market in 
Zambia he considered significant. 
245 The government put out a tender and three consultants were appointed: Arntzen de Besche 
(Norwegian, legal analysis), Econ (Norwegian, financial and tax analysis) and Windham Resources 
(US, strategy and negotiations). 
246 Mines who had received loans from the EIB included Lumwana, Bwana Mkubwa, Kansanshi, 
MCM and Munali Nickel Mine. However, among these mines Bwana Mkubwa was the only one 
included in my case-study companies, and their EIB debt had been repaid by the time of fieldwork. I 
was thus not able to determine the relevance of international standards launched in 2006 by the EIB in 
the form of the Economic and Social Impact Assessment Framework. 
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be undertaken in the areas of taxation as well as mine safety, environment, investment 
and production commitments, reporting, local business development, and human 
resource development (Lundstol, 30.10.07). 
5.4.3 Consultations, renegotiation and firm responses 
A consultative approach was envisaged as the preferred approach to renegotiating 
DAs. Throughout discussions with government, donors advocated that the GRZ 
should not move ahead unilaterally. This view was shared by government: “that was 
their take from the beginning also, that they would not do it unilaterally … So they 
would engage in a dialogue, try to get the mining companies to sit down voluntarily at 
the negotiating table.” (Lundstol, 16.7.07). 
In the first half of 2007 the GRZ set up a Renegotiation Technical Committee 
(RTC), chaired by Evans Chibuliti (Secretary of the Treasury, Ministry of Finance) 
and involving government officials with experience of working within the Ministry of 
Mines (and with knowledge of ‘mining issues’). The GRZ initially set itself ambitious 
targets for completing the renegotiation process. Villa-Chacon at the EC notes that 
“when they approached us to ask for financial support for consultants, I think it was in 
April 2007, and at this point they wanted to finalise the DA renegotiations by end of 
June.” (17.8.07). 
It was also around April 2007 that government first approached mining 
companies. The initial response from the CoM was that renegotiating DAs would 
raise costs, and that FDI into Zambia was sensitive to this due to the “stiff” 
competition for FDI into mining (see CoM 2007a). However, in recognition of the 
hardening political climate, mining companies came around to accepting the 
imperative of DA renegotiation. In reference to growing criticisms of the mining 
sector during and after the 2006 elections, KCM Company Secretary speculates that 
“maybe … the mining companies have started seeing that DA renegotiations might 
mean lower profits but greater stability” (Bwalya, 22.8.07). 
Yet mining companies were expecting something in return. One respondent at 
FQML recalls how “[t]hey came to us in April and asked to renegotiate, we said yes, 
subject to certain things.” (FQML mgr 1, 1.2.08). My respondent at the World Bank 
echoes this point: “We certainly alerted them to the fact that if you will renegotiate 
DAs, they must expect mining companies to come back for [a] quid pro quo, because 
then everything is on the table.” (Husband, 11.12.07). 
One possible concession that government could offer the mines was a greater 
allocation of taxes raised towards local development, thus improving mining 
companies’ relationships with communities. Some donors argued that the 
government’s bargaining position could be improved by “guarantee[ing] that some of 
it is fed back into the Copperbelt, infrastructure, electricity. The region needs a lot of 
facilitating investments.” (Lundstol, 10.9.07).247 
That greater local and community development constituted a central goal of 
several mining companies was brought out in the EITI scoping report (discussed 
below) as well as the CoM submission on the 2007 budget (CoM 2007a), drafted by 
one of my respondents at FQML’s Bwana Mkubwa.248 However mining companies 
247 With reference to the ‘cradle-to-the-grave’ social protection policies in place at ZCCM before 
privatisation, my respondent cautions that “companies may feel that citizens are still demanding too 
much from the firms, with the old mentality.” (Lundstol, 10.9.07). 
248 This document states that the mining industry is “in principle … in favour of communities 
benefiting from royalties, a split of 60% central government, 20% local government, 20% to local 
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stressed that they “would however like to see that local component was spent in 
transparent manner, and with an emphasis on infrastructure and not recurring costs 
such as staff costs’.” (FQML mgr, 11.10.07). 
Another form of ‘quid pro quo’ was mentioned by some respondents who 
noted that GRZ could relinquish the minority shareholdings held by ZCCM-IH. This 
however, seemed unlikely given the role of ZCCM-IH in providing government with 
insight into, and influence over, the mines (see sections 4.3.3 and 4.3.4). Professor 
Lungu thinks that, first, GRZ would not want to relinquish the ability of signalling its 
intentions through votes at the Board. Second, he thinks that mining companies 
recognise that ZCCM-IH divestment might not be in their long-term interest, arguing 
that it provides some kind of “social assurance” (Lungu, 31.10.07).I 
Interestingly, some mining companies I spoke to emphasised the need for 
GRZ to receive strong legal advice. A manager at FQML explains that “the mining 
industry was concerned that we wanted people that had international experience and 
good legal experience, because there are few good corporate lawyers in Zambia … 
And the Ministry of Legal Affairs, I wouldn’t rate them that highly in terms of their 
ability to draft good laws.” (FQML mgr 1, 11.10.07; also Lundstol 10.9.07). 
It remained unclear whether the government would seek to negotiate with the 
mining sector as a group or with individual companies. One mining manager put it 
thus: “I think they have to be interdependent to a large extent. Because we are not 
going to agree ‘ok, no problem, we’ll do this and we’ll pay some more tax here, and 
KCM gets away without it – it is not going to happen.” (FQML mgr 1, 2.12.07). 
5.4.4 Coincidental consultations: mining sector reform and the EITI 
The mining companies’ preparations for renegotiation of DAs coincided with their 
involvement in formal state-firm consultations over a new mining policy. The General 
Manager of the CoM observes: “[i]t is the trend now, for example the Mines and 
Minerals Act is being revised [see section 5.2.1] and we have been consulted together 
with other stakeholders, and we hope the GRZ will do the same for environmental 
regulation.” (Bantubonse, 7.8.07). 
The Ministry of Mines set up several working groups that included 
representation from the mining sector in the form of the CoM. These consultations 
were not explicitly about changing the DAs – although this remained a latent issue – 
but rather concerned a new broader mining policy.249 Its agenda points ranged from 
reforms of licensing procedures and the mining cadastre to the relative (financial and 
procedural) autonomy of the Mines Safety Department (see chapter six). 
An additional area of proposed fiscal reform came in the guise of the EITI. 
Following a request from government, the World Bank commissioned a ‘scoping 
report’ in mid-2007. It drew on research by World Bank staff and interviews by 
Mwaka Chulu, a lecturer and lawyer at Copperbelt University, with the mines and 
their stakeholders. Chulu recalls how “[t]he impression I got was that the mining 
companies were being put under extreme pressure, especially by NGOs and the 
communities, we would have no objection to such a split.” (FQML mgr, 11.10.07). The document also 
included tax payment forecasts ($500m in 2009) and a statement that the mining sector will support 
EITI. 
As one of my respondents notes, “there are discussions going on [regarding] changes in the mining 
legislation and fiscal regime, overall, regardless of DAs.” These included meetings in early August 
2007 when my respondent explains “we were all down in Lusaka for a consultation exercise with the 




various other stakeholders.” (7.11.07). She describes most mining companies as 
“keen” but highlights a limited understanding of how they could benefit from the 
EITI. She notes, meanwhile, that ZCCM-IH, were “very proactive and provided 
information over and above what she was asking for.” (Ibid.). 
My respondent cautions that the potential for the EITI to improve revenue 
transparency may be limited because of difficulties in coordinating across so many 
players “in a country like [Zambia]” (7.11.07). She also points to how the EITI 
requires a certain amount of civil society coordination and organisational/analytical 
capacity (see discussion in section 4.3.2.3).250 
Among the companies I spoke to, FQML was the most proactive investor with 
regard to adopting the EITI and its principles. The Group Environmental Manager 
explains how “[w]e’re working on the EITI at the moment, so in the new year we will 
disclose our taxes … this is working internally, we want to do it … we’re already 
paying so much, pay-as-you-earn, duties, all these sort of thing … [we would] like to 
have a big page in the news paper, to inform everybody … but nobody knows, only 
the government knows.” (FQML mgr 2, 7.11.07). 
5.4.5 Unilateral action and mining company reactions 
In his speech to open the 10th National Assembly in January 2008, President 
Mwanawasa announced the introduction of a new mining sector fiscal regime, to the 
apparent surprise of mining companies (AFX News 11.1.2008). The unilateral reform 
introduced a windfall tax, removed capital allowances, increased corporate tax rates 
from 25% to 30%, and changed royalty rates from 0.6% to 3.0% (frequently referred 
to in the media as the “world average”) for all large investors in the copper sector. 
The Economics Association of Zambia (EAZ) noted in its ‘2008 budget 
analysis submission’ that the new mining fiscal framework “[o]n the face of it … is in 
line with best practice, specifically the application of both a variable profit tax and a 
windfall tax related to prices, and the use of a reference price instead of average 
revenues declared by the mining companies” (EAZ 2008: 4). However, the EAZ also 
lamented that “detailed proposals have not yet been made available”, recommending 
they be presented to Parliament and to the Zambian public (Ibid.). Many companies 
initially either waited for clarification or were unsure whether the new regulations 
applied to them (in particular the case with Lumwana mine in Nortwestern Province). 
Mining companies protested, claiming they had accepted a formal invitation 
from government to sit down and renegotiate. In appearing before the Parliamentary 
Committee on Estimates, the CoM stated that the mines had letters dated April 2007, 
signed by the President, stating that the government would not unilaterally change the 
fiscal regime (The Post 12.2.2008; corroborated by FQML mgr 1, 1.2.08).251 
The GRZ may also have expected little short-term opposition (e.g. mining 
companies ‘picking up’ and leaving) given companies’ sunk costs. As Chris Adams at 
Macquarie Bank noted: “[i]n the near term the Zambians probably have some 
leverage as capital has already been committed and cannot easily be redeployed to 
other countries.” (16.3.08). The long-term credibility of Zambia as an investment 
250 For instance, questions exist regarding the coordination across civil society organisations in a 
context where these organisations (e.g. EAZ and CBE in the Zambian case) have fundamentally 
different agendas. 
251 Haslam (2004: 4) notes that companies may lower taxable profits through accelerated depreciation. 
In the case of Zambia, firms could not respond to unilateral action in this way because the initial 
bargain (at entry) maximised capital allowances (i.e. 100% depreciation in the first year). 
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destination, however, may have been dented. My respondent thinks “[i]nvestors will 
remember these broken promises when the balance of power shifts back to the 
investor” (Ibid.). 
Thus, while short-term implications for the sector’s output may have been 
limited, the unforeseen increases in fiscal costs could affect future investment into 
Zambia. This is particularly so with regard to this older and less profitable projects 
with higher costs. One mining manager explained that companies were reviewing 
capital expenditure plans in response to new legislation, in particular the older mines 
with high operating costs. My respondent cites MCM as having an average operating 
cost of $2.20/pound ($4,840/tonne) and notes, off the record, that “they have already 
cancelled huge amounts of capital expenditures.” (FQML mgr 1, 9.4.08).252 
This unilateral action appeared to signal a shift in GRZ bargaining strategy, 
away from the consultative approach to mining sector policy reform that government 
had taken to date. 253 It contrasts sharply with the careful approach taken when 
renegotiation was just entering the policy agenda, and reflects a gradual erosion of 
popular support for the old fiscal framework (illustrated in the 2006 elections, see 
chapter four). 
Some observers noted government may have attempted to secure a first mover 
advantage, hoping that mining companies would want to settle the issue quickly in 
order to not detract from other concerns facing the sector – mainly the issue of future 
power supply (Liebenthal, 15.3.08). The government confronted the mines in the 
knowledge that it retained a bargaining advantage only as long as international copper 
prices remained high. Its stance also drew legitimacy from the increasing support 
from donors. By emphasising how its move resonated with the position of NGOs that 
had advocated for DA reform, the government was also able to draw on a larger basis 
of support, thereby making it harder for firms to argue against the tax increases.254 
5.5 Chapter conclusion 
This chapter has examined the fiscal policy issues surrounding the mining sector, in 
particular fiscal concessions given to the mines and weak revenue collection capacity. 
After describing the key policy issues and legislative framework, it explored the 
organisational routines and aims of relevance to explaining company positions toward 
fiscal reform. 
I subsequently discussed how, at the time of privatisation, future capital 
commitments significantly increased the bargaining power of investors into assets that 
had long suffered from underinvestment.255 This gave larger companies (e.g. KCM 
and MCM who could raise the resources required for such commitments) greater 
252 Regarding whether such reviews had to be coupled with new feasibility studies, my respondent 
notes that it depends on the changes you will make, “for example if you have four shafts of $1.70, 
$1.90, $2.10 and $2.40, you might simply can the fourth one.” (FQML mgr 1). 
253 There were rumours of closed discussions between government and the firms, however interview 
data (e.g. Bhandawat, 5.12.07) corroborated with public statements suggest these changes were 
announced without wider consultations. 
254 In an example of the limited transparency and accountability of the political elite, statements in the 
state-owned media included misinformation [to] reduce the legitimacy of the mining sectors’ rights to 
appeal. These included statements by Dr Mwansa (then Finance Minister) that the mines had not 
responded to the government’s invitation to renegotiate. 
255 For example, MCM acquired Mufulira and Nkana mines from ZCCM in April 2000 for $43m, 




bargaining power when entering Zambia. Smaller companies could then piggy-back 
on larger firms by claiming unfair treatment and petitioning the government that 
claimed it was committed to private sector-led national development. 
Achieving stability in the policy environment constituted a central objective of 
firms under study. However the government did not appear capable of delivering on 
its promises of stability. This is evidenced, for example, in interviews with FQML 
and CM (e.g. allegations that local land taxes progressively increased). One 
explanation is the shift in political landscape following the 2006 elections, after which 
local and central government increasingly came to represent different interests (e.g. 
Copperbelt district councils controlled by opposition party PF after 2006 elections). 
Donors generally supported this view, arguing that central government had 
failed to provide a transparent and predictable investment climate (see chapter four). 
Villa-Chacon, private sector specialist at the EC, argues that “GRZ needs to offer a 
more predictable environment of how things will be done in the future. But not 
stability [in its current form] because it is not practical … Predictability for me is that 
things are more clear for the companies e.g. licensing, compliance procedures, to 
make a clearer business environment.” (14.9.07). 
The adoption of a consultative approach to dealing with mining sector 
interests provided a platform from which to pursue reform without violating the state-
firm contract embodied in the DAs. This engagement strategy based on consultation 
and accommodation is also consistent with government’s private investment-driven 
development strategy (see chapter four). It reflects a recognition within the Zambian 
government that a stable and predictable policy environment constitutes a key 
organisational aim of the firms. 
However the strategy of accommodation through orderly renegotiation failed 
for several reasons. First, government could not accept any outcome that did not apply 
across the board. This would have undermined the ‘level playing field’, seen as a 
corner stone of an investor-friendly policy regime. At the same time obtaining 
consensus among these heterogeneous investors, all with somewhat differing routines 
and aims, proved difficult. Second, mining companies’ individually negotiated DAs, 
coupled with the intervention-prone ‘presidential’ governance of the mining sector, 
meant it proved more difficult to reach a negotiated settlement. Third, several reform 
initiatives were simultaneously ongoing: consultations and negotiations were taking 
place around varying facets of mining sector policy, with implications for companies 
that depended on firm-specific characteristics and routines in place. This reduced the 
ability of firms to agree on one sector-wide approach to DA renegotiation. Finally, the 
high international copper prices put increasing political pressures on government to 
act. 
Within this context (of organisational diversity in the mining sector, informal 
and discretionary governance, various overlapping consultations around reform and 
volatile international commodity markets) the post-privatisation DA ‘bargain’ – 
although ostensibly providing guarantees of stability – appears to have been de­
stabilising for the mining companies. It resulted in increased policy uncertainty for the 
firms, despite the government’s stated support of private sector-led development. 
Donors played a significant role in providing technical support for the 
government in preparation for DA renegotiation. This seems to have strengthened 
government’s case for unilateral action, even though donors’ support was initially 
intended to aid a negotiated settlement. In hindsight it is not surprising that the 
donors’ preferred approach to renegotiation failed, as it failed to take into account the 
difficulties in reaching consensus among highly diverse actors in the mining sector. 
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Firms thus appear short-sighted. They were willing to enter into DAs if they 
could negotiate an attractive deal, but were at the same time agents of their own 
unpredictability. In the case of Zambia these state-firm contracts lacked democratic 
support and failed to align the distribution of benefits with the commodities cycle. 
This resulted in political pressures for reform all served to undermine the 
sustainability of the state-firm ‘bargain’ struck at privatisation. 
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6 Environmental, health, safety and labour regulation 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines environmental, health and safety regulations as well as labour 
relations in Zambia’s mining sector. I collectively refer to these issues as the 
‘regulatory sphere’ of state-firm relations. Although they are in many ways 
analytically distinct, they are interdependent and respondents would often discuss two 
or more of these issues in a single interview. 
Many of the policies and regulations discussed in this chapter were, by the 
time I left the field in late 2007, in the process of being revised. My primary focus in 
this empirical chapter is therefore on the processes whereby the agenda for reform 
evolved, at the height of the commodities boom, rather than institutional and 
regulatory outcomes. A secondary aim of this chapter is to understand the limits and 
constraints of Zambia’s existing regulatory framework. I attempt to go beyond the 
obvious explanations for lacking bureaucratic capacity in order to problematise the 
issue of enforcement further, by drawing on the literature reviewed in chapter two.256 
This chapter is organised as follows. I first set the scene by introducing the 
context and relevance of this ‘regulatory sphere’ of state-firm relations. The second 
section introduces the main organisational routines and objectives that shape firms’ 
practices in the areas of environmental management, health and safety, and labour 
relations. Here I try to identify relevant influences on routines and aims that are both 
internal and external to the Zambian context. The third section examines state-firm 
interactions in the area of environmental management, health and safety. It goes into 
some detail discussing the regulatory framework, regulatory failures, and the nature of 
persistent enforcement challenges. It looks at why existing mechanisms of 
enforcement in Zambia have been ineffective and how this has shaped the emerging 
policy reform agenda. The fourth section briefly looks at labour relations in the sector, 
highlighting a similar range of institutional capacity deficits, issues of contractors to 
the mines, and the role of labour in affecting change. The fourth section summarises 
and concludes. 
6.2 Context and relevance 
As discussed in chapter one, extractive industries are often associated with significant 
environmental and social externalities. In the case of Zambia’s mining sector these 
issues are significant, owing to historical legacies of old mining operations as well as 
the practices of current mine owners. This section highlights some of the regulatory 
failures in the mining sector, before proceeding to introduce the legislative 
frameworks governing environmental, safety and labour relations. 
256 The Chairperson of CSTNZ (one of Zambia’s largest NGOs) argues that it is misleading to simply 
blame weak regulatory enforcement on a lack of resources: “[i]f today I set up a political party and I try 
to undermine the GRZ, there will be systems set up to monitor my movements, who is he talking to, 
what is he doing, this gentleman from the UK, did they bring him, is he getting money etc… Where are 
those resources coming from all of a sudden, if we are so capacity constrained? … [R]eally, I think it is 
the political will which makes resources not available to do certain things. Because those issues are not 
a priority for those with the power to make decisions” (Muyakwa, 17.7.07). 
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6.2.1 Regulatory failures in the post-privatisation mining sector 
It was often difficult to discern the true extent of health-and-safety incidents at the 
mines in my study. The capacity of independent Zambian media to proactively 
scrutinise is limited, and workers lack incentives to report malpractice. 257 
Ascertaining isolated instances of non-compliance was challenging, as respondents 
representing regulatory agencies were often wary of ‘pointing fingers’ at specific 
companies. To illustrate, my respondents at the ECZ were keen to present a picture of 
harmonious state-firm relations in the mining sector and to stress how “generally the 
trend is more on the upwards” (ECZ official 4, 19.11.07). Joseph Makumba at 
ZCCM-IH was similarly eager to paint a positive picture of relationships between 
government and new investors: “we have never had any problems … we asked them 
to cooperate with the [CEMP] consultants, so far we have never had any difficulties, 
they have always cooperated” (23.7.07). 
Yet significant environmental incidents have taken place since privatisation, 
including an incident at KCM in 2006 when a pipeline transporting waste-material 
(tailings) burst. This resulted in the pollution of the Kafue river, one of Zambia’s main 
water arteries and the major source of consumable water for the majority of 
Copperbelt residents. Frequent but smaller-scale discharges into the Kafue constitutes 
an ongoing issue of water pollution (CEMP II Summary Report 2005: 7). 
Issues of workers’ health and safety are also significant in Zambia’s mining 
industry. A manager at FQML describes health-and-safety as “a huge undertaking” 
and considers “the government’s safety rules [to be] very minimal” (FQML mgr 
22.11.07). The most significant health-and-safety incident since privatisation occurred 
at explosives manufacturer BGRIMM, one of NFCA’s ‘sister companies’, which was 
levelled to the ground in April 2005.258 The aftermath of the accident – which took the 
lives of over fifty Zambian workers – highlighted breaches in safety and other 
regulations and served to galvanise anti-Chinese sentiment ahead of general elections 
in October 2006. 
6.2.2 Environmental, health and safety legal framework 
There are two sets of legislation of relevance to environmental, health and safety 
regulation affecting the Zambian mining sector. The first is the Environmental 
Protection and Pollution Control Act (EPPCA) from 1990 (no.12), which covers 
environmental management in all industrial sectors. It provides for the establishment 
of the Environmental Council of Zambia (ECZ), set up in 1992 under the Ministry of 
Environment and Natural Resources. The ECZ is a semi-autonomous body partially 
funded by fees charged for licenses and reviews of environmental impact assessments. 
Its mandate is to regulate environmental issues when they occur outside of the plant 
area. 259 The EPPCA (ECZ’s “enabling act”) was strengthened in 1999 to address the 
question of how liability attaches “when you are dealing with a corporation, e.g. a 
mining facilities which is run by a Board. So that was addressed, that liability will 
attach to the managers, to every Board member.” (ECZ official 3, 24.7.07). I found 
the ECZ to be relatively open and well-organised. 
257 At NFCA, one respondent notes that if “some guy wants to complain, they’ll just give him money. 
If they see that they are going to get into trouble they will bribe that person.” (Maboshe, 25.8.07). 
258 BGRIMM stands for “Beijing General Research Institute of Mining & Metallurgy”. See BBC News 
(21.4.2005). 
259 The Environmental Manager of ZCCM-IH explains that “as soon as the effluent touches the natural 
environment, then they are regulated under the EPPCA” (23.7.07). 
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The second piece of legislation of relevance is the Mines and Minerals 
(Environmental) Act (No. 41, 1996), which provides for the establishment of the 
regulatory agency Mines Safety Department (MSD) under the Ministry of Mines. The 
MSD covers environmental, health and safety issues within the plant area of mining 
companies, specifically. The MSD does not charge user fees for its work and was 
considered heavily underfunded by several respondents. 
The Ministry of Mines also oversees the sector in a less hands-on fashion 
through statutory reporting requirements (several of which are specified in the 
DAs). 260 The Mines and Minerals Act (No. 31) of 1995 also provides for the 
Environmental Protection Fund (EPF) (section 82: 1), to ensure that mines set aside 
funds for de-commissioning once mineral deposits are depleted. The MSD is the 
regulatory agency in charge of implementing the EPF. 
The ECZ and the MSD overlap somewhat in their mandates to address 
environmental and social issues. First, both address environmental issues, an overlap 
that reflects the historical context of mining regulations in Zambia. An ECZ official 
explains how “in the past [before the passing of EPPCA] everything that had to do 
with mining, including environmental issues, had to be put in the [Mines and Minerals 
Act], since this was the only piece of legislation. Now with the enactment of the 
EPPCA … we now had authority in two separate pieces of legislation, to basically do 
the same work … So to avoid putting too much pressure on mine owners, we had to 
find a way to address that, because it would mean that they had to submit two 
different EIAs to two different regulators.” (ECZ official 1, 11.9.07). To address this 
issue, a memorandum of understanding (MoU) was drawn up to allocate 
responsibilities across the ECZ and the MSD (ECZ official 5, 14.8.07). 
Second, both address health and safety and wider social issues. For the MSD 
this is a direct remit, for the ECZ it is indirect (through the Social Management Plan, 
SMP, described to me by several respondents as a component of the EMP). DAs 
provide a foundation for companies to develop SMPs by including clauses on the 
management of “social assets” by the mines.261 Despite such clauses, companies were 
not seen as contributing much in the way of social services. Limited enforcement 
capacity and little knowledge of the DAs (and their “social assets” clauses) reduced 
accountability of firms to any such commitments.262 Among the mines I studied, by 
July 2007 only KCM had an SMP, inherited from AngloAmerican, while MCM was 
in the final stages of developing one. 
260 Reporting requirements include, inter alia, quarterly reports on mined ore and average grades, 
finished copper produced, amount of copper ore refined by third-parties, and general progress on 
investment plans set out at privatisation. These were not accessible to me and I got the impression that 
companies had often failed to comply with this requirement. This could be a function of the lacking 
enforcement of these requirements, which I discus later in this chapter. 
261 The DAs make explicit references to “social assets” (relating to education, healthcare, recreation, 
and municipal services). Companies are generally given options whether to provide services 
themselves or ensure that employees are given additional benefits to ensure their ability to access e.g. 
schooling and health services. With regard to municipal services, KCM and MCM have explicit clauses 
that the companies do not have to pay for such services, whereas in the case of NFCA it appears that 
the company is responsible for providing these services to employees (the municipality provides 
services “at cost” to NFCA who provides them free of charge to employees, NFCA DA p.83). 
262 This lack of transparency shifted the discourse away from the actual state-firm agreements to moral 




6.2.3 Labour relations in the mining sector 
Employment in the post-privatisation mining sector has fallen short of expectations. 
Charles Muchimba, director of Research at the Mineworkers Union of Zambia 
(MUZ), claims the union had about 60,000 members in 1995. The number of jobs in 
the mines fell sharply in the immediate aftermath of privatisation, but has since 
rebounded to a level where the mining industry by 2007 employed “around 30,000 
permanent workers.” (Muchimba, 3.8.07). 
There are several reasons why the supply of employment opportunities has not 
kept pace with the expanding sector. In part this is due to the trend of mining 
operations becoming increasingly capital intensive, in tandem with a growing demand 
for more skilled workers (of which the supply in Zambia is limited). There are also 
structural shifts in the sector towards greater outsourcing of non-core activities. As at 
year-end 2006 approximately half of the 18,820 employees engaged across MCM’s 
mine sites were not on the payroll of the mining company, but rather on those of 
contractors, contracted to do specific and mainly shorter-term jobs, such as civil 
engineering. These contractors are typically not unionised and receive limited health 
insurance and other benefits.263 
Unions in Zambia have historically been powerful, providing the base for 
Frederick Chiluba to emerge as the leader of the Movement for Multi-party 
Democracy in the late 1980s.264 I found that all the mining companies had union 
agreements with either MUZ or the more recently established National Union of 
Mining and Allied Workers (NUMAUW), or both. The bargaining of collective 
agreements with the unions takes place through a sequenced process where the first 
agreements struck set the benchmark for others to follow.265 However the order of 
negotiations does not appear to encompass a strategic element but rather historical 
path dependencies.266 
Labour relations are governed by the Industrial Relations Act, and the rights to 
collective bargaining and freedom of association are enshrined in the law. However 
several institutional weaknesses and weak government capacity to inspect (in 
particular smaller companies) – undermine labour rights and result in tensions with 
mining companies. 
6.3 Organisational routines and objectives 
This section discusses various routines and objectives of case-study companies with 
respect of relevance to environmental, health and safety, and labour practices. These 
routines and objectives shape how a firm engages with regulators and other 
stakeholders. They are determined by a mix of influences that may be internal as well 
as external to the Zambian operating context. My aim here is to discuss key 
organisational features that emerged during fieldwork, and how they varied across 
263 As Lungu at the CBU notes, “short-term contracts is the trend the world over, and it would not be a 
problem if there were social safety nets in place” (31.10.07). 
264 Whilst powerful, unions have also been disorganised with union decision-making fragmented 
between three levels: central, branch, and the workers themselves (Larmer 2006). 
265 
“Like at Chibuluma … [t]hey made reference to NFCA and KCM. Because when you demand for 
example 30%, then they ‘say how come at CM the union is accepting 8%?’ When you compare the 
salaries at CM and Chibuluma, the former is much better, so even 8% is a lot.” (Lengwe, 4.12.07). 
266 Lengwe argues that “[w]e just compare with the previous years negotiations in the same mine. But 




companies, rather than offer a complete taxonomy of all relevant organisational 
routines and aims. 
I first look at approaches to environmental management and reporting, 
followed by the role of technology in shaping regulatory compliance. I proceed to 
discuss how the organisational objective of minimising costs shapes behaviour within 
the regulatory sphere. This is followed by an overview of mining companies’ safety 
practices and reporting. I then look at the organisational aim of stability and how 
mining companies pursue stable relations with communities through various 
community development activities. I then turn to labour relations, and discuss, first, 
variations in practices around industrial relations between expatriate management and 
mineworkers. Next I focus on labour relations within management of companies, in 
particular at the role of training and retention of local Zambian managers. Finally I 
offer some thoughts with respect to the role of language and culture in shaping labour 
relations as well as safety practices within the mines. 
6.3.1 Environmental management systems and reporting 
The environmental management systems and standards through which companies 
assess and manage their environmental impacts are clearly shaped by what is required 
under host-country legal frameworks. However companies are also influenced by 
their international institutional context. I discuss here, first, the evidence that 
environmental management varies across companies depending on their institutional 
background. I then look specifically at two sources of influences external to Zambia, 
namely voluntary standards and requirements arising from international capital 
markets. 
A senior official at the ECZ claims there is “very good evidence” that mining 
companies are influenced by international environmental standards. He suggests that 
standards are relatively higher among “companies that are coming from countries 
with strong environmental regulations, I’m talking about the western world generally, 
Canada, Australia and so on. They bring those standards with them, and there is very 
good evidence that they want to follow the standards to the letter … In many cases … 
they want to use the international best practices. Meaning that they are even going 
beyond what we have put as national standards” (ECZ official 4, 19.11.07). 
Environmental standards and procedures include voluntary international 
standards as well as initiatives mandated by international capital markets. Voluntary 
international standards, such as ISO14001 standard for environmental management 
systems, appear to play some role in the regulatory sphere of Zambia’s mining sector. 
At the time of fieldwork two out of KCM’s four mines sites were ISO14001 certified: 
the Environmental Manager of KCM explains how “soon after [Vedanta took over] 
we embarked on ISO14000 … And earlier this year we got certification for Konkola 
[KDMP] and Nampundwe”. The company is also accredited to OHSAS (Occupation 
Health and Safety Assessment Systems) 18001. FQML was in the process of 
implementing the ISO14001 environmental management standards, however the 
company had not yet decided to seek certification.267 At CM, the Superintendent of 
Environment, Health & Safety (EHS) states that management’s “aim or target is by 
2009 we must meet the ISO14001 and the OHSAS18001 – the international standard 
in safety. So by that certification we would have met international standards, which is 
267 My respondent explains: “there is an element of continuous improvement to the certification scheme 
… the yearly independent audit will look for such improvement … and it may not always make 
business sense … but failure to improve can be associated with bad publicity.” (FQML mgr 2, 17.9.07). 
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what the Board wants. So we have to come up with targets and activities that will be 
in line with the expectations of the Board.” (Chihili, 1.11.07). I found no evidence of 
any such international standards in place at NFCA. 
International capital markets play an important role in setting out requirements 
for environmental management at international mining companies. A donor 
representative I spoke to claimed that “[a] lot of people that I have spoken to in the 
[mining] industry would argue that the standards of environmental care, social 
responsibility, supplier practices and so on are dictated not by the regulatory 
environment within the country, but their global policy on such an issue, and they will 
argue that the global policy is set for them by the stock market” (MSDP techn. ass’t, 
22.8.07).268 
The group environmental manager of FQML highlights two governance 
initiatives that emanate from the firm’s stock exchange listings: one mandatory 
requirement is the ‘Closure Fund’ required under Toronto Stock Exchange rules, to 
which allocations must be set aside for plant de-commissioning. Another – voluntary) 
– initiative is the Carbon Disclosure Commission, linked to the London Stock 
Exchange, under which firms commit to calculate, disclose and then audit (through 
third-party consultants) their carbon footprint. My respondent recalls how he “tried to 
ask other mines in Zambia, to compare against our peers, but nobody had done this 
exercise.” (FQML mgr 2, 17.9.07).269 
The Equator Principles (EPs) play a significant and growing role in debt as 
well as equity capital markets (Amalric 2005) and bear on the internal environmental 
and social management routines of CM as well as FQML. CM has made its processes 
EP-compliant in preparation for a listing on the London Stock Exchange. CFO Anil 
Bangur explains that the long-term nature of mining means that equity investors “like 
to see these costs taken out at an early stage” (29.11.07), i.e. incorporated into 
financial forecasts. The potential for EPs to complement local regulations in Zambia 
is illustrated by comments from an environmental manager at FQML. He observes, 
rather wryly, that “the only difference” between the EPs and the Environmental 
Impact Assessment legislation in Zambia is fact that “the former is enforced” (FQML 
mgr 2, 7.11.07). 
268 My respondent thinks that western companies “would argue that … the standards set by the stock 
market ultimately, or shareholders ultimately, are always more demanding … the big pension funds, 
retail investors, insurances companies, all of us, in the North if you like, have become much more 
sensitive of what people are doing with our investment dollar.” He claims western companies “are 
arguing and using this as a debating tool, and very strongly, saying you want us, much more than you 
want the ones from the east, because they don’t have the same standards.” (MSDP techn. ass’t, 
22.8.07). 
269 He explains that the need to compare against local peers arises from the fact that companies in 
Zambia use mainly hydro-generated power, and are thus quite ‘green’ to begin with. 
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Box 7: The Equator Principles at First Quantum 
Andrew Spivey, FQML Group Environmental Manager, explains that the EPs require 
quarterly reporting on the implementation of the ‘Equator Principles action plan’. This 
document functions like an EMP, stating what the company will do to address environmental 
and social issues over a future time frame. EP reporting requirements include third-party 
auditing by independent engineering companies who audit (“read and criticise”) the 
“quarterly progress reports” that FQML submits to report against the EP action plan. Once a 
year these consultants also do a site visit to inspect, for example if “a hydro-geological 
structure has to be redone they come and look that it was done properly”. My respondent 
estimates this cost at about $50k per year in professional fees, noting that “you also have to 
pay plane tickets for these guys”. However, he does not see this figure directly, as it is 
deducted by the bank (or rather added to the loan outstanding) – the consultants (SRK in their 
case) do their work and then invoice the bank. 
6.3.2 Technology 
The technology adopted by companies is a significant determinant of environmental 
and safety performance. The choices of technologies appear to reflect the routines and 
aims espoused by current management, as well as the technological legacies of old 
operations acquired at privatisation (see section 4.4.6). 
At privatisation Zambia’s environmental standards were seen as excessively 
stringent in relation to the old infrastructure that the mines had been using under 
ZCCM management. During consultations in 1995-96 to develop stricter standards, 
“ZCCM said ‘look you’re asking for miracles from us’. The technology they were 
using was obsolete. So they said we have to strike a balance, so we introduced what 
we call the long-term emissions limits arrangement: present, intermediate and long-
term” (ECZ official 2, 28.8.07). 
Incoming companies were thus given exemptions from performance standards 
(e.g. concentration of sulphur in tailings) required under the legal framework. The 
Environmental Manager at KCM explains that when Anglo-American took majority-
ownership of KCM in 2000, “they found the plant in a deplorable state. They were 
given some concessions … that there would be an interim period for refurbishing the 
plant, and during that interim period we will not prosecute for polluting the water for 
instance.” (Phiri, 12.10.07).270 
A respondent at the ECZ argues that many companies taking over old mines 
were reluctant to invest in rehabilitation and maintenance: “you find that some 
companies … especially those that have taken up pre-existing companies, with a lot of 
inherent environmental problems, you find actually down grading, when they start 
operating that company they want to operate it the way it was always operated … 
There are a couple of examples, of course I can’t mention them specifically, but you 
see this.” (ECZ official, 19.11.07). 
Another ECZ official notes that the ECZ has “faced real challenges with the 
Chinese investors, because their technology is so dirty”. She suggests this may be 
either due to a desire to minimise costs, or because they are “experimenting” with 
technology. In contrast she observes that “[t]he Australians [operating Lumwana 
mine], on the other hand, they are ready to comply. They are proactive, they approach 
ECZ and say ‘what should we do?’” (ECZ official 1, 11.9.07). 
270 Such arrangements may go on for a long time, see for example the case of La Oroya mine in Peru 
(MiningWeekly 29.6.2009). In the case of KCM my respondent claims that “that window has passed. 
They were allowed two-three years after investing.” (12.10.07). 
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6.3.3 The objective of minimising costs 
The objective of minimising costs not directly linked to production appeared to be a 
general feature of the mining companies under study. The aim of minimising costs is 
clearly seen in some discussions around technology choices (see previous sub­
section), as well as in concerns over Zambia’s investment climate as being 
cumbersome and ‘high-cost’ relative to other countries in the region (e.g. Botswana). 
Concerns over high costs of doing business also manifest themselves in 
relation to procedural compliance costs. Several companies felt that fees charged by 
the ECZ (e.g. for reviewing environmental impact assessments or issuing licences) 
were expensive.271 The General Manager of the Chamber of Mines (CoM) explains 
that “the mining companies have been concerned about the high fees for EMPs, and 
the answer [from government] has been the regulations are being reviewed, and when 
they are through the fees will be different.” (Bantubonse, 10.10.07). Different 
attitudes concerning the benefits to business of minimising labour-related costs help 
explain the variation in salaries for mineworkers (see figure 4).272 
A strategy of minimising labour costs can affect company performance 
negatively in the longer term. As one informant at NFCA notes: “I think a happy 
employee works better, so it is good for the company in the long run. What you find is 
that at NFCA, people are always resigning, there is always a vacancy … That is the 
first clue they should get that something is wrong … That is a company where you 
always find a vacancy, they are always interviewing.” (Maboshe, 25.8.07).273 
Among companies studied KCM and NFCA appeared to be particularly 
associated with cost-minimisation objectives (including in the area of supplier 
practices, see chapter seven). Both operate high-cost mines (Gao, 21.8.07; 
Chitambala, 17.9.07). In the context of booming copper prices a cost-minimisation 
strategy appeared to be associated with reluctance to invest in (unproductive) 
maintenance, putting greater pressures on the use of existing infrastructure. For 
instance KCM’s corporate strategy emphasises cost reduction through the use of 
existing infrastructure, a potentially hazardous approach when the infrastructure on 
the Copperbelt suffers from decades of under-investment.274 
271 For instance, the Company Secretary at CM argues that ECZ’s “charges are exorbitant for 
everything” (4.10.07). 
272 One respondent comments on NFCA management’s reluctance to spend money on non-productive 
activities, observing that “the whole time I’ve been there they have never held a function, which can 
bring together … like a family day, like the other mines do, nothing like that” (Maboshe, 25.8.07). 
273 A BBC report quotes another miner as saying “[a]s soon as I find employment somewhere I will 
leave the Chinese” (BBC News 4.6.07). 




Figure 4. Span of mineworker wages (Kwacha ‘000s)

Source: Mineworkers Union of Zambia. 
6.3.4 Safety practices and reporting 
Providing a safe working environment appeared to be high on the agenda for all the 
mines. This observation is based on my experience of visiting the different mine sites, 
and corroborated by the impressions of donor representatives. A group of donor 
representatives visited some of the mines on 13-16 May 2007, and two of my donor 
respondents subsequently, and separately, stressed their impressions of mining 
companies as safety-conscious (Riby, 16.8.07; Gerner, 19.7.07)275 Mining companies 
the donors met with included KCM, FQML/Bwana Mkubwa and Enya/LCM but not 
NFCA (and as such these impressions do not reflect upon NFCA).276 
Deputy CEO Gao at NFCA separately stressed that safety was a key concern 
and that “[e]veryone must follow the safety rules” (21.8.07). He notes, however, that 
the company has evolved in its approach: “I can understand before, when we come in, 
in China these regulations were not always strictly followed. But after one or two 
years, of practice, we also learn by ourselves. Here must be following the law, we 
follow it strictly.” (Ibid.). 
Where Zambia’s regulations are considered insufficient companies may put in 
place their own systems to uphold health-and-safety standards, based on their 
experiences elsewhere. A safety specialist at FQML observes that in Canada a mining 
company must (as a condition of its licenses) have insurance as well as a government 
representative located on-site. He notes that this may seem arbitrary, but if something 
does go awry it becomes easy to allocate responsibility: “We don’t have that here, as 
soon as anyone falls or dies, all of a sudden we have all these people creeping out of 
places, saying ‘you didn’t follow the procedures’. What procedures? We put in our 
own procedures … based on the experience that we have on other mine sites.” 
(FQML mgr 4, 22.11.07). Reasons why companies see the need to uphold strict safety 
practices include the insurance policies that companies take out. One donor 
representative recalls in reference to KCM that “[t]hey told us, we have life insurance 
for our workers … if we don’t allow foreign inspectors, we pay a huge premium.” 
(Gerner, 19.7.07). 
275 The group included representatives from seven bilateral and multilateral donors. 
276 In addition, the delegation met with the Copperbelt Energy Corporation, the Chamber of Mines, the 
Kitwe City Council, and Professor John Lungu of the CBU. 
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6.3.5 Stability and corporate social responsibility 
Companies generally appeared concerned with maintaining stable relationships with 
all stakeholders, including employees and labour unions as well as local communities. 
At the height of the boom, various regulatory incidents, as well as renewed focus on 
the sector in the media (including debates around the DAs), meant greater criticisms 
against the mines in the media, with negative reputational impacts on the mines. 
When mining companies’ reputations gets tarnished, it plays into the hands of the 
political opposition, which in Zambia had explicitly sought to constrain the activities 
foreign investors (as discussed in chapter four). 
One way in which a company can deal with reputational issues is through 
community development projects (including health, education, and economic 
development). Such projects, to the extent they deliver benefits to satisfy the 
expectations of local communities, can promote stability in stakeholder relations. The 
Zambian government has a similar interest in seeing foreign mining companies 
‘giving back’ to communities, and tried – following the 2006 election – to present a 
picture of the mining sector as contributing to local development and community 
welfare. A press statement from mid-2007 states that “government is doing everything 
possible to encourage mining companies to plough back part of their profits into 
communities”, attempting to show that the mining companies are engaging with social 
and community issues. 
My estimates suggest that mining companies were spending a mere $1-4m 
each on social and community investment projects annually (see box below).277 In an 
expanding sector the potential for CSR to significantly contribute to local 
development is particularly limited: as a manager at FQML observes, it is difficult to 
motivate spending on CSR and community projects during a ramp-up phase, because 
“you are not making any income, and yet you are expected to contribute.” (FQML 
mgr 2, 17.9.07). 
Companies may pursue a positive reputation and stable stakeholder relations 
through a commitment to operate in accordance with international best practices 
(implementing rigorous routines and processes in the fields of environmental, health 
and safety, and labour relations). One respondent at FQML argues that doing so 
promotes his firm’s objective of stability, but also makes good business sense for his 
firm: “We strive to have zero accidents, because that is all part of good management. 
If you are having fatalities or Lost Time Injuries (LTI), it is not only indicative of you 
having accidents, you will be damaging equipment as well, and you will lower your 
productivity.” (FQML mgr 1, 11.10.07) 
International capital markets have a range of routine reporting requirements 
that play a key role in disseminating any negative news from environmental or safety 
infringements. Over time these routines become embedded in values and norms of 
what the organisation should be and do. My respondents thus portray it as more than a 
simple cost-benefit calculation: “[w]e don’t really see it as we don’t want to report 
fatalities or lost-time injuries to the stock exchange, so that is why we have a good 
277 Health-related examples include malaria, HIV/AIDS and general subsidisation of community health 
services; infrastructure-related examples include road rehabilitation, drilling of boreholes (wells), as 
well as construction and rehabilitation of education facilities. The companies mentioned in the press 
statement (in order of appearance) were Chibuluma, MCM, KCM, Kansanshi (FQML) and Enya 
(operating both CM and LCM). This statement claims that “each company will,” in order “to keep the 
public informed … continue to submit to the Ministry of Mines … a quarterly report on its corporate 
social responsibility activities.” However, when I asked about this report, neither my two interviewees 
from the Ministry of Mines nor respondents at the mines themselves said that such a report existed. 
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safety policy. I wouldn’t necessarily say that is the case, you have a good safety 
policy because you want to run your mine efficiently. And because it is the right way 
to do it.” (FQML mgr 1, 11.10.07). 
Above-average environmental and labour governance and a reputation for 
social investment can also provide intangible benefits to a company. One of my 
respondents at FQML notes that “if you talk to the Copperbelt Permanent Secretary, 
and Copperbelt Ministers, which company is doing most CSR … FQML will always 
come up. And that does open doors. However it is one of economic benefits that you 
cannot quantify.” (11.10.07). He suggests that cultivating a ‘good reputation’ by 
engaging with local actors can promote stability for the firm. This can be contrasted 
with the alternative strategy of seeking a close GRZ relationships and relying on GRZ 
protection (see section 4.3.4). 
Box 8: CSR among the case study companies 
There are clear variations in how much mining companies contribute to, and how they 
approach, local community development. In Zambia I found CSR to be firmly on the agenda, 
but still very much reactionary to public sentiment, and limited in scope. 
There are three modalities of CSR spending evident among firms surveyed for this 
study: discretionary, ‘memoranda of understanding’ (MOUs) with local government, and 
foundations. At KCM community investment is carried out in partnership with local councils, 
using MOUs. At FQML the company policy is to provide 1% of overall group profit to CSR, 
which is thus formalised in the organisations budgetary processes. However, the company 
varies across its mining operations in terms of how this is implemented: at Bwana Mkubwa 
c.$650,000 per annum is spent at the discretion of one manager (FQML mgr 3, 28.8.07), 
whereas at Kansanshi the process is more participatory: FQML contributes to a foundation 
($1.4m in 2008) whose management committee includes representatives of local 
communities. 
These differences reflect the more urban location and larger scope of Kansanshi’s 
operations, although the process has been criticised as not having proper guidelines, with 
Sinkamba at CBE pointing to “wrangling in that foundation, over who should decide what” 
(Sinkamba, 14.10.07). 
Elsewhere CM created a microfinance provider called Bakakomba, “their vehicle into 
doing something for the community” (Muchimba, 3.8.07). NFCA has historically not been 
visible in this area of CSR according to Muchimba at MUZ. He notes that “[i]t is only now 
that they are embellishing their investment with ‘we’ll do this, we’ll do that’.” Initiatives at 
NFCA include, according to the government newspaper, $400,000 on infrastructure 
rehabilitation and education and empowerment plans, with a further $200,000 earmarked for 
upgrading equipment at the Sino-Zam Friendship Hospital (announced during a visit by 
Presidential Mwanawasa in July 2007, see ToZ, 7.7.2007). 
6.3.6 Labour practices and industrial relations 
The directly employed staff among the case study firms (i.e. employees on the mining 
company’s payroll) are all either permanent employees or on fixed-term contracts, 
typically for one-to-three years. There is evidence of convergence in the sector, and at 
NFCA some employees have recently moved from being on fixed-term contracts to 
being permanent employees.278 All directly employed staff are generally members of 
278 However this is not all beneficial according to my respondent: “if you decide to leave, you lose you 
accrued benefits” (S.Banda, 8.9.07). This may well serve the interests of NFCA management, and may 
be an explicit strategy to the extent that managers know they have sub-standard employment 
conditions: employees become ‘locked in’, unable to afford move to better-paying competitors. 
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either MUZ or NUMAW, and the variations among companies in their relations with 
unions appear limited. The exception is NFCA, who in Muchimba’s (MUZ) 
experience “appear[s] not familiar to the practices of trade unionism, and we have had 
to induct them to play the ball. They have played along, but there is a lot of push and 
pull and pull.” (Muchimba, 3.8.07).279 
My respondent attributes the slow process of negotiations around collective 
agreements to what he calls “delaying tactics” of NFCA and other Chinese firms: 
“[l]et’s take the BGRIMM as a case. Those unfortunate souls that perished, they had 
expressed their desire to join this union. Almost a year and a half before they met 
their death. During that period, management had stood their ground, and used 
delaying tactics. And they never came to have a voice.” (Ibid.). He adds that the union 
has had a similar experience with NFCA’s sister companies on the Copperbelt, that 
“from the time that you give them a simple draft (resolution) agreement, it will take a 
whole bureaucratic way of doing things, where they would send it to China, have it 
translated in Chinese, get it back. And it is taking a year now, again. And workers 
become frustrated, they don’t have a voice.” (Muchimba, 3.8.07). 
I was unable to conclude whether NFCA was deliberately using “delaying 
tactics” or whether their slow response reflected internal inefficiencies of a company 
that appeared heavily reliant on ‘sign-off’ from the parent company in China (see 
section 4.4.3). Muchimba at MUZ alludes to this when he describes it as “a slippery 
type of investment” that “ha[s] got a unique different management style, which is 
rather bureaucratic, with a lot of government-to-government involvement.” (3.8.07). 
Difficulties in reaching agreement with unions can also be attributed to the 
relative segregation of Chinese companies from the wider local economy and society 
(Mohan & Kale 2007). Muchimba observes that “[t]hey are secluded, kind of, and 
difficult to mingle and associate with … Hasn’t endeared them well, and they have 
not really integrated themselves into the mining community.” (3.8.07). 
6.3.7 Expatriate and local management relations 
This section looks at relationships between expatriate managers and local managerial 
employees within companies. Understanding the particularities of recruitment and 
retention of managers is important, for two reasons. First, these individuals are often 
the flag-bearers of an organisation’s administrative legacy, i.e. the routines and aims 
that have served the organisation in the past. Second, more senior-level Zambian 
employees, even when they are new recruits, will be familiar with local business 
practices and stakeholder expectations (see section 2.5.5). 
I found that most companies surveyed tended to retain managerial staff, even 
following changes in ownership (e.g. at KCM in 2004 and at Chambishi Metals in 
2003) (Masupha, 12.11.07; Mwenya 4.10.07). First Quantum similarly retained many 
managers and staff who had been with the firm since the late 1990s (FQML mgr 1, 
2.12.07). However at NFCA the typical time Chinese managers spent in Zambia was 
three years. As expatriate managers spend more time in the host country, their 
understanding of social norms governing labour relations – and what constitutes 
‘acceptable’ behaviour – evolves: Banda at NFCA thus reflects that Chinese managers 
279 Muchimba observes that industrial relations at NFCA remain “lethargic” due to the legacies of the 
BGRIMM disaster (3.8.07). 
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who have stayed longer in Zambia are more likely to let Zambian staff take leave to 
attend funerals (a highly important socio-cultural practice in Zambia).280 
An example of inefficient internal management controls at NFCA (see 
previous sub-section) was the widespread practice whereby more senior Zambians 
“create vacancies” and fill them by hiring relatives (Maboshe, 2.12.07). My 
respondent sees it as very demotivating for workers, as it reduces job security.281 This 
nepotism among the lower ranks of management makes the company less efficient, 
since the most highly qualified people are not chosen for the job. It also has direct 
cost implications: when people get unfair dismissals, they often go to a lawyer and 
file a lawsuit. Banda explains that “that’s why we have so many lawsuits … And the 
company ends up paying!” (2.12.07). 
Most of the mining companies stress the value of training and development of 
Zambian staff. KCM, for instance, operates a ‘global leadership’ programme whereby 
Zambians go to India and vice versa for between six months and two years 
(Chitambala, 17.9.07). At NFCA, however, there are no similar programmes to 
promote long-term development of labour. This may reflect the objective of 
minimising costs not related to production: a Zambian employee at NFCA notes that 
“[r]ight now they don’t even have an HIV/AIDS policy [in contrast to other foreign 
mining companies] … We are having a very hard time to launch it, and we have 
invited GRZ officials to come and launch it, but they are refusing to give us any 
money … NFCA [was] saying ‘that is not what we came here for, we came here to 
mine copper’.” (Maboshe, 25.8.07). 
Gao at NFCA nevertheless argues that the firm takes a long-term view and 
that this investment must be for mutual benefit. He says “[w]e have a slogan, this is 
our common home” – whereas Chinese expatriates “exchange” and go back to China, 
for “our [c.3,000] employees, this is their home. We educate them and tell them ‘this 
is your mine, not our mine’. As for us Chinese, we don’t have to come here, we can 
stay in China, but our company sent us here to make this mine working smoothly. So 
we do a lot of education, or communication with our local employees, so they 
understand…” (21.8.07).282 However this “education” does not appear to include the 
type of training and skills development that is offered to workers at some other mines, 
according to my respondent (S.Banda, 2.12.07). 
280 
“He said you can go, but something clicked in my mind, probably because [inaudible] this guy has 
stayed longer in Zambia…” (S.Banda, 2.12.07). An important observation is that it is socially 
unacceptable for a Zambian to not go. NFCA is hereby creating an externality of social exclusion: the 
firm’s practices of not letting employees attend funerals can lead to the social exclusion of the 
individual, reducing her future social ‘safety net’ – not letting the employees attend funerals is thus an 
example of corporate social irresponsibility in the Zambian context. 
281 She explains that “[h]alf of the time they are employing their relatives, who haven’t done anything 
… You are working, they bring their relative, say ‘show them around’, and you are teaching them what 
to do, tomorrow you get non-renewal and that person is in your position.” (Maboshe, 2.12.07). 
282 The notion that Chinese managers do not see Zambia as their home is shared by Shyam Vasant, an 
Indian entrepreneur. He suggests that the poor standards he has seen and heard about among Chinese 
business partners actually derives from their failure to see Zambia as “their home” (7.11.07). 
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6.3.8 Language and culture as drivers of organisational behaviour 
A guard at the gates to the Chambishi Copper Smelter explains how the Chinese came 
and “started clearing the bush in November last year [2006], but the foundations they 
were starting January, February. In the beginning they were slow slow, because of 
the rain, but then, they went fast fast! They will start at 06:00, at 11:30 they will go 
for lunch to 13:30 then they will go to 17:30, eat supper, then at 19:00 hours back, up 
to 22:00 hours, every day … They stay here” he says, pointing to an area next to the 
main gate, “[t]hey have a dining hall here – everything is here. Even the CEO stays 
here! But us [Zambians] we can’t sleep here, not here in the bush, but they can!” 
In the case of Chinese investors in particular, language divisions appear to constrain 
communication between expatriate management, Zambian employees and local 
stakeholders. Mr Gao argues that NFCA “tr[ies] to be good at communication … But 
we have the language problem, sometimes the equipment is manufactured in China, 
so the manual will be in Chinese … So we have to train people to have key operating 
points done by Chinese.” (21.8.07).283 
Language issues can explain why the secluded nature of Chinese investment 
discussed above extends to intra-organisational relations (between Chinese and 
Zambian managerial employees). At NFCA Zambian employees have very little 
insight into the ongoings at their company: the vast majority of internal memos appear 
in Mandarin only, and Zambians are wary of being seen as “asking too many 
questions” (Maboshe, 25.8.07).284 
Language determines how information that reaches company decision makers 
will be interpreted and acted upon, and therefore how companies respond to 
government policies. 285 To the extent language problems hamper the flow of 
information within a large-scale mine, there can be serious health, safety and 
environmental implications. One respondent alleges that NFCA’s “Mining 
Department [which is] directly linked to the mining underground and the production 
… have people that do not even know how to speak English.” (S.Banda, 8.9.07). He is 
clear that this situation puts at risk the safety of the working environment: “It is very 
dangerous, that is why we used to experience a lot of accidents. You know NFCA was 
the company with most fatalities, excluding BGRIMM, underground, because of lack 
of communications.” (Ibid.).286 
The Company Secretary of the Chambishi Copper Smelter argues that there is 
less need for strict labour regulations and inspections in China because of the way in 
which conflicts are resolved internally within the firm. He claims this is made 
283 My respondent claims there are “50 Chinese managers” but that “all operations [are] done by local 
people.” This contrasts with information provided by two Zambian employees, who put the figure of 
Chinese expatriates at closer to 200, including foremen of teams of workers that go underground 
(S.Banda, 2.12.07). 
284 My respondent reflects that “even when they are talking, or when they are holding meetings, they 
hold it themselves and they speak Chinese. So even if you put a Zambian, he won’t understand 
anything. Because they speak in Chinese, they won’t speak English, they always [speak] Chinese to 
each other … You feel useless, how can you contribute?” (25.8.07). 
285 As North notes, individuals and organisations only exert pressures on institutions after incorporating 
new information into their “belief systems”, wherefore “getting it right through time requires that we 
perceive correctly changes in the human environment.” (2005: 116). 
286 Banda confirms that there used to be frequent beatings underground. “The problem was with the 
language” he explains, “he’ll say ‘can you drill there’. But instead of correcting you, maybe he will 
push you, and because you are tired, you get upset and push him back.” (S.Banda, 8.9.07). 
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possible due to shared culture: “I think it is like this, the management and the 
employee in China, you can communicate very well, and it is also easy for both 
parties to understand each other, because we are from the same culture.” (Sun, 
1.11.07). 
6.4 Interaction and bargaining (environmental and safety) 
I now turn to the policy environment and how mining companies engage (or not) with 
government agents in Zambia. This section comprises four parts and begins by 
reviewing the institutional mechanisms of environmental, health and safety regulation 
in the mining sector. It then critiques the regulatory framework by pointing to several 
high-profile instances of regulatory failure, including environmental and safety 
incidents. The third part discusses in some detail the challenges of monitoring and 
enforcing regulations. Finally I examine the emergent pressures for policy reform, and 
mining companies role in articulating these pressures. 
6.4.1 Regulatory institutions and their enforcement 
This sub-section discusses the main regulatory instruments and enforcement 
mechanisms used by the government of Zambia in regulating the mining sector’s 
environmental, health and safety performance. 
6.4.1.1 Regulatory institutions, standards and requirements 
New large-scale mining projects must first complete an Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA), which serves as an entry point for firms into the regulatory process 
and provides the basis for licensing. 287 In the EIA the firm conducts a broad 
assessment of environmental impacts within the plant area as well as the link between 
the plant area and the external environment (ECZ official 3, 24.7.07). As part of this 
process the firm prepares an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) as required under 
(SI 28, 1997) (the “EIA regulations”), which then – upon consultation with the ECZ – 
forms the basis of an Environmental Management Plan (EMP).288 
If a company wishes to expand its operations (a common occurrence during a 
commodity boom) the company must prepare an Environmental Project Brief (EPB), 
which an ECZ official describes as “actually an EIS but on a smaller scale.” (8.7.07). 
As an outcome of this EIA process, the ECZ issues licenses. A senior inspector 
explains that “[t]he idea is that if you pollute more, you will pay more, because the 
EPPCA is based on the polluter pays principle. If you are polluting more, your license 
class goes higher, and the license fees go higher.” (ECZ official 3, 24.7.07). The 
outcomes and findings of these EIS/EPBs should then be incorporated into the EMP, 
explaining why managers at FQML refer to the EMP as a “live document”.289 
The EMPs thus vary from company to company and are often more relevant in 
setting pollution limits than industry-specific (sector-wide) legislation. The way in 
which companies were able to re-negotiate extensions to limits on effluents originally 
agreed at privatisation undermines the potential for the EMP to be used as a frame of 
287 This requirement is provided for in the Environmental Impact Assessment SI (no. 28 of 1997). 
288 As an ECZ official puts it, the objective of the EMP is “to set out responsibilities, who is 
responsible for what” (ECZ official 3, 17.8.07). 
289 One respondent explains how “whenever you change something … you got to update the EMP, all 
the time” (28.8.07; also FQML mgr 2 mentions this). 
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reference or benchmark.290 NFCA, for instance, only submitted an EMP in 2006, nine 
years after arriving in Zambia (ECZ official 4, 8.8.07). Lifuka at Transparency 
International (who has a background in environmental management) also criticises 
ECZ for overemphasising the EMPs whilst neglecting internal management processes. 
He argues there is insufficient attention paid to firms’ internal routines that are 
supposed to guide activities towards addressing issues identified in the EMP.291 
Environmental regulations are stabilised by, and subsidiary to, companies’ 
DAs. The Mines and Minerals (Amendment) Act makes reference to privatised 
companies’ “environmental plan[s] … made pursuant to any Development 
Agreement[s]”. It indemnifies companies from “environmental liabilities” and “mine 
safety liabilities” as long as the purchaser of a ZCCM asset is in compliance with the 
EMP, except for liabilities arising “after the last date provided in the Development 
Agreement … by which the purchaser’s operations are due to achieve full compliance 
with the environmental requirements applicable under the environmental plan and 
with any environmental law” (MM(A)A No.2 of 2000, Sect. 4-4-c).292 
The Ministry of Mines requires companies to submit a ‘Plan of Operations’ 
(PO) that details commitments in terms of quantities of ore to be mined, employment 
levels, and other operational data.293 The PO resembles the EMP in that it is meant to 
be a ‘live’ document, such that “if there are changes in circumstances, [the mining 
companies] are supposed to update it with our involvement and approval … e.g. 
[they] want to build a concentrator and put up a leach plant ... It is a fundamental 
document forming part of their license.” (Ndalama, 1.10.07). My respondent at the 
Ministry of Mines adds that lacking organisational capacity, which he attributes to 
“the inability to retain technical staff,” has meant that inspections and follow-up 
verifications of the PO are often lacking (Ndalama, 1.10.07). 
6.4.1.2 Regulatory enforcement 
The main modes of enforcing regulatory standards in the area of environment, health 
and safety are company inspections, self-reporting and audits of the EMP. First, ECZ 
retains the right to inspect any company it suspects of non-compliance with the 
conditions contained in the licences it provides. In practice ECZ usually comes once a 
year to the visit companies when licenses are due for renewal. The MSD is also 
mandated to inspect firms’ health-and-safety as well as environmental management, 
but inspections are not always forthcoming due to capacity constraints: a manager at 
FQML observes that “we generally don’t get many visits from the MSD, they might 
visit us once or twice per year as a general rule. They don’t seem to come here very 
often.” (2.12.07). 
290 For instance, in a letter to the ECZ dated 10 July 2006, KCM applied “for an extension to deadlines 
for specific commitments agreed in KCM’s final EMP.” This is despite the KCM EMP at privatisation 
stating that “KCM is committed to meeting GRZ and IFC/World Bank requirements for their facilities 
within three years of investing, i.e. by 31 March 2003.” (AMEC 2001: 2-14) 
291 My respondent stresses that “management of a company … should have a clearly articulated 
environmental policy, and they should have a budget as well to go along-side the implementation of the 
policy.” (Lifuka, 20.7.07). 
292 To illustrate, KCM’s DA notes that “KCM shall achieve the objectives of the KCM Final 
Environmental Plan no later than the last day of the Stability Period” (KCM DA p.34), i.e. 20 years 
after the signing of the development agreement. 
293 The PO does make some reference to environmental management, although as Senior Mining 
Engineer Gideon Ndalama notes “the bulk of environmental conditions is contained in the EMP, which 
forms part of the PO.” (1.10.07). 
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A second enforcement mechanism is the extensive self-reporting required by 
companies. 294 In the area of environmental management companies are meant to 
submit reports semi-annually, failing which certain actions can be taken by the 
regulator: an official at the ECZ explains that “when a company does not submit, that 
is something that is punishable by law. And if they submit a non-compliant report, 
that is also something that attracts certain actions.” (ECZ official 4, 8.8.07). However, 
there appears to be a degree of leniency in this. ECZ officials review this six-monthly 
data, using their judgement, and if values are ‘off’ in one month but not others, no 
action might be taken (ECZ official 3, 23.7.07). This resonates with concern among 
stakeholders was that the regulatory framework was over-reliant on self-reporting was 
highlighted in the World Bank EITI scoping report (see section 5.4.4). The report 
argued that too much self-reporting complicates the assessment of not so much what 
has been paid, but what should be paid (World Bank 2008d: 18). 
A third form of enforcement is through the requirement that the EMP be 
audited every three years. 295 At FQML one respondent confirms that ECZ does 
conduct audits “by law”, and that they “come every now and again, I think they came 
to us about two years ago, they went through our environmental systems and EMPs, 
to see how we’re progressing” (28.8.07). 
6.4.2 Environmental and safety incidents 
Despite the institutional mechanisms discussed above, enforcement is imperfect and 
regulatory failures in the areas of environment, health and safety have been frequent. 
The most significant breaches of environmental and safety standards since 
privatisation involved KCM and NFCA, respectively. KCM was behind the largest 
environmental incident since privatisation in November 2006, when the company 
discharged highly acidic tailings (waste material) into the Kafue river, one of 
Zambia’s main water arteries. According to the investigations by the ECZ the incident 
occurred because KCM had continued discharging acidic tailings despite having run 
out of the lime required for neutralisation. The acidic material burned through a 
pipeline and entered the natural environment. 
Rueben Lifuka at Transparency International argued that the ECZ had been 
visiting KCM’s Chingola sites, “indicat[ing] the weakness that they had in the way 
they were discharging waste water … but still that accident did occur, because there 
was nothing compelling the company to ensure that they put in place new measures. I 
mean they took note of what ECZ were saying, but they didn’t investigate further and 
ensure that appropriate measures were taken into consideration.” (20.7.07). A 
manager at FQML adds to this, noting that “the Kafue stream was blue from copper 
content” and that “it wasn’t a surprise … it had been happening for years, small spills 
and small spills” (FQML mgr 2, 17.9.07). 
At NFCA a much-publicised incident took place in April 2005 when the 
explosives-manufacturing plant BGRIMM, a subsidiary of NFCA, was levelled to the 
ground in an explosion that killed all ﬁfty-four people working in the plant (BBC 
News 21.4.2005). Accountability over the incident was limited: a report was 
presented to Parliament but never made public. It highlighted lack of safety standards 
294 Livernois & McKenna (1999) review the economic rationale for regulatory self-reporting. 
295 My respondents at the ECZ confirms that this is an appropriate time frame, given the costliness and 
labour-intensity of such audits (various). Daniel Chihili, Superintendent of Environment, Health and 
Safety at CM, explains how “the [CM] EMP was done in 2001, and 2004, the law requires us to update 
it every three years. I just updated it in April 2007” (1.11.07). 
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and lack of training in the handling of detonator devices (ECZ official 1, 11.9.07).296 
It also emerged that the company had breached labour regulations by not keeping 
adequate records of workers: one employee recounts how identification of those 
perished required company representatives going into the nearby township to search 
for weeping families (S.Banda, 8.9.07).297 
Other incidents took place at CM, where the new owners – like their 
predecessors – continued to experience technical problems with their copper and 
cobalt smelter. The smelter was ordered to be shut down by the MSD following an 
explosion on 23 April 2007 that injured four workers. This was the third accident at 
CM in 2007, following two accidents earlier in the year that injured a total of eight 
miners (Metals Place 25.4.2007). At NFCA a waste-transportation pipeline failed on 8 
December 2006, causing waste material (tailings) to be discharged into the 
environment (ECZ correspondence 11.12.06). 
At MCM there were, according to a Senior Inspector at the ECZ (who worked 
on MCM’s smelter in Mufulira around the time of privatisation), “a lot of fugitive 
gases” (ECZ official 2, 28.8.07). Asked whether he thought this related more to 
technological efficiency or conscious cost-cutting, he surmises that “[i]t is a 
combination, but more on the side of cutting corners” (Ibid.). 
Pin-pointing company-specific trends more generally proved difficult. A 
senior inspector at the MSD was one of few government respondents willing to speak 
openly about how practices varied across the mines. He observes that “it does vary to 
a certain degree. But except for the Chinese the rest are more or less the same. The 
Chinese are quite apprehensive when they hear that there is an inspector around. They 
get worried. But the others, they are quite confident, they don’t get bothered so much, 
most of the time they have their house in order … our colleagues the Chinese are still 
adjusting to certain impositions of the law, so they get worried that you will find them 
wanting in this or that area.” (MSD inspector, 27.8.07). 
6.4.3 Enforcement challenges 
This sub-section examines in some detail why the regulatory framework in place has 
failed to prevent the regulatory failures discussed in the previous section. I found 
constraints and challenges to regulatory enforcement to be multifaceted, including: 
outdated legislation, lack of resources, competition over skills, political intervention, 
and limited regulatory clarity. 
6.4.3.1 Outdated legislation 
Two mining company respondents highlighted the outdated or inappropriate nature of 
existing mining regulation. The Superindendent of EHS at CM felt that the 
enforcement of environmental, health and safety regulation across the mines was 
consistent, but argued that reform was needed “because the mining methods have 
changed, and the regulations have not been revised for a while.” (Chihili, 1.11.07). 
The Environmental Manager at KCM echoed this point when he argued that 
regulations are often out of touch with “modern mining methods” in ways that 
296 I went to the National Assembly (Parliament) to inquire about this, but the rather helpful official I 
spoke claimed he was not aware of any reports following BGRIMM. 
297 Peter Sinkamba and his NGO Citizens for a Better Environment made a petition to the Minister in 
July 2007 requesting regarding greater disclosure surrounding the BGRIMM incident. He said he could 
share this correspondence with me, but these documents were not accessible at the time of our meeting. 
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counteract best-practice environmental management (Phiri, 12.10.07). 298 Another 
issue raised by several respondents was the limited deterrent of fines, given statutory 
fines set in a historical context of a much stronger Kwacha, which become very small 
in today’s terms.299 
6.4.3.2 Resource constraints 
Regulatory agencies faced financial as well as human resources constraints. Chihili at 
CM noted that MSD and ECZ needed to “boost their capacity and manpower so that 
they can regularly visit the mines.” (1.11.07). A lack of funding appears to result in 
limited follow-ups on compliance (Ndalama, 1.10.07), creating demand for rent-
seeking among inspectors (ECZ official 4, 19.11.07).300 Capacity constraints may also 
explain the CM Company Secretary’s view that ECZ’s processes seem slow: “[t]hey 
issue many licenses but it always takes a long time. [CM’s] environmental people 
always have to remind them and remind them.” (4.10.07). 
Shortfalls in the government’s organisational capacity may also limit firms’ 
ability to plan ahead and follow a pre-agreed investment path. As the Company 
Secretary of CCS notes, “the only problem sometimes is that the GRZ is not quite 
efficient. Sometimes you apply for something, you don’t know when they will 
approve it” (1.11.07). Mining companies thus often have to spend resources following 
up with the GRZ on regulatory matters. 
6.4.3.3 Competition over skills 
Competition over mining-related skills increases when the sector is expanding and is, 
as noted in section 4.4.5, one of the few areas in which large mining companies in 
Zambia compete. The shortage of certain skills in Zambia meant that engineers and 
managers would often move from the Ministry of Mines to better-paying mining 
firms. A senior mining engineer at the Ministry of Mines recalls how he attempted to 
recruit eighteen geologists in early 2007 but was unable to recruit a single one 
(Ndalama, 1.10.07). Engineers at the ECZ and the MSD were also routinely poached 
by foreign mining companies, leading one inspector at the MSD referring to his 
organisation as a “training ground” (MSD inspector, 27.8.07). 
The inability of the state to retain experienced staff undermines the efficacy of 
regulatory agencies: an inexperienced regulator is less likely to spot breaches in 
compliance. Moreover, lack of technical skills is a particular problem for regulatory 
activities in high-technology industries. As one respondent notes, “environmental 
298 Phiri gives a technical example based on the statutory limit of sulphites in some tailings dams being 
1500mg/l. KCM would like to remove these sulphites (i.e. clean up) by precipitating (solidifying) this 
material, and did a study together with engineers from the University of Zambia which concluded that a 
concentration of 1750mg/l was required in order for the necessary precipitation to take place. 
299 As Lungu at the CBU notes, “the government of Zambia has never put an economic price on things 
– if you run over a person, it is K2m [$500]” (31.10.07). This is also mentioned by an official at the 
ECZ (8.8.07). 
300 My respondent explains how “there is always this constant battle, when inspectors go out there” and 
that “this is at every level, in fact I was recently with the Director and the Board Chairman of ECZ on 
the Copperbelt, and we were trying to see this smelter that was popping up from nowhere, and we went 
there to tell them it was in the wrong place for this and that reason, and as we are leaving, this person 
actually takes some money out of his pocket, a wad of cash and says this is for your drink. Obviously 
you cannot call it a bribe, but it was meant to be a bribe. So the Director says just give it to the workers. 
I can assure you that the intention of that gesture, was obviously to get a favourable treatment. So those 
things are quite real, whenever you have officers that go out there, there is always going to be that kind 
of thing.” (ECZ official 4, 19.11.07). 
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management [in mining] is a dynamic phenomenon. It changes and you need to keep 
constantly developing your skills” (ECZ official 3, 24.7.07). 
6.4.3.4 Political intervention 
The political intervention discussed in chapter four appeared to be pervasive in the 
areas of environmental, health and safety regulations, thereby constraining the work 
of agencies such as the ECZ and MSD. According to one of my respondents at 
FQML, “the ECZ has a lot of discretion … but they are also under pressure … 
Sometimes you see them flexing their muscles only to be smacked over their fingers.” 
(FQML mgr 2, 17.9.07).301 
I found evidence of political intervention in relation to both the BGRIMM 
(NFCA) and the Kafue (KCM) incidents. An official at the ECZ explains how it was 
seeking an investigation into BGRIMM because of NFCA’s application for licenses to 
rebuild the factory. She explains that the President himself gave the go-ahead for 
reconstruction, making “a public pronouncement to that effect during a visit NFCA in 
early 2007” (ECZ official 1, 26.2.08), despite the fact that impact assessments and 
standard procedures had yet to be concluded. My respondent acknowledges that 
“obviously when a head of state makes such pronouncements, it has an effect on 
regulators, because in the mind of regulators they will be sort of influenced by 
that.”302 
In the case of KCM’s pollution of the Kafue river the ECZ would have been 
within the law if they arrested the CEO of KCM, given powers provided to the ECZ 
in 1999 amendments to the EPPCA.303 Lifuka at Transparency International claims 
“they had prepared all the documentation to do [just] that … but they got instructions, 
from what we hear, from the President to not do that. And in any case, KCM had 
created a lot of jobs, and it was going to send the wrong signals about Zambia as an 
investment destination etc.” (Lifuka, 20.7.07; see also Sinkamba, 1.8.07).304 
Importantly, this intervention was also within the law, as it were. There are 
provisions in the Environmental Impact Assessment regulations (clause 24) that allow 
Minister of Environment to overrule ECZ decisions. To illustrate, in May 2007, the 
Zambian Parliament questioned ECZ Director Edward Zulu about two projects that 
were going ahead despite ECZ opinion that project plans were environmentally 
unsound. Zulu referred to the clause in the EPPCA giving firms the right of appeal to 
the Ministry of Environment if unhappy with ECZ decisions, noting that “we rejected 
301 He speculates that there is a strategic element to the application of ECZ enforcement efforts, based 
on his view that Ndola Lime seems to be getting away with more (FQML mgr 2, 17.9.07), perhaps 
explained by the latter being state-owned or the strategic nature of its product as an input into the 
production of copper. However this is not supported by Joseph Makumba’s (ZCCM-IH) comments of 
how Ndola Lime was temporarily closed by ECZ in the first half of 2007 (23.7.07). 
302 From the ECZ perspective the application from NFCA to reconstruct BGRIMM should not have 
been controversial, given that “the initial accident had nothing to do with environmental management 
and standards, but rather with failure to follow safety standards.” (ECZ official 1, 26.2.08). However, 
My respondent adds that the ECZ “had a hard time convincing people that the ECZ was not complicit 
in this regulatory failure” (Ibid.) which can be explained by muddled – from the point of view of 
stakeholders – perceptions of the allocation of roles between ECZ, MSD, and other regulatory agencies 
such as the factories and labour inspectorates. 
303 Environmental Protection and Pollution Control Act (Amendment) 1999. 
304 As a result of this intervention, KCM was instead required (by the ECZ) to implement and regularly 
report on (first weekly, then monthly) a series of mitigating measures. 
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them but the Minister has powers to overrule ECZ and direct otherwise. Our hands are 
tied” (Times of Zambia 15.5.2007).305 
6.4.3.5 Lacking regulatory clarity 
An overlap across institutional frameworks limits regulatory clarity and increases 
compliance costs for firms in two ways. First, there is some lack of clarity 
surrounding the allocation of environmental liabilities between the GRZ and new 
investors. This can be traced to the process of privatisation and the donor-supported 
Consolidated Environmental Management Plan (CEMP). The aim of the CEMP was 
to allocate responsibilities for addressing the long list of environmental liabilities 
from decades of often sub-standard environmental management. 
In this process the government’s share of historical liabilities was then 
implicitly defined through new mine-owners’ EMPs. Those environmental liabilities 
not taken on by new investors were, through the CEMP, to be managed by ZCCM­
IH.306 One respondent at the ECZ explains how “sometimes there are grey areas, for 
example the company may claim ‘this facility is not part of our own operations’, yet 
they are using it to dispose of waste. And according to the DA, it means it is strategic 
to their operations, and should be part of their liabilities. So there were some grey 
areas…” (ECZ official 4, 8.8.07). 
Second, overlapping mandates between MSD and ECZ lead to duplication of 
work and may explain the view of some respondents at FQML that reporting 
requirements are high and that “the best thing to do is just to report everything to 
everybody” (FQML mgr 3, 28.8.07). My respondent claims that “[o]n environmental 
management sometimes there is a bit of confusion, because you also have MSD, and 
within that you have the environmental department. And sometimes one party does 
not always know what the other party is doing.” (Ibid.).307 
The role of ZCCM-IH as monitoring the mining sector (as discussed in chapter 
four) is relevant in the context of environmental reporting. This is illustrated by the 
observations from one ECZ official that large mining companies in effect do “dual 
reporting … they would report to ZCCM-IH and also to us.” (ECZ official 4, 
19.11.07). He adds that the information ECZ obtains from ZCCM-IH is “almost like 
… some intelligence [laughs]” (Ibid.). 
6.4.4 The policy reform agenda 
In this section I first discuss the emergence of a reform agenda for each of these 
regulatory agencies, and how it evolved through interaction with stakeholders. I also 
discuss the Environmental Protection Fund as an example of legislation that appeared 
to take the mining sector somewhat by surprise, and where there appeared to be some 
overlap between ECZ and MSD capabilities. Regulations governing the work of both 
305 Other instances of such ministerial intervention include Vic Falls hotel, Kafue Steel Project, and 
National Milling Corporation in centre of Lusaka. 
306 As the project manager at the ECZ notes, to “come up with the CEMP, the new owners … had to 
produce EMPs for their mining units. And the areas not taken up by the new owners, ZCCM-IH on 
behalf of GRZ had to produce an EMP” (ECZ official 5, 14.8.07). 
307 Chihili at CM concurs, saying that “[t]he problem that we have is that we have two GRZ institutions 
performing almost a similar task.” (1.11.07). One way in which environmental regulations lack clarity 
is in regard to the auditing of the EMP: one respondent at FQML claims that there is “there is a conflict 
in the regulations” which contain references to first audit having to take place 36 months after 
commencement of operations, as well as after 18 months (FQML mgr 2, 17.9.07). 
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ECZ and MSD were still being reviewed by the time I wrote up this thesis, wherefore 
I focus on the processes surrounding policy evolution, rather than policy outcomes. 
6.4.4.1 Proposed reforms at the Environmental Council of Zambia 
The agenda for reform of the ECZ can be traced to the donor-funded Copperbelt 
Environment Project (CEP). To address the historical environmental liabilities that 
new mine-owners did not adopt at privatisation, the GRZ obtained funding from the 
World Bank and the Nordic Development Fund to undertake the ‘Copperbelt 
Environment Project’ (CEP). The CEP consisted of two components: the CEMP (see 
previous section) and a programme for ‘institutional strengthening’ through 
regulatory reform (ECZ official 5, 14.8.07; Lifuka, 20.7.07).308 
These recommendations were developed within a highly consultative process. 
An official at the ECZ explains that the agency “had various meetings on the 
Copperbelt, in Lusaka, in Livingstone, to consult the stakeholders on what is 
coming.” (ECZ official 3, 24.7.07).309 My respondent confirms that the CoM, the 
MSD, water utilities, and academics all attended, as well as several big mining 
companies, of whom he mentioned KCM, MCM and Kansanshi (Ibid.). 
The aim was that new environmental regulations would be applicable to 
mining companies despite stability clauses contained in DAs (ECZ official 4, 8.8.07). 
The Environmental Manager at KCM noted that “[t]he revision of the act is not in bad 
faith, if you like. That’s why we have been invited as stakeholders. It is not a brand 
new legislation, it is just amendments. The basics are there.” (Phiri, 12.10.07). 
This consultative process generated several proposals for regulatory reform. 
These included, first, several amendments aimed at simplifying how the ECZ works. 
One proposed amendment was to simplify ECZ’s work by establishing an ‘integrated 
client system’, whereby a company would have one key contact point at the ECZ 
(handling air, waste, water, chemicals). This would address concerns that “if you have 
three-to-four people dealing with one mine, the inspectors may give conflicting 
views.” (ECZ official 4, 19.11.07). Proposed reforms also included an ‘integrated 
licensing system’ to simplify the agency’s current system of licensing mines’ 
emission points and address some of the capacity issues mentioned above.310 This 
appeared to be consistent with mining companies’ own interests: the current licensing 
system was described as “very tedious” by KCM’s Environmental Manager, who 
308 An early non-legislative outcome of this project of ‘institutional strengthening’ was the 
establishment of an Inter-Agency Coordination Committee (IACC) to support capacity strengthening at 
the ECZ. The IACC consists of representatives from ministries of environment, mines, and health, as 
well as representatives of academic institutions (University of Zambia and the Copperbelt University) 
whose activities include visits to the mines (Makumba; ECZ official 5; ECZ official 4). 
309 These consultations were organised by Scanagri, the Finnish consultancy managing this exercise, 
with several non-government stakeholders invited to comment on draft revisions, including Lifuka at 
TIZ (20.7.07). I asked my most senior ECZ respondent for the report on these consultations, but he was 
unwilling to share it with me. 
310 ECZ official 4 stresses the mutual benefits of proposed reforms to the mines and ECZ, noting that 
for ECZ “it is supposed to reduce a lot of paper work and also make things easier, and even from the 
side of the mines, it will be easier.” (19.11.07). In addition, proposed changes included making 
environmental regulation more ‘equitable’ by the introduction of load factors, where a company would 
not only be judged by emissions at the point of measurement, but where the size of the area into which 
emissions are released is also taken into account. This conforms with international best practice and a 
Senior Inspector notes that “the mines are happy with the load factor”, but stresses that the ECZ will 
need more people to manage the new rules (28.8.07). 
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explained that “KCM has 57 licenses, you need to renew every year, at a cost [of] 
K120m [c.$30k].” (12.10.07). 
A second characteristic of the reform agenda was the attempt to address issues 
of outdated legislation, including increases in fines. A senior ECZ official noted “one 
problem we have had is that fines are not deterrent enough, and that is one of the 
things we are trying to change with the new EPPCA, to make sure it becomes cheaper 
for you to comply than not comply.” (ECZ official 4, 8.8.07). According to one 
respondent “some of the compliant companies have been saying is that it is easier for 
people to break the law than to comply with it … e.g. if MCM complies with 
regulations, some other company X may want to do things the other way around, and 
they get away with it.” (ECZ official 4, 8.8.07).311 This again suggests consistency 
between the regulator’s interests and those of – at minimum some subset of – the 
mining sector.312 
However simply raising fines to address the issue of ‘cheapness’ of non­
compliance is not straightforward in a context where ECZ user fees are seen as 
conflicting with mining companies’ cost-minimisation objectives: ECZ official 4 
reflects that “[o]f course even these fines we have to ask how punitive are they, 
because you find that the clients out there they will think that this becomes a fund-
raising thing.” (19.11.07). 
A third agenda point was to strengthen the ECZ by changing the provision in 
the EPPCA that allows ECZ decisions to be overruled by the Minister of 
Environment. One recommendation arising out of the Scanagri report was to remove 
the political connection by establishing an independent tribunal, at the level of a high 
court, to which companies could appeal, rather than appealing directly to the minister 
(ECZ official 2, 28.8.07). 
6.4.4.2 Proposed reforms at the Mines Safety Department 
At the MSD reform has long been considered an imperative, with discussions centred 
on how the agency should be funded. Reforms of the MSD, as an agency controlled 
by the Ministry of Mines, are integral to the broader agenda to revise Zambia’s 
mining policy (which includes fiscal provisions as discussed in chapter five). 
Proposals included making the MSD more autonomous from the Ministry of Mines 
by allowing it to be funded through user fees (à la the ECZ), most obviously to 
enhance capacity. 
Once more, this agenda appears consistent with the interests of a sub-set of the 
mining companies. Stakeholder consultations have often found a desire for a stronger 
and more independent MSD, even if this means charging economic fees for the work 
they do (MSD inspector, 27.8.07). One respondent at CM notes that “[t]he MSD is 
pushing for it, and they want the support of the mines.” (Chihili, 1.11.07).313 He 
claims there is, at his firm, “a lot of management support” for this (Ibid.).314 This 
311 According to ECZ official 4 “there have been loop holes somewhere, where it makes it easy for you 
to disobey the law first, because you know that it will be cheaper for you, in the long run, than if you 
comply” (8.8.07). 
312 Unfortunately my respondent would not elaborate further on which mining companies had 
expressed these views. 
313 A Senior Inspector at MSD illustrates this view, when he says it “would “improve the way we do 
our work … If you are a bit independent, you can make certain decisions without frequent interference 
from GRZ … Less interference and better results.” (MSD inspector, 27.8.07). 
314 My respondent recalls how he “was in the meeting when Derek Webbstock said ‘CM and LCM 
have no problem contributing to that, we fully support it’, those were his words.” (Ibid.). 
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initiative is supported by the political opposition, as Guy Scott notes “we keep raising 
it in Parliament, if a mine is set up, it needs to pay for a EIA, [so] why is safety a 
responsibility of us tax payers? … Why don’t you just make the mines pay for safety? 
Then you won’t have problems with your damn budget all the time.” (Scott, 
24.10.07). 
However not all mining companies appeared equally supportive of these 
reforms. My respondent at CM notes that other mining companies were more 
“apprehensive,” attributing this to concerns that “[w]hen you give discretion to 
inspectors, who have to come up with fines and charges because they need money, so 
it can be abused.” When prompted about neighbouring NFCA, a couple of kilometres 
down the road, he says “[e]xactly, those are the people who would have 
apprehensions, but for us we have nothing to hide, we do everything in a transparent 
manner.” (1.11.07). 
The agenda for reform at the MSD involves changes to the agency’s 
governance structure, to make it less susceptible to political intervention, including 
the establishment of a Board of directors with reporting duties. However the objective 
of MSD reforms may draw more support internally within the agency than from its 
‘parent’ the Ministry of Mines.315 My respondent at MSD argues that his organisation 
badly needs this, noting that “a Board is a very efficient institution … where people 
have to be accountable … they must earn their money. There are a few people that 
feel that they won’t meet that challenge, and they will fear for their job security.” 
(MSD inspector, 27.8.07) 
6.4.4.3 Policy uncertainty and the Environmental Protection Fund 
The Mines and Minerals Act (1997) mandates the MSD to administer an 
Environmental Protection Fund to assure government that companies allocate enough 
funds for decommissioning (Sinkamba, 14.10.07). Contributions to the EPF were to 
be determined by an environmental audit – to be completed by end-2007 – against 
firms’ “Environmental Impact Statement in accordance with the requirements of the 
Mines and Mineral (Environmental) Regulations SI 29 (of 1997).” (see also FQML 
mgr 2, 7.11.07).316 The implementation of an EPF had not, however, been pursued 
until it was announced on 3 September 2007 (in a letter from the Director of the 
MSD) that all mining companies must contribute to an EPF.317 
The EPF serves as an example of a policy that appeared to take mining 
companies somewhat by surprise, and show cases the overlapping mandates of the 
MSD and the ECZ. The ECZ was not invited to attend EPF consultations, nor partake 
in the abovementioned audits, to the dismay of ECZ officials (ECZ official 4, 
19.11.07). Such audits of environmental processes are normally the domain of ECZ, 
which at the time was actually conducting its own audits of the mines (in line with 
requirements to audit EMPs every three years). This example of regulatory overlap 
thus contributed to additional costs of compliance for the mining companies. 
315 One possible explanation for the limited progress of these reforms is that Ministry of Mines is 
seeking to retain control over resources in the face of and continued shift of power to the Ministry of 
Finance (see chapter five). 
316 One respondent within the Ministry of Mines believes the EPF has come on the Ministry of Mines 
agenda following a realisation through CEP analysis that “the environmental legacy of the big mines … 
is enormous, just scary, really, the level of environmental problems that are there. Now the question is 
who is going to pay for it.” (MSDP techn. ass’t, 1.10.07). 
317 Depending on audit outcomes, mining companies’ annual cash contributions to the fund would 
range from 5-20% of final closure costs. 
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The mines varied in their perceptions of the EPF: respondents at FQML saw it 
as adding little, possibly because FQML already operated under the Equator 
Principles. The CFO at CM did not see it as problematic, arguing that “all mines 
should have been aware of it” (Bangur, 4.10.07) and that only poor performers had 
cause for concern. At a consultative meeting with MSD in mid-October 2007 the 
mining sector as a group agreed that “instead of individual mines trying to battle it 
out, they [would] use the CoM to address all the concerns of the mines and to have a 
dialogue with GRZ to come up with an acceptable form of implementation.” (Chihili, 
1.11.07). 
6.5 Interaction and bargaining (labour relations) 
The aim of this section is to explicate the institutional framework within which labour 
relations are articulated. It proceeds to discuss some key labour-related issues, 
including the use of contractors and the role of labour in affecting change. In doing so 
I try to identify the differences across companies from varying institutional 
backgrounds. 
6.5.1 Institutional capacity to regulate labour 
The formal labour legislation suffers from two weaknesses. First, because of various 
procedural requirements, it becomes virtually impossible to strike legally and there 
have been no legal strikes since privatisation (Muchimba, 3.8.07).318 Thus although 
industrial action can be “very costly” (Sinkamba, 1.8.07) to firms, by disrupting and 
undermining firms’ stability, the fact that strikes in practice cannot be done legally 
reduces their legitimacy and the power of unions to enact change. 
Second, the outdated labour law makes an ambiguous distinction between 
temporary and permanent employees. This makes it easy for employers to ‘casualise’ 
labour whereby workers are hired for short periods of time, often with no benefits, 
only to be dismissed and then re-hired once their probation period expires (Petrauskis 
2006). This was a persistent problem in Zambia’s post-privatisation economy, 
extending to all industrial sectors. 
Third, although it is stipulated in the Employment Act that the Factories 
Inspectorate is responsible for monitoring and enforcement of firms’ labour standards 
(Chansa, 25.10.07), this monitoring is weak. Chansa attributes this to a lack of 
resources as well as a proliferation of actors following privatisation. The latter is due 
to new mining companies as well as the increasingly common practice of outsourcing 
of projects to smaller contractor companies (Chansa, 25.10.07).319 
318 Muchimba describes how, first, the union must “indicat[e] a dispute, you have to ‘agree with 
employer’ (to disagree). You then have to agree on what course to take (to court or arbitration). Then, 
suppose you want to go to strike, you are supposed to ballot for your members, and 2/3 must vote, and 
supervised by principal labour officers, whose staff complement is small, they don’ have mobility. 
Then, once you have voted to go to strike, you have to wait for 10 days. And how can you get annoyed 
today and wait 10 days to throw the branch!? And within those 10 days, the minister has power to go to 
court and get an application to declare your intention to go to strike not in the public interest … So in 
terms of MUZ flexing its muscle, it has virtually been impossible.” (3.8.07). 
319 To illustrate, in 2000 census there were 68,000 employment companies, and in 2006 a total of 98 
labour inspectors visited 1,500 companies. In contrast, the District Labour Commissioner is very often 
directly involved with KCM HR, however in a non-supervisory role, as the former needs to sign off 
“on all new contracts” (Masupha, 12.10.07). 
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6.5.2 Problems with contractor employees 
Casualisation appeared limited among the foreign mining companies since the 
government made policy pronouncements to limit the use of outplacement, or ‘labour 
hire’, firms in 2006.320 James Chansa at the Ministry of Labour argues that – in fact – 
casualisation was never a major issue among the big mining companies on the 
Copperbelt (25.10.07). However in the case of contractors, whose employees 
constitute a significant share of the workers on a typical mine site, it appears that 
casualisation in the employment of unskilled workers remains the norm (Malema, 
30.11.07).321 
Terms and conditions among contractor employees are generally worse than 
for those directly employed by the mining companies. There is, for instance, a lack of 
effective enforcement of the legal requirement that contractors insure workers.322 
According to Vincent Lengwe at MUZ, the main problem regarding contractor-
employees’ conditions of service relates to compensation. Difficulties in making 
claims against the Workers Compensation Board, under the Workers Compensation 
Act (Chp 271) arise “because the law makes reference to insurance in reference to 
long-term work.” (Lengwe, 18.9.07). 
Asked whether there has been, over time, any improvement of labour practices 
among contractors, Sophie Masupha at KCM says “[s]lightly, but they are slippery. It 
is something that needs to be monitored [by the Ministry of Labour] all the time in my 
view … Because here we can sit and I can paint a very positive picture, but what is 
out there is different. And they really need to do onsite inspections, not just talking to 
people like ourselves all the time.” (12.10.07). 
In the absence of government enforcement, mining companies may have an 
interest in demanding certain labour conditions from contractors. Masupha at KCM 
explains that “in the days of ZCCM – as a committee we would say if we want 
artisans they have to be paid such-and-such number. Because what we have found is 
that we have a lot of thefts on the premises, and a lot of them will be committed by 
contractors because their employers are not paying them enough.” (12.10.07). 
However, the enforcement of salary-related standards appears to be limited, 
perhaps unsurprisingly since the contractor might pass on higher salaries to the 
mining company through increased service charges. Thus, Masupha is unsure of 
whether contractors actually follow such policies in paying their employees. She 
confirms that KCM “ha[s] also had situations in the past where we have paid the 
contractors but the contractors have not paid the employees.”323 
MCM was rumoured to have a company policy in place demanding that sub­
contractors be paid 85% of the average MCM wage for an equivalent position (Fraser 
& Lungu 2007). Also here implementation is questionable: Trust Mushota, an 
acquaintance who at the time of study was providing several contract services to 
320 There was talk in the Ministry of Labour about issuing a SI about casualisation in 2005 but in the 
end it was only ever a policy (Chansa 25.10.07). 
321 Sophie Masupha notes that although KCM does not employ any casualised labour, this is an area 
where KCM “ha[s] found some contractors wanting” (12.10.07). 
322 A MUZ official gives the example of how “you find that KCM has insured these people, and they 
can easily be compensated, but if these contractor employees are found in the same accident, they 
cannot be compensated because the contractors do not insure their employees.” (Lengwe, 18.9.07). 
Chansa also notes the issues of how such companies, without own assets, would be able to pay 
obligations to workers if they lost their contracts (25.10.07). 
323 The company’s position now is “that if we come across a contractor where we know they do not 
intend to pay the employees, then we will cancel the contracts.” (Masupha, 12.10.07). 
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MCM including small excavation projects (with 10-15 employees), said they had not 
heard about this policy.324 
Low wages and limited benefits among labour employed by contractors 
intermittently result in ‘wildcat’ strikes. 325 Might these strikes among contractor-
employees present a risk for companies, thereby incentivising them to place higher 
demands on operating standards of contractors? The CM CFO does not think so, 
referring to how these contractors operate mainly during the development stages of a 
mine, where operational disruptions do not equate to disruptions in output (Bangur, 
29.11.07).326 
According to one manager at FQML, mining companies (including FQML) 
usually include a standard clause that “Zambian labour regulations must be met” by 
contractors (FQML mgr 1, 11.10.07). However because strikes among contractor 
employees do not constitute a serious threat, mining companies have little incentive to 
voluntarily monitor whether labour regulation (including wages and benefits) are in 
fact met. 
On safety it is another matter. An FQML manager elaborates that “[a]gain, it 
is a part of our contracts that any contractor operating on site has to adhere to all our 
safety regulations. And before any contractor is allowed to bring employees on site, 
they have to go through our one-day induction, which is obviously mainly safety 
orientated. So they have to adhere to all our on-site safety regulations, which are 
pretty stringent, probably more stringent than MSD regulations.” (FQML mgr 1, 
2.12.07). KCM, under AngloAmerican, was the first company to demand labour-
related conditions of contractors, in this instance due to a “lack of protective clothing” 
(Lengwe, 18.9.07). Both CM and FQML do health and safety induction (Chihili, 
1.11.07; FQML mgr 1, 2.12.07). Interaction also takes place through meetings, such 
as the monthly meetings to discuss safety, health and environment issues at CM. 
Chihili notes that “even in the contract it is specified that they must comply with CM 
safety and environmental regulations. So we don’t discriminate. And if [it is] a big 
organisation, with a big contract, we insist that they employ a safety officer, to act as 
liaison between their company and CM.” (1.11.07).327 
6.5.3 The role of labour in affecting change 
The conditions of service enjoyed by employees at NFCA appear to have improved 
following the BGRIMM incident. First, NFCA increased salaries across the board for 
Zambian employees (Maboshe, 25.8.07). Second, NFCA is now signing longer 
contracts, 2-3 years instead of 6m-1 year (S.Banda, 8.9.07). Third, workers’ claims 
that health benefits should cover not only spouse but also children were met with less 
resistance. NFCA has since moved to having the same coverage of health benefits as 
324 Professor Lungu similarly notes that he “know[s] some people working for contractors, even at 
MCM, at Mufulira. They get some quite miserable salaries, about K400,000 per month, and that is less 
than half of what a MCM worker gets.” (Lungu, 31.10.07). 
325 In one case, there were 600 workers contracted by Prosec, to provide services to Grinaker LTA, who 
in turn was contracted by KCM for the Konkola Deep project, who threatened to go to strike over the 
lack of insurance benefits, given the dangerous nature of their work (Daily Mail 6.10.2007). 
326 Bangur explains that if there are disruptions during the development phase, there are ways in which 
a company can accelerate development in order to make up for ‘lost time’ and still achieve planned 
production start-dates. 
327 In this account there is a case of selection bias. The companies that are mentioned are also those that 
were more positively disposed to talking about these issues. For example, because of access-issues, I 
do not know whether NFCA offers such an induction for contractors. 
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the other mines (i.e. including all dependents, understood as people living under your 
roof). 
However it appears workers rather than the Zambian government have played 
key roles in pushing Chinese management to address safety and other issues. 
Reflecting on the improved safety performance at NFCA, Banda notes that 
“[y]esterday when we received two containers, of course from China. I saw some 
equipment related to safety and the environment … But I wouldn’t say the 
government has done much. We the workers have put pressure on management to 
address some of the issues.” (8.9.07). 
In the area of social programmes, the HIV/AIDS programme at NFCA was 
also made possible through the initiative of workers, reflecting a realisation by 
Chinese management of the need to improve social relations: “right now they feel 
they have to start looking good, so we said you have to start putting these things in 
place, but they don’t really care, they have just come here to mine mine mine and take 
the profit out. So reluctantly they started to implement some [of these] things.” 
(Maboshe, 2.12.07). These accounts suggest that the company was, over time, 
becoming increasingly conscious of its reputation among stakeholders. 
6.6 Chapter conclusion 
This chapter began by introducing the context and relevance of the regulatory sphere 
of state-firm relations. It then reviewed the organisational routines and objectives of 
relevance to understanding environmental, safety and labour practices in the Zambian 
mining sector. These organisational features help explain variation across companies, 
including choices of technology and organisational structure, as well as objectives of 
minimising costs and pursuing stability in external relations. 
The organisational routines and aims discussed all have a bearing on the firm’s 
environmental and safety compliance as well as its stance on proposed regulatory 
reforms.328 For example, routines that result in excessive cost minimisation can also 
be seen as contributing to de facto regulatory failure, due to reduced compliance (e.g. 
unwillingness to invest in maintenance). On the other hand, a focus on cost 
minimisation also means that companies will not want to be found non-compliant in 
any case where significant fines are effectively levied. I found that standards 
emanating from international capital markets play a big role, as indicated by 
respondents from FQML referring to internal safety standards (aligned with the 
Equator Principles) as being more stringent than what is required by the MSD. 
This chapter then identified some environmental and labour-related instances 
of regulatory failure, including KCM’s pollution of the Kafue river and NFCA’s 
industrial accident in the company’s explosives factory. It sought to explicate the 
significant enforcement challenges that remain in the areas of environmental, health 
and safety, and labour practices. I found that many of these challenges become 
particularly acute when high international commodities prices are driving rapid 
growth and expansion. 
In discussing the emergence of proposals to strengthen the regulatory 
framework I showed how Zambian mining sector policy evolves through consultation 
and accommodation (consistent with my findings in chapter five). Stability clauses of 
DAs implied that regulators could not force costly amendments upon companies. The 
328 One MUZ official highlighted the fragmentation of Chinese companies, where many of NFCA’s 
‘sister companies’ appear to be “below the radar” for regulators (Lengwe, 18.9.07). 
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GRZ and its regulatory agencies thus needed to get big companies to ‘come on board’ 
in order to conduct any legislative reform.329 Just as in the fiscal policy sphere, 
government had to accommodate investors if it wanted to pursue reform without 
breaking the promises of stability embedded in the DAs. 
This consultative nature of regulatory reform requires ongoing and mutual 
adaptation by government as well as firms. As one ECZ official observes, “[w]e have 
to do so much adaptation. Some [mines] are more easy to work with, some are more 
compliant that others. We have learned that the hard way in some cases, but we’ve 
definitely had to change our approach to how we regulate them. When it comes to 
compliance, some investors would do everything they can to avoid compliance unless 
they have to”. (ECZ official 1, 11.9.07). 
However progress of these policy reforms has been slow despite a highly 
consultative process that seeks to bring mining companies on board as stakeholders. 
An ECZ official explained (in a follow-up interview conducted in April 2009) that 
there had been no revisions to the environmental regulatory framework as envisaged 
in consultations during 2007. Similarly, by mid-2009 the MSD remained underfunded 
and weak (ECZ official 4, 13.4.09; corroborated by J.Lungu 13.4.09). 
I point to two possible reasons why reform has been limited. First, not all 
mining companies were equally supportive of reforms to strengthen enforcement. 
Rather a company’s support appeared to depend on its routines-in-place: to illustrate, 
a company with advanced environmental management and reporting systems in place 
is unlikely to incur much additional costs were the MSD a tougher regulator. 
Therefore firms that already exhibit above-average regulatory performance are likely 
to be the ones most supportive of policy reform, in particular given concerns that poor 
enforcement allows worse performers leeway. This leeway, if it results in 
environmental or safety incidents, comes to reflects badly on the mining sector as a 
whole. The divergence in interests – between firms that can easily meet higher 
compliance requirements and firms for which reform is associated with significant 
costs – becomes a barrier to reform. 
Second, there is a question about how much can be achieved through 
consultations between mining companies and regulatory agencies given certain 
features of Zambia’s institutional framework. These include capacity constraints, 
political intervention and overlapping mandates of the ECZ and MSD that increase 
the burden of reporting for companies and complicates regulatory relations (see 
discussion of the Environmental Protection Fund above). Moreover, the fact that 
regulatory standards are non-uniform (as shaped by firm-specific negotiated 
standards) and to some degree stabilised by DAs makes it more difficult to reach 
consensus around reform proposals. 
Within the area of labour relations formal practices do not appear to vary 
much across firms, but informal practices do. Chinese expatriates in Zambia have 
remained relatively segregated from local communities as well as in relation to 
Zambian staff: a prominent organisational feature of NFCA was the limited 
interaction between Chinese and Zambian administrative staff (see section 6.3.6). 
I found that a labour-related concern that cut across the sector was the use of 
contractors in firms’ many non-core activities. My interview data suggests that 
between a third and half of employees on a typical mine site will not be employed 
directly by the mine, but rather by contractor firms. Terms and conditions are 
Sinkamba at Citizens for a Better Environment argues that stability clauses in DAs hamper 
environmental regulatory reform: “[e]ven if we made those regulations, look at the DAs … no new 




generally lower for these workers and mining companies’ influence on wages and 
benefits of these workers is limited. 
The formal requirement common to all mines – through a standard contractual 
clause that “Zambian labour regulations must be met” (FQML mgr 1, 11.10.07) – 
holds limited significance in the context of weak enforcement of labour laws. 
However, there is some evidence that firms’ already-in-place routines and practices, 
in the area of safety in particular, do ‘trickle down’ to the contractors and become de 
facto ‘regulations’ for these contractor companies. 
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7 The mining sector and local economic linkages 
7.1 Introduction 
The fiscal and regulatory policy frameworks discussed in preceding chapters present a 
range of public policy issues that must be placed in the context of mining companies’ 
value chains. This chapter aims to do so by exploring the role of local small-to­
medium size traders and manufacturers that provide goods and services to the 
Zambian mining sector. It is to some degree subsidiary to other empirical chapters, 
and included to illustrate how these issues are interlinked. For instance, there are 
particular environmental, health and safety issues associated with sub-contractors (as 
indicated in the previous chapter) as well as ore procurement from small-scale 
informal mines. Moreover, understanding companies’ value chains and supplier 
practices is important because the regulatory frameworks discussed in preceding 
chapters can be subverted through sub-contracting. 
This chapter comprises four parts. It first presents the context and relevance of 
economic linkages between the mining sector and the local economy, and why this is 
an important topic of study. It then explores the organisational routines and aims of 
companies in an attempt to identify and explain how supplier practices vary across 
firms. In doing so I pay special attention to the ways in which a firm’s institutional 
background and external relations (with home-country parent companies etc.) affect 
their supplier practices. I proceed to look at how these markets develop over time and 
how firms bargain with suppliers, as well as the role of social networks in this 
process. The final section summarises and concludes the chapter. 
Some disclaimers are in order. This chapter does not explicitly treat the role of 
employment and economic multiplier effects of mineworkers’ salaries. It does not 
discuss trade policy and the impacts of varying tariff rates on the inputs procured by 
mining companies. Nor does it cover the way in which organisational routines and 
aims shape labour standards of contractors (firms supplying the mines with labour-
intensive services), given the treatment of this issue in the preceding chapter. 
7.2 Context and relevance 
During the 1970s and 1980s Zambia followed import-substitution policies with heavy 
protection for the manufacturing sector. In this period Ndola on the Copperbelt 
became Zambia’s manufacturing hub and included operations by multinationals such 
as Dunlop, Johnson & Johnson and Colgate-Palmolive (H.Gatchell, 8.10.07). 
However, the sector failed to remain competitive after liberalisation in the 1990s, and 
many industries closed down.330 
Hopes for a revival were set with the privatisation of the mines in the late 
1990s. Large-scale mining has the potential to have a positive impact on local 
economic development because of the demand it generates for a wide variety of goods 
330 One respondent, a veteran of business in Zambia, reflects that “[i]ndustries were highly protected, 
there was no competition, the only way to survive was to get foreign exchange to buy the raw materials 
for your inputs, and once you had that you could actually demand whatever price you wanted … And a 
lot of industries were set up that quite frankly should never have been set up. We used to assemble 
motor cars, we’d assemble 10-12 cars per month, huge overheads but no economies of scale, so their 




and services. This effect could be significant on the Copperbelt, where the economy is 
highly dependent on the mining sector as providing a market for goods and services 
(Ahmad & Walker 2005) and where alternative livelihoods are limited (CEMP 2005: 
61).331 
However the impact of new mine owners on local private sector development 
has fallen below expectations. Low competitiveness of local suppliers (in terms of 
cost, quality and reliability) has played a part in this, leading mining companies to 
look abroad for their inputs. However, as I argue in this chapter, there are significant 
variations across the foreign mining companies in how they engage with local 
suppliers: mining companies have varying organisational routines and objectives that 
shape their interaction with local economic actors. This chapter discusses linkages 
between foreign mining companies and three types of local economic actors: ‘general’ 
suppliers of goods and services, contractors providing specific services such as civil 
works, excavation etc., and suppliers of copper ore. 
The ‘general’ supplier sector is highly fragmented, including suppliers of big 
and small, standardised and non-standardised, high- and low-tech inputs to mining 
operations. KCM and MCM, the largest mines on the Copperbelt, had about 3,000 
registered suppliers each. The smaller mines, including Bwana Mkubwa (FQML’s 
operations outside Ndola), NFCA and CM have around 500, 300, and 1,000 registered 
suppliers, respectively. Salim Mirza, an established supplier based in Ndola, reckons 
he has “several hundred” competitors “supplying spares and engineering” (Mirza, 
8.10.07). 
Contractors are a second type of actor, providing services within the mine 
plant area such as installations, light engineering works etc. The mines outsource a 
growing share of their non-core activities to such contractors, in particular during 
development phases of new mining operations. Contractor firms and their employees 
are thus prominent features on mine sites, and may comprise between half (e.g. 
MCM) and a third (e.g. KCM) of the employees working within plant areas. Many 
small local businesses migrate from being general suppliers to being contractors. One 
veteran supplier estimates that “75% of the people doing contractor work are former 
general suppliers”, i.e. people who used to supply “stationary and nuts and bolts” 
(Malema, 13.11.07). 
Suppliers of ore are a third type of actor. High copper prices have resulted in a 
surge in unlicensed and small-scale mining, with many people involved in sourcing 
and trading copper ore. Most of the copper ore that is extracted by small-scale and 
artisanal miners is treated within Zambia, mainly at the foreign mining companies 
with excess refinery capacity.332 In 2007 these were KCM (with it’s Nkana smelter), 
MCM (Mufulira smelter) and Bwana Mkubwa/FQML (with its refinery outside 
Ndola).333 These companies all have an interest in running their refinery operations at 
maximum capacity, and procure so-called “third-party ore” to ‘top up’ the supply of 
ore from own sources (Dudhia, 15.8.07). The procurement of third-party ore is often 
through traders, consolidators etc., and sources include small-scale mines as well as 
old waste dumps at disused mine-sites. The livelihoods of those engaged in this 
business are highly sensitive to fluctuations in the London Metals Exchange (LME) 
331 This concern led the CEMP report to identify “creation of economic opportunities” as a key socio­
economic concern on the Copperbelt following privatisation (CEMP 2005: 61). 
332 Low-grade ore (constituting most of that which is found in Zambia) is always processed inside the 
country (Mwamulima, 30.10.07). 
333 At the time of fieldwork the CCS was under construction and upon commissioning in 2008 was 
poised to expand the domestic market for copper ore. 
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price of copper that serves as a benchmark throughout the copper value chain, from 
ore to finished cathodes (Ibid.). 
To give an idea of the potential significance of mining companies’ 
procurement on the local economy, of $219m worth of contracts awarded to suppliers 
by KCM in the first quarter of 2007, $146m (67%) was given to locally registered 
suppliers (Ministry of Mines 2007). At an annualised rate, this is c.$600m. Gerry 
Nordoff at CM explains that production inputs procured from locally registered 
suppliers in the year to June 2006 were $125m.334 Based on these figures, I estimated 
the total value of contracts given to local suppliers by mines on the Copperbelt as 
being $1.5-2.0bn in 2006. However these are transfers to locally registered suppliers, 
many of which will be representatives of international firms that generate little-to-no 
value addition within Zambia’s borders. I discuss this issue in further detail below. 
7.3 Organisational routines and objectives 
This section discusses the organisational routines and objectives that I found useful in 
explaining variations across mining companies’ supplier practices, including: cost-
minimisation, predictability-seeking, the choice between local and international 
procurement, organisational structure, security systems, ore procurement, and norms 
of business practice. I try to bring out the importance of these organisational features 
for a firm’s relationships with policy makers and wider stakeholders 
The issues discussed in these sub-sections are interdependent. For instance, 
firms that prioritise cost-minimisation were also likely to procure a greater share of 
inputs from abroad. At times objectives (e.g. of increasing reliability) are clearly 
reflected in routines (e.g. automated procurement systems), at other times they are 
not. 
7.3.1 The objective of minimising costs 
Operating inputs constitute a large share of the costs of operating a modern mine. Old 
infrastructure (as discussed in chapters five and six) adds to the cost of mines in 
Zambia, as does the inflation in input costs (due to, for instance, higher oil prices – 
see FQML mgr 1, 6.11.07; Bangur 29.11.07).335 Among the mines surveyed, the 
organisational objective of minimising costs was particularly evident at KCM and 
NFCA, yet manifested itself in different ways at these two mining companies. I begin 
with discussing the case of KCM at some length, followed by a briefer account of 
NFCA before commenting on other companies in my sample. 
Many of the suppliers I spoke to viewed KCM as very cost-sensitive, and 
often saw these practices as having come with the new Indian owners. This was one 
marked change compared to when KCM was owned by AngloAmerican: the Vice-
President of HR explains how after years of underinvestment by ZCCM, 
AngloAmerican “came in and they were well capitalised, and the guys loved it, they 
334 This figures excludes energy ($25m) and concentrates sourced from sister company LCM ($40m). 
335 At the time of field work in 2007, operating costs had gone up significantly since 2005. One of my 
respondents notes that “[b]ecause of energy prices, steel prices, there is actually quite a significantly 
inflation for the mining industry” (FQML mgr 1, 6.11.07). He adds that high oil-prices have had 
knock-on effects on many inputs, including lubricants (a “significant” cost for many mines). The CFO 
of CM agrees that costs have gone up significantly, that “[i]t used to be $90c [per pound], now it is $2, 
ask any company except Kansanshi which only have an open pit … the prices drops to $4500/tonne, 
you’re in trouble” (Bangur, 29.11.07). 
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said look at these guys, we ask for something, and they buy it. Now when our 
colleagues [Vedanta] came in, always negotiations tough, tough, tough” (12.10.07). 
Grant Gatchell, an entrepreneur with many years of business experience on the 
Copperbelt, reflects on how KCM has changed since Vedanta’s takeover, arguing that 
they have become “super cash sensitive … there is not very much an assessment as to 
the quality of the good or the service” (G.Gatchell, 8.10.07). Malema confirms this 
view: “[t]he only problem that KCM has is its price control … In AngloAmerican’s 
days, when they give an inquiry, they wouldn’t only do an adjudication on the price, 
but they would also look at the establishment. AngloAmerican used to be interested in 
knowing why I was expensive, [e.g.] do you have an engineer who will do things, 
they were interested in knowing what makes you cost so much, unlike KCM today. 
These guys KCM today, what they do, when you’re cheap you’re their friend.” 
(Malema, 11.10.07). 
The Vice-President of HR at KCM reflects on the new management style after 
the arrival of Vedanta, corroborating claims of KCM’s high cost-sensitivity made by 
suppliers. She notes that “[t]hese guys, after you strike a deal, they still want you to 
go and negotiate. And in the process the guy who is needing that equipment is not 
getting it” (12.10.07). One supplier argues that “[w]ith Vedanta, their bottom line was 
always cost. So if anybody came in and said we can do this cheaper, they would 
switch.” (Mwamulima, 30.10.07). He notes that now “KCM has a big problem, 
production is very bad … underground in Chililabombwe, they tried to cut down on 
costs, so they changed the contractor … he was learning the ropes as well, so they fell 
back on development.”336 According to my respondent KCM subsequently went back 
to some of the old contractors, realising that “it was a question of reliability not only 
cost” (Ibid.). 
NFCA appeared similarly cost-conscious, with one respondent describing the 
company as “want[ing] something for nothing” (Malema, 11.10.07). The objective of 
minimising costs may be linked to NFCA managers’ familiarity with Chinese product 
markets: “[n]ormally they prefer Chinese products. I think it is because of most of the 
Chinese guys cannot read English, so they prefer Chinese products. And initially 
Chinese products are cheaper than anything you can think of.” (Malema, 11.10.07). 
As noted in chapter six, high international copper prices may lead to a 
preference of spending on activities that are directly linked to production. This 
production focus, though to some extent present at all the mines, was particularly 
apparent at NFCA and its sister companies.337 As one respondent puts it, the “Chinese 
have a funny thing, they believe they have to spend directly on production. They 
calculate it on production, on their core business.” (11.10.07).338 He speculates that 
“[m]aybe it is just the policy they have on spending money… spend it on something 
that benefits production, don’t spend it until you need to.” (Ibid.). 
As with KCM, a short-term focus on minimising costs can lead to longer-term 
inefficiencies. A mid-tier supplier thus notes regarding NFCA that “[t]hey don’t want 
to prioritise value, quality, they don’t do that, that’s the biggest problem they have. 
336 Mwamulima elaborates how “[d]evelopment is supposed to be like three weeks ahead of production, 
but now production and development are happening at once. So what they’ll do is do some 
development, then do some mining, do some development, then do some mining.” (30.10.07). 
337 The company secretary at the CCS cites high copper prices as a motivation for halving the normal 
construction time from four to two years (Sun, 1.11.07). 
338 Malema illustrates with an example: “If they know that if they build a house, [and] they won’t get 
anything from it, they wont build it. But if they know that in that house there will 20 more Chinese in 
that house, and they can work in the mine, they will build that house.” 
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Everything must be cheap. And in the long run they have paid four times what they 
are looking for.” (Malema, 11.10.07). 
FQML and CM were less frequently mentioned in suppliers’ accounts of the 
mines’ cost-sensitivity. The only evidence of cost-cutting I found at CM stemmed 
from the change in ownership in 2003. Company Secretary Mwenya, notes that 
“[m]aybe if you talk to the production people, what they say was good with [previous 
shareholders Avmin] was that when the company was doing well, there were bonuses, 
which they don’t see now, and people don’t like that, because now production is high, 
prices are high, but workers are not seeing this.” (4.10.07). 
7.3.2 Procurement systems and predictability of supply 
Predictability of supply can be a big issue for the mines, and some mining 
professionals see timeliness of access to goods and services as a key objective in their 
companies’ procurement practices. 339 The routines whereby companies manage 
timely procurement, stocking and consumption of supplies also varied between the 
mines. 
For instance, NFCA does not appear to be prioritising predictable stocking of 
supplies and spares: Malema observes that NFCA has “a funny way of working, they 
somehow live hand-to-mouth … They don’t have a stocking [system], you know 
warehousing system like KCM and MCM, where if something breaks down they have 
something to follow. To make sure you stock something of the product. The Chinese 
don’t do that. They say how many boxes do we need today? 10? Ok we’ll buy again 
when it finishes. They are very careful with their costs.” (Malema, 11.10.07). He 
speculates that NFCA may be unwilling to tie up working capital by keeping many 
supplies in stock, because of inexperience with storing (Ibid., 13.11.07). 340 
Alternatively, he suggests it could be a conscious policy of control, to reduce 
pilfering. 
At CM, on the other hand, managers stress the importance of reliability of 
supply. Reflecting on the choice between direct imports and sourcing through 
Zambian agents, the CM Procurement and Materials Manager argues that “[t]he 
advantage of dealing with somebody locally is that they would hold inventory … and 
therefore the lead time would be less.” (10.10.07).341 He claims that Zambian agents 
(for international manufacturers) typically hold some inventory and have some 
technical expertise “so if there is a problem in the plant, those guys will come and fix 
it.” (Ibid.). 
339 The Company Secretary at the CCS notes: “The problem we have is with the power, in negotiations 
with ZESCO, it should take three weeks and we got it after five months, so we had to use diesel 
generators,” adding that “[a]nother problem is shortage of cement.” (Sun, 1.11.07). 
340 Malema speculates that “[t]hese are government companies, maybe that is why they are not so 
professional.” Similar comments were made regarding NFCA’s ‘sister companies’: Edward 
Mwamulima, a supplier to Sino Metals, argues that “[i]t is a very simple operation. One Chinese who 
used to work for Bolo, he says the management [at Sino Metals] are not that scientific … [that] the 
Deputy CEO of Sino Metals … doesn’t know anything, but he has been a very loyal person, with the 
party and everything, and as a reward they send him to Africa.” He further observes that management 
practices regarding supplies seem inefficient: “I’ll give you an example: at Sino Metals, the crusher, the 
bore mill, broke down. They had to fly in a bore mill from China, they didn’t have spares for the bore 
mill. That is how disorganised they are.” (30.10.07). 
341 KCM’s “business support programme” is specifically designed to lower inventory costs for 
suppliers (Kharkar, 27.11.07). 
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In contrast to NFCA’s procurement systems, those of CM seem highly 
formalised. They include an automatised IT system that assesses and generates orders 
for spare parts, as dictated by consumption (Nordoff, 10.10.7).342 The company also 
routinely visits suppliers: “Before we register a supplier, obviously he has to make 
submissions based on documentary criteria which we lay down. Then we visit … 
more often than not my senior buyer, or one of the buyers, who visits and does an 
assessment. We found that the assessments in the past were not done as well as they 
should have been, we were dealing with a lot of what we would call briefcase 
companies … He would wait for the order to come through and then order from South 
Africa, which has no value whatsoever.” (Nordoff, 10.10.07). 
7.3.3 The choice between international and local procurement 
Mining companies’ choices of international vs. local suppliers have clear implications 
for local economic development. However as the Director of the Kitwe Chamber of 
Commerce observes, the mix between local manufactures and imports through 
Zambian-registered agents is difficult to ascertain (Kapungulya, 17.10.07). A 
procurement manager at CM confirms that “a lot of” the manufactured inputs “[come] 
from Zambia, but through agents, who are importing from South Africa … So on 
paper you can say we are buying from Zambian companies, but the manufacturing 
source is outside of Zambia.” (Nordoff, 10.10.07).343 He estimates that 40% of the 
manufactures bought by CM are direct imports, 50% come in through agents or 
traders, and that 10% is manufactured locally. 
There is a general lack of transparency around the true impact of mining 
companies’ procurement. Kapungulya explains that “normally MCM says that 75% is 
given to Zambian companies, and doesn’t give more information.” (17.10.07). He 
acknowledges that nobody really knows this mix except the mines themselves, and 
speculates that “[t]he percentage which is Zambia-manufactured is maybe 10-15%.” 
(Ibid.). Malema similarly estimates that around 10-20% of the value of mines’ supply 
procurement is captured by Zambian nationals: “[W]hat we supply is the one-off, the 
small things. It is things that they are feeling too lazy to get from South Africa.” 
(Malema, 13.11.07). 
Given high expectations that mining companies contribute to local 
development, several mines came to realise the importance of the local supplier 
sector. Grant Gatchell thinks that, after privatisation, “[s]ome mine owners … some 
faster than others, realised that it wasn’t good from a long term point of view, and that 
they needed to try to embrace local suppliers, or at least accommodate them.” 
(G.Gatchell, 8.10.07). 
However, Zambian suppliers appear to have been less successful with KCM 
and NFCA because of these companies’ supply chain linkages with home countries. 
In the case of NFCA, the parent company procures on their behalf (Steven Banda says 
“we pay a lot to CNMC, I tell you … [supplies] are coordinated to CNMC, then 
CNMC does the buying for NFCA” (S.Banda, 2.10.07). One veteran supplier argues 
342 My respondent explains that “whenever consumption takes place, our inventory reduces in the 
system, and once our coverage – which is combination of inventory and what is on order – falls below 
a pre-defined level, the system generates a requisition for our stores.” (Nordoff, 10.10.07). 
343 Grant Gatchell confirms that most suppliers to the mines are traders, not manufacturers: “Things 
provided by guys purporting to be ‘local suppliers’ are usually things that have been imported and held 
in stock for a couple of weeks. There is very little that we manufacture … Zambia doesn’t manufacture 
compressors, we don’t manufacture valve-heads.” (26.11.07). 
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that new mining companies come in with supply chains already in place, so that 
“when they come here … they bring them in. They ask can you do this, can you do 
that. Because they know those companies. The only problem is that they just import 
it, they don’t bring that idea so that the Zambians can learn to do the job” (Malema, 
11.10.07). 
In the case of KCM, home market supply linkages influence local procurement 
in a less overt way: respondents noted that when buying locally KCM will benchmark 
procurement rates against equivalent costs in the Indian market, which they know 
well (Kharkar, 27.11.07).344 Grant Gatchell also relates the greater use of international 
suppliers at KCM to a strategy of minimising costs: “I think KCM is basically looking 
for price, for people who are doing that it means looking to either China or India. And 
for people who are of that origin, it may be easier for them to get a hold of someone in 
India who can supply what they need for the mines” (Gatchell, 26.11.07). He adds 
that Indian and Chinese companies therefore may have an inherent advantage since 
“for a European or a Zambia-based business, that has historically looked to South 
Africa, which is a naturally more expensive market, it may be more difficult to create 
the linkage with India or China” (Ibid.).345 
There is evidence that KCM’s procurement practices of prioritising home-
country markets may reduce financial flexibility. “I was talking to someone 
yesterday,” Malema notes, “he is [a] very senior person in procurement in KCM. He 
said it is very bad what these Indian’s are doing. He said he might get a quote from 
SA, $218 to buy a relay. And the Indians, the bosses, the Vedanta officials, they say it 
is two much, it is better you phone India, where it turned out to be $180. So they say, 
because of the transport costs, buy 10, so you can compensate. They want to make a 
profit buying from India.” (Malema, 13.11.07). My respondent argues that this results 
in tying up of working capital through over-stocking of spares, thus reducing the 
financial flexibility of the company.346 
The Director of the Mines Supplier and Contractor Association of Zambia 
(MSCAZ) complains that NFCA still procures very little of its inputs locally and is 
not responding to the “instrument of dialogue” (F.Banda, 2.11.07). He explains that 
NFCA has two supplier registries, “one shows all the business they are doing with 
local Zambians, which is very good … But they also have another registry of items 
that they import directly, they won’t show you that.” (Ibid.).347 The possibility of dual 
supplier registries at NFCA is corroborated by evidence of parallel accounting 
systems at the company (see section 5.3.3). 
344 Some respondents indicated that they may accept a bid by a Zambian supplier, and then – once the 
supplier has acquired and stocked the items – turn around and introduce an India-derived benchmark. 
345 Moreover, linkages with Indian suppliers may be leveraged through local Indian networks: Grant 
Gatchell argues that “suddenly you see a lot of Indian companies are now really taking off before they 
wouldn’t get looked at before”. He thinks this is “because they act as intermediaries, they know 
somebody who knows somebody who can get two tonnes of welding rods from Hyderabad”. Malema 
confirms this, saying that “[i]n the AngloAmerican days we never used to have Indians that were doing 
supplies, except from the ones based in Chingola. You know Indians are usually known to be shop 
keepers. All the big guys that are owning shops in town, they are now supplying, you find them having 
hiring companies, trucks … Because it is just like the Chinese, that’s how they are. They look after 
each other.” (Malema, 11.10.07). 
346 During times of high copper prices and expansion such inefficiencies are likely to matter less, and it 
may be easier to prioritise procurement through own social networks. 
347 He asks, “what can I do when I go there and they tell me they are buying from Zambia and they 
show me figures? But they don’t show me everything. What we do is we have our own ways of finding 
out, and we know that they have two registries there, at the Chinese company.” (F.Banda, 2.11.07). 
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Limited international experience and language problems of expatriate 
managers were also raised by Steven Banda at NFCA as issues shaping the firms 
procurement practices, including the choice between Chinese and other suppliers. He 
argues that “[m]ost of the Chinese I can tell you the truth, they are not educated, they 
are not … You’ll find they say ‘this one is a buyer’, he is heading the Buying 
Department, he cannot even make an international order. They only can do it if the 
order is from China, because they can write in Chinese. Zambians have to come in, 
always we have to come in, the only thing that is done by Chinese management is the 
signature.” (S.Banda, 8.9.07). 
7.3.4 Security systems 
Mining companies have to routinely deal with a range of challenges to the integrity of 
their procurement systems. The procurement manager at CM argues that the potential 
for corruption in procurement systems is particularly great “where it is an emergency, 
where the plant could be shut down … and we need this or that part within a couple of 
hours. [T]hose things can be manipulated between the user, the person who actually 
needs the item, and the buyer … being in this business for many many years, I’m 
aware of some of the tricks that people get up to.” (10.10.07). All mining companies 
appear to be subject to such risks: the Director of a medium-sized minerals trader tells 
med he “know[s] for a fact that KCM was stung … I know CM has lost money on 
that, and MCM has been in a big fix.” (Chakera, 8.11.07).348 
Mining companies have developed routines and practices in response to these 
challenges. They include improvements to internal systems, for instance the 
installation of systems such as MCM’s Quadrem (a third-party web-based industrial 
procurement system), widely seen as an attempt to improve security in procurement 
practices. Sector-wide collaborations include a group of mines (KCM, MCM, 
Chambishi Metals and First Quantum) coordinating their efforts to improve security 
systems and reduce theft and corruption (FQML mgr 4, 22.11.07). The CM group 
procurement manager observes that “in terms of our supplier registration we are now 
a lot more rigid than we used to be” (10.10.07). 
The Chinese are not involved in this form of intra-industry learning, increasing 
the exposure of NFCA to corruption and efficiency-reducing informality in its 
procurement practices. However, NFCA may be somewhat insulated from such 
impacts to the extent that it procures a smaller share of inputs locally, and holds less 
stock compared to other mines (see 7.3.2). Indeed, Malema thinks that NFCA’s just-
in-time procurement strategy of not keeping much stock may be a good system from a 
security point of view, because it reduces the risk of pilfering: “you cannot get rid of 
it, you can only reduce it. So NFCA noticed that a good way to reduce pilfering is to 
not have high stock supplies … an employee won’t steal from the bank, but he can 
steal from the storage.” (Malema, 13.11.07). 
Finally, I found indications that the copper boom was leading to some 
complacency among managers, resulting in less control over corruption. A manager at 
FQML acknowledges that when prices are high, there is less pressure to address 
security issues among all stakeholders. This applies “as much for the GRZ as well as 
expats, locals, and what not, nobody wants to participate in it … it is a bit touchy, it is 
like talking about religion and politics.” (FQML mgr 3, 22.11.07). 
348 A compromised procurement system is rumoured to have led to a loss at MCM of around $20m in 
2005, in a case of ‘supplying air’: capital equipment was delivered, paid for, and subsequently 
clandestinely removed for the firm to buy back a second time. 
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7.3.5 Ore procurement 
This sub-section discusses the routines associated with procurement of third-party ore. 
It first points to the organisational objective of running refinery operations at full 
capacity, thus creating demand for third-party ore. It then comments on the high level 
of supply at the height of the copper boom, driven by high international copper prices. 
Finally, I show that although mining companies do have routines in place to avoid 
sourcing illegally mined ore, these routines are easily circumvented. 
A veteran supplier, who has worked with all the large mines on the 
Copperbelt, describes ore trading as “the most crooked business … it is [the] one 
business which is not genuine.” (Malema, 11.10.07).349 At FQML one manager states 
that “[w]e get a lot of ore stolen” (11.10.07) and at Sharma Brothers, Director Mohsin 
Chakera (who practiced law in Australia as well as Tanzania) laments that “[w]e find 
it very difficult to rely on the integrity of the artisanal miners, and also other 
suppliers. The whole work environment is defensive you work on the basis that the 
supplier is out there to cheat you.” (8.11.07). A security manager at FQML in Ndola 
thinks that the GRZ is unaware of the scale of security issues surrounding trade in ore, 
and how much revenue the Zambian authorities are losing (FQML mgr 4, 
26.11.07).350 
Mining company respondents generally argued that they avoided buying ore 
from unlicensed mines in as far as possible, given the criminal and health-and-safety 
issues associated with illegal mining. At FQML, one of my respondents explains, 
“before we buy from one of the small scale miners, we want to see the mining license, 
we normally go to inspect the site, we do everything we can to ensure that they are 
genuine.” (FQML mgr 1, 11.10.07). However non-mining company respondents 
suggest that this kind of verification can be easily circumvented, enabling people who 
obtain low-grade ore – legally or illegally – to market it to the companies that have 
leach-plants (MCM, KCM and Bwana Mkubwa).351 
It appears that a significant share of firms’ purchases of so-called “foreign 
ore” comes from informal sources, and informal ore easily takes on an “aura of 
formality” (Chakera, 26.11.07; also Mwamulima, 30.10.07). 352 There are several 
349 My respondent exemplifies: “The guys will bring [ore with] 1% [copper content], they tell the guy 
at the lab just write 10%, I’ll give you 2%. For ore, and also concentrates. They go to the weighbridge, 
I’ve only got 20 tonnes I want you to write 40 tonnes, or to say I have brought four trucks. They go and 
dump next to the person who’s dumped a lot.” (Malema, 11.10.07). 
350 FQML was in the process of building an internal database for use as an advocacy tool, “so we can 
tell [government] ‘this year you have lost $100m in revenue’ … if we can tap into important sources of 
information, such as the Office of the President, or the Auditor General’s Office, or the Ministry of 
Mines, and the Minister himself – because I don’t think anybody has ever told them the scale of it all” 
(FQML mgr 4, 26.11.07). My respondent recognises the capacity constraints on government agencies: 
“I’m not saying they are not serious, they just don’t have time. There is just too much of it.” (Ibid.). 
351 At the time of research, there were many small-scale Chinese smelters popping up across the 
Copperbelt, however according to several respondents these operate using simpler ‘blister’ technology, 
which cannot take low-grade ore (Mwamulima, 30.10.07). Rather, these companies – most of which 
exited in the second half of 2008 following sharp falls in copper prices (Walgaard, 7.3.09) – tended to 
rely on higher-grade ore originating in the DRC. 
352 Mwamulima says “I can tell you one thing, everyone that supplies to these guys doesn’t have a 
mine. One, it is too expensive. They probably get all the material from old ZCCM dumps. That is 
where all the material comes from. They may have their own license, but they don’t have a mine … I’ll 
give you an example, the biggest supplier to KCM, he’s a friend of mine, and he supplies something 
like 2,000 [tonnes] per month. But he also gets from others.” (30.10.07). 
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reasons for this. First, there is ample supply due to many old disused mine sites 
around the area. The efficiency of copper extraction technologies has improved 
significantly, and many of the old waste dumps contain sufficient copper to make ‘re’­
processing economically attractive (Mwamulima, 30.10.07). 
Second, overlapping licenses promotes illegal mining (see Times of Zambia 
15.6.2007). The GRZ is complicit in this, as the Ministry of Mines giving out 
overlapping licenses promotes illegal mining. As an environmental manager explains 
“GRZ calls KCM saying ‘what is it you are doing, you are causing political 
instability!’ We have started a serious dialogue with GRZ, because one of the things 
Ministry of Mines was doing was issuing licenses on existing property.” (12.10.07). 
My respondent believes this is due to corruption rather than disorganisation at the 
Ministry of Mines. 
Third, it is relatively easy to obtain the necessary documentation, and mining 
company respondents indicated that it was not possible to thoroughly investigate (“all 
we can do is go to visit”).353 There are also people who act as consolidators, what 
Chakera refers to as “sponges”, who acquire smaller supplies of ore from artisanal 
miners until they reach the 30 tonnes or so needed for a delivery to the big mines. 
7.4 Market development and interaction 
This section discusses the environment in which suppliers to the mines operate, 
including market structure, processes of firm-supplier bargaining, and the role of 
social networks. It then assesses the institutional environment in which this 
interaction takes place, including transaction costs, property rights and relevant 
government policy. 
7.4.1 Market structure and bargaining 
Most local suppliers in Zambia’s copper sector are small and fragmented. The mines, 
on the other hand, are few and large, with purchasing decisions traditionally 
concentrated in the hands of a few ‘buyers’ within each company.354 Large mining 
companies may have thousands of registered suppliers, often with weakly 
differentiated products, who are always afraid to be ‘cut off’ (see figures in section 
7.2). The monopsonistic market structure means that mining companies can bargain 
‘hard’ with suppliers in their efforts to minimise costs (see 7.3.1). 
I found KCM to be (in)famous for ‘asking for a discount on the discount’, i.e. 
agreeing payment terms and then seeking to pressure suppliers for further reductions 
in price. Small-scale entrepreneur Kamoto shrugs: “[y]ou resign yourself to the fact 
that your profit margins will be less. You cannot just write them off, because if you’re 
supplying to the mining industry, they are basically the largest company.” (27.8.07). 
He recognises that “[s]ome of these pressures is because in the beginning, some of the 
profits being made were abnormal, it wasn’t strange seeing people make 4-500% 
profit on a deal.” (Ibid.). 
353 It remains to be seen whether CCS will indeed provide such a ready market for ore, as several 
respondents suspected. 
354 
“The buying department is the most prestigious department in any of the mines. You can go to any 
department, but when you go to buying, you feel it… They don’t even bother much, when you come, 
they are not even friendly, service minded, when you go there. The guy just sits there and looks at you 
… He knows he is in the right place” (Malema, 11.10.07). 
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Interviewees’ describe supplier bargaining as taking place through a two-stage 
process, where a formal tender is followed by informal negotiation. The first (formal) 
stage is the selection of companies from whom to solicit tenders. For larger items or 
contracts, the mines solicit tenders through advertisements in the daily newspapers. 
For many of the smaller items with less asset-specificity – where local suppliers may 
have a greater relative advantage – the process is different, and highly path-
dependent: companies usually send solicitations to between four and six of companies 
that have successfully supplied in the past. 
Respondents suggest that the above process is often followed by a second 
(informal) stage of bargaining, where the buyer at the mining company tells less 
uncompetitive bidders ‘how to win’. This may include improving one’s price (and 
bidding just under the previously most competitive bidder) or improving contractual 
terms in other ways (e.g. delivery times). The buyer expects something in return for 
this information, and for many contracts the way to win includes offering a bribe to 
the buyer (and possibly their boss). These bribes raise costs for the firm and take the 
form of “kick-backs” or “marketing fees”, whereby 10-20% of the value of the 
contract is paid (in cash or in kind) to the buyer in return for the award of the 
355 contract.
This overlap of formal and informal institutions resonates with the literature 
reviewed in chapter two regarding African institutional environments as systems of 
formal rules superimposed over highly resilient social norms and practices (Bangura 
1994; Bratton & van de Walle 1997; Dia 1996). Competition among suppliers thus 
takes two forms: by fulfilling formal requirements (providing a timely good or 
service, holding stock, having agency-ships, having a low-cost advantage), and by 
satisfying informal demands (i.e. having personal relationships, willingness to pay 
‘marketing fees’). The latter assures that the supplier is included in the solicitation of 
bids, and that he/she stays informed of ‘how to win’. 
The organisational objective of minimising costs is clearly evident in KCM’s 
bargaining with suppliers. Masupha describes how Vedanta, after taking over KCM, 
“fell out of favour with suppliers, who were complaining, AngloAmerican gave us so 
much business, you strike a deal, and that was it.” (Masupha, 12.10.07). This 
experience was common among independent suppliers to KCM. 356 One supplier 
recalls how “we wanted to supply them mining services … and we tendered for it and 
they asked for a huge discount of the tender.” (Dudhia, 15.8.07). Walgaard at clearing 
agent CML had a similar experience in negotiating with KCM, “their tender last year 
was the same thing, they closed it. We won it, they said you won the tender, these are 
the rates … We looked and said ‘those are not our rates’” (Walgaard, 30.8.07). 
355 As one supplier notes, “even if you are the best supplier, if there is not enough in it for the buyer, 
they will simply lose your quotation, tear it up” (Ngolwe, 14.9.07). 
356 For instance, Grant Gatchell tells of how “[w]hen Vedanta came in, they were watching the money 
very tightly, even on occasion penny wise pound foolish. One anecdote was KCM telling someone to 
bring in some pipes, some deep-hole, high pressure pipes, and the guy said this is my price 100. The 
KCM buyers took them down to 70. When they were delivered to site, KCM said ‘we don’t need them 
anymore’. This was a significant order, the guy took them back, then KCM said we need them, please 
deliver, but we can only pay x [less than 70] because this is what we can get them for in India. The guy 
said “stuff you” … a month later the guy was sitting on the stock, and they had a major pipe burst 
underground, suddenly they had flooding and all sorts of very serious problems. KCM said please 
deliver at your original price. And he said, you can have them at 150, and we’re taking cash before you 
can take them off our premises.” (Gatchell, 26.11.07). He adds that he “meet[s] people and ask[s] them 
who are you here to see, they say ‘everybody except KCM’.” (Ibid.). 
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7.4.2 Social networks 
Informal social networks are prominent on the Copperbelt and contribute significantly 
to difficulties in stamping out corruption in supplier practices. Sergio Bettega, 
proprietor of a medium-sized engineering company in Zambia since the early 1970s, 
thinks that many miners laid off during privatisation moved into supplies: “[a]ll the 
old miners, this is what I think, they know the systems with the mine. They are all 
middlemen, they are all trying to get something out of it. So they can supply. They 
know, if we need that machine part, me I know where I can get that.” (20.8.07; also 
Nordoff, 4.10.07).357 
These social networks exert a lasting impact on the integrity of procurement 
systems (see 7.3.2 and 7.3.4). People often figure out the new systems, largely 
because of buyers spreading such news to somebody they know, who may spread this 
information further (Malema, 11.10.07). Chakera says he “know[s] MCM is going 
through an exercise to plug the hole … [but] you plug the hole for three months, then 
it starts again you see…” (8.11.07). Poor conditions of service also play a role: my 
respondent reports that a senior chemist earns K3m, or $8-900 per month, “[a]nd if he 
suddenly is offered K1m, around $300, it is not a lot of money, but it is tempting.” 
(Chakera, 8.11.07). 
In response, mining company procurement departments generally move 
people around once in a while, but networks are so persistent that it sometimes 
requires more forceful action. Nordoff recalls how he in 2004 “basically decimated 
the LCM purchasing department, I got rid of the whole lot, 197 people … LCM had 
just been taken over by J&W … Small town, lots of suppliers, it was a situation that 
was very unhealthy, let me put it that way. So this was the only way one could be 
reasonably satisfied that things in the future would go well”. (Nordoff, 10.10.07).358 
The social networks on the Copperbelt can also explain why KCM’s strategy 
of minimising costs by asking for “a discount on the discount” does not confer any 
sustainable benefits for the company. As the Operations Manager at the Copperbelt 
Energy Corporation puts it, “because everybody gets to know that [with KCM] you 
have a second chance … other mines, like MCM, will say … we’ll keep the integrity 
of our tender system by sending a strong signal out there that if your price is low, you 
have very good chance of supplying. So there is a difference in culture.” (Lwiindi, 
31.8.07). 
7.4.3 Institutional environment 
This sub-section discusses the institutional features of the environment in which small 
Zambian businesses find themselves. These features include transaction costs, 
property rights, and the role of Zambian government policy. 
357 This is not to say that corruption and rent-seeking are new phenomena: Grant Gatchell believes that 
many suppliers to the former ZCCM became “very wealthy … whether it was done at arms length or 
not we really don’t know, but there was certainly a big shift [following privatisation], and I think it 
caused quite a lot of frustration.” (8.10.07). He believes this frustration was the basis of the formation 
of MSCAZ. 
358 Interestingly, Kapungulya at the Kitwe Chamber of Commerce reports that the practice of moving 
staff around (to increase procurement security) has negative externalities for suppliers, resulting in 
difficulties of marketing to these companies. “we are having problems to sort of interact with them. 
They’ll either change their personnel, the people you deal with today are not the ones you deal with 
next week, and the new guy doesn’t know what the other guy left off.” (17.10.07). 
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7.4.3.1 Transaction costs 
Underinvestment in Zambia’s roads and other infrastructure increases transaction 
costs for suppliers and reduces their relative competitiveness. As Grant Gatchell 
notes, “[i]f you want to move something from Livingstone [in the south of Zambia] to 
Ndola, it is cheaper to fly to Johannesburg [in South Africa] and then Ndola, rather 
than flying direct.” (26.11.07). 
The institutionalisation at some mines of third-party procurement systems also 
effects transactions costs for suppliers. For instance, the adoption of Quadrem – an 
electronic procurement system to link the mines with suppliers – was met with 
antagonism among Zambian suppliers, given the $600 fee required to register. As 
Gatchell notes, “[s]uddenly the system was put upon everyone, and everybody is 
expected to contribute and pay for it. But nobody got a say in which system is going 
to work for everyone. So the suppliers are also paying for the same thing, but had no 
say in which system was selected.” (26.11.07). 
Finally, falling transaction costs, partly due to advancements in international 
logistics, means local would-be suppliers are subject to greater competition than 
before (G.Gatchell, 26.11.07). Moreover, as international competition has increased, 
so has domestic competition: reduced international transaction costs also translate to 
more Zambians being able to procure products from abroad. This results in reduced 
margins on regular supplies. As one supplier notes, “the big money now is in ore 
supplies, more than in normal regular supplying of spares, partly because margins in 
this business have come down. So some former ‘regular’ suppliers have now moved 
into ore” (Kamoto, 27.8.07). 
7.4.3.2 Property rights protection 
Weak property rights undermine the growth of the supplier sector by disincentivising 
investment. Intellectual property rights protection appears to be weak, leading to 
temporary and ‘lumpy’ rents for suppliers. One respondent tells of how he obtained 
the product specifications of Atlas Copco compressors used by NFCA, such that he 
was able to recycle these, despite recommendations from Atlas to NFCA that 
recycling was not advisable. This cut the cost for NFCA from $7000 to $3500 per 
compressor, and “was really good, because they had a lot of them and they were just 
about to throw them in the junk. They really loved it.” (11.10.07) – see section 7.3.1. 
Soon enough, however, “another guy came from nowhere” and started doing the same 
thing so my respondent left the market. Grant Gatchell offers a similar story of how 
Vedanta, after acquiring KCM, did “things like ask people for specifications on how 
to do something, and this submission includes a significantly degree of intellectual 
property. And KCM would send the specifications out to 50 people and ask ‘how do 
you do this?’ And your intellectual property has been handed out to everyone.” 
(8.10.07). 
7.4.3.3 Government and the supplier sector 
The role of the GRZ in the supplier sector appears to be limited. The state-firm 
contracts (Development Agreements) with incoming investors included provisions for 
firms to promote local business development (see chapter four). Companies were 
required to provide a “local business development plan” and in some cases monitor 
and provide updates on this plan, but these reporting requirements appear to have 
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gone largely unenforced (Ndalama, 1.10.07). 359 Regarding ore supplies, a FQML 
manager mentioned that the firm “ask[s] for customs papers [to] make sure that 
everything is stamped properly” when procuring third-party ore, “because we need to 
show that to government to prove that we bought legitimate ore.” (22.11.07). 
However this reporting requirement was not mentioned by other respondents, 
suggesting that it is largely unenforced. 
The many policy pronouncements regarding the need to improve the ‘ease of 
doing business’ (e.g. through institutional strengthening or tax incentives for small 
business) have corresponded to little actual change for small-scale entrepreneurs. 
There is much tax evasion in the sector with companies choosing to not expand and/or 
formalise their operations in order to remain “under the radar” of the ZRA (Mirza, 
8.10.07).360 
Weaknesses in government’s processes of awarding mine licenses have 
contributed to the surge in informal mining during the copper boom. The Ministry of 
Mines’ licensing system has been lacking in transparency and efficiency, resulting in 
two effects: granting of overlapping licenses as well as politically motivated granting 
of licenses (FQML mgr 1, 5.9.07; Phiri, 12.10.07). The benefits of improving the 
cadastre system through which licenses are granted was recognised by donors who 
funded a project to digitalise the cadastre (MSDP techn. ass’t, 14.11.07; Villa-
Chacon, 14.9.07), a key component in the new mining policy developed during 2007 
(see chapter five). 
7.5 Constraints on development of the supplier sector 
The previous sections in this chapter have looked at the organisational routines and 
aims that shape company supplier practices, as well as the market and institutional 
environments in which firm-supplier relations are articulated. I now ask what this tells 
us about the constraints on further development of the supplier sector, followed by a 
discussion of what mining companies’ are doing in response to these issues. 
7.5.1 Barriers and constraints for small-scale investors 
Barriers to entry for would-be suppliers include getting registered with the mines, 
access to financing, personal networks, and skills. The first step for would-be 
suppliers is to register with the mines. Over time this has become more difficult, with 
one supplier noting that “[b]ecause they have so many, MCM now has 3,000 suppliers 
registered … they sort of closed it off ... I don’t think it’s a formal policy, but they just 
made it more difficult. Now there has to be more justification, you have to offer 
something no one else is offering … I think that is the largest barrier.” (Kamoto, 
27.8.07). 
Access to financing is limited. Many suppliers are unable to access domestic 
financial markets and resort to borrowing from friends and family. Significant funds 
359 Regarding non-ore supplies, one respondent noted that he provided figures of CM’s procurement of 
inputs in a report prepared for the Ministry of Commerce. However I was not able to ascertain whether 
this was part of statutory (i.e. obligatory) reporting or provided voluntarily (i.e. in lobbying efforts). 
However two junior Ministry of Commerce officials I later spoke to, as my time in the field was 
drawing to a close, were unable to confirm or deny this. 
360 Part of the reason relates to Zambia Revenue Authority rules where companies with less than 
K200m (approx. $50,000) per year in revenue are not required to provide data to ZRA for tax 
calculation purposes, but rather pay a fixed tax contribution. 
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are tied up in this, even if the mines pay within 30 days as per the formal contractual 
terms: “so I borrowed the money, then logistics, getting it shipped over here, I will 
have borrowed the money for 8-10 weeks before I get paid.” (Kamoto, 27.8.07). 
Financing constraints reduce the ability of suppliers to hold stock and thereby satisfy 
mining companies’ demand for predictable supplies (see 7.3.2). 
Recently domestic financial markets are becoming more favourable to 
Zambian businesses who were previously regarded as too “high-risk” (F.Banda, 
2.11.07; corroborated by Mirza, 8.10.07). However, they target mainly upper-tier and 
larger suppliers, and requirements to provide a history of accounts and invoices 
remain onerous for most. Access to funding is a key constraint for many suppliers 
who are traders rather than manufacturers: “[o]ur business … is actually measured by 
our pockets. So, if you have $2,000, and you get a $20,000 order, you won’t do it. 
Even if you know where to buy the pump…” (Malema, 13.11.07). 
Personal connections are needed to succeed in this monopolistic market, 
where suppliers compete by offering kick-backs in the form of cash, alcohol, cars and 
even houses. 361 These connections persist through the social networks on the 
Copperbelt, but depend also, to some extent, on top-management support for such 
activities: some senior managers seem to be against it (see Nordoff, 10.10.07), others 
may not care, whilst some possibly encourage it (as argued by Malema, 11.10.07). 
Gatchell argues that such practices may actually benefit local Zambian entrepreneurs 
who would otherwise not be considered due to lacking competitiveness (G.Gatchell, 
26.11.07), a view corroborated by Nordoff (10.10.07). 
A major constraint on market development for smaller firms on the Copperbelt 
is the limited availability of human capital. Grant Gatchell observes that “many of 
these businesses, like the engineering firms, were operating in the 1970s, and 
consequently have a level of infrastructure which is close to what they had then. So 
there is still room for increases in capacity in the machine shops … ample capacity to 
expand, whole banks of machines, but five operators … The shortage is in the human 
capital” (G.Gatchell, 26.11.07). Mohsin Chakera at Sharma Brothers explains his 
plans to invest in a small refinery operation, using state-of-the-art smelting 
technology, and that his firm “need[s] experienced engineers to take it from A-Z. 
We’ll have to import those people on permits. There are a few very good Zambian 
engineers, but their technique is perhaps 10-20 years old.” (8.11.07). The existing 
skill base of Zambian engineers is of limited practical relevance given the rapid 
technological evolution of the sector. 
Borensztein et al. (1998) find evidence that positive spillovers of FDI 
(discussed in chapter one) are conditional on the availability of skills for the local 
manufacturing sector to draw on. In Zambia such ‘higher-tech’ engineering, 
administrative as well as artisanal skills are all in short supply, due to increased 
competition and expansion in the mining sector (see section 4.4.5). Gatchell notes that 
this skills competition undermines local business development: “because of this 
poaching of human capital, some of the supplier companies are struggling to provide 
the services they used to be able provide.” (26.11.07). Many companies are thus 
unable to meet the mining companies’ formal aims of quality standards.362 
361 Interviews with various suppliers, Kitwe, Zambia. 
362 Grant Gatchell describes “the whole raison d’etre for [the] MSCAZ, to buy locally, it is like ‘buy 
through me and make me a little bit of a margin’, rather than importing direct. A lot of suppliers talk a 
lot about this, but to justify getting a margin you actually have to provide a service. And that service is 
the issue.” (26.11.07). 
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Finally, the increased technological sophistication of mining engineering 
equipment means that it requires specific spares, and agency-ships for such parts are 
exclusive, thus benefitting only a few individuals. As Nordoff notes, “if it is 
engineering-type spares, you are basically tied to the manufacturers agents.” 
(10.10.07). 
7.5.2 Mining company responses to supplier development issues 
Given limited access to capital, liquidity and payment practices become key factors in 
considering local suppliers’ ability to meet demand from the mines. The President of 
Kitwe Chamber of Commerce argues that the mines’ payment practices “used to be a 
problem, but it has improved. We’ve had meetings with the mines and they’ve 
explained the problems.” (Kapungulya, 17.10.07).363 One supplier confirms that the 
companies are paying on time, but that “[t]his didn’t use to be the case.” (Mirza, 
8.10.07). He attributes this to the boom in copper prices, because with “high prices, 
they need our services. So they need us and we need them.” (Ibid.). In particular 
NFCA and its sister companies were seen as generally paying on time for regular 
supplies, with one respondent noting that “the Chinese” appeared “more prepared on 
the business side … they know that when you have spot cash it is easier to negotiate.” 
(Malema, 13.11.07).364 
In 2007, the Copperbelt Small Supplier Development Programme (CSSDP) 
was being set up as a partnership between mining companies and the IFC, with the 
aim of supporting local business development. The founding members include 
Kansanshi, Bwana Mkubwa, MCM, and CM, who each contribute $50k which the 
IFC then matches (Mwanza, 31.10.07). These funds go towards a debt facility that can 
be drawn on by local businesses. It is governed by a steering committee whose 
Chairman is Frederick Bantubonse, General Manager of the CoM. Other committee 
members include the IFC, the Ministry of Commerce and ZCCM-IH. 
I did not find evidence of any similar programmes at NFCA. Vedanta, 
however, appears to increasingly recognise the socio-political significance of 
maintaining good relations with the supplier sector, following the initial criticisms 
after its takeover of KCM in 2004. KCM’s Head of Business Development, who deals 
with supplier relations development, explains that his understanding of Zambian 
business culture (after 20 years in the country) was the main reason he was brought in 
to KCM (Kharkar, 6.12.07). He explains the reason for KCM’s non-involvement in 
the CSSDP as a concern that the latter is too bureaucratic and too much of a “talking 
shop”. He claims that KCM’s own small manufacturing promotion programme as “far 
ahead” of the CSSDP. My respondent does nevertheless participate in regular CSSDP 
meetings and acknowledges the value of CSSDP as a forum, noting that “whatever is 
363 Kapungulya reminds us that limited organisational capacity also plays a role, in that “[s]ome of the 
problems arise from the suppliers themselves, like they give wrong descriptions, or deliver things to 
wrong places. Like yesterday, I was at the mines myself trying to sort out a problem, because my 
workers … instead of taking the goods to the stores, to be stamped and cleared, they just took them 
straight to the end-user instead. Now I haven’t been paid for two months, until I discovered yesterday 
that this was a problem.” (17.10.07). 
364 Interestingly, it appears that this aversion to incurring debts (payables) appears for NFCA as well as 
smaller Chinese traders that procure ore for export or refinery in small ‘back-yard’ smelters. Chakera 
comments that these small companies appear to be highly liquid, with an ability to pay cash that he 
cannot match (26.11.07). Malema notes that he “rarely see[s] the Chinese in the banks” (13.11.07). He 
speculates that the Chinese perhaps withdraw dollars even when they are not doing business, or that 
they somehow do bring in dollars from abroad (also suggested by Chakera). 
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good for the industry should be shared” (6.12.07). NFCA was, at the time of study, 
not involved in any similar initiatives. 
Fanuel Banda, Director of the MSCAZ, argues that the prominence of KCM 
on the Copperbelt means it has little choice but to adapt its practices: “[w]ith KCM 
being the largest mine, and the biggest employer at the moment, with a very big 
infrastructure, with a lot of influence on the economy on the Copperbelt, their 
decisions are more conspicuous, and they haven’t much gone into hide-and-seek 
procurement.” (2.11.07). This indicates a link between reputational concerns and the 
extent of KCM’s local procurement. 
Box 9: Chinese private investors on the Copperbelt 
Chinese small-scale investors became a prominent facet of the ore market during the copper 
boom, and served to provide a ready market for any high-grade ore (generally obtained from 
disused mine sites or the DRC). In an interview in November 2007, Mohsin Chakera, Director 
of Sharma Brothers International, noted that the competition from the Chinese had “become 
more pronounced over the last 15 months”. He argued that this competition was now 
“[l]evelling off because Zambians [were] waking up to their dishonesty” – Chakera says his 
Chinese competitors “give even higher prices than me, which cannot be sustained when you 
look at the LME, cannot be sustained by any purchaser.” He explains how an ore supplier 
might get their material tested, e.g. at 28%, but then at the Chinese traders’ own “backyard 
laboratories” they would get it tested to 23%-24%, “[s]o even if they are giving higher prices 
on paper, they will in affect pay less!” (Chakera, 8.11.07). 
Another respondent was involved in sourcing ore from disused slag dumps. He 
explained that behind the Wusakile ‘black mountain’ (on the left as you drive into Kitwe from 
Ndola), there is a vast area were people illegally collect so-called chrome, essentially waste 
from old (and inefficient) copper processing that retains a high degree of copper content. He 
notes this is “very very lucrative. Those guys steal the copper … And that is what the Chinese 
buy, and they export directly, they don’t even put it into the furnaces. They say the Chinese 
buy it for K8m ($2,000), for a tonne of this Chrome here in Zambia. This translates to $4­
5,000 for a tonne of copper, much lower than the LME [accounting for refinery costs to get 
the copper out]. They sell not less than 100 tonnes per week to the Chinese. A lot of people 
live on this.” (Mwamulima, 30.10.07).365 
According to this respondent, “[o]ne thing you realise with the Chinese, is that it is a 
lot about personal relationships. The owner of the company I supply to is the son of the 
Deputy CEO of the main group [CNMC] in China … The company I supply to is Bolo 
Mining, and then they supply to Sino Metals [one of NFCA’s sister companies] … So that is 
why he has very favourable prices, and payment terms with the company – because of his 
father.”366 He adds that they do not appear very professional – for instance the bore will at 
times break down, something he describes as “unthinkable” elsewhere. 
365 He adds: “[t]here is a compound Kandabo (on the left heading to Kalulushi from Kitwe), that was 
built on a former dump. These guys have refused to move. So families, cooperatives of women, they 
actually sell the copper to the Chinese.” 
366 Mwamulima elaborates: “Bolo Mining is only registered here. His father came here to set up NFCA, 
and when he left he told his son to come here and set up something. But unfortunately he couldn’t stay 
because he couldn’t speak English. He couldn’t interact with anyone.” 
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7.6 Conclusion 
The procurement decisions of large foreign mining companies have potentially 
significant impacts on local economic development on the Copperbelt. In part because 
of a lack of alternative livelihoods, many people are involved in supplying the mines 
with a range of goods and services, or as engineering contractors, or as suppliers of 
ore. 
Organisational routines and objectives play a big role in explaining variations 
across firms’ supplier practices. These routines and objectives highlight variations in 
how firms prioritise characteristics such as price, quality and predictability of 
supplies, and how their attitudes towards the local private sector vary. Some 
companies focus on minimising costs, others emphasise the potential benefits of lower 
lead-times, or the importance of reliability and quality. Organisational routines and 
objectives thereby shape interaction with suppliers, how orders are generated and 
handled, and by extension enabling or constraining local private sector development. 
With regard to international vs. local procurement, I found KCM and NFCA to 
have the strongest links with home-country markets. It indicates that companies that 
have internationalised more recently, and which retain significant operations in their 
home countries (and/or business contacts in these markets), are more likely to bias 
procurement towards home markets. This can provide companies from China and 
India with a lower cost base, but also makes their position in the host country 
(Zambia) more contested. 
Organisational routines and aims are often complementary, and jointly explain 
why some managers prioritise quality and predictability over cost, or vice versa. To 
illustrate, the preference for international procurement at the Chinese and Indian case 
study firms is explained by two complementary factors: existing routines (including 
language and familiarity with low-cost home-country product markets) as well as an 
organisational objective of minimising costs. 
At the same time there are processes of evolution and organisational learning 
taking place, for instance in collaboration on security as well as attempts to build 
capacity in the local manufacturing sector (e.g. the IFC-sponsored CSSDP). This is 
partly a function of the high political profile of the large mining companies, as 
evidenced by Fanuel Banda’s assertion that KCM has had no choice but to improve its 
supplier practices. 
The bargaining between mining companies and private sector suppliers can be 
described as a predominantly formal institution governing the short-listing of bidders 
to supply. This process is path dependent in the sense that requests for bids are 
typically sent out to only a handful of companies that have been successful in bidding 
for supply contracts in the past. This process if followed by an informal process where 
the buyer at the mining company feeds back to the bidders on ‘how to win’, in return 
for a ‘kick-back’ in some form. 
Social networks on the Copperbelt both enable and constrain development of 
the local supplier sector. For many smaller Zambian suppliers, the fact that business is 
obtained on the basis of personal connections may be a good thing – if local suppliers 
would otherwise not be competitive, they would not get any business at all. The social 
networks on the Copperbelt also mean that suppliers learn quickly the negotiating 
strategies of the firms. In this context any benefits of tough bargaining practices (e.g. 
KCM asking for ‘a discount on the discount’) may be short-lived and only serve to 
create resentment. On the other hand, the evidence that choices of suppliers are highly 
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path-dependent (where the suppliers that are successful today are likely to get invited 
to tender again tomorrow) means that these practices are highly exclusionary and 
inequitable. It also shows how it may be worthwhile for suppliers to invest 
considerable resources into establishing good personal relationships with buyers in the 
mines, rather than invest in their own productivity, quality etc. 
Local suppliers are subject to a range of institutional constraints that 
undermine their competitiveness (skills competition, property rights, transaction costs, 
access to funding, access to social networks). Non-government organisations have 
tried to address these issues, with organisations such as chambers of commerce and 
the MSCAZ attempting to lobby the mines to support the local supplier sector. 
However these actors appear weak in achieving their objective. The attempts of these 
actors to promote local procurement are limited to provision of market information 
(e.g. listing suppliers in different product groups) and calling for greater involvement 
of the mines in local capacity development. Lack of trust also undermines collective 
action: the MSCAZ – despite being very vocal on these issues – is alleged to be 
mainly focused on securing contracts for a select group of local businessmen 
(Malema, 11.10.07). 367 Many suppliers are thus wary of putting their (albeit 
individually small) weight behind the organisation. 
Central government does not appear to be very involved in the supplier sector 
(despite provisions in DAs relating to local business development). Regulatory 
agencies such as the ZRA and the Factories Inspectorate lack the capacity to influence 
these smaller and ‘below-the-radar’ companies. In this institutional environment – 
including limited government capacity to enforce a ‘level playing field’ – suppliers 
become highly dependent on the strategies and routines in place at mining companies. 
In particular, the monopsonistic buying power of mines (coupled with boom effects) 
means they can squeeze local suppliers of goods and services, limiting profitability, 
reinvestment, and growth in the supplier sector. 
Because of this structural dependence, suppliers’ ability to influence the large 
mining companies by exercising voice or by exiting the sector (Hirschman 1970) is 
limited. First, it is difficult for suppliers to coordinate and speak with one voice, due 
to a lack of trust in organisations such as the MSCAZ that undermines collective 
action (e.g. the MSCAZ seen as having vested interests). Second, the calls of 
suppliers can easily be ignored by mining companies with access to an ever-growing 
range of international product markets. Third, suppliers cannot easily exit the market 
because of limited alternative livelihoods. 
The organisation was founded following a conflict between KCM and a group of local suppliers 
soon after privatisation, and due to this historical relationship it continues targeting KCM. It is often 
visible in the media, e.g. expressing its “outrage” at KCM’s extension of payment terms in response to 
the financial crisis in 2009, claiming “[c]ontractors are now going up to six months without being paid. 




8 Analysis and discussion 
8.1 Introduction 
The preceding four chapters have explored a series of regulatory and market 
relationships involving foreign mining companies and the Zambian state. I grouped 
these relationships into three ‘spheres’ of tax-related policy and practice (the fiscal 
sphere), environmental, social and labour governance (the regulatory sphere), and 
economic linkages to the local supplier sector (the market). These empirical chapters 
have highlighted weaknesses in raising and collecting tax revenue, regulatory failures 
resulting from limited institutional capacity, and constraints on the mining sector’s 
potential to catalyse local private sector development. The aim of the present chapter 
is to analyse these findings, in order to identify and synthesise cross-cutting themes, 
and inform the research questions posited at the outset of this thesis. In doing so it 
draws on the literature and theoretical framework developed in chapters one and two. 
I first develop the argument that state-firm bargaining takes place through bi­
directional processes of interaction between the firm and the state, shaping both 
policy formulation as well as implementation. I emphasise the need to look at 
political, economic and social factors within the host country, as well as influences 
external to the host country (e.g. international commodity markets, capital markets, 
and inter-state relations). 
Second, I develop a critique of Zambia’s mining sector regulatory regime, 
focusing on policy in the areas of environmental, health and safety. I argue that 
Zambia’s current regulatory framework is based on notions and norms of 
‘partnership’, where the regulator is mainly charged with providing an enabling 
environment. Such a ‘partnership’ approach to regulation is ill-suited to a volatile 
policy environment (where many issues are on the negotiation ‘table’, 
simultaneously) and where the mining sector is becoming increasingly fragmented 
and diverse. Although this regulatory approach brings enforcement agencies and firms 
closer to each other, it risks alienating civil society and wider stakeholders. 
Third, I discuss the various features of organisational diversity, learning and 
convergence that I found in the Zambian mining sector. I argue that much of the 
variation in organisational behaviour identified in chapters five to seven can be 
explained with reference to firm-specific routines and aims. I provide examples of 
how organisational learning – understood as changes to these routines and aims – 
shapes regulatory (non-)compliance and what it means for the evolution of regulatory 
policy. 
Fourth, I highlight how this thesis contributes to an understanding of fast-
growing Chinese economic engagement with Africa. I begin by identifying those 
characteristics of my Chinese case study firm that I believe to be transferrable to 
Chinese overseas investment more generally. This is followed by an attempt to 
answer the question of whether China will be a good development partner to African 
states. Fifth I conclude the chapter with some methodological reflections. 
8.2 State-firm bargaining and policy evolution 
This section comprises three parts. It first discusses the processes of state-firm 
bargaining, focusing on the fiscal sphere. The second part then argues that an 
interventionist political culture enables the state to sustain, simultaneously, multiple 
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articulations of state-firm relations. Lastly I discuss market and policy influences on 
regulatory policy that are external to the host country. 
8.2.1 The processes of state-firm bargaining 
Zambia was, at the time of privatisation, facing a crisis. The country was saddled with 
external debt and suffering from a protracted slump in commodity prices. Contracts 
were given to foreign mining companies that included many incentives to ensure a 
sale, thus conditioning the state-firm ‘bargain’ at privatisation in favour of the newly 
arrived foreign investors. 
The obsolescing bargaining theory discussed in chapter two suggests that over 
time, as companies sink their costs, bargaining power shifts to the state. However 
contrary to theory, the mines in Zambia did not become ‘hostage’ to government 
policy in the post-privatisation period. Rather, they retained significant influence over 
policy, and were able to improve the regulatory terms of their investments further (see 
5.4.1). This took place through formal government-firm consultation processes as 
well as informal mechanisms. The latter included direct contact between the President 
and representatives of the mining investors, motivated through a pro-investment 
political discourse. 
The Zambian economy’s dependence on copper mining helps explain why the 
MMD, in power since 1991, in its post-liberalisation economic policy has prioritised 
providing an ‘enabling’ environment for international investment. Contractual 
stability provisions contained in the initial state-firm Development Agreements that 
greeted investors at privatisation also help explain the reluctance of the Zambian 
government to ‘clamp down’ on firms. 
Another reason why bargaining power did not shift to the state is that many 
so-called ‘sunk’ costs are in fact recoverable, as long as international capital markets 
are liquid (as was the case during the commodities boom that preceded the 2008 
financial crisis).368 The fact that companies have made significant investments does 
therefore not automatically imply that companies rescind the threat of exit (their chief 
bargaining chip with the state). If the price is right – even in a context of depressed 
copper prices – a buyer can be matched to a seller and companies will divest (as 
evidenced by frequent changes in ownership since privatisation, e.g. at CM, LCM, 
KCM, Kansanshi and the Copperbelt Energy Corporation. 
The commodity dependence of a host country might, ironically, actually make 
it easier for firms to exit. With the local economy of mining areas dominated by 
foreign-owned mines, the government would much rather take on the task of finding a 
new buyer than allowing a current owner to simply close down shop (and run the 
immediate risks of mass redundancies and social unrest). 369 In this scenario the 
Zambian government’s ‘special share’ granting veto rights in the event of change in 
368 Although expended resources that are non-recoverable (e.g. infrastructure) have no value to the 
seller, they will typically have value to the buyer, and this value will be reflected in the price paid (in 
fact, most bargaining is likely to take place around this price). 
369 In fact, a key role of ZCCM-IH (which as argued in chapter four sees itself as the eyes of the 
government) appears to be to help government step in during interim periods when mining companies 
pull out. For instance, ZCCM-IH took over KCM when AngloAmerican pulled out, using government 
resources to keep the company running while looking around for another investor. According to Lungu, 
“the World Bank, [the] Commonwealth Development Fund, and [the] IFC, they just left, they didn’t 
think it was profitable to stay in KCM, so ZCCM-IH remained alone and called on state resources 
while they looked for another partner. So GRZ injected money into ZCCM-IH, if ZCCM-IH had not 
been there, I think it would have been total chaos.” (J.Lungu, 31.10.07). 
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majority shareholders (see section 4.3.3) does not constitute a credible threat facing 
companies that contemplate leaving the country. 
Government’s Board-level insight provided by minority shareholdings 
retained in privatised mines does, however, allow government a degree of informal 
insight and influence. I found some evidence that these shareholdings, held by 
ZCCM-IH, can provide informal support for government’s regulatory efforts: I argued 
in chapter five that ZCCM-IH can drive transparency (using the example of 
consultations around EITI) and in chapter six that their reporting to the ECZ 
supplements that agency’s own monitoring efforts (as a Director of the ECZ argued, 
the environmental reports lodged by ZCCM-IH covering its investments into the 
privatised mines were almost like “some intelligence”). Evidence of such state-firm 
links as well as the finding that government provides a degree of protection for firms 
(helping to broker wider state-firm relations (see next sub-section) suggest that 
government retains some (more subtle) bargaining power, concentrated in the 
Presidency. 
Whilst government was pursing its investor friendly policy programme, 
political pressures mounted – as made evident during the 2006 election – on the 
government to re-assert itself vs. the sector and seek a redistribution of benefits from 
mining. It had become clear that the Development Agreements given to investors at 
privatisation were not designed with the ups and down of commodity markets in 
mind. At the same time, donor support for changes to the fiscal regime grew, putting 
pressures on mining companies to accept changes to the fiscal regimes stabilised 
under these agreements. Finally, an emerging political agenda in support of local 
economic empowerment also emboldened the state to assert itself vs. the mining 
sector (see chapter four). This agenda, which can partly be seen as a backlash against 
prior World Bank/IMF policies, legitimated the state as getting involved in economic 
affairs with the aim of securing economic benefits for its people. 
The Zambian government perhaps recognised that it retained a bargaining 
advantage only as long as copper prices remained high. It seized this opportunity by 
pushing for renegotiation. When faced with the complexities of negotiating with a 
diverse sector with divergent interests, it ultimately resorted to unilaterally imposing a 
new fiscal framework.370 Sudden policy reversals can, however, have negative longer-
term consequences on a country’s attractiveness as an investment destination, and 
Zambia’s medium-sized mining companies may be particularly sensitive to this kind 
of policy volatility.371 
8.2.2 Implications of political interventionism 
I found evidence of a tendency toward political intervention, what I described as 
‘presidentialism’ in chapter two, in the fiscal as well as regulatory spheres. It took the 
form of involvement of political agents in bureaucratic (regulatory) issues, or through 
direct (usually informal) engagement with companies. Such mechanisms of influence 
370 There was a concern on the part of donors “that government was making some mistakes, as they 
were rushing to amend legislation” (Lundstol, 3.3.08). My respondent observed that there was a 
significant amount of legislation that needed to be redrafted. This behaviour of the government 
resonates with what one respondent referred to as Mwanawasa’s “preference for quick wins” 
(G.Lungu, 22.10.07). 
371 As a project finance specialist at Macquarie Bank explained, more diversified and larger mining 
companies may be more resilient in the face of political and economic shocks (Adams, 16.3.08). 
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constitute a key way in which an institutionally weak, resource-dependent state can 
retain control over economic activity within a liberal policy framework. 
From the perspective of firms, political interference undermines the 
organisational aim of stability that I showed in my empirical chapters to be prevalent 
among firms. It means that enforcement activities – and expected costs of non­
compliance – are less easily predictable for the firm. This is because a particular 
organisational behaviour, or lack thereof, does not correspond to a given government 
response, consistently across firms and over time. 372 As noted in section 5.4.1 
government also applies significant discretion to how it engages with the mining 
sector. For instance, the low tax and royalty rates that applied to the sector as a whole 
at the time of fieldwork actually originated in discretionary bargaining with new 
owners of the two largest mines at privatisation (KCM and MCM). 
I also found that political intervention in the activities of regulatory agencies 
undermined the integrity and effectiveness of these agencies. Bureaucrats lose 
influence and public credibility when seen as lacking in authority, for instance when 
the ECZ is criticised in Parliament (AllAfrica 15.5.07). The problem – recognised 
within the ECZ – is that once the Minister has made a decision, the agency still has to 
provide ongoing regulation of facilities that are not operating in accordance with its 
own standards (ECZ official 1, 26.2.08). The persistence of this culture of 
interventions is illustrated by the fact that even the ECZ – the regulatory agency 
which is to the greatest extent being funded through user fees – is still not fully 
autonomous from political considerations of the ministries. 
The political culture also enables certain behaviour that firms may value. The 
ability to cultivate personal relationships can speed up the policy process. As one 
respondent noted, if you manage to “get the ear of the President” your issue moves “at 
the speed of light” (MSDP techn. ass’t, 14.11.07).373 However some companies may 
be more inclined than others to make use of informal, more personal connections with 
policy makers. For those companies that cannot (or do not wish) to access policy 
makers through such means, the bureaucratic inefficiencies and lack of institutional 
clarity (see chapter six) imply particular constraints.374 Evidence included the finding 
that the two ‘western’ firms FQML and CM were more likely to report that regulatory 
non-transparency and institutional overlap were key issues of concern for their 
businesses. Further examples of how practices varied between companies of different 
institutional and cultural backgrounds are discussed in section 8.4 below. 
The close ties between senior government officials and foreign mining 
companies enable the government and the Presidency to take on a ‘brokering’ role 
(see chapter four). The extent to which mining companies make use of this avenue for 
state-firm interaction will, again, vary depending on the routines and aims in place at 
a particular organisation. For example, firms may pursue stability either through 
engaging directly with top government officials or by improving their reputations 
within a wider group of stakeholders. NFCA, for example, appeared to seek stability 
by letting the GRZ ‘broker’ their social contract. On a visit to Zambia in February 
2008, Chinese Deputy Minister of Commerce Gao Hucheng called on the Zambian 
372 Theory suggests that firms will comply with pollution laws only when costs of 
compliance are lower than the expected penalty for non-compliance (Livernois & McKenna 1999). 
373 Because “nobody wants to be known as the person who did not do what the President wished” 
(Ibid.). 
374 Dr Derek Fee, head of the European Commission in Zambia, argues that donors’ attempts to build 
relationships with ministers and policy makers are frustrated by an overly bureaucratic system of 
following “protocol” (Fee, 20.11.07). 
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government to ensure that meetings were held to brief stakeholders on projects and 
their impacts (ToZ 28.2.2008). 
NFCA’s view of what role central government should play stands in contrast 
to that of FQML. Whilst NFCA prefers to engage with wider stakeholders through 
government, FQML sees it as a problem if “only the government” knows (see section 
5.4). FQML thus pursues stability by cultivating relationships with local stakeholders: 
“if you talk to the Copperbelt Permanent Secretary, and Copperbelt Ministers, which 
company is doing most CSR, and FQML will always come up. And that does open 
doors. However it is one of economic benefits that you cannot quantify.” (FQML mgr 
1, 11.10.07). Different approaches to pursuing the objective of stability thus lead to 
different articulations of state-firm relations. 
8.2.3 Commodities cycles, capital markets and regulatory capacity 
This section discusses the external influences that I found to shape the evolution of 
regulatory policy in Zambia. I first argue that the boom in commodity prices had a 
range of adverse impacts on the state’s ability to formulate and implement regulatory 
policy. I then look at the role of international capital markets and foreign policy in 
shaping state-firm relations in the Zambian mining sector 
It was clear that the volatility of international commodity markets played a key 
role in shaping the political economy of copper mining in Zambia. First, I found the 
rapid expansion of the mining sector during the boom to be associated with increased 
competition for skilled labour. This led to low-paid public sector mining engineers, 
geologists etc. frequently being ‘poached’ from government agencies by the private 
sector. 375 This negative spillover effect undermined capacity of state agencies to 
regulate effectively. 376 It was exacerbated by government policies that prevented 
companies from importing skilled labour. The finding that the Ministry of Mines 
continued to play a key role partly because of the technological sophistication of 
mining (see chapter four) underlines the significant constraint posed by technical 
skills shortages within government bodies. 
Second, the proliferation and fragmentation of mining and supply companies 
undermined the coordinating role of unions (reducing capacity to address member 
issues) as well as regulatory oversight by ECZ, MSD and the labour inspectorate.377 
This finding runs counter to what theories of public choice reviewed in chapter two 
would indicate, namely that increasing fragmentation within interest groups would 
strengthen government’s ability to push through policy changes. My finding is 
explained by reference to the Zambian government’s strategy of promoting inward 
investment by accommodating investors in the policy making process. This strategy 
works less well in a fragmented mining sector with widely varying organisational 
375 Evidence from Ndalama, MSD inspector, Walgaard, MSDP techn. ass’t, and G.Gatchell. 
376 The movement of people further undermines enforcement by increasing possibilities for rent-
seeking. These processes were also apparent in the supplier sector, where mining companies’ attempts 
at making procurement routines more resistant to corruption are undermined by the permanence of 
social networks on the Copperbelt. 
377 As Vincent Lengwe of the MUZ notes, “[t]his structure was designed at a time when you were 
negotiating [with ZCCM] at one and the same table. There are now different companies, different 
employers, and you look at the number of full-time employees, one needs to go to Southern Province, 
one needs to go to Solwezi... the number of companies in the Copperbelt is high, so that is the biggest 
challenge, so you find that where you are supposed to go, you fail to go and even show up, and then 
members feel that you are failing them.” (Lengwe,18.9.07). 
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practices, and reduces the ability of government agencies to advance and implement 
policy. 
Third, I found non-government and international standards such as the Equator 
Principles to be a significant influence on practices of some foreign mining companies 
in Zambia. However, I found that the relevance of such external influences decreased 
during the commodities boom. High prices provided companies with windfall profits 
that could be used to fund expansion without the added scrutiny of outside lenders 
(this was the case for both KCM and NFCA; Gao, 21.8.07; Chitambala, 17.9.07). In 
addition, the rapid expansion of the global mining sector resulted in shortages of 
consultants to conduct the ‘bankable’ feasibility studies needed to access international 
capital markets.378 Companies therefore resorted to doing more of their expansion 
planning ‘in-house’. 
Fourth, from the perspective of companies, the boom promoted organisational 
routines and objectives to minimise costs not directly linked to production. High 
international copper prices increased the opportunity cost for any delays to firms’ 
expansion plans, thereby focusing managers’ attention on production (short­
termism). 379 This influence of international commodities markets on producer 
behaviour – visible at all mines but particularly prominent at NFCA and KCM – 
shapes how the firm understands relative costs. For instance maintenance 
expenditures become more expensive, in relative terms, when the payback time on 
new (productive) mine shafts is reduced due to higher prices. 
As soon as commodity markets fall, however, access to international capital 
markets plays a big role in determining the ability of companies to sustain their 
investments. When the global financial crisis was traumatising the sector in 2008, 
many western mining companies with large exposures to single commodities found 
access to capital markets severely constrained. Many responded by selling off assets. 
Chinese investors, in contrast, did not face these pressures to such an extent. Chinese 
state-owned banks kept up their financing of overseas projects: they had limited 
exposure to the exotic and ultimately toxic financial instruments that brought down 
Lehman Brothers and other large lenders. The continued investment from China at a 
time when ‘traditional’ sources of funding were drying up drove home to African 
governments the importance of accommodating Chinese capital. I discuss political 
and firm responses to the global financial crisis of 2008 in more detail in Haglund 
(2010; 2011). 
Other external influences on mining sector policy evolution include foreign 
policy, most evidently in relation to Chinese foreign direct investment. As I have 
argued in Haglund (2009) the special economic zone in Chambishi (now dubbed the 
Chambishi Zambia-China Cooperation Zone) plays a prominent role in China’s Africa 
policy. Managed by a former boss of NFCA, it is seen as a test case for accessing raw 
materials as well as markets in central Africa. The stakes for the Zambian government 
in facilitating Chinese investment into and around the zone are thus significant. 
Government sees itself as benefiting from further investment as well as other forms of 
378 As a FQML manager explains, “these days you find that because engineering is so scarce, people do 
it in house, but then their feasibility study is not approved by the banks, so you go on without financing 
from the bank. However now the copper sector is so rich itself, so it can afford to also finance projects 
using retained earnings. So you don’t have to do the feasibility study, if there is a problem you go 
around it. So times have changed.” (FQML mgr 2, 7.11.07). 
379 One might expect that firms during boom times can carry larger costs and thus be less cost-sensitive. 
A topic for further research is the extent to which mining company managers are actually incentivised 
in relation to costs rather than revenues, given the inherent volatility of commodity markets. 
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international cooperation as long as it adequately accommodates and supports this 
investment. 
Lastly, I found donors to play a significant role in enabling the government to 
proceed with unilateral fiscal reform, through their funding of consultants to support 
the GRZ. These consultants provided government with evidence that mining 
companies had expatriated resources well beyond that indicated in their publicly 
disclosed accounting profits (Lundstol, 3.3.08). Such evidence provided ammunition 
supporters of unilateral action by undermining the legitimacy of any company 
counter-claims or threats of arbitration on the basis of government not sticking to its 
side of the bargain. 
8.2.4 Section conclusion 
I have argued in this section, first, that mining companies in Zambia have retained 
their bargaining power vis-à-vis the state, despite sinking their costs and becoming 
economically and politically embedded. Mining companies retained the right of exit 
(sale to another investor) because the alternative – closure and redundancies – was 
politically unacceptable to the ruling government. Government nevertheless retained 
some influence over the sector, albeit through less formal means including Board-
level insight provided by minority stakes in the privatised mines. Evidence 
government retaining bargaining power includes the finding that government provides 
crucial support to companies by acting as broker between the investor and labour 
unions. 
I argued that Zambia’s political culture of state intervention in the private 
sector provides space for sustaining separate articulations of state firm relations. 
However this is associated with the risk – which I elaborate on in the next section – 
that it muddles state-firm bargaining over policy: information asymmetries prevent 
mining companies from readily distinguishing where different government interests 
lie. 
Lastly I looked at the role of various external influences arising outside of the 
host country context, including international copper prices, capital markets and 
foreign policy. I argued that the boom exacerbated skills shortages as companies 
poached highly skilled individuals from government agencies charged with 
monitoring the sector. I also noted how the role of the Equator Principles and other 
international standards diminished during the boom, because companies could afford 
to self-finance their expansion. In considering that the copper markets are cyclical in 
nature, I observed how the recent global economic crisis represented a shift in 
financing power away from ‘western’ capital markets toward emerging markets, in 
particular China. This, coupled with the ever-closer inter-state relations between 
China and Zambia, help explain Zambia’s accommodating approach to Chinese 
investors. 
8.3 The partnership approach to regulation 
As argued in the previous section, the political and economic importance of the mines 
makes the government want to be closely involved with the mining sector. In seeking 
to ensure Zambia remains a competitive destination for international investment, 
policy makers involve the mining companies in the development of new legislation. 
In doing so government aligns its interests with those of the mining sector. Thus, 
although the government bargains with the firm in seeking to capture a politically 
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acceptable share of resource rents (as adversary), it is also functions in a role as 
‘guardian’ of firms (as partner) (e.g. when firms get embroiled in labour disputes). 
This section focuses on three areas of regulatory failure identified in chapter 
six in relation to: environmental, health and safety-related incidents; failure to 
progress on reform; and predictability-reducing institutional overlaps. These failures 
call into question the circumstances under which mining sector regulation can 
successfully be formulated and implemented. 
This section comprises five parts. I first sketch the key features of regulatory 
relations in Zambia, highlighting the heavy emphasis on self-reporting, consultation 
and consensus, and mutual accountability. The second section elaborates on the 
defining features of this ‘partnership approach’ to regulation, tracing regulatory 
features to roots in orthodox economics and liberal conceptualisations of the state. 
The third sub-section discusses what I refer to as the fungibility of power in state-firm 
relations. It highlights how multiple and simultaneous policy negotiations reduce the 
ability to reach consensus. The fourth sub-section then critiques in some detail the 
current approach to regulation in the Zambian context. It draws on previous accounts 
of Zambia’s institutional environment and political culture and highlights issues 
relating to regulatory capacity as well as the exclusion of civil society. Finally, the 
fifth sub-section discusses Zambia’s ‘partnership approach’ to regulation in the 
context of high organisational diversity. 
8.3.1 Features of regulatory relations in Zambia 
As pointed out in chapter two, a tension exists in modern capitalism between the 
views of government as (largely economic) enabler and (largely social) enforcer of 
society’s chosen standards (Harriss-White 2003). This tension is reflected in 
contrasting views of how government should regulate business: at one end of the 
spectrum is ‘command-and-control’ regulation, at the other is complete self-
regulation. No regulatory regime is a pure case of either but will – in practice –contain 
elements of both. In Zambia I found that government places high emphasis on 
providing an enabling environment for business, formally through incentives and 
informally through a strongly pro-investment political discourse. 
I found relations between the regulatory agencies and the mining sector to 
exhibit three characteristics. First, regulation was heavily reliant on self-reporting 
with companies expected to self-report their performance, semi-annually (to ECZ) 
and quarterly (to the Ministry of Mines).380 Regulatory features such as self-reporting 
of course serve a very practical purpose of reducing costs for the regulator in ensuring 
the compliance of firms. In Zambia there appears to be a degree in terms of actions 
taken on the basis of these reports: ECZ officials review this six-monthly data using 
their judgement and if values are ‘off’ in one month but not others, no action may be 
taken (ECZ senior inspector, 23.7.07). My examination of such ‘statutory reports’ 
highlighted the variation in internal standards and procedures among companies (see 
chapter six). 
It would appear that companies have considerable freedom to choose what 
they report, as this reporting varies widely. Companies with operating practices 
aligned with international standards seemed to submit statutory reports with much 
higher levels of detail. I was shown a report from NFCA, comprising a single sheet 
380 Livernois & McKenna (1999: 420) present a model of environmental policy with self-reporting with 
the following variables: accepted pollution levels, probability of inspection, fines for non-compliance 
(if fails inspection), fines for non-compliance (if voluntarily reported). 
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with a 10x10 table of figures, to be compared to reports from CM that provided a 
broad range of data, including narrative explanations (thus partially off-loading the 
ECZ of the burden of analysis). 
A second feature of Zambia’s mining sector regime was the highly 
consultative nature of regulatory relations (see chapters five and six). This appeared 
to reflect the foreign investment-driven growth strategy of Zambia’s recent 
governments (see chapter four). A consultative approach has benefits because it helps 
firms from different institutional backgrounds adapt to a new external (policy) 
environment (see chapter two). In Zambia the need for consultation is partly a 
function of the stability provisions given to mining companies at privatisation: under 
these provisions government cannot force costly amendments and must get big 
companies ‘on board’ in order to implement legislative reform. 
Third, accounts from representatives of regulatory agencies overseeing the 
mining sector point to a sense of mutual accountability between agencies and firms. 
Under existing regulation mining companies can challenge and even sue the ECZ for 
non-adherence to its mandate and statute, e.g. in relation to non-disclosure of sensitive 
information.381 The effect of regulatory agencies being accountable to business is 
most significant at the ECZ, since it is partly funded by the mining sector through 
licensing and user fees. The agency is thereby easily subject to charges of conflicts of 
interests. Top MSD officials’ reluctance to reform that agency (by making it semi­
autonomous and allowing it to charge ‘user fees’ like the ECZ) can also be explained 
by an aversion to the heightened scrutiny that comes from such a setup (MSD 
inspector, 27.8.07). 
8.3.2 Zambia’s ‘partnership approach’ to regulation 
I refer to the collection of regulatory characteristics above – that ascribe a large role to 
the preferences of regulated agents – as a ‘partnership approach’ to regulatory policy 
making. It is fundamentally based on the common goal of the Zambian state and the 
foreign mining companies: private-sector led development. Key features are that 
consultations (in various forms) are a key tool for the state to develop regulatory 
reform agendas, and that consensus is seen as a tipping point when reform proposals 
acquire legitimacy. This concept of regulatory policy making has its roots in the 
liberal conceptions of the state as primarily concerned with providing an enabling 
environment for business (see 2.2.2). A drawback is that the pursuit of a regulatory 
settlement that minimises conflicts between state and heterogeneous firm interests 
requires very complex negotiations to take place. 
This ‘partnership’ between states and firms is based on formal arrangements 
that are contractual, formalised, and based on mutual and well-defined rights and 
obligations (such as when a government and an infrastructure firm come together in a 
‘public-private partnership’). It is also based on shared cultural values, such as norms 
of reciprocity or common aims (e.g. independence or national development). Such 
shared cultural values can enable parties to transcend collective action problems by 
reducing transaction costs and enable institutions to evolve (Greif 1998; North 1990). 
In Zambia the regulator thus presents itself as a partner to the companies, that 
is there to enforce but also to enable: “the idea is that we need to come up with a win-
win situation, so that when we regulate, we regulate such that they are more than 
381 As a top ECZ official explains, “also ECZ can be sued, we are liable to being sued. We can be sued 
actually for maybe divulging information that we are not supposed to share.” (8.8.07). 
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willing and glad to comply with whatever has been put before them” (ECZ official 4, 
8.8.07). Companies are in the first instance asked to rectify situations where they are 
found to be non-compliant.382 Regulatory relations also resemble a partnership in the 
sense that mining companies are given the benefit of the doubt, and that mining 
companies and regulators are expected to work together to achieve a socially optimal 
outcome. The partnership approach to regulation thus facilitates the accommodate of 
firms with varying environmental, safety, and economic practices. 
8.3.3 The fungibility of power in state-firm relations 
This sub-section introduces the concept of fungible power in state-firm relations, to 
describe how the exercise of power in negotiations over a particular policy can be 
used to influence outcomes in parallel state-firm negotiations. My notion of fungible 
power reflects the idea of competing and/or complementary interests being 
experienced as a totality by a social actor. 383 The implications is that a mining 
company’s policy positions in one area become contingent on policy positions in 
other areas. 
For example, the Development Agreement renegotiations were not only about 
fiscal incentives and stability clauses. Although compliance has been patchy, DAs 
also committed firms to various environmental, social and private sector development 
objectives, including submissions of proposals for training of Zambians and local 
business development.384 The concept of fungible power in state-firm relations also 
helps explain why, as I argued in chapter four, government largely failed to deliver on 
its promises of stability (cf. the view held among CM management that hikes in local 
government taxes and ECZ fees constituted a breach of DAs). 
It becomes difficult for government agents to ‘partner’ and reach consensus 
when there are so many proposals on the table at the same time. The mines saw the 
Development Agreement renegotiation agenda in 2007 as part of a complex ‘grand 
bargain’ that included inter-related reform proposals concerning environmental 
regulation, health and safety governance, and energy security.385 The CEO of Metorex 
(the South African firm operating Chibuluma mine), in declining to participate in my 
study, went so far as to say that a study of policy evolution did not “make sense” 
because the regulatory environment for mining was in such a “state of flux” 
(Mounsey, 12.9.07). 386 
382 If non-compliant practices are identified, ECZ will first issue an “enforcement notice” stating 
remedial actions to be taken. According to the law ECZ then returns 7-14 days later to inspect against 
the enforcement notice, although this follow up inspection is often lacking (ECZ official 3, 23.7.07). 
383 Interests are understood here in relation to sectoral or issue-specific reforms, including 
environmental, and other regulations. The concept of fungibility has previously been examined to some 
length in the literature on foreign aid (see Feizioglu et al. 1998). 
384 A decade after privatisation, the unilaterally implemented Mines and Minerals Development Bill 
(enacted on 1 April 2008) similarly requires that applications for all large-scale mining licenses include 
the submission of an Environmental Management Plan (GRZ 2008: 24). This represents a ‘step up’ 
from DAs granted at privatisation, which only required companies to submit such plans within three 
years. 
385 Given the evidence of transfer pricing presented above, proposed stricter rules on management 
contracts by the Zambia Revenue Authority (Chungu, 21.11.07) further added to the sense of a grand 
negotiation taking place. 
386 Various aspects of mining companies’ operations were similarly under scrutiny at once through the 
project to audit the mines (using donor-funded consultants, in preparation for DA negotiations) on 
environmental, health and safety, training, as well as local business development (Lundstol, 30.10.07). 
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The range of overlapping negotiations taking place had varying impacts on 
mining companies depending on their cost-structures, routines-in-place and 
management objectives. With an absence of known outcomes in some policy spheres, 
firms could not easily commit to a particular position in other policy spheres. This 
complicated and slowed down state-firm bargaining around policy reform. 
Overlapping aims within the government may also have reduced policy visibility for 
the mines. For example, whereas the Ministry of Finance was leading the new tax 
policy, the Ministry of Mines led the country’s World Bank-sponsored EITI initiative 
(Mubanga, 21.11.07). 387 This is despite the fact that the EITI seeks primarily to 
improve transparency regarding tax payments, and as such has aims (and implications 
for firms) that overlap with government’s broader tax policy. 
The commodities cycle with its rapidly expanding and contracting prices 
undermine the ability of ‘partnership regulations’ to deliver reform. Indeed, 
government’s unilateral action on taxes and royalties – a breach of the partnership 
promise – was likely triggered by the a sense that the end of the boom, and falling 
copper prices, would quickly undermine government’s bargaining position (see 8.2.3). 
International relations and donor policies also play a big role in determining 
the overall investment into the mining sector, through lending (e.g. the IFC) and 
donor financing for institutional reform to ‘level the playing field’. In the case of 
state-owned enterprises – including most of the large Chinese companies active in 
Africa’s extractive sectors – the congruence of interests is even more clear-cut. 
To sum up, fungibility of power in state-firm relations promotes flexibility and 
open-endedness at the expense of stability and predictability, thereby making state-
firm relationships more like incomplete contracts (Williamson 1998). The open­
endedness of the state-firm contract was also evident with regard to economic 
linkages discussed in chapter seven: the lack of knowledge among individuals 
interviewed for this study of the appropriate multiplier effect between mining sector 
jobs and indirect jobs (e.g. local manufacturing) is itself a finding. When policy 
makers do not know with any precision the development impacts of mining 
investments, state-firm ‘contracts’ must be seen as incomplete i.e. imperfectly 
specified. 
8.3.4 The politics of partnership 
This section discusses the politics of partnership regulation in the Zambian context, 
with reference to three discrete but interrelated themes. I first discuss what Zambia’s 
interventionist political culture means for effective partnership regulation. I then 
discuss how partnership does not absolve regulators of the need to be well-staffed, 
and how agencies funded through contributions from the mining sector can lead to 
allegations of conflicts of interest. Lastly I highlight some implications for the role 
played by civil society in the mining sector. 
8.3.4.1 Political culture 
The mandates given to regulatory agencies to provide an enabling environment for 
investors often contrast with central government’s own attempts to retain control over 
the economy (and minimise commodity dependence). Although there is much 
387 The objective of the EITI – to increase transparency and thereby improve tax collection – is 
institutionally aligned with changes to the fiscal regime announced in January 2008, which includes the 
establishment of an easily audited copper ‘reference price’. 
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consultation between firms and regulatory agencies such as the ECZ and MSD, these 
consultations have little to say about the how reforms are passed into law, 
implemented and financed. Rather, the executive decision of whether to move ahead 
with proposed reforms rest singularly with the government and ultimately the 
Presidency. As Peter Sinkamba at the CBE puts it, industry can really “only judge if it 
is adequate or not … [government] issues an Act of Parliament and that is it.” 
(14.10.07). 
In passing new legislation and in its general approach to business, the 
government was repeatedly described as following a prescriptive command-and­
control approach (see 4.3). This can be traced to concerns with sovereignty (see 4.3.2) 
and a culture of de facto centralised decision making (see 2.2). It contrasts with the 
ideology of partnership that was apparent at the level of regulatory agencies. Thus, 
whilst Young (1981) saw policies but not outcomes as influenced by ideology, this 
study suggests that different ideologies of regulation appear to exist somewhat 
independently at different levels of the state. Central government and regulatory 
bureaucrats thus operate according to slightly different logics in their attempts to 
control the mining sector (c.f. the African ‘hybrid state’, see 2.2.1). Mining companies 
in Zambia must deal with both. 
The close influence of government in the mining sectors, through informal and 
often personal relationships, can explain the reluctance of regulatory agencies to be 
forthcoming with information to researchers and NGOs. Agencies are afraid to share 
information with third parties if they run a risk of upsetting political state-firm 
relationships that (due to high information asymmetries) they are unlikely to have full 
information about. For example, mining companies can appeal to the Minister, above 
the heads of the regulatory officials at the ECZ if unhappy with the latter’s chosen 
course of action. This limits real mutual accountability and may weaken inspectors’ 
job security, i.e. their ‘internal’ property rights (consider how the ECZ was rebuffed 
over its decision to prosecute KCM management over their pollution of the Kafue 
river, see chapter six). This may lead to even greater caution among implementing 
agencies in their handling of the firms.388 
8.3.4.2 Regulatory capacity, taxation, and the democratic system 
Importantly, partnership regulation does not eliminate the need for regulators to be 
well-staffed and well-resourced. Somebody needs to analyse and draw conclusions 
from company reports. In fact, partnership regulation necessitates ongoing interaction, 
which in a context of firms from different institutional backgrounds (that operate 
according to different standards) requires significant organisational capacity.389 This 
is a particular concern, as I argued in section 8.2.3, since the copper boom that 
followed privatisation led to increased competition for skills (thus constraining 
regulatory capacity). 
In theory, taxation presents a way to raise funds to ensure regulatory agencies 
are sufficiently well-resourced. Yet in the post-privatisation period the Zambian 
government was largely unable to levy taxation on the mining sector. In lieu of this, 
the government attempted (as noted above) to strengthen funding for agencies such as 
388 This notion of ‘internal’ property rights resonates with findings by van Donge & Liviga (1986) that 
‘presidentialism’ in African states is less about top-down coercion, and rather about government 
officials not wanting to ‘rock the boat’ because of overriding concerns about stability. 
389 Because of lacking capacity, Zambian regulators currently exhibit a post-hoc approach to 
enforcement (illustrated by one respondent’s comments that people approach the company only after an 
accident has occurred). 
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the ECZ by letting it charge user fees, thereby making it “semi-autonomous” from 
government. 
However funding regulatory activities directly through user fees (rather than 
through taxation and public spending) is problematic because it removes these 
regulatory activities from the democratic system. It subjects regulators to allegations 
of conflicts of interests, e.g. whereby levying user fees can lead to charges of rent-
seeking and concerns that ECZ’s regulatory activities become a “fund-raising 
mechanisms” (ECZ official 4, 19.11.07). Such suspicion hampered the ability of 
Zambian regulatory agencies to strengthen their enforcement by levying fines. 
8.3.4.3 Informational context and civil society 
A further feature of partnership regulation I found in Zambia was that it put, within 
the discourse of regulation, state actors ‘on par’ with regulated entities. I argue here 
that whilst this opens up space for more direct and continuous two-way 
communication between these groups, it risks excluding wider civil society. First, the 
significant information asymmetries in Zambia limit the capacity for bottom-up 
enforcement by civil society: it results in limited public information around which 
non-state actors can advocate and mobilise the public interest (see chapter four). For 
example, the donor-funded CEMP report described the current EPPCA as instituted 
through a government-focused process with limited awareness from citizens and local 
communities, thus hampering its effective implementation (see 6.4.3.5). 
Second, the mutual accountability (in the case of environmental regulation 
institutionalised in the EPPCA) results in disincentives for regulators to divulge 
information to other stakeholders.390 This is institutionalised in the EPPCA. I quote 
one ECZ official at length: “usually … we don’t want to release this information [on 
non-compliance] neither to the press or to the wrong hands. In the past there have 
been cases where a company is taken to court by some residents … so the company 
could also say how did this information get to these people? The only place where we 
share this information is ECZ, so ECZ you have broken the confidentiality agreement 
[in] the EPPCA that obliges us not to divulge certain information that, once in the 
wrong hands it may actually put the company in the wrong light” (ECZ official 4, 
19.11.07). 
Third, the exclusion of civil society under the partnership approach to 
regulation conditions civil society approaches for engaging with the mining sector. 
When environmental and labour rights NGOs are excluded from public reporting of 
company (environmental, financial etc.) performance, their only means of 
engagement is through legal and adversarial confrontation – the approach chosen by 
NGOs Citizens for a Better Environment – rather than more constructive dialogue 
(ToZ 9.2.2009). Such an ‘adversarial’ strategy for engaging with the mines is 
resource-intensive for NGOs. Moreover this type of engagement risks being 
misinformed, given the low-transparency environment of Zambia, such that advocacy 
messages are met with little serious response.391 
390 In the context of a close-knit mining community, the effect of mutual accountability is amplified. 
ECZ ‘unfairness’ with one mine is likely to be shared with others, including the CoM, who can then 
challenge government (and perhaps – by extension – the jobs of ECZ officials). 
391 For instance, despite skill shortages described above, civil society often takes a critical stance 
against the use of expatriate engineers in the mining sector. This is exemplified by the claim by Father 
Kaunda of NGO Caritas Zambia that “Zambia already has experienced engineers, so why do mining 
companies need to import such skills?” (9.10.07). 
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8.3.5 Partnership in a context of diversity 
Although the government portrays itself as a ‘partner’ to the mining sector, not all 
companies are given equal access to the policy process. I found some evidence that 
despite much consultation, the inclusion or exclusion of stakeholders remains at the 
discretion of government policy agents. This raises questions of whether the 
government views some mines as preferred constituents (for instance, only the largest 
mines were invited to consultations over environmental regulations; ECZ official 3, 
24.7.07). Elsewhere, tripartite labour negotiations between government, labour unions 
and employees only included – at the time of fieldwork – the largest mines (“the likes 
of KCM and MCM”; Bantubonse, 10.10.07).392 
It is understandable that not all firms are invited to all negotiations given the 
transaction costs involved. As noted above, ‘partnering’ with different companies 
with substantially different interests (as defined by their routines and objectives) puts 
pressure on already capacity-constrained state agencies. Nevertheless, such selective 
bargaining undermines the partnership approach and risks alienating smaller actors.393 
As Braithwaite has argued, for self-regulation to work, companies must “internalise 
the values in the law” (1989: 59). Discretionary consultation with only a select group 
of firms prevents non-participating companies from learning and adapting to 
emerging policy agendas. It slows down the process whereby Indian, Chinese and 
western mining managers adjust to Zambia’s espoused values and norms of doing 
business (leading to stagnation in policy reform, see 6.4.4). 
A regulatory policy with prominent use of self-reporting can work well to 
alleviate regulatory capacity constraints in a context of low diversity (i.e. it helps if 
you have just one format of report to analyse and follow up on). It is more 
problematic in a context of high organisational diversity. For example, the ECZ in 
Zambia lacks standardised self-reporting protocols owing to the asset-specific 
exemptions given to companies at privatisation. 
Government can more easily ‘partner’ with the sector if the sector itself can 
reach internal consensus. 
Given the varied aims and routines of the mines this remains difficult, even 
though the Chamber of Mines is taking steps to promote more unified policy 
positions. For example, the government had intended to renegotiate the fiscal 
framework with the sector as a whole, as evidenced by formal invitations to 
companies to enter into renegotiations (which companies accepted, see chapter five). 
However it failed to do so, given the difficulties to reach consensus. Sensing that it 
had a window of opportunity as long as copper prices were high, the government 
opted for the more adversarial route of unilateral action. 
Finally, negative reputational externalities undermine the ability of mining 
companies to produce a coordinated approach to policy reform. If certain companies 
in the sector do not ascribe to their responsibilities, as laid down by the state, they 
create political pressures on the sector as a whole (e.g. those drummed up against 
392 In future the CoM is hoping to become involved in order to represent the whole mining sector. 
393 Clearly the fact that consultations over new regulations are not all-inclusive does not imply that the 
GRZ is intentionally and strategically selecting which companies to invite. As my respondent at the 
MSDP suggests, it may also reflect a lack of organisational capacity within state bureaucracies: “I think 
people suddenly wake up in the Ministry of Mines to the fact that a certain decision has to be made, 
and its quite quick, they might simply send out an invitation can you come tomorrow to a consultative 
workshop … then decisions are made without that person.” He elaborates that “the Ministry of Mines 
will probably feel two things, first we have to drop everything, and second, that’s the way we do things 
in Zambia, if you can’t adapt to that then tough. Actually they don’t even rationalise like that, it’s just 
how it is done.” (MSDP techn. ass’t, 1.10.07). 
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foreign investors by Michael Sata ahead of the 2006 election). In discussing the 
mining sector more generally, stakeholders repeatedly highlighted KCM’s and 
NFCA’s incidents as causing reputational damage to the sector as a whole. 
8.3.6 Section conclusion 
This section first defined Zambia’s regulatory approach to the mining sector as based 
around a set of characteristics and norms that together engage states and firms in a 
partnership with the common purpose of private sector led development. I noted how 
this ‘partnership approach’ to regulation was based on regulatory relations exhibiting 
features of self-reporting, consultations and mutual accountability. It appears that this 
partnership ‘ideology’ is shaped by a combination of ‘hard’ donor demands for 
market-based solutions and ‘soft’ FDI-friendly liberal discourse. The concept of 
partnership regulation is analytically useful as a benchmark from which to distinguish 
between different articulations of state-firm relations. It is also inductively useful 
because it helps us understand how largely western or neoliberal ideologies of 
governance become applied and embedded in weak resource-dependent states. It 
helps illustrate how such an approach, based on assumptions of stability and 
homogeneity, fails to deliver reform in a context of rapid change (volatilise 
commodity and financial markets, and growing economic and political power of 
countries such as China and India). 
This section then discussed how power in state-firm relations becomes 
fungible when there are unusually policy reforms on the table at once. In an 
interventionist African state, regulatory enforcement becomes political and not merely 
technocratic: non-compliance in one ‘arena’ carries not only direct costs but may have 
repercussions in other areas of state-firm relations. External influences serve to 
complicate this ‘game’ further, as regulatory relations become an inseparable sub-set 
of broader inter-state relations. 
Turning to the question of how Zambia’s political culture influences 
partnership regulation, I argued that mining companies find themselves having to 
sustain relationships with two levels of the state, and that these two levels have 
different logics of how to regulate the mining sector. Regulatory agencies are thus 
charged with implementing policy in partnership with firms, yet constrained by more 
centralised and ‘command-and-control’ relationships between the executive and 
mining companies. 
A partnership approach to regulation also fails to account for the wider 
political economy of foreign investment, and the fact that regulatory capacity is 
always needed, no matter how much you emphasise self-regulation. I also highlighted 
how the partnership approach, due to its emphasis on mutual accountability between 
regulator and regulated, can make regulatory agencies reluctant to share information. 
This limits the policy space in which civil society can participate. 
Finally I linked a partnership approach to regulation with particular challenges 
in a context of organisational diversity: the emphasis on self-reporting, in the context 
of capacity deficits and Zambia’s political culture implies that companies can 
continue operating the way they have operated in the past: companies are likely to 
submit reports to regulators that are limited to information that can easily be produced 
by already-in-place routines. I found tentative evidence that companies with more 
sophisticated reporting systems, which routinely produce detailed and relevant data, 




The sense of one big complex renegotiation taking place (see 8.3.3) would be 
less of a problem if mining companies were good enough at agreeing amongst 
themselves. However I argued that non-compliance among some companies carries 
negative externalities for others, leading the latter to bargain for stricter controls, 
thereby splitting the mining sector into pro- and anti-reform groups (see 6.4.4). Given 
that learning and convergence among mining companies can improve the efficacy of 
partnership regulation, the next section now turns to this topic. 
8.4 Organisational diversity, learning and convergence 
This section seeks to map out and establish the diversity of business practices among 
foreign mining companies from different institutional backgrounds, and identify 
processes of organisational learning that are taking place. In doing so it aims to 
illuminate the research question of whether and under what conditions organisational 
learning is resulting in convergence across regulatory standards and practices. 
I begin by exploring diversity across the mining companies’ business 
practices, based on organisational routines and aims highlighted in the three empirical 
chapters. The second sub-section discusses the processes whereby convergence or 
divergence takes place among diverse actors. The third sub-section highlights some 
examples of organisational learning, with particular reference to NFCA as a case 
study. In the last sub-section I argue that policy making must take into account the 
diversity of business practices, in particular in the context of a partnership approach to 
regulation. The risk otherwise is that companies have to learn ‘the hard way’, i.e. 
always addressing significant negative impacts post-hoc, clearly associated with 
significant social costs. 
8.4.1 Establishing diversity across the mines 
The framework for understanding organisational behaviour developed in chapter two 
emphasises the role of organisational routines and objectives. These routines and 
objectives govern a firm’s interactions with its external environment, including 
engagement with policy-makers, safety and environmental standards and 
management, as well as supplier practices. My empirical chapters subsequently made 
use of these constructs to illustrate particular and at times divergent patterns of 
behaviour across foreign investors. 
Some of the diversity in my sample of foreign mining companies in Zambia is 
captured in the in the uniqueness of Development Agreements, including different 
environmental rules depending on the mining infrastructure inherited. However the 
institutional background of firms, including their varying reliance on international 
capital markets, also plays a big role in explaining the variation in standards and 
attitudes across companies (see section 6.3.1). 
KCM, FQML and CM all include elements of international environmental and 
safety standards in designing their internal processes (I found no evidence of 
equivalent standards present at NFCA). Such international standards matter in the 
context of Zambia’s partnership approach to regulation, where it appears that a 
company with sophisticated reporting systems that ‘routinely’ produces detailed data 
– and which thereby faces no transaction costs in doing so – will provide the regulator 
with this information. The reader should thus bear in mind that worse-reporting firms 
are not necessarily looking – actively and intentionally – for opportunities to cut 
corners or confuse inspectors. Rather, reporting may be poor because routines-in­
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place are weak or because conflicting objectives (e.g. cost-minimisation) prevent 
investment into development of more detailed reporting routines.394 
Chapter seven discussed the practices among some mines, in particular at 
NFCA and KCM, to bargain very ‘hard’ with suppliers. These two companies used 
their connections with Chinese and Indian markets, respectively, to obtain inputs at 
prices with which local suppliers could not compete. One finding of this thesis is that 
organisational routines and aims often overlap, and in doing so reconstitute one 
another. For example, at KCM the apparent aim of cost-minimisation is associated 
with practices of dealing with suppliers by routinely asking for a “discount on the 
discount” (Mirza, 8.10.07). In other cases, organisational aims may conflict with 
routines: for instance, KCM’s aim for flexibility – linked by respondents to its new 
Indian owner’s “hurry to see results” – is a poor ‘fit’ with more formal but less 
flexible routines inherited from AngloAmerican.395 
In support of existing theory I found these routines and aims to be relatively 
stable over time, reflecting path-dependencies and an implicit discounting problem 
(whereby managers must make a trade-off between shorter-term and longer-term 
benefits, see 2.4.1). 
Organisational routines persist even in the presence of inefficiencies. I found 
that the aim of minimising costs, for instance, can easily lead to operational disruption 
without much in the way of sustainable advantages. The cost-minimisation objective 
may bias business decisions towards lower-quality goods and services, thereby 
hampering the longer-term performance of the firm. Cost minimisation may also be 
bad for the longer-term performance of companies if it reduces the ability to retain 
human capital. Thus a desire to minimise labour-related costs at NFCA leads to a 
fickle labour force that only remain with the firm in the absence of other opportunities 
(see 6.3.7). 
8.4.2 How diversity persists: mechanisms of convergence 
Having looked at diversity, I now turn to the question of how diversity evolves, and 
what might drive convergence or divergence around regulatory standards. I focus on 
changes to organisational routines and aims through processes that I defined in 
chapter two as organisational learning. 
As argued in chapter two, organisational learning is in part a collective 
activity. In social settings where historical experiences are easily shared, knowledge 
can be seen a public good. In Zambia there are many close personal relationships 
between key individuals at the mining companies. Through these individuals the 
mining companies become engaged in a loose network, which facilitates learning 
from others. The emphasis on consultation embedded in the partnership approach to 
regulation can therefore, over time, support greater convergence around standards. 
Processes of convergence are facilitated by organisations that mediate between 
the state and the mining companies. As discussed in chapter four, ZCCM-IH and the 
394 It is, for instance, difficult to ascertain whether the auditor qualifications given to NFCA’s financial 
reporting are due to poor quality of internal reporting more generally (lack of appropriate routines), 
lack of benefits of getting a clean approval (because the firm does not rely on international ‘western’ 
capital markets), or the existence of something to hide (transfer pricing, corner-cutting) – or some 
combination of the above. Similarly, the ‘delaying tactics’ mentioned by unions in relation to NFCA 
could reflect bureaucracy (existing routines) or an intentional strategy of obfuscation. 
395 One respondent explained that “AngloAmerican [was] a structured and well-laid out system. To 




Chamber of Mines play significant roles in mediating between government and the 
mining sector. The presence of ZCCM-IH on privatised companies’ Boards seems to 
promote stability by enabling government to obtain intelligence regarding the private 
sector (thereby reducing transaction costs associated with effective – i.e. more fully 
informed – policy making).396 
Processes of organisational learning and change also take place through 
embedding and normative diffusion of routines. As Biggart (1977) observes, contact 
between firms through movement of personnel constitutes a form of mimetic 
diffusion of norms and rules, driving convergence within an organisational field (see 
2.5.5). Such personal networks also involve state regulators. The aforementioned 
evidence of skills shortages meant mining companies would ‘poach’ inspectors from 
government (and to a lesser extent from each other). Through this process of socially 
embedding the firm, convergence of norms and practices take place. 
However these processes of convergence are not automatic. First, the hybrid 
nature of the African state (see 2.2.1) enables it to simultaneously entertain formal as 
well as informal expressions of state-firm relations, reducing pressures on 
convergence. Second, within an institutional context where freedom of press is 
limited, reporting standards are non-uniform, and civil society is weak, the difficulty 
of observing ‘true’ conduct rises. As a consequence, stakeholders may not 
discriminate between companies, which poses a problem for better-performing 
companies that end up being judged in light of the lowest-performing firm.397 
Lastly, when interaction between a firm and external stakeholders is mediated 
by an opaque institutional environment (see chapter four) the potential for such 
interaction to convey information about others’ preferences is limited. In this case the 
information that reaches the firm – which forms the basis of organisational learning – 
is unlikely to reflect accurately the demands and expectations of stakeholders in the 
firm’s external environment. In other words, routines become less effective as ‘filters’ 
(see 2.4.1). The result may either be less organisational change, or change that is 
poorly aligned with the economic, social and political environment.398 
8.4.3 Evidence of organisational learning 
Organisational learning was defined in chapter two as the processes of change 
whereby a firm evolves its routines and aims, due to internal or external impetus. 
Normally, organisational routines and aims change slowly in response to a changing 
environment. However over time they change in response to social interaction as 
firms seek to improve routines (e.g. environmental management) or re-focus aims in 
order to align their interests with its state- and non-state stakeholders. 
In Zambia’s mining sector I found evidence of convergence of standards and 
practices in areas of policy positions, security cooperation, as well as in the growing 
role of the Chamber of Mines as spokesperson for the mining sector. Representatives 
396 This is Peter Evans’ (1995) embedded autonomy argument: a state that was only embedded would 
be totally captured by interests groups, whilst a state that was only autonomous would lack sources of 
intelligence and the ability to rely on decentralised private implementation. In Zambia the 
government’s embeddedness becomes crucial given evidence that firms retain the right to exit in the 
event of adverse external market conditions. 
397 This is particularly the case because ‘negatives’ – i.e. poor performance, strikes, riots, 
environmental incidents etc. – are more likely to cause a media uproar than company ‘positives’ such 
as community investment and timely reporting. 
398 Recall that transaction costs exist at the stage of information acquisition, as well as when changing 
organisational routines, systems and norms. 
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of regulatory agencies I spoke to argued that companies were also converging towards 
the same standard of regulatory compliance. NFCA in particular was seen as having 
‘improved’ its practices, albeit from a ‘low’ starting point. In late 2007 the situation at 
Chinese-owned mines was improving according to respondents at both ECZ and 
MSD.399 This also applied to the area of labour standards.400 
Yet some elements of business practice appeared more resistant to change than 
others. At NFCA organisational objectives of cost-minimisation continued to shape 
labour practices and limit trust between expatriate and local managers and workers. 
With limited interaction between Chinese expatriate managers and Zambian 
employees, there is little flow of information to facilitate organisational learning and 
diffusion of norms regarding doing business in Zambia (and with Zambians).401 In 
addition, I found no learning in the area of financial accounting and reporting. As the 
head accountant at NFCA reflects, “every year there are the same things that could 
not be comprehended last time [by the auditors]” (Chirwa, 30.11.07). 
To illustrate where the impetus for effective learning arises, and why NFCA 
has changed in some areas but not others, I draw on theories of evolutionary 
economics developed in chapter two. First, direct experience, or learning-by-doing, 
may account for some of the changes in the company’s labour practices (see 2.5.3). 
Stephen Banda at NFCA observed how in the past workers used to go underground 
without protective clothing: “[t]hey never knew the dangers of doing that. Until when 
three-four Chinese were killed, then they realised ‘oh, we have to be serious about 
safety’. I would say that at least of late they are trying to improve on safety.” (8.9.07). 
Another example of learning-by-doing relates to pressures from within the 
organisation: my respondent at NFCA argues (regarding continued improvements in 
conditions of service) that “it is because of the pressure of the workers themselves that 
have made those guys to change.” (Banda, 8.9.07). 402 Judging from follow-up 
interviews after field work, these changes to practices have been sustained, indicating 
examples of double-loop learning (see section 2.5.4). 
Alternatively, learning may arise from purposeful search and engagement with 
outside actors. This includes attempts to accommodate or in other ways defuse an 
increasingly adversarial political environment (such as that reflected in the 2006 
election and in debates following the publication of Development Agreements in early 
2007). One respondent at NFCA suggests that greater sensitivity to reputational risks 
(post-election, post-BGRIMM, post-DA publication) means that mining companies 
can no longer ride roughshod over communities in their vicinities (Maboshe, 
25.8.07).403 
399 
“I must say that in the last two-three years they are catching up … they are learning quickly.” (MSD 
inspector, 27.8.07). 
400 
“I’m telling you at first it was very difficult to interact with the Chinese … but of late they are 
trying, I would say some are good, some are not good.” (S.Banda, 8.9.07). 
401 Maboshe recounted how a new (Zambian) public relations officer at NFCA retorted “we don’t 
interface with journalists” when called from the press, lamenting that “our own Zambians” are 
supporting NFCA’s poor accountability (2.12.07). Banda jokingly explains that “we have what we call 
Zambian Chinese, or ‘black Chinese’” (2.12.07), referring to workers who adopt the practices and 
norms of management. My respondents are pessimistic about reform at NFCA, suspecting that because 
of such a tendency among Zambian employees it “will never change”. 
402 Other examples of labour-led progress include the new HIV/AIDS policy, see chapter six. 
403 Regarding a case where there were seasonal farmers occupying NFCA land, Maboshe thinks NFCA 
recognises they will get into trouble if they remove the farmers by force. “The fact is that they will 
have a problem with human rights NGOs if they just push them out… And that will also make them 
look bad. So they need to be sensitive, they have to do it nicely.” (Maboshe, 2.12.07) 
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NFCA appeared wary of becoming more of an embarrassment to government, 
sensing that the ruling MMD would be unlikely to stake their political future on 
Chinese investment alone. Retaining control over the legislature and with direct 
influence in the economy, the President could easily act against these investors if 
political sentiment against these mines grew strong enough (for the opposition) to 
challenge the MMD Presidency. The importance to NFCA of relying on GRZ as a 
broker – and evidence of official visits to NFCA and otherwise close links with the 
central government – provides a mechanisms for the communication of such 
404 concerns. 
However, installing a Zambian human resource manager – one of the changes 
at NFCA in response to post-BGRIMM criticisms – appears to not have been 
associated with more fundamental changes in company practices (one respondent sees 
him “more like remote control”; Banda, 8.9.07).405 The response to this learning-by­
search appears to be associated with single-loop learning, in particular where ‘hard’ 
enforcement is rarely exercised. 
My findings also indicate that under Zambia’s partnership approach to 
regulations, learning-by-doing (‘low interaction’) is likely to constitute double-loop 
learning at NFCA (Argyris & Schön 1978). Outside pressures (‘high interaction’) on 
the other hand, unless coupled with real threats of enforcement, are likely to be 
limited to more superficial single-loop learning (i.e. small changes to accommodate 
regulatory demands, satisficing health and safety inspectors with the bare minimum 
etc.). 
Another finding is that within this regulatory framework, firms that emphasise 
cost-minimisation (KCM and NFCA) appear more prone to single-loop learning. 
They thereby fail to address the internal systems in a way that reduces future risks of 
environmental, health and safety incidents: small incremental changes that are 
associated with lower costs are prioritised over the more fundamental (and costly) 
change associated with double loop learning (cf. how KCM’s large scale pollution of 
the Kafue had long been preceded by “small spills and small spills”, see 6.4.2). Table 
9 displays an indicative tabulation of examples of organisational learning in the 
Zambian mining sector. 
Table 9. Classification of examples of organisational learning 
Single-loop learning Double-loop learning 
High-interaction (incl. 







•	 Human resources policy • Env. incident (KCM) 
(NFCA) • Security (KCM, CM, 
•	 Accounting systems FQML, MCM) 
(NFCA) 
•	 Ongoing env. non­
compliance (KCM) 
•	 Labour conditions of • Safety practices (NFCA) 
service (NFCA)	 • Health, HIV/AIDS 
(NFCA) 
404 Stephen Muyakwa, Chairman of CSTNZ, thinks that the GRZ has grown more assertive towards 
NFCA, “taking advantage” of these political pressures and “saying ‘you almost cost us the [2006] 
election’.” (17.7.07). 
405 Banda explains that “the problem is that whatever that he thinks, he also takes it to this man, and if 
he says it is not good, that will be the end of it.” (8.9.07). 
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8.4.4 Organisational diversity, learning and policy evolution 
Organisational diversity matters for policy makers pursuing an enabling ‘partnership’ 
framework for international investment. I found western companies to be more used 
to the idea of regulatory relations as a constructive partnership, for instance CM often 
proactively invited regulators to come to its plants. FQML, similarly, pursues wide 
and open engagement with stakeholders, while NFCA preferred to let the Zambian 
government broker its relations with communities and labour unions. 
I found evidence of variation in positions and attitudes toward proposed 
reform of environmental and health and safety regulations. Some companies (for 
instance FQML, MCM and CM) actively supported regulatory reform. They included 
the firms where I found most evidence of high standards (FQML and CM), i.e. the 
companies that could more easily (with less cost) deal with stricter standards. NFCA, 
in contrast, was described as “apprehensive” when safety inspectors were around. 
These differences highlight how organisational diversity makes some companies more 
supportive of reform than others: companies that already have high standards and 
reporting routines in place will have an easier job of implementing more stringent 
government policies. 
Another example: the additional cost to FQML in publishing what it pays to 
government is a small effort with transparent and ‘straight’ reporting, as mandated by 
FQML’s participation in international capital markets (listings in London and 
Toronto). The marginal cost to this company in pre-emptively aligning its reporting 
with the EITI is very small, and helps guard against negative reputational effects (see 
chapter five). At NFCA, on the other hand, aligning routines with new regulations 
promoting fiscal transparency will be more costly (given evidence of transfer pricing, 
see chapter five). NFCA management is thus likely to be more resistant to change, 
and simply evade these measures if they can. 
Over time the processes of organisational learning can, to the extent it drives 
convergence around standards and policy positions, be seen as an input into the policy 
process (see 2.2.2). First, if firms are more of a homogenous lot, this makes it simpler 
for the state to enforce regulations. This is particularly the case with a regulatory 
framework that emphasises consultation and accommodation to each investor. As I 
argued above, it is resource-intensive to be a partner to a range of different actors. 
Second, learning is an intrinsic feature of a theoretical perspective of policy evolution, 
which emphasises mutual adaptation (as in the policy analysis of Grindle & Thomas 
1991). This appears to be the case in Zambia, as argued by several respondents at the 
ECZ.406 
To sum up, Zambia’s regulatory context features an interventionist political 
culture, an emphasis on accommodating investors (partnership regulation), and high 
information asymmetries. In such a context firms must learn from their mistakes and 
only then do routines and aims (and standards) change. An ECZ official recalls how 
when Vedanta arrived in 2004 they were saying they had no money to implement the 
AngloAmerican EMP. However in the aftermath of Kafue, “overnight money was 
widely available … So Kafue turned out to be a blessing in disguise, now we have 
[had] no problems getting KCM to comply.” (ECZ official 1, 11.9.07). 
“We have learned that the hard way in some cases, but we’ve definitely had to change our approach 




8.4.5 Section conclusion 
In this section I first established the diversity in organisational routines across 
investors from different institutional backgrounds. I reported on the oft-overlapping 
different channels of policy in the Zambian state: a state that can and does sustain, 
simultaneously, multiple (formal and informal) articulations of state-firm relations 
(for example NFCA vs. FQML). I argued that diversity across firms presents a 
problem when trying to reform mining sector policies. In the context of Zambia’s 
partnership approach to regulation, where each investor is promised consideration, 
support, and with rights of consultation on new policy, diversity equates to policy 
stagnation. 
I then discussed why convergence might take place over time. I argued that 
given transaction costs associated with changing routines (and given scarce 
managerial resources), managers must have sufficient incentives to expend resources 
on upgrading reporting systems. If regulation were more effectively enforced, this 
would increase the opportunity cost of non-compliance (thereby creating incentives 
for investing in compliance). In its absence companies’ self-reporting will likely 
continue to reflect its routines-in-place. 
In presenting some examples of organisational learning, the third sub-section 
provided some indications that worse-performing companies – if enforcement 
capacity is lacking – will respond to regulators through single-loop learning (Argyris 
& Schön 1978, see section 2.5.4). KCM’s engagement with ECZ in the lead-up to the 
Kafue incident constitutes an example of single-loop learning. ECZ had been visiting 
KCM’s sites, following several small spills, but the company had taken little forceful 
action to remedy the problem. This suggests that lacking enforcement is associated 
with more superficial changes to environmental management systems. 
Finally, I looked at how organisational diversity and learning shaped policy 
evolution. I found that the partnership approach to regulation and policy making did 
not appear to resonate equally strongly will all the mines. I also found that companies 
in the absence of effective enforcement are most likely to change their practices at a 
fundamental level when exposed to processes of learning-by-doing rather than 
external shocks in the policy environment (a somewhat counterintuitive result). The 
problem is that in high-externality industries where a (potentially significant) 
proportion of costs are not borne by the company, learning-by-doing (i.e. by incurring 
costs through trial and error) carries high social costs. In these situations, an effective 
regulatory framework is needed to ensure that companies change reform their routines 
and practices before such incidents occur. 
8.5 Chinese exceptionalism? 
Much of the rapidly growing academic literature on China-Africa relations has tended 
to isolate and explore Chinese engagement with little attention to historical and local 
context (see literature reviews by Large 2008 and Mohan 2008). This often results in 
a rather static view of Chinese engagement as somehow exceptional, separate from 
the western donor-driven international aid architecture, and even de-coupled from 
other influences on African economies and polities. A similar danger over­
simplification is present in the literature on south-south trade and investment (see 
chapter one), with its grouping of countries into broad ‘northern’ and ‘southern’ 
categories. 
In response to this deficiency I developed the concept of ‘institutional 
background’ as a basis of categorisation. It allows us to look at the political economy 
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of policy making through a multi-coloured lens of corporate governance, 
administrative heritage legacies (see 4.4.6), inter-state relations, and international 
markets (for capital as well as commodities). A central aim of this study was therefore 
to place one small part of China-Africa economic engagement in such a holistic 
framework. 
In this section I attempt to elaborate on two inter-related questions concerning 
Chinese investment into the Zambian copper mining sector. First I ask how large 
Chinese companies are different from their western counterparts. I then ask whether 
China is likely to be a good development party to African states. I focus on features I 
believe to be generalisable beyond the single case of NFCA. 
8.5.1 Distinguishing characteristics of Chinese multinationals 
In this sub-section I make five selected points concerning what appear to be 
distinguishing features of Chinese state-owned mining multinationals. I first I argue 
that large-scale Chinese investment into Africa’s extractive industries represents a 
form of state-influenced capitalism that includes exposure to markets as well as state 
politics. As a second distinguishing feature, I highlight the network structure of 
organising different mining functions that I found at NFCA. I then point to the fact 
that Chinese companies are unlikely to be familiar with the partnership approach to 
regulation employed in institutionally weak African states. Fourth, I note some 
tentative evidence of what I found to be de facto short-term strategies in place at 
NFCA, and finally the segregated nature of employee relations. 
Chinese companies are often characterised by a nuanced mix of state influence 
coupled with partial exposure to markets.407 While the state-owned enterprises that 
dominate Chinese investment into the extractive resources often rely on international 
markets to buy and sell inputs and outputs, Chinese government plays a facilitating 
role: Chinese firms often enter through political channels and pursue articulations of 
state-firm relations that concentrate on executive-level relations with the Presidency. 
As the Minister of Commerce, Felix Mutati, remarked, “[i]t’s because of the president 
going to China that we have been able to secure a loan of US$1 billion” (Lusaka 
Times 11.3.10). African states with highly centralised and neo-patrimonial rule, 
including Zambia, can readily accommodate such relationships (see 2.2.1). 
Unlike the other mines I looked at, NFCA operated in a network structure with 
a range of ‘sister companies’ (e.g. the Chambishi Foundry) primarily producing inputs 
to NFCA but simultaneously supplying (their surpluses) to other mining companies. 
This allows NFCA to retain control over its supply chain without relinquishing 
neither flexibility nor the discipline of the market. An interesting feature of this 
networked organisational structure is that it enables future entrants to leverage the 
experiences of already-established organisations (e.g. NFCA facilitating for new 
entrants into the Chambishi Special Economic Zone). In addition to financial support, 
NFCA disseminates internal policies and administrative processes. This network 
structure thereby drives convergence of standards among Chinese actors in the mining 
sector by allowing new entrants to leverage the experiences already internalised by 
NFCA. 
One distinguishing characteristic at NFCA was what appeared to be limited 
familiarity of Chinese managers with norms of behaviour embodied in Zambia’s 
regulatory framework. As discussed in some detail above, the partnership approach to 
407 See The Economist (15.4.10). I elaborate on this point in Haglund (2010). 
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regulation requires companies to engage with regulatory bureaucrats, and relies on 
self-reporting supported by inspections and proactive exchange of information. Mr 
Sun, Company Secretary of the Chambishi Copper Smelter and previously at NFCA, 
suggests that companies in China do not have experience with the closer relationships 
with regulators. “I think that the labour laws in China will not interfere in the 
production of the company … here you must pay more attention to the labour laws, 
because it is easy for an investor to be taken to court.” (1.11.07). 
NFCA often appeared to tend toward de facto short-term strategies, including 
a focus on minimising costs, a focus on maximising short-term production, and rapid 
(institutionalised) turnover of Chinese managers. The focus on production among 
managers may be explained as follows: with NFCA expected (by its parent CNMC) to 
support other companies in and around Chambishi, including through loans, CNMC is 
likely to measure NFCA management’s performance based on more ‘operational’ 
(non-financial) indicators (such as production and sales). This is because the latter 
production indicators are – unlike the financial bottom line – within NFCA 
management’s control. 
However short-term objectives lead to organisational learning that is 
superficial and reactive, and that fails to address underlying issues. It thereby 
undermines companies’ long-term political legitimacy and drives nationalist politics 
in the host country (as I have argued in Haglund 2009).408 This is a particular concern 
in the context of Zambia’s partnership approach to regulating the sector, where 
companies appear to be learning ‘the hard way’ (meaning that sustainable changes 
only occur after costly incidents). 
In a related point, I also found clear evidence of managerial segregation at 
NFCA that did not exist at the other mines I studied (see, for instance, 6.3.6). As one 
of my respondents at NFCA notes, “[n]o matter how educated I will be, if a Chinese 
comes, I will teach him what to do, then they will say this one is your boss.” (Banda, 
8.9.07). This form of organising labour, with historical antecedents in the way British 
mining companies operated during the colonial era,409 limits organisational learning 
by the firm: an individual’s experience is not transferred to others within the 
organisation, and “the lessons of history are likely to be lost through turnover of 
personnel” (Levitt & March 1988: 328). 
8.5.2 Will China be a good development partner to African states? 
Chinese development cooperation is still low relative to that of ‘traditional’ donors 
(Manning 2006) but it is expanding rapidly. China has pioneered the resource-backed 
loans that are funding roads and other infrastructure in many African countries, in 
return for natural resource concessions (see Foster et al. 2009). Importantly for many 
commodity-dependent African countries, the state-directed capitalism of the PRC has 
thus far been able to display itself as a more stable partner to African governments. In 
Africa’s resource sectors Chinese investment exhibited particularly ‘counter-cyclical’ 
behaviour during the financial crisis that rocked the world economy in 2008 and 2009. 
This trend was apparent in Zambia, where Chinese firms acquired assets at low prices 
from their credit-constrained western owners (see Haglund 2009b, Brautigam 2009). 
408 Chan (2008) reflects that Chinese companies’ limited reflection over underlying systems, processes 
and values, and reduced exposure to competing views leads to risk analysis that can only be 
“generalised and one-dimensional”. 
409 David Leonard, Institute of Development Studies, personal communication (27.9.08). 
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In this particular crisis western capital markets rebounded pretty fast, however 
the lesson of who is a reliable partner was not lost on Zambian policy makers 
(Haglund 2011). Unlike most other states, China can make a credible commitment to 
maintain investment into key sectors, since it controls the companies that invest as 
well as the banks that finance them. 
However there are causes for measured concern. Some features of how 
Chinese capital currently operates may limit its contribution to Africa’s development. 
For example the networked structure reduces external accountability to the Zambia 
Revenue Authority, an important issue given evidence of transfer pricing in the sector 
(see chapter five). 
Another issue is that Chinese companies that do not depend on international 
capital markets may be unencumbered by disclosure requirements and reporting based 
on international accounting standards, thus facilitating transfer pricing and tax evasion 
(see box below). Chinese investment may also have a particularly low catalysing 
effect on the local manufacturing sector, given the tendency among Chinese 
companies to procure from low-cost home-country input markets (which they are 
intimately familiar with). 
In answering the question of whether China will be a good development 
partner to African governments, one must be careful to distinguish between state and 
government. China’s generally un-transparent means of engaging and arranging 
overseas projects may hold benefits for ruling African political elites. At the same 
time, this form of engagement may actually – by virtue of excluding wider 
consultation and analysis of projects – reduce overall development impacts of this 
investment. 
From a policy perspective, there is a risk that the preferred approach of 
Chinese companies to negotiate and invest in African markets leads to stagnation in 
policy reform. Africa has vast untapped natural resources but lacks domestic sources 
of capital to transform these into economic growth. In order to attract, retain and 
benefit from foreign investment effective policy must be in place. However Chinese 
companies are unlikely to be familiar with the type of ‘partnership approach’ to 
regulatory relations evident in Zambia, where consultations and consensus are 
required to legitimate policy reform in the mining sector. Rather, my Chinese case 
study firm shows a tendency towards approaches to engaging with, and seeking 
stability in, the external policy environment through engagement with political elites. 
These characteristics can become a hindrance to progress in reforming regulatory 
policies. 
However any failure to proceed with reform cannot be traced solely to Chinese 
(or any other ‘subversive’) investors. Rather, both sides of the coin matter: it is the 
ability/willingness of the Zambian government to entertain both informal and formal 
relations that sustain differences within the sector (Haglund 2008). As Alden (2007) 
observes, Chinese investors’ regulatory compliance varies across jurisdictions. 
Chinese firms thereby show themselves as quite capable, despite having 
internationalised relatively recently, of adhering to higher corporate standards in 
countries with stronger regulatory frameworks. 
Importantly this thesis has also showed that the way in which my Chinese case 
study company does business, and negotiates the local political economy, has evolved 
over time. I found various examples of organisational learning taking place at NFCA, 
including how the company was seen as having improved both environmental and 
safety standards (albeit from a low base, relative to other companies studied). This 
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points to the need for more detailed and empirically grounded studies of Chinese 
investment into Africa, ideally of a comparative nature. 
Box 10: Managerial compensation and international capital markets 
The role of routines and practices related to managers’ compensation and financial incentives 
may be significant in shaping firm behaviour, but has not been discussed in this thesis due to 
data limitations. Managers’ financial incentives include salaries and performance-linked 
bonuses, typically set by a Board-level remuneration committee. For companies listed on 
international stock markets, bonuses normally include some form of deferred consideration 
linked to the firm’s market value, often in the form of stock options. As managers rise in 
seniority, the overall remuneration package tends to become increasingly correlated to the 
stock price, thereby aligning managers’ incentives with the factors driving the stock price. 
According to financial theory, the stock market price should capture both short-term 
and long-term expected performance (Brealey & Myers 1996).410 Thus, at stock-market listed 
companies, managers’ fortunes will to some degree be linked to long-term performance. 
However, at unlisted and state-owned companies, constituting the majority of Chinese 
multinationals in the extractive industries, individuals cannot be rewarded on this basis of a 
market (and long-term) indicator such as a share price. In this case it is likely that a higher 
weighting will be attributed to shorter-term and more easily observed indicators, such as 
production, sales, and profit. 
8.6 Reflections on methodology 
I found that my methodology of looking for detailed markers of behaviour among 
companies as well as within government was challenging at times, when these 
organisations and individuals did not engage with me. Mining companies too were 
also often reluctant to share information, partly explained by what I found to be a 
contested notion of what constitutes public and non-public information. To illustrate, 
in negotiating access with the mining companies, I initially attributed NFCA’s 
granting of a long interview with a deputy CEO (and apparent readiness for me to 
meet more people) to a gradual ‘opening up’ of NFCA following recent criticisms. 
Their subsequent and sustained refusal to grant further meetings therefore took me by 
surprise. In private, an employee in NFCA’s administration explained how NFCA 
“ha[d] gone back into their shell” following a radio programme on Chinese 
investment conducted for the BBC World Service (Maboshe, 2.12.07).411 
It was often difficult to obtain detailed or quantitative information because 
regulatory agencies took care not to highlight variations among firms and single out 
‘worse’ performers. 412 It seemed that doing so might serve to acknowledge that 
regulators were having ‘problems’, thereby opening up space for external criticism. In 
an environment of high information asymmetries, with few checks on the factuality of 
410 A firm’s stock price is defined as the risk-adjusted present value of all future cash flow to the firm 
(derived by the markets collective assumptions on things such remaining years of mine life, output 
growth, de-commissioning costs etc.). It therefore takes into account an element of longer-term 
prospects – consider how stock prices fall when a firm becomes embroiled in a conflict, even before 
any actual payments or costs have been incurred. 
411 She explains that “[t]he BBC came, they were talking about Chinese investment around the world, 
and it was Mr Xu, he said there are no problems here etc. etc. Lying to his teeth, we are very happy, our 
workers are happy. And then they got a casual worker as well, and it was the opposite, so that is what 
Xu [Company Secretary] was complaining about. So then they banned foreign interviewees.” 
(Maboshe, 2.12.07). 
412 To illustrate, this only happened on a couple of occasions in over ten interviews with ECZ officials. 
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information in the media, and where bureaucrats are often political appointments, 
admitting to any form of difficulties becomes risky. 
It was clear to me that some caution was required in interpreting mining 
managers’ views regarding the merit of particular policy proposals. In discussing 
increases in tax and royalty rates, for example, mining company respondents had an 
obvious incentive to exaggerate the impact of this policy change on the country’s 
attractiveness as an investment destination. However evidence that investors not only 
care about fiscal incentives and stability clauses is provided by Peru, which has 
climbed rapidly in the Fraser Institute’s mining-sector competitiveness rankings, 
despite the Peruvian government’s move to increase royalties in 2005.413 
Another example of such mining sector bias is how some mining company 
representatives described the 100% capital allowances granted to firms as “very 
common” (FQML mgr 1, 5.9.07). In fact the changes (through the 2008 fiscal reform) 
from 100% to 25% capital allowances – such that capital expenditure is depreciated 
over four years – remains highly competitive internationally (Lundstol 2009). 
This study has illustrated the danger of functionalist explanations to 
institutional outcomes (see chapter two). First, it showed how fiscal and 
environmental concessions and discretionary standards were given to firms that were 
not themselves involved in lobbying for such concessions (see Sinkamba, 1.8.07). 
Second, I found evidence that the concessions of environmental standards, including 
limits on effluents that were to rise gradually over time, were initially devised by state 
mining conglomerate ZCCM-IH rather than an outcome of bargaining with incoming 
foreign firms (see 6.3.2). 
In exploring the role that large foreign mining companies play in policy 
evolution I was interested in whether companies might bargain with different 
government actors during the policy ‘design’ phase and during a subsequent policy 
‘implementation’ phase. I found such ‘stages’ of policy making to not be easily 
distinguishable, reflecting the multi-faceted role that central government plays in 
policy formulation as well as enforcement. 
Moreover, where regulatory policy makers are actively involved with mining 
companies in a consultative ‘partnership’ framework, these essentially enforcing 
agencies become involved in policy formulation. For instance, the ECZ is mainly seen 
as an implementing agency, with direct contact with the mines. Yet under a regulatory 
framework based on the principle of accommodating foreign investment, this ECZ as 
a company-facing technocratic regulatory agency also becomes actively involved in 
setting the agenda for reform.414 The ECZ thus operates in a dual role as both enforcer 
and originator of rules but relies on Parliament – controlled by the Presidency, with a 
different set of incentives from the ECZ – for incorporating policy proposals into 
binding legal frameworks. 
413 The Fraser Institute is a well-respected research firm that produces rankings of countries’ mining 
policy frameworks (based on surveys of mining managers). See http://www.fraserinstitute.org. 
414 Section 96 of the EPPCA states that the Statutory Instruments, which specify conditions for granting 
licenses, are to be developed by the Ministry of Environment “in conjunction with” the ECZ. The role 




My thesis has analysed a range of issues that prevent Zambia’s mining sector from 
delivering on its great potential to drive national development. I ave focused on issues 
relating to fiscal transparency, environmental, health and safety practices and the 
nature of mining companies’ economic links with their suppliers. This final chapter is 
structured as follows. I first summarise the main findings and analysis as presented in 
the previous chapter. I then offer some recommendations for future research, as well 
as some suggestions for policy makers. 
9.1 Summary of findings 
This section summarises the findings of my pursuit of two research questions posed at 
the outset of this thesis: 
•	 How do state-firm relations and regulatory policy making evolve in weak 
resource-dependent countries? 
•	 What shapes processes of convergence or divergence around regulatory 
standards in the Zambian mining sector? 
9.1.1 State-firm bargaining and policy evolution 
Relations between the Zambian state and foreign mining companies are characterised 
by ongoing bargaining over the allocation of costs and benefits of FDI, including 
fiscal terms. I found no evidence of a unidirectional shift of bargaining power towards 
or away from the state. Rather, in this process firms retain some forms of power (e.g. 
the right to exit, as evidenced by early investors leaving whilst copper prices remained 
depressed), whilst the state retains other forms of power (such as control through 
brokering relationships and providing operational stability). 
At the time of privatisation in the late 1990s the government sought to 
accommodate incoming investors by providing a range of incentives, including fiscal 
terms and commitments to regulatory stability. These were provided initially through 
individual bargaining, at the government’s discretion. However subsequent pleas by 
companies for a level playing field resulted in mainstreaming of best-negotiated terms 
(of e.g. royalty and tax rates) into the legal framework applicable to all mines. 
This reduced further the already low economic ‘take’ accruing to Zambians 
from extraction of their mineral resources. Although motivated at privatisation as 
incentives that would ensure investment and therefore stability in the mining sector 
(guarantees of jobs etc.), these concessions reduced the longer term stability and 
attractiveness of the country as an investment location. In the case of Zambia the 
sentiment that local citizens were not benefitting from rapid expansion of foreign 
investment fuelled political pressures. It led to growing demands that government 
renegotiate the fiscal framework in the mining sector. 
Government tried to engage in orderly negotiation, wary of reneging on 
stability commitments given at privatisation. Yet when faced with the complexities of 
negotiating with a group of mines each with different agendas, government eventually 
took unilateral action. This policy reversal will be remembered by international 
investors and is likely to have contributed to the sharp reductions in investment that 
took place during the subsequent economic crisis. 
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Institutionally weak states are often subject to high policy volatility: policy 
changes quickly, because governments need to attract capital but at the same time can 
be eliminated at the polls if they do not address pressing economic and social 
development concerns. In the case of Zambia limited policy predictability was 
exacerbated by political intervention in the mining sector by the President and central 
government. Such interventionism was legitimated by a pro-development discourse 
directly linking “investment” with “development” (see discussion around the ‘faith in 
FDI’ discourse in section 4.3.2.2). 
Importantly the Zambian government also intervened to provide support for 
large foreign mining companies, e.g. by ‘brokering’ companies’ relations with unions. 
I found that companies varied in their predisposition toward making use of such 
‘services’ from government, depending on their institutional background. Companies 
that were used to leverage personal networks and state-level political support before 
arriving in Zambia are more likely to retain this way of doing business. For example, 
whilst NFCA’s state-centric approach means it relies heavily on government to brief 
communities and stakeholders on the implications of its projects. FQML, on the other 
hand, engages actively and directly with local actors and has a more ‘western’ multi-
stakeholder approach to community relations. The combination of formal and 
informal channels of policy making and access to firms enables African governments 
to sustain – simultaneously – these alternative articulations of regulatory relations. 
The trajectory of policy evolution is also shaped by a range of external 
influences including international commodity markets, capital markets and inter-state 
relations (for instance relations with western donors or the Chinese state). I argued in 
chapter eight that the commodities boom had adverse impacts on Zambia’s regulatory 
capacity: already capacity-constrained regulatory agencies found themselves having 
to deal with an ever-growing number of fragmented actors, while shortages of skills 
led higher-paying mining companies to poach engineers, geologists etc. from the 
government agencies supposed to oversee the mining sector. 
The boom also served to make many companies more short-sighted in their 
investment decisions. High copper prices reduce the payback time on new projects, 
leading companies to prioritise expansion of production over investment in 
maintenance. This constitutes a particular risk in a context of enforcement capacity 
constraints. Interestingly, the boom also reduced the impact of international standards 
on the mining companies: with windfall profits companies could self-finance 
expansion rather than going through international capital markets that increasingly 
demand adherence to the Equator Principles. 
At the time of field work, when copper prices were high and capital markets 
buoyant, there was little difference among the companies under study in terms of their 
ability to raise investment capital. The subsequent global financial crisis of 2008-09, 
however, drove home to many developing countries that investors purporting to 
develop their mineral resources depend hugely on access to capital markets. As 
western firms saw their credit turned off by banks that quickly sought to minimise 
their risk exposures, China’s state-owned banks could (and did) keep lending. Many 
western firms pulled out, and China stepped in (Haglund 2010). 
Given evidence of the fickleness of western international capital, it is small 
wonder that African governments have been increasingly looking east. Whilst the 
policy focus remains one of providing an enabling and attractive environment for 
foreign investment, policy makers are seeing more value in accommodating Chinese 
investment. In the case of Zambia China’s decision to locate its first African special 
economic zone in the country comes with a promise: additional future investment and 
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cooperation can be had if the business practices of these investors (see 8.5) can be 
accommodated (within limits of what is politically acceptable to the ruling party). 
9.1.2 The partnership approach to regulation 
In section 8.3 I argued that regulatory policy in Zambia’s mining sector is developed 
within a framework that emphasises partnership between mining companies and 
regulatory agencies. This framework places companies close to their regulators 
through institutionalised consultative processes, a reliance on self-reporting and 
notions of mutual accountability. 
Making use of self-regulation and emphasising a degree of partnership in 
regulatory frameworks can be a beneficial strategy for institutionally weak states. It 
can serve the dual purposes of increasing the attractiveness of an investment 
destination (companies have a say in how they are regulated) and alleviating 
government capacity constraints (having companies self-report their conduct takes 
some pressure off regulatory bodies). However I found several issues with a 
partnership approach to regulation within the Zambian context, many of which will 
apply to commodity-dependent developing countries elsewhere. 
First, for policy reform to move ahead the partnership approach to regulation 
necessitates some level of consensus among the participating parties. This consensus 
is difficult to obtain when there are many such proposals ‘on the table’ simultaneously 
and where companies have different objectives and routines for achieving them. The 
overall bargaining ‘game’ was further complicated by the multiple and at times 
overlapping consultations around new mining policy, environmental policy, health 
and safety policy, and energy policy – each with significant bottom-line impacts of 
firms. One effect of this complex negotiation agenda is that it makes the overall 
policy environment more difficult to interpret for firms, thereby reducing 
organisational learning and processes of convergence in the sector.415 
Second, I elaborated on the point that partnership regulation sits rather 
uneasily with the highly centralised and ‘Presidential’ nature of Zambian politics. 
The President and senior government officials retain the right to intervene in the 
decisions of regulatory agencies as well as the private sector, which accounts for some 
of the perceived policy volatility referred to above. Companies, however, may be 
reluctant to participate fully in the process if they fear that a tough bargaining stance 
in one policy realm might lead to retaliation from the government in another. With 
much of state power concentrated in the Presidency, and with the ruling party 
exercising majority control over the Parliament, the latter is relegated to the role of 
formalising and rubber-stamping policy. This situation reduces the real policy 
relevance of ostensibly important consultations between firms and regulatory 
(implementing) agencies. 
Third, the emphasis on mutual accountability contained in the partnership 
regulatory discourse makes regulatory agencies wary of divulging information that 
may be used to increase the accountability of firms. Thus, while the partnership 
approach puts regulators and regulated on par, it excludes participation and 
consultations with wider stakeholders such as NGOs, community groups etc. 
Fourth, the Zambian mining sector has been transformed over the last decade 
from a homogenous and uniform sector to one with significant diversity in 
415 As Teece et al. observe, “if many aspects of a firm’s learning environment change simultaneously, 
the ability to ascertain cause-effect relationships is confounded because cognitive structures will not be 
formed” in time. They add that “rates of learning will diminish as a result” (1997: 523). 
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organisational practices and interests. The mining companies studied all have 
different cost structures, operate under slightly different Development Agreements, 
and have different preferences for how to achieve a stable operating environment. 
Diversity across companies has implications for a regulatory framework that relies 
heavily on self-reporting. When discretionary and varying standards applied to mining 
companies, and with limited requirements on what should be included in these 
reports, self-reporting becomes reflective of firms’ routines in place when they arrived 
in Zambia. 
Importantly, diversity makes some mining companies more supportive of 
policy reform than others. The better-performing companies suffer negative 
reputational externalities when worse-performing companies get involved in 
environmental, safety or other incidents.416 Better-performing companies end up more 
supportive of stricter regulations, whereas worse-performing companies oppose them. 
It becomes difficult to reach consensus. The result is stagnation in policy reform (see 
6.4.4). 
9.1.3 Diversity and learning in volatile and complex environments 
In this thesis I have argued strongly that differences across companies’ organisational 
routines and objectives (see chapters five through seven) are significant determinants 
of companies’ relationships with state and non-state actors. These routines and 
objectives evolve over time through processes of organisational learning, as firms 
respond to an ever-changing external environment. They derive from a combination 
of investors’ institutional background and legacies of its acquired host-country 
operations (see section 4.4.6). 
In section 8.4 I first highlighted some examples of variation in company 
practices in relation to international standards, supplier bargaining practices, and in 
the relative importance ascribed to objectives of cost-minimisation and stability. In 
support of existing theory I found these routines and objectives to be relatively stable 
over time, even in the presence of inefficiencies. 
I then asked what might drive processes of learning, and ultimately 
convergence or divergence of standards in the mining sector. I found that the 
consultative approach to policy reform embodied in Zambia’s regulatory framework 
can promote convergence. Moreover, processes of convergence among firms make 
future consultation and bargaining easier. A partnership approach to regulation 
therefore reinforces itself over time and can be a driver of organisational learning. 
Learning is a collective activity, and organisations such as the Chamber of 
Mines as well as ZCCM-IH can play significant roles in facilitating the sharing of best 
practices as well as coordinating policy positions among investors. I found some 
evidence of the Chamber of Mines becoming increasingly influential in this regard. 
Less formally, the movement of people between the mining sector and the 
government or non-state actors leads to a form of mimetic diffusion of routines, aims 
and norms. 
My findings show, however, that these processes of convergence are far from 
automatic. This is particularly the case in ‘hybrid’ African states (see section 2.2.1) 
with capability to sustain, simultaneously, two different articulations of regulation: the 
less formal variant Chinese companies aspire to and are accustomed to, as well as the 
416 I found that the companies that already had standards in place that sometimes went beyond the 
Zambian requirements were more likely to support reform. 
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more formal variant preferred by western foreign investors. Convergence is also held 
back by the opacity of institutions, which makes it more difficult for firms to correctly 
interpret signals in their external environment. 
I identified cases where organisational learning is taking place and asked 
whether these processes were promoting convergence in firms’ stances on fiscal, 
environmental, safety and supplier practices. My findings highlight cases where 
routines and aims have changed at the mining companies, in response to varying 
internal and external pressures. These instances of learning can be distinguished 
between superficial ‘single-loop’ learning and more deep-seated, or transformational, 
‘double-loop’ learning. In the context of weak enforcement under a partnership 
approach to regulation, single-loop learning seems to be a more likely initial path for 
companies faced with external pressures. However, if faced with greater pressures, 
and the removal of the option to bargain over outcomes with government (e.g. in the 
case of severe environmental incidents), I found companies to exhibit more 
fundamental double-loop learning. 
The fact that many initial pressures (e.g. ECZ reprimanding KCM over its 
small spills into the Kafue river) did not immediately result in more deep-seated 
organisational changes would not be an issue in the absence of externalities. However 
in pollution-intensive heavy industries, failures to comply with regulations can have 
serious consequences. The problem is that under a partnership approach to regulation, 
with limited enforcement capacity, firms need to ‘learn the hard way’ with significant 
negative development implications. 
My findings also suggest that double-loop learning may be more likely when 
there are actors within the organisation that are championing organisational change. 
For instance, slow but steady improvements to labour standards at NFCA appear to 
have resulted from sustained pressure by workers themselves (with a limited influence 
of unions). 
Finally, these processes of convergence are important to policy makers 
operating within a partnership regulatory framework. I noted that it is resource 
intensive for regulatory agencies to be a partner to a diverse set of actors. To the 
extent it results in convergence around some set standards, organisational learning can 
therefore act as an input into the policy process that facilitates future rounds of policy 
negotiations. 
9.1.4 Chinese exceptionalism 
This study has found that Chinese state-influenced enterprises presents a special case 
of investment worthy of further study. In section 8.5 I defined Chinese foreign 
investment as state-influenced where the company operates largely on market terms 
(e.g. with respect to marketing its copper), but where the parent state-owned company 
(and, by extension, the PRC government) retains ultimate control. I showed how the 
Chinese case-study firm engages with the executive rather than local stakeholders. I 
discussed how exercise of control through personal and informal relationships enables 
the firm to avoid scrutiny associated with more formal channels of state-firm 
relations. 
I highlighted features that can be generalised to wider Chinese investment 
beyond NFCA. These features include the network structure employed by NFCA and 
its operations on the Copperbelt (implications for fiscal transparency), and the lack of 
familiarity with norms underpinning Zambia’s partnership approach to regulation. 
Other characteristics included the relative segregation between Chinese expatriates 
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and local employees at these companies and the aggressive practices of minimising 
costs and prioritising production expansion. These characteristics have implications 
for regulatory compliance at the company, as well as the likely pace at which 
convergence around regulatory standards can take place. 
In asking the question of whether China will be a good development partner 
for African states, I highlighted how China’s promise of being a more reliable and 
stable partners in Africa’s economic development gained credibility after the recent 
global financial. African governments may thus be particularly prone to accommodate 
large Chinese investment that form part of broader China-Africa development 
cooperation. 
Foreign investment is an activity that does not attract much case-by-case 
scrutiny in Zambia. It is de facto legitimated by the shift in discourse from aid to 
investment, and from external dependence to local economic empowerment (see 
chapter four). However, if non-transparency surrounding Chinese projects continues 
(a hallmark of Chinese overseas investment to date), the result may be stagnation in 
reforms aimed at removing discretionary treatment of investors (see chapter five). The 
risk is that growing dominance of Chinese and other ‘southern’ economic interests in 
Africa’s extractive industries will polarise the sector, thereby posing challenges for 
reform. 
9.1.5 Concluding remarks 
Understanding policy making as an evolutionary process reveals how Zambia’s 
current partnership approach fails to address the government’s official policy 
objectives of providing an enabling environment for business. The partnership 
approach fails because it is poorly suited to a context of rapidly changing policy, an 
interventionist political culture, and high diversity among the regulated firms. 
The policy environment I have studied is one where mining companies have 
room for manoeuvre, but within limits. On the face of it firms in Zambia’s copper 
sector have significant bargaining power (including the de facto right to exit). 
However government retains influence through informal mechanisms and reliance by 
companies on government to ‘broker’ labour relations (both discussed in chapter 
five). The government’s power to shape the policy environment is volatile, as it is 
directly linked to international copper prices (illustrated by the unilateral action to 
raise taxes and royalties in January 2008. 
Zambia’s presidential political culture enables the government to sustain, 
simultaneously, formal as well as informal articulations of state-firm relations, 
including through brokering wider stakeholder relations of firms. The imperfectly 
specified nature of this ‘game’ results in uncertainty for investors. When regulatory 
failures occur, the opaque informational context means that one company’s 
malpractice readily reflects on other firms in the sector. This divides the sector into 
better and worse performers. A regulatory framework based on notions of 
accommodation and ‘partnership’ with investors fails to move ahead with reform 
when different parts of the mining sector hold different views for how this reform 
should take place. 
Outward investment from China and other emerging markets has expanded 
dramatically over the past decade, and followed a counter-cyclical pattern during the 
recent global financial crisis. Chinese firms differ from western firms in their 
tendency to focus on relationships with political leadership, rather than engage more 
broadly with a range of local actors. Over time companies from different institutional 
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backgrounds may harmonise around some new standard, and my findings show some 
indicative signs of convergence. Yet in the short-term disequilibrium is likely to 
persist given rapid change of the external policy and market environments. 
Different articulations of state-firm relations are easily accommodated in 
countries with presidential political cultures, that allow for informal (if not formal) 
discretion in industrial policy. In such environments, personal relationships with 
political leaders have real value to companies. The key point is not that the 
government is offering protection to e.g. the Chinese, for instance, but rather that the 
Chinese are more likely (currently at least) to take them up on this offer. If increased 
south-south FDI leads to a greater share of firms that seek to cultivate and make use 
of such relationships, this may perpetuate informal, un-transparent and centralised 
mechanisms of governance, thus entrenching the challenges of regulatory policy 
evolution highlighted in this thesis. 
9.2 Recommendations for research 
A key finding of this thesis is that institutional analysis of a specific policy instrument 
cannot be undertaken in isolation from other, conflicting or complementary, policies. 
This points to the need for a political economy approach to understanding regulatory 
relations in which the researcher must be open to both state-centred and interest 
group-centred (pluralist) policy analysis (see 2.2.2). This finding carries 
epistemological implications: data collected on the basis of isolated observations of 
policy positions and state-firm interaction is unlikely to provide a comprehensive 
picture of how policy evolves. This thesis should be read as a call for more inter­
disciplinary and context-sensitive methods in researching mining sector policy 
making. 
A second finding is that institutions affect firm behaviour in different ways 
depending on firm-specific characteristics in the form of organisational routines and 
objectives. Because of divergent routines and objectives across firms, getting 
institutions and policies ‘right’ is only part of the answer: we must pay more attention 
to the responsiveness of the regulated to proposed market and policy reform 
(Braithwaite 2006). 
The arguments and findings of this thesis provide fertile ground for greater 
formalisation of extractive industries policy in least-developed countries. Such studies 
could include taking constructs and relationships developed here into existing 
formalised schema for explaining institutional change (cf. the emphasis of Ostrom 
2005 on exogenous factors, the arena for social interaction, and outcomes). Ostrom’s 
emphasis on understanding the informational context as one where stable and pre­
existing institutions cannot be pre-assumed, is very much in line with the evolutionary 
perspective adopted in this study. 
Finally, this thesis locates regulation of the extractive industries at the 
intersection of two global trends of greater diversity at the micro level and greater 
convergence at the macro level. 417 The challenges faced by mining companies 
417 In March 2009 the Global Environmental Institute of China (GEI) announced guidelines for 
environmental conduct of Chinese overseas companies overseas. Under new rules all such projects 
would have to undertake environmental impact assessments before projects are commissioned. See 
China Daily (29.5.2009). Similarly, China is not alone in supporting its overseas investors, and this 
model has been copied in Japanese government policy instructing the country’s Bank for International 
Cooperation (that normally does not lend to private TNCs) to make capital available to Japanese TNCs 
investing abroad (UNCTAD 2009: 20). 
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resonate with developments in the field of overseas development aid, where the 
question associated with donors’ move to direct budget support becomes one of ‘who 
is adapting to whom?’ Donors are supposed to ‘align’ themselves with the state, but 
cannot adapt too much because of need to keep their international operations 
streamlined. 
A second parallel can be drawn with developments in the human rights 
agenda: a transition is taking place away from homogeneous interests among donors 
(over e.g. human rights and the conflict in Darfur, Sudan), to a new composition of 
external influences, where recent ‘entrants’ (e.g. China) show a disregard for 
previously established norms. These examples point to the need for a political 
economy approach that is sensitive to the divergent and convergent forces that exist 
amongst the external actors themselves, be they multinational enterprises, state actors, 
or both. 
9.3 Policy implications 
What can commodity-dependent developing states do to maximise development 
impacts from mining investment, whilst minimising social and environmental ills? It 
is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide a comprehensive list of policy 
prescriptions to address all the issues I raise regarding regulation of the mining sector. 
Below I consider a selection of policy responses that countries like Zambia should 
consider. 
9.3.1 Policies to overcome regulatory constraints 
A central issue highlighted in this thesis is the need to match an expanding private 
sector with increased regulatory capacity. Government’s option of letting the ECZ be 
semi-autonomous and funded by user fees seems like a good policy to boost capacity 
at the agency, in particular when companies have not yet started paying tax. However 
policy makers need to account for the conflicts of interest this introduces, which 
undermine the legitimacy of the ECZ (and its ability to levy fines). Donors, on their 
part, need to be seeking assurances of funding for regulatory implementation in their 
private sector support programmes. 
The mutual accountability institutionalised in environmental legislation 
(whereby the ECZ can be sued for divulging the wrong information) may limit the 
sharing of information with civil society. However I found evidence that it promotes 
formalisation of regulatory processes, thereby subjecting the ECZ to a form of 
discipline.418 For this policy to work it may require that state-firm relations are more 
precisely specified, such that non-compliance with regulatory requirements becomes a 
binding constraint (rather than something that can be reversed via well-managed 
relationships with the Presidency). 
418 One ECZ respondent claims that the need for his organisation to maintain formal environmental 
management records is partly due to networks of mining company managers, indicating that the mining 
companies do exchange information regarding their experiences with regulators (ECZ official 4, 
19.11.07). The ECZ director describes how a company will ring with an EIS-related question, noting 
that “[o]bviously there is no harm in having some informal consultations” but adds that ECZ officials 
then “then put it in writing for the sake of records and also for consistency. That becomes very crucial. 
We don’t want to do some action with [some company] and then say something else to another 
company, they’ll tell us ‘why are you applying double standards?’. So we are quite wary about that.” 
(ECZ official 4, 19.11.07). 
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Promoting convergence in foreign mining companies’ standards and practices 
should be a key policy objective, as it facilitates agreement around future reform 
proposals. This could be achieved by increasing reputational competition among 
firms, for instance by government mandating and enforcing common and standardised 
environmental and social reporting requirements. More accessible information would 
enable stakeholders to make comparisons across firms’ operating standards and hold 
the worst-performers to account (thereby leading to upward pressure on ‘laggards’). 
This recommendation holds particular relevance in the presence of multinationals that 
are exposed to standards emanating from international capital markets (e.g. Equator 
Principles) which I have argued constitute significant influence on organisational 
behaviour in the host country. 
At the time of study external reporting was rising on the agenda of 
government, courtesy of the EITI. Civil society should leverage the increased public 
support for greater fiscal transparency by calling for timely reporting of business 
performance also in the fields of environmental and labour practices. At a minimum 
they should advocate for the inclusion of ‘community-investment’-type expenditures 
in EITI reporting, to promote an element of ‘social competition’ across the mines. 
Calls for more transparent reporting may, however, be met with to opposition from 
industry associations: in particular below-average firms are unlikely to support such 
reforms.419 
Greater transparency and regulatory ‘teeth’ are, in fact, mainly in the interests 
of companies that have complementary routines and aims that make them 
compliance-seeking to begin with. The Zambian case illustrates how it can be in the 
interests of leading firms to disclose intentions and activities (despite potential short-
term costs of engaging and/or refuting criticisms). This sub-set of the industry could – 
if willing to bear the costs relating to management time, increased stakeholder 
expectations etc. – join forces with regulators and voluntarily offer a higher level of 
external (financial and social) reporting. While this might polarise the sector in the 
short term (thus hampering collective action), it may promote long-term convergence 
and upgrading of standards. This can protect better-performing firms from 
reputational fallout from incidents associated with worse-performing companies, and 
help the former guard against future political mobilisation against the sector as a 
whole. 
However, firms are unlikely to entertain civil society calls for transparency 
unless non-government organisations have some backing of the government – not 
necessarily because firms have something to hide, but because explaining oneself 
takes time and resources, and therefore carries transaction costs.420 Therefore, the 
government should seek to overcome its mistrust of non-government organisations 
and support those NGOs that are most concerned with environmental and labour 
issues. This must be combined with reforms to streamline reporting requirements that 
currently – because of the institutional overlap between the MSD and the ECZ – are 
seen as onerous by mining companies. Civil society, on its part, must take a measured 
419 A strong reason for improving transparency and auditing capabilities is that the government 
currently appears to be losing a significant share of its royalties. To illustrate, a respondent working in 
exports at NFCA notes shipments of copper concentrates include unreported (and untaxed) amounts of 
several other valuable minerals (S.Banda, 8.9.07). Anecdotal evidence suggests this underreporting is 
prevalent also at the other mines. 
420 Although the aim of institutions is often seen as the reduction of transaction costs (North 1990), the 
act of abiding to institutional demands also carries transaction costs. In part because institutions are 




view and refrain from benchmarking current mining practices against the 
comprehensive cradle-to-the-grave social protection offered by state-owned ZCCM in 
the pre-privatisation era. 
9.3.2 Policies to promote private sector development 
Early research on south-south FDI commented on its potential to drive private sector 
development by introducing more ‘locally appropriate’ technology, thereby increasing 
technological spillovers (see chapter one). Yet this study found that practices of 
Chinese and Indian companies in sourcing from low-cost home-country markets 
actually limited the potential for technology transfer. Such findings call into question 
appropriate policies for promoting local private sector development. 
Changes in the composition of the mining sector undermine the potential for 
mining-generated demand to catalyse the supplier sector. The supplier market has 
become increasingly fragmented as new owners have come in and upgraded 
infrastructure and technologies, in different ways at different mines depending on who 
the new owners are. One veteran supplier reflects that “[t]he operations of the mines 
[was] almost the same, because it was the same mine. [So] they had to buy the same 
product.” (Malema, 11.10.07) However this is increasingly no longer the case, 
resulting in smaller markets for asset-specific inputs that reduce incentives for 
suppliers to make the necessary investments to reach economies of scale. It thus 
becomes a tall order for local Zambian suppliers to stay competitive, in particular in 
competition with Asian product markets. 
To promote private sector development what is needed might be not so much 
tax breaks to the multinational mining companies, but a more favourable policy 
environment (tax-wise and otherwise) for local small- and medium-sized businesses. 
Fortunately, Zambia already has institutions in place for providing cost-
effective business environments, through a model of economic development based on 
largely tax-free export processing zones (Ministry of Commerce 2009a, 2009b). In 
order to promote local economic development, policies should be put in place that 
make Zambia’s tax-free or low-tax ‘economic zones’ more inclusive for local firms. 
These zones – the path for which is being blazed by the NFCA-managed zone in 
Chambishi – could potentially offer an attractive environment also for local 
businesses and thereby promote local economic development. 
Private sector incentives should be directed towards higher value-added 
activities rather than towards external capital. Third-party contractors are involved in 
a significant share of the work conducted on mine sites, yet enforcement of 
environmental and safety standards at these firms is particularly weak. Mining 
companies currently exercise little influence over the conditions of service that 
contractors provide, except for demanding commitment to company health-and-safety 
rules (often required for insurance purposes). The broadening of existing tax-carrots 
to include local companies, coupled with stronger sticks in the form of environmental 
and labour enforcement, should be considered in order to improve standards in the 
large contractor and supplier sector. 
Finally, government and donors could leverage existing private sector 
initiatives that involve the mines, for instance the IFC-funded Copperbelt Small-Scale 
Development Programme (CSSDP, see 7.5.2). Given capacity deficits at the Ministry 
of Labour, one way of formalising the activity (and payment practices) of the supplier 
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Andries Scott, Technical Manager (1 int.) FQML Bwana Mkubwa Copperbelt 
Robert Chenier, Group Investigations Manager (1 int.) FQML Bwana Mkubwa Copperbelt 
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Yotham Phiri, Manager Environment (1 int.) KCM Copperbelt 
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James Chansa, Senior Labour Officer (1 int.) Ministry of Labour Copperbelt 
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Henny Gerner, First Secretary, PSD (1 int.) Netherl. Embassy Lusaka 
Lena Hasle, First Secretary, Political Governance (1 int.) Norw. Embassy Lusaka 
Olav Lundstol, First Secretary, Country Economist (2 int.) Norw. Embassy Lusaka 
Henrik Riby, First Secretary, Energy & PSD (1 int.) Swedish Embassy Lusaka 
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Michael Soko, Governance specialist (1 int.) UNDP Lusaka 
Tom Fox, Broker (Global Sustainable Bus. Initiative) (1. int) UNDP Lusaka 
Charles Husband, Lead Mining Specialist (1 int.) World Bank Lusaka 
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Francis Chigunta, Professor (1 int.) Univ. of Zambia Lusaka 
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Peter Sinkamba, Executive Director (2 int.) CBE Copperbelt 
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Private sector (incl. suppliers) 
Manyanyato Kamoto, entrepreneur (1 int.) Small-scale supplier Copperbelt 
Julia Chaila, Legal Councel / Company Secretary (1 int.) CEC Copperbelt 
Roland Lwiindi, Operations Manager (1 int.) CEC Copperbelt 
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Other 
Ernest Mwape, Vice President (1 int.) EAZ Lusaka 
Peter Mwanza, Director (1 int.) CSSDP Copperbelt 
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Guy Scott, Vice-President (1 int.) Patriotic Front Lusaka 
Table 11. Interviewees not mentioned in empirical chapters

Name and title Organisation Location 
Mr Yang, Third Secretary (1 int.) ECC Lusaka 
Anthony Harrison, Operations Manager (1 int.) CHAMP Lusaka 
Webster Malido, Editor (1 int.) The Post Lusaka 
Birgitte Poulsen, Chief Technical Advisor (1 int.) ILO Lusaka 
Emmanuel Pamu, Acting Ass't Director (1 int.) BoZ Lusaka 
Justin Mukosa, Senior Communications Officer (1 int.) ECZ Lusaka 
Healey Mwemba, Senior Economist (1 int.) Ministry of Commerce Lusaka 
Mwiche Mudala, Senior Clerk (1 int.) Ndola City Council Copperbelt 
Hira Singh, COO (1 int.) CM Copperbelt 
Manuela Niccolai, [Social management] (1 int.) FQML Frontier Copperbelt 
David Makepeace, Director of Technical Svcs (1 int.) ICS Copper Systems Copperbelt 
William Wang, Entrepreneur (1 int.) Entrepreneur Lusaka 
Neo Simutanyi, Political & Dev’t Consultant (1 int.) Pangolin Consulting Lusaka 
Francis Kasongo, Environmental Officer (1 int.) CEC Copperbelt 
Butch Shone, Director (1 int.) Kasempo Transport Copperbelt 
Larry Phiri, Managing Partner (1 int.) KPMG Copperbelt 
Cao Peng, Manager (1 int.) Chinese private company Copperbelt 
Ian Mkandawire, Deputy Secretary General (1 int.) ZCTU Copperbelt 
~ 241 ~

